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SUMMARY 
In the sphere of labour and employment, "prerogative" is usually taken to refer to the 
"right to manage" an organisation. The right can be divided into those decisions which 
relate to the utilisation of the human resources of the organisation and decisions of an 
"economic" or "business" nature. This thesis focuses on the first category of decision-
making. 
It is generally accepted by employers and trade unions that employers have the right to 
manage employees. The legal basis for this right is to be found in the contract of employ-
ment which has as one of its elements the subordination of the employee to the authority 
of the employer. This element affords the employer the legal right to give instructions and 
creates the legal duty for the employee to obey these instructions. 
Employers' right to manage is, however, neither fixed nor static. The main purpose of 
this thesis is to determine the extent of employers' right to manage employees. This is 
done by examining the restrictions imposed by the law {ie common law and legislation) 
and collective bargaining. The examination is accordingly focussed on what is Jett of 
employer prerogative. 
A number of conclusions are drawn from the examination. One of the most important 
conclusions reached is that, although most of an employer's common law decision-
making powers have been statutorily regulated, none have been rescinded. The 
employer has accordingly retained its decision-making power, albeit in a more restricted 
or limited form. This makes further restriction of its decision-making power through con-
tractual or statutory provisions or collective bargaining possible. It, however, also makes 
the lessening or even the total removal of these restrictions through future statutory 
provisions or collective bargaining possible. 
Key Terms: 
Decision-making power; Duty to obey instructions; Employer prerogative; Managerial 
prerogative; Prerogative; Right to give instructions; Right to manage; Subordination 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ORIGIN, NATURE AND EXTENT OF EMPLOYER PREROGATIVE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The terms "employer prerogative" and "managerial prerogative" are freely used by 
employers and trade unions.1 The management of an enterprise may, for instance, 
refuse to bargain about a particular matter with a trade union on the ground that it forms 
part of "management's prerogative". A trade union may demand that management 
bargains with it over a particular matter as, according to the union, it does not form part 
of "management's prerogative". 
These terms are also used by writers on industrial relations2 and labour law,3 arbitrators 
in labour law disputes, 4 judges of the supreme court5 and the labour appeal court6 as 
1 See par 1.5 below where the reasons why the two terms are used as synonyms are discussed. 
2see, for example, Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 12; Mark Anstey Corpo-
ratism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Analysis of Change in the South 
African Labour System Phd thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 381; Mark Anstey (ed) Worker Partici-
pation: South African Options and Experiences: Proceedings of the 1989 Conference on Worker Participa-
tion (1990) 101; Michael Salamon Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1992) 31; Martin M Per-
line and David J Poynter "Union and Management Perceptions of Managerial Prerogatives: Some Insight 
into the Future of Co-operative Bargaining in the USA" (1990) 28 British Journal of Industrial Relations 179; 
Robin Smith "The Maximisation of Control in Industrial Relations Systems" in John Purcell and Robin Smith 
(eds) The Control of Work (1979) 5 and 6; John Purcell "A Strategy for Management Control in Industrial 
Relations" in John Purcell and Robin Smith (eds) The Control of Work (1979) at 27; Richard Hyman Indus-
trial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (1975) 152; Neil W Chamberlain "The Union Challenge to Manage-
ment Control" (1962-63) 16 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 184 at 185 and Neil W Chamberlain and 
James W Kuhn Collective Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 112. 
3See, for instance, Maas van den Berg "The Rights of the Employer" (2 December 1983) Financial Mail 52; 
Paul Pretorius "Status Quo Relief and the Industrial Court: The Sacred Cow Tethered" (1983) 4 IW 167 at 
168 and 173-174; Barney Jordaan "Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 
1; Darcy du Toit "Democratising the Employment Relationship" (1993) 3 Stell LR 325 at 326; Alan Rycroft 
and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 179; MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH 
Cheadle and MP OIMer The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law (1987) 310; D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour 
Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 8; PhUip Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (1980) 178 and 182; MR 
Feedland The Contract of Employment (1976) 46-47 and 50 and Harold B Bergen •Management Preroga-
tives· (1940) 18 Havard Business Review 275. 
4see University of the Western Gape and University of the Western Cape United Workers Union (1992) 13 
IW 699 (ARB) at 701 B-C and 7050-E as well as Checkers SA Ud (South· Hills Warehouse) and SA Com-
mercial Catering & Allied Workers (1990) 11 IW 1352 (ARB) at 1364H. 
5see. for example, Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ud v Roux NO & Another (1988) 9 /W 45 (C) at SOH. 
6see Kellogg SA (Pty) Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & Others (1994) 15 IW 83 (LAC) at 87A and 
Changula v Bell Equipment (1992) 13 /W 101 (LAC) at 111 A. 
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well as presiding officers of the industrial court. 7 
The terms are generally used as though their meaning is self-evident or universally 
known and understood. The fact remains, however, that they are not defined in any 
labour legislation nor have they been afforded a specific meaning in terms of the com-
mon law.8 
1.2 WHAT IS "PREROGATIVE"? 
The term "prerogative" denotes a right or privilege which belongs to a particular institu-
tion, group, or person.9 The term is commonly used in labour law10 and constitutional 
law.11 
In constitutional law, "prerogative" means the theoretically unlimited discretionary powers 
or rights of an executive authority such as a sovereign.12 The discretion or right is only 
unlimited in theory as it is both created and limited by the common law. 13 An executive 
authority can therefore claim no prerogatives except such as the law allows or as are not 
7see, for example, George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 ILJ 571 (IC) at 582E-F; 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 /W 405 (IC) at 407F-H; 
BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (2) (1989) 10 /W 701 (IC) at 705C; Metal & Allied 
Workers Union v Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts & Rivets (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 /W 696 (IC) at 701G-H; Black 
Allied Workers Union & Others v Palm Beach Hotel (1988) 9 IW 1016 at 1022J; Fihla & Others v Pest Con-
trol Tvl (Pty) Ltd (1984) 3 IW 165 (IC) at 169G-H and National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Driefontein 
Consolidated Ltd (1984) 5/W101 (IC) at 143 D-E. 
8The term "common law· is used here as denoting the whole of the law of South Africa that does not 
originate from legislation. It refers, in other words, to the Roman-Dutch Law (see HR Hahlo and Ellison 
Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1973) 132). 
9see Joyce M Hawkins The Oxford Paperback Dictionary 3 ed (1988). 
1 Osee notes 3-7 above. 
11 See FG Fowler and HW Fowler The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English 5 ed (1969); John B 
Saunders (ed) Words and Phrases Legally Defined Vol 3:K-Q 3 ed (1989) 418; IJL Sisson QC The South 
African Judicial Dictionary: Being a Dictionary of Words and Phrases as Interpreted by the Superior Courts 
in the Union, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa (1960) 609 and FF Odendaal (ed) PC Schoonees, 
SJ du Tait and CM Booysen Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal 2 ed (1987) 856. 
12see Hercules Booysen Volkereg en sy Verhouding tot die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2 ed (1989) 372; M 
Wiechers Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg 3 ed (1981) 58-64, 244 and 342; Laurence Boulle, Bede Harris 
and Cora Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law: Basic Principles (1989) 70 as well as Sachs v 
Donges, NO 1950 (2) SA 265 (A) and the authorities referred to therein. 
13see Laurence Boulle, Bede Harris and Cora Hoexter Constitutional and Administrative Law: Basic Princi-
ples (1989) 70 and Dion A Sasson and Henning P Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (1988) 42. 
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contrary to any statute.14 Within the sphere of the prerogative, however, the executive 
authority has an absolute discretion. 
The definition which best defines an executive authority's prerogative is that of Dicey 15 
The prerogative appears to be both historically and as a matter of actual fact nothing else 
than the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left 
in the hands of the Crown [ie the executive authorlty] .... The prerogative is the name for the 
remaining portion of the Crown's [ie the executive authorlty'sJ original authority, and is 
therefore, ... the name for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands 
of the Crown, [ie the executive authority] whether such power be in fact exercised by the 
Queen [ie the executive authority] herself or by her Ministers. 
In the sphere of labour and employment, "prerogative" is usually taken to refer to the 
"right to manage" an organisation.16 It refers to the right to make decisions regarding the 
aims of the organisation and the ways in which it will achieve these aims.17 
Any organisation must have a mechanism for making such decisions. Some person or 
body of persons must decide what the aims of the organisation are and what resources 
(human and physical) are needed to achieve these aims. This person or body must also 
co-ordinate and direct these resources to achieve the aims of the organisation. This is 
the case whether the organisation has a commercial or any other purpose. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the decisions referred to above can be divided into two 
broad categories. The first relates to decisions about the human resources utilised by 
the organisation.18 Typically, but not necessarily, 19 organisations will make use of 
employees20 to achieve their aims.21 Decisions will have to be taken as to the number 
141bid. 
1 SAv Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 1 o ed (1959) 424-425. 
16see BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (2) (1989) 10 IW 705 (IC) at 705C where the 
court stated that "the right to trade includes the right to manage that business, often referred to as the 
managerial prerogative". 
17see George v Uberty Ufe Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 /W 571 (IC) at 582 where the court des-
cribes the prerogative of an employer as "the totality of the capacity of the employer". 
18see Barney Jordaan "Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1 at 2. 
19An organisation may also make use of independent contractors or labour brokers. 
20An employee is defined ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (hereafter the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995) as "(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for 
the State and who receives, or Is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other person who in 
any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer". 
21The legal nature of the employment relationship and contract of employment is discussed in par 2.3 of 
chapter2. 
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and types of employees needed, their terms and conditions of employment, the termina-
tion of their employment, where, when and how they do their work and the supervision of 
their work. 
The other category of decisions can be described as decisions of an "economic" or 
"business" nature.22 These include decisions relating to the acquisition and/or use of 
physical assets needed by the organisation and decisions regarding the aims of the 
organisation, the products it produces or the services it provides. 
The concept "managerial prerogative" is usually seen as being of special importance 
when dealing with the first category of decisions. It is linked to the ability of the employer 
to control the activities of employees in the workplace. In this thesis, the emphasis will be 
on this type of decision-making. However, the distinction is not a watertight one and 
many decisions falling within the second category will influence the other category of 
decision-making.23 The objectives of the organisation will, for example, influence deci-
sions as to the number and type of employees to be employed by the organisation as 
well as the terms and conditions of employment that they are offered. A decision to relo-
cate a factory or to make a new investment may affect the job security of employees. 24 
Where necessary, therefore, attention will also be given to this facet of decision-making. 
221n National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 /W 405 (IC) at 407F 
the court referred to this category of decisions as "economic". Barney Jordaan "Managerial Prerogative and 
Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1 refers to this category of decision-making as the "power to 
manage industrial capital". 
23see Bruno Stein "Management Rights and Productivity" (December 1977) The Arbitration Journal 270 at 
271. See also par 1. 7 below. 
24see also the facts of National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 
ILJ 405 (IC) where a decision to mechanise lead to retrenchments and Young & Another v Lifegro 
Assurance (1990) 11 /W 1127 (IC) where a merger of two businesses resulted in retrenchments. Trade 
unions are aware of this over1ap and in some countries are becoming more assertive in their demands to 
have some say in the decision-making in the business or economic sphere of enterprises where such deci-
sions impact upon their members (see Bruno Stein "Management Rights and Productivity" (December 
1977) The Arbitration Journal 270 at 271 as well as par 1.7.3 below where this matter is also discussed). 
The legislature has come to the assistance of trade unions by providing ins 189 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 that an employer contemplating the dismissal of employees for operational reasons such as the 
economic, technological or structural needs of the business, must first consult with the trade union (see 
par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 in this regard). It has also listed matters which relate to the business sphere of 
the business such as the restructuring of the workplace, partial or total closures. mergers and transfers of 
ownership, the dismissal of employees for reasons based on operational requirements, product develop-
ment plans and export promotion as matters abol4 which the employer must consult with the workplace 
forum (see s 84 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where this matter is 
discussed). 
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The reference to "economic" or "business" decisions may imply that these decisions are 
only of relevance to organisations with commercial aims. In this sense the description 
may be misleading as most organisations, 25 whatever their purpose, will have to make 
this type of decision. Similarly, organisations such as charities and government depart-
ments may have to make decisions falling within the first category mentioned above. The 
legal principles concerning managerial prerogative will normally be just as relevant to 
such organisations, although their application may differ to some extent, especially as far 
as employees of the State are concerned.26 This thesis, however, will concentrate on 
the topic of managerial prerogative in the private sector and in context of commercial 
undertakings. 27 
1.3 WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE? 
The need for some form of managerial prerogative is based on the fact that in any 
organisation or enterprise a mechanism must exist to co-ordinate the skills, effort and 
activities of its members so as to attain the goals of the organisation or enterprise.28 
Some person or body of persons within the organisation or enterprise must have the 
power to decide which methods are going to be utilised to achieve its purpose, to allo-
cate functions and duties to members of the organisation and to supervise their 
activities. Where such powers have been afforded to more than one person, this body of 
persons will usually exercise its powers within the limi~s imposed by the hierarchical 
structure of the organisation. 29 
25Angus Stewart "The Characteristics of the State as Employer: Implications for Labour Law" (1995) 14 /W 
15 at 17 points out that the rationale for decisions by the State will, however, usually be political rather than 
economic or profit induced. 
26For a discussion of the nature of the employment relationship between the State as employer and its 
employees, see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed 
(1996) 302 as well as Angus Stewart "The Characteristics of the State as Employer: Implications for Labour 
Law" (1995) 14/W15 at 16-21. 
271n this context, terms such as "business", "enterprise" or "organisation" will be used as synonyms, unless 
the context indicates otherwise. 
2Bsee Paul Davies and Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 18 who accept that 
someone must have the decision-making power in a business or enterprise. See also Allan Flanders 
Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 88; Orme W Phelps Dis-
cipline and Discharge in the Unionized Firm (1959) at 95; Neil W Chamberlain and James W Kuhn Collec-
tive Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 66 and P Drucker The New Society (1951) 27. 
29see Allan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 88 
and Peter Drucker The New Society (1951) 27. 
6 
Origin, Nature and Extent 
Davies and Freedland30 summarise the need for decision-makers in an undertaking as 
follows 
Except in a one man undertaking, economic purposes cannot be achieved without a hierarchical 
order within the economic unit. 
1.4 WHO EXERCISES MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE? 
1.4.1 Introduction 
Reference is often made to "employer prerogative" or to "managerial prerogative". This 
implies that the "right to manage" rests with the employer (who will normally be the owner 
of the business) or managers appointed by the owner who will act on the owner's behalf. 
-
This view can be seen as the generally accepted view. Jordaan states that amongst 
South African management, there is "a strong sense of managerial prerogative, that is, 
'the right to manage"'. 31 Many32 trade unions also accept this view. 33 Well-known 
labour law and industrial relations authorities also accept that the right to manage 
employees vests with employers. Brassey34 states, for example, that "[t]he law gives the 
employer the right to manage the enterprise". 35 Flanders36 expresses employers' right 
to manage employees in the following terms 
30paul Davies and Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 18. 
311n his article entitled "Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1. 
321t must be mentioned that not all trade unions share this view; particular1y those that hold a radical view 
of industrial relations (see par 1. 7.3 below where this perspective of industrial relations is discussed). 
33see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 603. This view is also generally 
accepted by trade unions in the United States. Bruno Stein •Management Rights and Productivity" (Decem-
ber 1977) The Arbitration Journal 270 at 271 describes their view in the following words, "It is noteworthy, 
however, that the union does not seek to manage. This task remains in the hands of management. The 
union may seek to restrict certain managerial actions, but it does not ... see its role as co-partner in the 
managerial function. Thus the employer's right to manage is implicitly acknowledged by the union ... ". 
34Martin Brassey in MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP OIMer The New Labour Law: Strikes, 
Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 74. See also Theodorus Poolman 
Principles of Unfair Labour Practice (1985) 101 and Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA 
Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (1990) 11 IW 1352 (ARB) at 136H-1365A. 
35Martin M Per1ine and David J Poynter "Union and Management Perceptions of Managerial Prerogatives: 
Some Insight into the Future of Co-operative Bargaining in the USA" (1990) 28 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 179 at 180 talk about "the traditional authority of the employer". See also John Storey The Chal-
lenge to Management Control (1980) 32 and Daniel Quinn Miis Labor-Management Relations 2 ed (1982) 
105-106 and 137. 
36AJlan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 135. 
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... the decisions that they [ie employees] have to obey ... are taken by management. The 
management of a business enterprise, ... represents its government; on behalf of the enter-
prise it rules the lives of all employed in it during their working hours. 
As appears from the above excerpts, the terms "employer" and "management" are used 
indiscriminately when employers' right to manage employees is discussed. This is 
understandable as employers' decision-making powers are mostly exercised by 
managers who act as the employers' agents. 37 
1.4.2 The Legal Basis for the Employer's Prerogative 
The fact that it is the owner of the business who has the right to manage may seem self 
evident in the context of our present economic system. The question may of course be 
asked why this is the case. Why should the owner of the business have the power to 
manage, as opposed for example, to a "workers' committee" or a body that represents 
the interests of the other stake holders in the business? The consideration of this ques-
tion could form the subject of a separate dissertation. Some of the facts relevant to this 
question will be referred to below.38 This dissertation will proceed from the premise that 
control does lie with the owners of the business. It will deal with the legal basis of this 
premise. 
Writers such as Poolman39 and Perline40 argue that the prerogative is derived from the 
real right of ownership in the property which comprises the enterprise. Other writers 
such as Stanley Young41 and Barney Jordaan42 criticise this argument. They point out 
that the employer's property rights do not extend to employees and that one can there-
fore not argue that these rights also afford the employer the right to manage its employ-
37see John Storey The Challenge to Management Control (1980) 32-33 and 36 as well as Allan Flanders 
Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 135. See further par 1.5 
below. 
38see par 1.5 below. 
39rheodorus Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice (1985) 91. See also John Storey The Challenge 
to Management Control (1980) 44-45. 
40Martin M Perline "Organized Labor and Management Prerogatives" (1971) xiv California Management 
Review46. 
411n his article entitJed "The Question of Managerial Prerogatives" (1962-63) 16 lndustria/ Labor Relations 
Review 240 at 242. See also Neil W Chamberlain and James W Kuhn Collective Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 
114. 
421n his article entitJed "Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1 at 2. 
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ees. Property rights give the employer the right to make decisions regarding the eco-
nomic or business component of the business;43 they do not per se afford the employer 
the right to manage its employees. 
Allan Flanders44 argues that the employer's prerogative is based on the fact that only its 
managers have the necessary skill and expertise to manage present-day undertakings 
with their large work-forces and advanced technology. It is submitted that, although this 
argument explains why the employer, or its managers, should· in practice manage the 
employees, it does not provide a legal basis for their prerogative. In addition, this view 
does not explain why the employer in a relatively small enterprise, where no or little 
expertise is required to operate machinery, has the power to manage its employees. 
Hugh Collins45 states that the sources of employers' right to manage, and the employ-
ees' obligation to follow instructions, are twofold. The right t<? manage is f~rstly based on 
the market power of the employer. Collins argues that no equality of bargaining power in 
the labour market exists between the employer and the employee as the former com-
mands capital, information, and access to legal advice. Although there is merit in this 
viewpoint and it goes a long way to explain the practical realities of the subordinate posi-
tion of an employee in an employment relationship, these social and economic realities 
do not confer upon the employer a legal right to manage its employees. 
The second ground which Collins advances for employers' prerogative is the 
bureaucratic organisation of an enterprise. 46 He states4 7 that when the employee joins 
an enterprise, he becomes part of a bureaucratic organisation in which he is subordinate 
to those above him in the system of ranks. 48 It is submitted that this ground must also 
be rejected as bureaucratic organisation does not confer a legal duty on the employee to 
43see par 1.2 above where this sphere of the business is referred to. 
44Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) at 135. See also John 
Storey The Challenge to Management Control (1980) at 45 and 48-49. 
45•Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment" (1986) 15 IW(UK) 1. 
46At 1. 
47At 1-2. 
48At 1-2, "This bureaucratic aspect of subordination arises from the organisational structure rather than 
from any initial inequality of bargaining power In the market, for it persists even when the employee, either 
individually or collectively, enjoys strong leverage•. 
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obey instructions from his superiors. It is merely a decision-making structure devised by 
the employer to exercise the maximum amount of control over its employees. 49 
It is submitted that all of these arguments touch on the economic and social realities of 
the employment relationship. The relationship is, in most instances, between a bearer of 
power and someone with little or no bargaining power. These social and economic con-
siderations do not, however, provide a legal basis for the employer's right to manage its 
employees and, conversely, for the employees to obey its instructions-. 
For it to be legally enforceable, employer prerogative must have its origin in the law.50 
Lawyers find its origin in the contract of employment which has as one of its elements 
the subordination51 of the employee to the authority of the employer.52 This element 
creates the legal right for an employer to manage the employee as well as the legal duty 
on the employee to adhere to the employer's instructions.53 _ 
But the contract of employment cannot be separated from the economic and social 
realities within which it comes into being. The contract provides the legal foundation for 
the employer's decision-making power, but this right is buttressed by the employer's 
greater economic power and social position. The employer will normally be able to 
negotiate a contract which entrenches and extends its decision-making power to all the 
activities in the workplace. 
49see par 1.6 below where the various techniques employed by employers to enforce their prerogative are 
discussed. 
50see MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals 
and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 74; Roger Blanpain "The Influence of Labour 
Law on Management Decision Making: A Comparative Legal Survey" (1974) 4 ILJ(UK) 5 at 6-7; John Storey 
The Challenge to Management Control (1980) 46 and Barney Jordaan •Managerial Prerogative and Indus-
trial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1 at 2. 
51 See par 2.3.1 of chapter 2 where subordination, as an element of the contract of employment, is dis-
cussed. 
52see JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 
Vol 1 5 ed (1992) 383-384; SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse 
Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 60-63; Ongeval/ekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap AVBOB 1976 
(4) SA 446 (A) at 456G-H and Smitv Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 60-61. 
See also Lord Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 3 ed (1986) 5 and Dr R Blanpain Handboek van het 
Belgisch Arbeidsrecht: I Collectief Arbeidsrecht 2 ed (1968) 11. 
53see pars 2.3.1 as well as 2.4.2 of chapter 2 where subordination as an element of the contract of employ-
ment and as the origin of the employer's right to give instructions, is discussed. 
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Davies and Freedland54 explain the structuring, in legal terms, of the social and eco-
nomic realities of an employment relationship as follows 
But the relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a rela-
tion between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is an 
act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the sub-
mission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal 
mind known as the "contract of employment". 
1.5 MANAGEMENT AS THE AGENT OF THE EMPLOYER· 
As was mentioned earlier,55 the terms "employer prerogative" and "management 
prerogative" are used as synonyms when employers' right to manage employees is dis-
cussed. This is because an employer's decision-making power is usually exercised by 
managers who act as its agents. 56 
In formal legal terms, the composition and structure of an organisation's management 
depends primarily on the nature of the particular undertaking. In addition, managers are 
usually not all afforded the same measure of authority. The management usually con-
sists of managers who collectively form a hierarchical structure of decision-making 
power.57 
The relationship between management and the employer or owner of the business 
usually depends on the legal form of the particular enterprise and generally on the rights 
attached to ownership by law or custom. 58 
54paul Davies and Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) at 18. 
55see par 1.4.1 above. 
56see John Storey The Challenge to Management Control (1980) 32-33 and 36 as well as Allan Flanders 
Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 135. Where the employer's 
prerogative has been delegated to a manager or managers who are not owners, a separation between 
ownership and control occurs. Nevertheless, the employer retains control and the manager or managers 
merely act as its agent or agents. See the discussion later in this paragraph on the separation between 
ownership and control. 
57 See Allan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 136 
where he states that • ... all business organisations of any scale have a hierarchical structure .. :. See also 
Hugh Collins "Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment" (1986) 15 IW(UK) 1 
where he states that •[a]n employee normally joins a bureaucratic organisation•. See further Richard 
Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace In the Twentieth Century (1979) viil 
58see Allan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 135. 
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The most important types of enterprises to be found in the private sector are one man 
businesses, partnerships, close corporations and companies. 59 
In a one man business matters such as "prerogative" and "management" do not arise 
unless the sole proprietor employs people to work for him. 60 In such circumstances he 
may delegate some of his decision-making powers to one or more of his employees who 
will then also form part of management. 
In the case of a partnership, the partners constitute the undertaking and they are there-
fore the employers. They may elect to exercise their prerogative personally,61 or they 
may appoint someone else as manager.62 When they appoint a manager, the partners 
delegate their prerogative to that person. 
A close corporation is a jurist person63 consisting of between one to t~n members64 
who must all be natural persons. 65 The members have equal rights in regard to the 
management of the business66 but they can agree that only some of them will have 
managerial powers. 67 The managerial power of members is original in nature68 and 
they can therefore delegate some or all of their powers to one or more of the close cor-
poration's employees. Management can therefore consist of members as well as 
employees. 
59see JT Pretorius, PA Delport, Michele Havenga and Maria Vermaas Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book 5 ed (1991) 3-4 and 42-43; Cilliers and Benade Maatskappyereg 4 ed 
(1982) 3 and Tom Hadden Company Law and Capitalism 2 ed (1977) 47-58 and 95-124. 
60s~ Tom Hadden Company Law and Capitalism 2 ed (1977) at 97. 
61 See JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Yeats: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 ed 
(1992) 393-395 and 400-405. It is possible for the partners to exclude some of them, by agreement, from 
the management (see JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Yeats: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 5 ed (1992) 385 and 393 in this regard). Thiswill result in only some of the owners having 
managerial powers. 
62see JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Yeats: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 ed 
(1992) 393 as well as Forcier, Ritch & Eriksson v Engar's Heirs 1973 (1) SA 719 (N) in this regard. 
63see s 2 of the aose Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (hereafter the aose Corporations Act). 
64see s 28 of the aose Corporations Act 
65There are exceptions in this regard (sees 29(2)(b) and (c) of the aose Corporations Act). 
66see s 46(b) of the Close Corporations Act There are, however, certain members who are disqualified 
from managing the business of the corporation (see s 47 of the aose Corporations Act). 
67 See s 46 of the aose Corporations Ad. 
681t is afforded to them by the Oose Corporations Act (see s 46(a)). 
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A company is also a juristic person and can only act through its organs.69 Usually, a 
company's decision-making powers are exercised by its board of directors. 70 The direc-
torate's right to manage the affairs of the company, including its decision-making power 
regarding employees, is contained in the company's articles of association71 and is 
original in nature. 72 It is therefore possible for the directorate to delegate some or all of 
its powers to someone else in the company, such as an individual director,73 a manag-
ing director,74 or even an ordinary employee. Where the directorate has delegated 
some of its powers, the management-of the company wit~ consist-of the directorate as 
well as the persons to whom it has delegated its powers. 
Employers in the public sector such as the State, also appoint managers who have to 
manage their employees. 75 As in the case of private sector enterprises, management in 
the public sector is usually comprised of managers who collectively form a hierarchical 
69see Robert R Pennington Company Law 6 eel (1990) 32; HS Cilliers and ML Benade Maatskappyereg 4 
eel (1982) 4 and 261; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Yeats: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 4 eel (1978) 528-531 and Colin Jack Cohen "The Distribution of Powers in a Company as a Mat-
ter of Law" (1973) 90 SALJ 262 at 264. 
70see JT Pretorius, PA Delport, Michele Havenga and Maria Vermaas Hahlo's South African Company Law 
Through the Cases: A Source Book 5 eel (1991) 446; RR Pennington Company Law 6 eel (1990) 531-614; 
HS Cilliers and ML Benade Maatskappyereg 4 eel (1982) 261, 264 and 298-302 and JC de Wet and AH van 
Wyk De Wet en Yeats: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4 eel (1978) 637 for a general dis-
cussion in regard to the directorate. Where a managing director is given specific managerial functions in 
the articles, he will have exdusive jurisdiction over those functions and will bind the company in regard to 
any acts by him in this regard. Under these circumstances, he is also an organ of the company and will be 
regarded as part of management. In this regard, see RR Pennington Company Law 6 eel (1990) 583 as well 
as HS Cilliers and ML Benade Maatskappyereg 4 eel (1982) at 263. 
71This is the document in which the internal affairs, such as the mutual rights, duties and capabilities of the 
directorate and the members in general meeting, as well as the manner in which and by whom the 
management of the company will be exercised, are set out. See JT Pretorius, PA Delport, Michele Havenga 
and Maria Vermaas Hahlo's South African Company Law Through the Cases: A Source Book 5 eel (1991) 
113-128; RR Pennington Company Law 6 eel (1990) 23-26 and HS Cilliers and ML Benade Maatskappyereg 
4 eel (1982) 113-117 for a general discussion on the articles of association. 
72see in this regard Louw v WP Kooperasie BPK 1991 (3) SA 583 (A) where the appellate division regarded 
the fact that the rule delegatus delegare non potest is not applicable to the directorate's powers as proof 
of this. See also HS CIUiers and ML Benade Maatskappyereg 4 eel (1982) at 299. Contra, however, LCB 
Gower, DD Prentice and BG Pettet Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law 5 eel (1992) 160. The court 
in the Louw-case was, however, not convinced that Gower was actually expressing the opinion that the 
directorate's powers are delegated powers (see at 602C-G). 
73see pars 62 of table A and 63 of table B of schedule 1 to the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter the 
Companies Act). 
74fbid. 
75see Theodorus Poelman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice (1985) 25. 
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structure of decision-making power.76 In the case of State departments, for instance, 
the State exercises its prerogative through natural persons such as the heads of these 
departments?? and their subordinate officials.78 Their managerial or administrative 
powers are set out mainly in the Public Service Act 111 of 1984 (hereafter the Public 
Service Act) 79 and the regulations issued in terms of this Act. 
The delegation by the owner of a one man business of his decision-making power to an 
employee brings about a separation of ownership and control in-the business. This also 
occurs when the partners of a partnership or the members of a close corporation 
delegate their decision-making power to manager-employees. 
In the case of companies, ownership is vested in the shareholders and control in the 
directorate.BO Where the shareholders are also the directors, as is often the case in 
small companies, ownership and control are not separated_. But where the directorate 
consists of people who are not all shareholders, a separation of ownership and control 
occurs. 
Even though there is a separation of ownership and control, the owner usually retains 
the right to withdraw the delegated decision-making power if he is dissatisfied with the 
manner in which management exercises it.81 The only possible exception would be 
where the owner has lost his right to appoint the managers. 82 This may occur in com-
panies whose shareholders have lost the right to appoint the directorate due to the fact 
76see Angus Stewart "The Characteristics of the State as Employer: Implications for Labour Law" (1995) 14 
/W 15 at 16 and JNN aoete Public Administration and Management 7 ed (1992) 205. 
77see JNN Cloete Public Administration and Management 7 ed (1992) 129 as well as 202-219. See also SR 
van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 303. 
78such as, for example, deputy directors-general (heading branches of the particular department), chief 
directors (heading divisions of the branches) and directors (heading subdivisions of the divisions). See 
JNN Cloete Public Administration and Management 7 ed (1992) 122 and JJN aoete Sentrale, Regionale 
en Plaaslike Owerheidsinstellings van Suid-Afrika 7 ed (1986) 148 and 151. 
79see also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 
303-308 for a discussion of those aspects of the Act dealing with terms and conditions of employment in 
the public sector. 
SOsee the discussion on the directorate of a company and its functions earlier in this paragraph. 
81The employer will retain control as long as it can elect the managers (see Adolph A Berle and Gardiner C 
Means The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1991) 66-67 as well as RR Pennington Company Law 
6 ed (1990) 751). 
82see Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1968) 68 and 
RR Pennington CornpanyLaw6 ed (1990) 751. 
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that ownership is so widely distributed between them that no group of shareholders is 
large enough to control the affairs of the company. Under these circumstances, the role 
of the owners is usually nothing more than that of passive investors whose only recourse 
is to sell their shares if the dividends are not satisfactory or if they are dissatisfied with the 
directorate. 
Under such circumstances, the directorate no longer merely acts as the agent of the 
shareholders but de facto controls the enterprise. 83 There is, in other words, a complete 
separation of ownership and control. Atiyah84 describes the practical consequences of 
such a separation as follows 
The role of the owner of the business has been converted into that of mere investor, and 
although at least his property remains readily marketable, his rights of control over the busi-
ness have, in practice, been almost entirely eroded. 
However, Berle and Means85 are of the opinion that even under these circumstances, 
the shareholders can regain control by campaigning amongst themselves for the 
removal of the directorate. Should they muster sufficient support, the directorate may 
decide rather to work with the shareholders. Control would then be in the hands of both 
the directorate and the shareholders. 86 
It is submitted that a complete separation of ownership and control will not necessarily 
cause the employees to be managed differently.87 The managers' interests will usually 
be similar to those of the owners. 88 Palmer89 explains that in a capitalist society 
managers have 
83see RR Pennington Company Law 6 ed (1990) 751; John Storey The Challenge to Management Control 
(1980) 32; Philip Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (1980) 43-52 and 66-67 and Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner C Means The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1968) at 68 and 78-111. 
84ps Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 729. 
85see Adolf Berle and Gardiner C Means The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1991) 82. 
86see Adolf Berle and Gardiner C Means The Modem Corporation and Private Property (1991) 83 and 111 
where they refer to this scenario as "joint control". 
87 See HA Jordaan Employment Relationship: Contract or Membership? unpublished LLD thesis, University 
of Cape Town (1991)) 123. The Marxists and neo-Marxists also argue that, although large companies are 
no longer controlled by the owner or owners, this does not result in the managers pursuing goals which are 
fundamentally different from those of the owners. (see Gill Palmer Economics and Society Series: British 
Industrial Relations (1983) 35-36). 
88see, however, JK Galbraith The New Industrial State 3 ed (1978) 52 who expresses the view that, in prac-
tice, the interests of the owners are placed secondary to those of management and that large coparations 
are operated in the Interests of rnanagemenl He nevertheless accepts that management regards corporate 
growth as the best means to reach their personal goals. It is suggested therefore, that management's Inter-
ests are, in practice, essentially the same as those of the shareholders. 
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... the same concern with labour as a cost, and the same need to maximize the effort and 
flexibility of labour, and to subordinate labour to managerial authority in order to pursue 
more dominant objectives of efficiency, low costs and reasonable returns on investment. 
Managers will also be constrained by their need for capital support from the owners 
which may be refused if it appears that their objectives are different from those of the 
owners•.90 
1.6 EMPLOYER STRATEGIES TO ENFORCE, MAINTAIN AND PROTECT ITS 
PREROGATIVE 
An employer's interest in the employment relationship is motivated primarily by its wish 
to achieve its ultimate objective. In the private sector, employers' principal aim is the 
making of profit.91 With this objective in mind, employers endeavour to exercise their 
decision-making power in respect of employees in such a way as to ensure the most 
beneficial conversion of their labour potential into actual labour. 92 Two broad categories 
of techniques to enforce their decision-making power can be distinguished, namely 
those implemented by employers as individual bodies93 and the techniques imple-
mented by employers acting collectively. 94 
1.6.1 Individual Employer Techniques 
1.6.1.1 The Enforcement of Employer Prerogative 
There are a number of techniques which an employer can employ to enforce its right to 
manage its employees. One of the principal techniques is to structure decision-making 
89Gill Palmer Economics and Society Series: British Industrial Relations (1983) 35. He further states that 
nationalisation does not necessarily result therein that the •non-propertied managers'" objectives are dif-
ferent from those of managers in private enterprises. 
90see Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 33-35. 
91 See Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 12 and Richard Hyman Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (1975) 19. There are, however, 
exceptions such as charitable organisations. The making of profit is also not the main aim of employers in 
the public sector. 
92see Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 35; Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Trans-
formation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century (1979) 12 as well as Richard Hyman Industrial Rela-
tions: A Marxist Introduction (1975) 19-20. · 
93see par 1.6.1 below. 
94see par 1.6.2 below. 
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or control in the enterprise in such a way as to ensure maximum control over the 
employees. The type of managerial control which an employer elects, depends on a 
number of factors such as the size of the enterprise, the type of industry in which the 
enterprise operates, the personality of the chief executive, the historical background and 
tradition of the enterprise, 95 the extent of trade union organisation, the impact of 
governmental policies, the technology involved96 and the speed of technological 
change.97 
According to the Marxist economist, Edwards,98 three types of managerial control can 
be distinguished, namely personal, 99 technological, 100 and bureaucratic control.101 
Personal control entails that the employer personally allocates work, issues instructions, 
checks on the methods used by the employees and monitors the standard of results. 
This type of supervision would normally be found in sm~ll business~s. 102 In large 
organisations, control is delegated to managers. and a pyramidal hierarchy of "line 
management" ensures that employees receive their instructions from the top.103 
There appears to be some difference of opinion as to the continued relevance of this 
form of control. Palmer 104 is of the view that it is no longer widely used whereas both 
95see Joan Woodward Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1980) 31-32. 
96see Joan Woodward Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1980) 50. 
97see Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 15. 
98Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 18-20. 
99Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 18-19. 
1 OORichard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 20. 
101 Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 20. 
102see Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century (1979) 18-19 as well as 23. 
103see Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century (1979) 30-34. Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 36 refers to this type of organsation as 
iine organisation·. 
104GHI Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 36. 
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Edwards105 and Woodward106 state that a fairly substantial number of present day 
employers have implemented this form of control in their businesses. 
Technological contro1107 is achieved through the programming of automated machines 
or plants which minimise the problem of converting labour potential into actual labour. 
The assembly line came to be the classic example of this form of control. Technological 
control reduces workers to mere attendants of prepaced machinery. Workers, however, 
can cause substantial losses if they refuse to work as all their labour- is linked to this one 
technical apparatus. This form of control actually emphasises workers' homogeneity and 
has promoted trade unionism.108 Today, this form of control is seldom implemented on 
its own by employers. It is usually combined with elements of another structural system 
of control namely the bureaucratic control system. 109 
According to Edwards 110 and Palmer 111 bureaucratic contro1112 is the _type of control 
most often employed by employers.113 It rests on the principle of embedding control in 
the social and organisational structure of the workplace. 114 It is built into job categories, 
105Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 34 states that this form of control is fairly widely used in the United States. 
106ouring a survey done by Woodward in 1980 in the United Kingdom It appeared that out of 100 com-
panies whose organisational structures were investigated, 35 had predominantly line organisation type 
decision-making structures (see Joan Woodward Industrial Organisation: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1980) 
17-18). 
107Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 20 and 111-129. 
108Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 128 and 130. 
109Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) at 129 and 130. 
110Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 21; 131-132 and 146. 
111 Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 37. He also refers to this form of control as "administrative 
control•. 
112see Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century (1979) 21. 
113This type of control was first discussed and analised by Max Weber in The Theory of Social and Eco-
nomic Organisation (1947). See also Craig Littler ·oeskilling and Changing Structures of Control" in 
Stephen Wood (ed) The Degradation of Work?: Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process (1982) 133-145. 
114Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 21and131. 
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work rules, 115 promotion procedures, discipline, wage scales and definitions of 
responsibilities. Bureaucratic control establishes the impersonal force of "company rules" 
or "company policy" as the basis of controt.116 
This form of control can be divided into two categories namely control over personnel 
and control over task pertormance.117 
Control over personne1118 relates to the employer's personnel policy and covers provi-
sions regarding the appointment, promotion, rewarding, and disciplining of its employ-
ees. The content of each job is formalised and made explicit. Edwards points out that 
formalising job descriptions does not remove these matters from the realm of workplace 
conflict. What it does, however, is to ensure that bargaining focuses on the application of 
the rules and procedures and not on employer prerogative as a whole.119 
Control over task performance 120 essentially entails the monitoring and evaluation of 
work. It is built on two elements. Firstly, the principle that workers should be evaluated 
on the basis of what is contained in their job descriptions and secondly, hierarchical con-
trol in that those who are formally charged with the responsibility of evaluating are them-
selves subject to bureaucratic controt.121 Weber 122 argues that this form of control 
enables management to plan work and thereafter to allocate tasks throughout the 
organisation while specifying the criteria on which any decisions should be based. 
115Rules render complex work situations predictable. Workers accordingly know what is expected of them 
and managers know what they can expect from their workers. For a discussion of the different reasons for 
the usage of rules in the control of workers, see Lee Taylor Occupational Sociology (1968) 326-328. 
116Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 145 states that "Above all else, bureaucratic control institutionalized the exercise of capitalist power, 
making power appear to emanate from the formal organization itself'. 
117see Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 37. 
11Bsee Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century (1979) 136-139. 
119See Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century (1979) 139. 
120Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 139-142. 
121 Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 131 states that "[i]n its most fundamental aspect. bureaucratic control institutionalized the exercise 
of hierarchical power within the finn". 
122Max Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (1947) 52. 
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According to Palmer 123 and Edwards 124 two managerial strategies, used by employers 
to promote bureaucratic control, can be distinguished, namely Taylorism and 
bureaucratic paternalism. 
Tay/orism 125 has as its object the deskilling of jobs. It essentially entails that several per-
sons are employed to do various small portions of a particular job with the result that 
they are largely unskilled and can easily- be replaced by. the- employer. This strategy 
enables employers to control task performance of employees. 126 According to Peter 
Drucker 127 Taylorism largely ignores the human component of labour. He states 128 that 
Scientific Management [ie Taylorism] purports to organize human work. But it assumes -
without any attempt to test or to verify the assumption - that the human being is a machine 
tool... 
Employers in both the United States 129 and the United Kingdom 130 endeavoured to 
cure this shortcoming of Taylorism by introducing a form of paternalism131 aimed at 
123Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 39-45. 
124Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 136-152. 
125For a detailed discussion on Taylorism as a strategy by management to organise labour, see Harry 
Braverman Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (1975) 85-121. 
See also Craig Littler "Deskilling and Changing Structures of Control" in S Wood (eel) The Degradation of 
Work?: Skill, Deskilling and the Labour Process (1982) 138-143 and Stephen Wood and John Kelly 
"Taylorism, Responsible Autonomy and Management Strategy" in The Degradation of Work?: Ski/I, Deskill-
ing and the Labour Process (1982) 74 at 75-76. 
126see also Alan Fox Man Mismanagement 2 eel (1985) at 72-73 and Richard Hyman Industrial Relations: 
A Marxist Introduction (1975) 20. 
127Peter F Drucker The Practice of Management (1961) 277. 
1281bid at 277. 
1291n the United States bureaucratic paternalism is inter alia found within the Ford company (see Gill Pal-
mer British Industrial Relations (1983) 44-45). 
130Bureaucratic paternalism is found in the British civil service (see Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations 
(1983) 44). It is also to be found in large German companies such as Siemens and Krupp (see Gill Palmer 
British Industrial Relations (1983) 44). 
131This form of paternalism is based, to a certain extent, upon Japanese paternalism (see Gill Palmer 
British Industrial Relations (1983) 41). The distinguishing features of Japanese paternalism are threefold 
namely lifetime commitment by employees to a particular employer, group responsibilty for tasks, and the 
existence of reward systems, salary scales, and career progression (see Gill Palmer British Industrial Rela-
tions (1983) 41-45 and Craig R Littler "A Comparative Analysis of Managerial Structures and Strategies· in F 
Howard, Gospel and Craig R Littler (eds) Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations: An Historical and 
Comparative Study (1983) 171 at 186-190). For an informative and detailed discussion of Japanese 
paternalism, see Ronald Dore British Factory Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Indus-
trial Relations (1973). 
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making employees feel part of the enterprise and encouraging them to co-operate with 
the employer.132 This was done through the introduction of employee incentive 
schemes such as the systematic dispensation of higher pay, promotion, more 
responsibility, 133 access to better or cleaner or less dangerous working conditions, bet-
ter health benefits, longer vacations and assignment to work stations with more status or 
comfort.134 
These incentives increased employees' co-operation thereby affording employers 
greater control over personnet.135 According to Edwards, 136 these incentives also 
pushed employees to pursue their self-interests as individuals and worked against trade 
unionism and the impulse to struggle collectively for those same self-interests. 
Although the view is held by some 137 that bureaucratic control is wasteful, slow and 
ineffective, others like Edwards, 138 regard it as the most effective form of control. He 
states139 
The core corporations survive and prosper on their ability to organize the routine, normal 
efforts of workers, not on their ability to elicit peak performances ... Bureaucratic control 
made workers' behaviour more predictable, and predictability brought with it greater control 
for the corporation. 
132see Peter F Drucker The Practice of Management (1961) 259 where he states, 'We [ie managers) must 
create a positive motivation ... This is one of the central, one of the most urgent tasks facing management". 
133see Peter F Drucker The Practice of Management (1961) 260 who regards greater worker participation 
in the planning of work and production (see also 283-295) as extremely important for the maximum utilisa-
tion of workers' labour potential. He regards the deskilling of jobs and the exclusion of the worker from the 
planning of work as the two main weaknesses of Taylorism. According to him, these two aspects present 
the principle obstacles in the optimum conversion of labour potential into labour (at 275-279). It appears 
that the South African legislature also shares Drucker's view. In the Labour Relations Act, 1995 it has listed 
matters such as the introduction of new technology and new work methods, changes in the organisation of 
work and job grading as matters about which employers must consult with workplace forums (see s 84 as 
well as par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where this section is discussed). 
134see Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century (1979) 142-143. 
135Edwards refers to these incentives as • ... an elaborate system of bribes .. : (see Richard Edwards Con-
tested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century (1979) at 145). 
136Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 145. 
137 See, for example, Alvin Gouldner Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954) 17 4-5. 
138Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979). 
1391bid at 146. 
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Although it is by far the most effective form of control, this system also has faults and 
weaknesses which, instead of promoting employer prerogative, could actually restrict it. 
Job security and seniority, 140 for example, often provide precisely those conditions 
which are most likely to foster demands among workers for more say in establishing 
rules by which the enterprise is run.141 This form of control also causes rigidity in that 
the company's emphasis is on long term employment and the training of its workers 
according to its job descriptions.142 
1.6.1.2 The Maintenance and Furtherance of Employer Prerogative 
Employers' decision-making power regarding their employees is neither fixed nor 
static.143 There is a constant struggle in the workplace between employers and employ-
ees. This is because the objectives of the two parties are in ~onflict. Employers strive to 
exercise maximum control over their employees to ensure that their labour potential is 
converted as effectively as possible into actual productive labour.144 Edwards 145 
explains the employer's situation as follows 
But the capacity to do work is useful to the capitalist only if the work actually gets done .. .If 
labor power remains merely a potentiality or capacity, no goods get produced and the capi-
talist has no products to sell for profit. Once the wages-for-time exchange has been made, 
the capitalist cannot rest content. He has purchased a given quantity of labor power, but he 
must now "stride ahead" and strive to extract actual labor from the labor power he now 
legally owns .. .lt is this discrepancy between what the capitalist can buy in the market and 
what he needs for production that makes It imperative for him to control the labor process 
and the workers' activities. 
140see Lee Taylor Occupational Sociology (1968) at 329 where he states that "developing norms of 
seniority has constituted one of the most powerful elements in the limitation of managerial authority and the 
protecting of rights of occupational workers". 
141 Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 153 explains this consequence of the system as follows, "Thus, in establishing those conditions 
most favorable for bureaucratic control, capitalists inadvertently have also established the conditions under 
which demands for workplace democracy flourish". 
142Rlchard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 157. 
143see Richard Hyman Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (1975) 26 where he states that "[a]n 
unceasing power struggle Is therefore a central feature of industrial relations". (author's emphasis). See 
also Barney Jordaan "Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1 at 4 and 5. 
144See par 1.6.1 in this regard. 
145Rlchard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace In the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 12. 
22 
Origin, Nature and Extent 
Employees' main aim is to earn as much as possible to support themselves and their 
families. They generally have no interest in the profit aims of the business as they have 
no direct stake therein.146 Accordingly, employees have little incentive to work as pro-
ductively as possible and they necessarily resist their employers' efforts in this regard. In 
Edwards's147 words 
The workplace becomes a battleground, as employers attempt to extract the maximum 
effort from workers and workers necessarily resist their bosses' impositions. 
In addition, employees continuously strive to improve their terms and conditions of 
employment with the result that constant pressure is exerted by employees, through 
their trade unions, on employers to bargain about workplace-related matters such as 
increases, hours of work, leave and health and safety.148 
In view of this ongoing resistance and attacks on their decision-making power, 
employers have had to develop strategies to maintain or protect their power. 
The strategy or strategies which they adopt depend on a number of factors such as the 
prevailing economic climate, government policy as reflected in legislation 149 and, of 
course, the bargaining strength of trade unions and how well they are organised. 
Where, for example, the economy is stable or in an upward phase and the trade union's 
bargaining strength is substantial, an employer may elect to bargain with the trade union 
about the latter's demands.150 Through its preparedness to bargain, the employer may 
influence the union positively and succeed in maintaining those aspects of its decision-
146some employers have endeavoured to overcome this obstacle by creating schemes in terms of which 
their employees can share in the profits (see par 5.3.2.17 of chapter 5 where productivity agreements are 
discussed). 
147Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century 
(1979) 13. 
148see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 13; Richard Edwards Contested Ter-
rain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century (1979) 14-15 and Richard Hyman 
Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (1975) 17-18 and 27. See chapter 4 where the restriction of 
employer prerogative through collective bargaining is discussed. See also chapter 5 where the scope and 
content of collective bargaining is discussed. See further chapter 6 where the economic pressure which 
trade unions and employees may exert against employers in order to force them to accede to their 
demands, is discussed. 
149see chapters 3-4 and 6-7 where the influence of legislation on employer prerogative is discussed. 
150see Howard Gospel ·Managerial Structure and Strategies: An Introduction" in Howard F Gospel and 
Craig R Littler Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations: An Historical and Comparative Study (1983) 
1 at17-18. 
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making power which it regards as important.151 Should this "co-operation" fail to provide 
a satisfactory outcome, the employer may decide to use economic pressure, such as an 
(offensive) lock-out or dismissal to protect its prerogative.152 
Apart from enforcing and maintaining its prerogative, circumstances may also arise 
where the employer actually wants to enhance or further its prerogative. Once more, the 
technique which it would use depends on a number of factors. If the trade union's 
bargaining power is substantial and the economy fairly healthy; the employer may elect 
to obtain the co-operation of the trade union through a preparedness to bargain with it. 
Or, the employer may go even further by allowing so-called participative management. 
Tannenbaum 153 explains that participative management may actually promote employer 
prerogative. He states 154 that 
... participation is often thought to imply taking power from managers and giving it to sub-
ordinates, but in fact managers need not exercise less control where there is participation. A 
reduction in managerial power may occur but It need not, and there is evidence to suggest 
that participation may be a means through which managers actually increase their own con-
trol along with that of the workers. 
Others hold the view that although participative management could actually increase 
employer prerogative, it nevertheless "humanises" it as it ensures greater accountability 
by management to the employee-directors.155 
Where an employer cannot further its prerogative through collective bargaining or partici-
pative management, it may endeavour to achieve this by unilaterally changing the terms 
and conditions of employment156 of its employees in accordance with its aims or by 
151see John Purcell and Robin Smith "Introduction" in John Purcell and Robin Smith (eds) The Control of 
Work (1979) ix at xi as well as Robin Smith "The Maximisation of Control in Industrial Relations Systems" in 
John Purcell and Robin Smith (eds) The Control of Work (1979) 1at7. 
152see chapter 7 where the exercising of economic pressure by employers in order to maintain and further 
their decision-making power is discussed. See par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where the statutory requirements 
for the fair dismissal of employees for operational reasons are discussed. 
153As Tannenbaum ·systems of Formal Participation· in Organisational Behaviour: Research and Issues 
(1974) 78. 
1541bid at 78. 
155see Robin Smith "The Maximisation of Control in Industrial Relations Systems· in John Purcell and 
Robin Smith (eds) The Control of Work (1979) 1 at 19-20. 
15&rhe employer will nevertheless have to go about this very carefully. Should It dismiss employees in 
order to force them to agree to changes in their terms and conditions of employment, their dismissal may 
be branded as automatically unfair In temJS of s 187(1)(c) of the labour Relations Act, 1995 (see par3.4.3.2 
of chapter 3 in this regard). But, if It could prove that it had to change the employees' terms and conditions 
for economic reasons and their refusal to accept the new terms and conditions made them redundant, the 
employer may be able to dismiss them fairty for operational reasons (see par 3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3 where 
this matter is discussed). 
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implementing economic pressure such as an (offensive) lock-out or even the dismissal 
of its employees.157 
1.6.2 Collective Employer Techniques 
Although employers normally act on their own 158 when endeavouring to either enforce, 
maintain or further their prerogative, circumstances may prompt employers to act collec-
tively. They may establish or join employers' organisations159 or bodies for a number of 
reasons. Where, for example, employers' organisations bargain at central and regional 
level with trade unions, the latter are largely kept out of the work-places.160 Employers 
may also endeavour to influence Government and its legislation-making functions 
through these organisations.161 
The fact that employers' organisations are made up of a number of employers, each with 
their own employment policies and interests, makes it difficult for these bodies to act as 
157see chapter 7 where the exercising of economic power by the employer against the trade union and 
employees is discussed. See also par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where the statutory requirements for a fair dis-
missal for operational reasons are examined. 
158see Paul Davies and Mark Freedland Kahn-Freud's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) at 17 where they 
point out that an individual employer is a collective entity, "The individual employer represents an 
accumulation of material and human resources, socially speaking the enterprise is itself in this sense a 
'collective power.' If a collection of workers (whether it bears the name of a trade union or some other 
name) negotiate with an employer, this is thus a negotiation between collective entities, both of which are, 
or may at least be, bearers of power". 
159tn regard to South African employers' organisations, a distinction can be made between those which 
are registered in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and those which are not so registered. The 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 has a number of provisions relating to registered employers' organisations (see 
chapter VI thereof). For more information on South African employers' organisations, see Sonia Bendix 
Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 190-193 and 237-328; MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH 
Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law (1987) 23-27, 325-326 and 349 as well as SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van 
Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 233-234. See Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 52-59 
for a historical account of the development and functions of employers' organisations in Britain and at 62-
66 for a discussion on the structure of these organisations. 
160rhe Labour Relations Act, 1995 specifically promotes collective bargaining by employers' organisations 
with trade unions at sectoral level (sees 1 ands 27(1) as well as· par 4:2.6 of chapter 4 in this regard). See 
also Howard Gospel •Managerial Structure and Strategies: An Introduction in Howard F Gospel and Craig 
R Littter (eds) Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations: An Historical and Comparative Study (1983) 
18. 
161 tn South Africa. employers often establish so-called chambers of commerce or industry for this purpose 
(see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations In South Africa 3 ed (1996) 190). See further GUI Palmer British 
Industrial Relations (1983) 62 who states that the influencing of government through employer organisa-
tions is particular1y prevalent in Germany and Sweden. 
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collective entities and to present a united front against trade unions and Government. 
There are, however, certain factors which may induce employers to act collectively. Gen-
nard162 points out that small enterprises realise that they can present a more dynamic 
and effective front against trade unions and Government if they act collectively. He also 
states that companies, which have a low level of bureaucratic management control, 163 
and those who make use of casual labour, 164 tend to act collectively. 
Palmer 165 states that in Britain the importance of employers' organisations has declined 
as a result of two employers' policies namely the strategic independence policy and the 
policy of federalism. The strategic independence policy is prevalent in large companies 
which have adopted a bureaucratic personnel policy 166 and prefer to negotiate inde-
pendently with unions through their specialist staff departments. The policy of federalism 
entails the decentralisation of control in an enterprise with the result that lower, local 
levels of management bargain with the unions. 
In South Africa, employers' organisations play a fairly important rofe in the collective 
bargaining process, particularly at sectora1167 or industry level where they counter-
balance the bargaining strength of the bigger trade unions which usually bargain at 
these levels.168 These bodies' primary function is to ensure uniformity in wages and 
other conditions of employment. 169 Bendix 170 points out that in negotiating uniform 
162J Gennard Multinationals-Industrial Relations and Trade Union Response (Occasional Paper: 
Universities of Leeds and Nottingham (1976)). 
163Employers who have bureaucratised their personnel policy (see par 1.6.1.1 above), by offering internal 
careers to their employees, are less likely to need to act collectively with other employers as they do not 
share a labour market with them. See Gill Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 69. 
164Casual labour tends to move constantly between employers and the use of standard, industry-wide 
rates of pay does away with the need to negotiate terms with the union every time such labourers are 
employed (see par 5.3.2.28 of chapter 5 where the terms and conditions of casual workers which have 
been determined through collective bargaining, are discussed). It also prevents the poaching of labourers 
by employers which can offer higher rates and enables employers to predict labour costs. 
165Gm Palmer British Industrial Relations (1983) 60-62. 
166see par 1.6.1.1 above in this regard. 
167The Labour Relations Act, 1995 subscribes to collective bargaining at sectoral level (see ss 1 and 27(1) 
as well as par 4.2.6 of chapter 4 in this regard). 
168Examples of such collective employer bodies are the Chamber of Mines and the Steel and Engineering 
Industries Federation of South Africa. 
169see par 4.2.6 of chapter 4 where this matter is discussed more fully. 
170sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 192-193. 
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wage structures at sectoral level, employers' organisations try to prevent unions from 
using an agreement about wages with one employer as a starting point for its negotia-
tions with the next employer.171 
In industrial disputes, employers' organisations may implement the same sanctions as 
those implemented by individual employers to maintain or further their prerogative such 
as lock-outs, unilateral amendment of terms and conditions of employment, threats of 
closure, suspensions and dismissals.172 These· organisations may co-ordinate 
employers' usage of such sanctions and provide moral or financial support on a formal 
or an ad hoc basis for members engaged in industrial action. 
1. 7 THE EXTENT OF EMPLOYER PREROGATIVE 
As was indicated above, 173 most employers, trade unions! 17 4 industri~I relations and 
labour law writers accept that employers have the right to manage their employees. 
However, it is one thing to accept that employers have this "right to manage". It is 
another to determine the extent of this right. This is the purpose of this thesis. In the 
remaining paragraphs of this chapter as well as the chapters that follow, the extent of 
and limitations on employer prerogative will be discussed and analysed. 
In this paragraph, the views of the various role players on the extent of employers' 
prerogative are examined. 
1. 7 .1 An Industrial Relations Perspective on The Extent of Employer Prerogative 
It appears that most 175 industrial relations writers 176 hold a pluralist view 177 of indus-
trial relations. They regard the undertaking as a coalition of diverse interest groups such 
171 Bargaining at sectoral level by the bigger trade unions is also beneficial for employees as it ensures the 
best minimum wages in the industry and protects workers who belong to smaller unions and those who are 
not unionised against exploitation. See par 4.2.6 of chapter 4 where this matter is discussed more fully. 
172see par 1.6.1 above as well as chapter 7 below. 
173see par 1.4.1 above. 
174There are, however, certain trade unions which hold the view that employees should have a say in 
respect of all aspects of the business, including its economic sector (see pars 1.2 and 1.4.1 above as well 
as par 1. 7.3 below in this regard). 
175However, there are those who hold the so-called radical or marxist view of society and, by implication, 
of industrial relations. For a discussion of this view and its proponents, see Alan Fox Beyond Contract: 
Work, Power and Trust Relations (1974) 274-296. 
176see, for instance, Alan Fox ·industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations: An Assessment of the Con-
tribution which Industrial Sociology can make towards Understanding and Resolving some of the Problems 
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as the employees and their trade unions, shareholders and consumers, presided over 
by a top management which serves the long-term needs of the organisation by paying 
due concern to all these different interests. 
Most of these industrial relations writers distinguish between the two components of an 
enterprise namely its business or economic component and its labour or human 
resources component. 178 They accept that the employer has exclusive decision-making 
power in regard to the economic or business component of the business. It therefore 
has the right to make decisions about economic matters such as profit reinvestment, the 
goodwill of the business, and managers' salaries.179 These writers also accept that the 
employer's prerogative regarding the employees must be restricted. In their view, the 
employer should be obliged to negotiate or bargain with the trade union about matters 
which fall within the so-called job territory or immediate work environment of employ-
ees. 180 
The pluralist view that an employer's prerogative regarding its employees can be limited 
through collective bargaining is apparent from Mars and Evans•s181 definition of 
employer prerogative. According to them, employer prerogative entails 
the rights or functions which managements assert to be exclusively theirs and hence not 
subject to collective bargaining with trade unions, nor to joint regulation with unions or 
employees. 
now being considered by the Royal Commission" in Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations: Research Papers 3: Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations (1966) 1 as well as David 
Farnham and John Pimlott Understanding Industrial Relations (1979) 58 and 65-66. 
1771n regard to pluralism, see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed 
(1992) 119-125; Michael Salamon Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1992) at 33-36; HA Clegg 
·p1urallsm in Industrial Relations• (1975) 13 British Journal of Industrial Relations 309-316. See also Richard 
Hyman ·Pluralism, Procedural Consensus and Collective Bargaining• (1978) 16 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 16-40. Hyman points out that there are significant variations in the form and derivation of indus-
trial relations pluralists' pluralism. 
178see par 1.2 above where this distinction is also made. 
179see Martin M Pertlne and David J Poynter ·union and Management Perceptions of Managerial Preroga-
tives: Some Insight into the Future of Co-operative Bargaining in the USA· (1990) 28 British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 179 at 182 and 186. 
1801bld. 
181 Al Mars and EO Evans The Dictionary of Industrial Relations (1973). See also Allen Rycroft and Barney 
Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 123 where they state that "[f]or the pluralist, col-
lective bargaining is 'the right way' of dealing with industrial conflict". See further Jay M Shafritz The Facts 
on File: Dictionary of Personnel Management and Labor Relations 2 ed (1985) 252; Robin Smith "The Maxi-
misation of Control in Industrial Relations Systems• in John Purcell and Robin Smith (eds) The Control of 
Work (1979) 6 and Roux van der Merwe ·Focus on Employers' Rights" (6 January 1984) Financial Mail 34. 
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Although the majority of industrial relations writers mention only collective bargaining as 
a factor which must limit or restrict the employer's prerogative, there are some writers 
who also regard the law as such a factor. Storey, 182 for instance, defines employer 
prerogative as 
... the residue of discretionary powers of decision left to management when the regulative 
impacts of law and collective agreements have been subtracted. 
Flanders 183 identifies not only collective bargaining and the law as factors which restrict 
the employer's prerogative, but also control by the market and accountability. Market 
control relates to the availability of work which, in turn, depends mainly on the economy. 
Employer prerogative is at its strongest when the economy is at its weakest, as a weak 
economy results in jobs scarcity and a large potential work-force for employers to 
choose from. Flanders 184 argues that employers should be accountable for their 
actions to employees. Worker participation 185 in management decision-making has 
been suggested186 as a way in which this can be achieved, but Flanders 187 expresses 
some reservations about its effectiveness. 188 
182John Storey The Challenge to Management Contml (1980) 41. 
183Anan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 136-
139. 
184Anan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 138-
139. 
185see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 
where he distinguishes between direct employee participation (at 474-486) and indirect participation (at 
486-498). For an in depth discussion of the diverse streams in employee participation, see Mark Anstey's 
thesis 471-527. 
186see the suggestions made by George Goyder The Responsible Company (1961) 81. 
187 Allan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 139. 
See also the reservations expressed by, for example, Roy Lewis and John Oark "Reports of Committees" 
(1977) 40 Modem Law Review 323-338 in regard to the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial 
Democracy CMND 6706 (1977), (the so-called Bullock Report) which propagated some fonn of worker par-
ticipation in the United Kingdom. 
188However, in Gennany, the Netherlands as well as in Sweden, some fonn of worker participation is to be 
found. See in this regard Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A 
Comparative Analysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port 
Elizabeth (1997) 474, 487-498; Catherine O'Regan "PossibHities for Worker Participation in Corporate 
Decision-making• in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB HutchJson, I Leeman. CM Murray and D van Zyl Smit (eds) 
Labour Law (1991) 125-126 and J Schregle "Workers' Participation in the Federal Republic of Germany in 
an International Perspective" (1987) 126 lntemational Labour Review 317-327. 
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1. 7 .2 Employers' Perspective on the Extent of their Prerogative 
Most employers, when first confronted with trade unions and their demands, were of the 
view that their prerogative should not be restricted in any way.189 In justifying their view, 
employers often adopted a unitary 190 perspective of industrial relations. They argued 
that every enterprise was an integrated and harmonious entity which existed for a com-
mon purpose. The proponents of this view assumed that every employee identified with 
the aims of the business. According to this view, there could be no conflict between the 
interests of the employer and the employees. The employer and employees were com-
plementary partners committed to the common aims of production, profits and pay in 
which everyone in the organisation had a stake. Managers and employees alike were 
merely parts of the same team. 
Today, a unitary perspective of industrial relations may stilLbe found in relatively small 
businesses with strong-willed or charismatic persons in the top management positions, 
in old family businesses and in businesses in relatively isolated areas where alternative 
jobs are few and trade unions not well organised.191 
189see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996)603. This was also the original view of 
most employers in the United States during the first quarter of this century (see Martin M Perline and David 
J Poynter ·union and Management Perceptions of Managerial Prerogatives: Some Insight into the Future of 
Co-operative Bargaining in the USA" (1990) 28 British Journal of Industrial Relations 179 at 180-181; Neil W 
Chamberlain -rhe Union Challenge to Management Control• (1962-63) 16 Industrial and Labour Relations 
Review 184 at 185-186 and Neil W Chamberlain and James W Kuhn Collective Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 8-
16). The United States' National Metal Trade Association's declaration of principles (see Reinhard Bendix 
Work and Authorit:y in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization (1956) 269 as 
well as Neil W Chamberlain and James W Kuhn Collective Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 109-11 O) at the end of 
the First World War included the following passage, "Since we, as employers, are responsible for the work 
turned out by our workmen, we must have full discretion to designate the men we consider competent to 
perform the work and to determine the conditions under which that work shall be prosecuted, the question 
of the competency of the men being determined solely by us. While disavowing any intention to interfere 
with the proper functions of labor organizations, we will not admit any interference with the management of 
our business•. 
1901n regard to the unitary perspective of industrial relations, see Allen Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 118-119 and Mark Anstey Managerial Strategy in Industrial 
Relations: A Theoretical Review and SuNey of Trends in the Port Elizabeth Uitenhage Area (1989) 14-17. 
See also Michael Salamon Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1992) 31-33; David Farnham and 
John Plmlott Understanding Industrial Relations (1979) 51-55; Alan Fox Man Mismanagement 2 ed (1985) 
at 31 and 146-148; Alan Aldrige Power, Authority and Restrictive Practices: A Sociological Essay on Indus-
trial Relations (1976) 109-110 and Alan Fox Beyond Contract Work, Power and Trust Relations (1974) 249-
250. 
191 See Mark Anstey Managerial Strategy In Industrial Relations: A theoretical Review and SuNey of 
Trends in the Port Elizabeth Ultenhage Area (1989) at 15. See also Alan Fox Beyond Contract : Work, 
Power and Trust Relations (197 4) 250. 
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Employers, however, have come to realise that a unitarist approach may harm the busi-
ness, particularly where well organised trade unions represent their employees.192 They 
have found that such an approach may lead to friction with the trade unions and work 
force. 193 Most 194 of them have consequently adopted a pluralist view 195 in terms of 
which they have accepted that certain aspects of the business are of importance to the 
trade unions and the employees and should therefore be made subject to collective 
bargaining. Labour legislation, which affords employees the right to associate in trade 
unions 196 and promotes collective bargaining 197 has also ptayed an important role in 
the employers' adoption of a pluralist view of industrial relations.198 
In determining which matters must be made subject to collective bargaining, most 
employers clearly distinguish between the economic and labour spheres of the business. 
They are not prepared to bargain about matters related to the former sphere as they 
consider them to be within their exclusive prerogative. -Employers, -however, are 
prepared to bargain about labour related issues.199 
192see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 603. Employers in the United Statess 
have also come to this conclusion (see Martin M Perline "Organized Labor and Managerial Prerogatives" 
(1971) xiv California Management Review 46 and Philip Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice 
(1980) 181). . 
193see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 603. 
194see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 576 and Brian Smith ''Volkswagen's 
Holistic Approach to Worker Participation" in Mark Anstey (ed) Worker Participation: South African Options 
and Experiences: Proceedings of the 1989 Conference on Worker Participation (1990) 225 at 230-231. This 
is also the case in most Western societies (see Alan Fox Man Mismanagement 2 ed (1985) 26). 
195For a discussion on the pluralist view, see Mark Anstey Managerial Strategy in Industrial Relations: A 
Theoretical Review and Survey of Trends in the Port Elizabeth Uitenhage Area (1989) 17-19. See also 
Michael Salamon Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1992) 33--36; Alan Fox Man Mismanage-
ment 2 ed (1985) 26--32; Alan Aldrige Power, Authority and Restrictive Practices: A Sociological Essay on 
Industrial Relations (1976) 110; HA Oegg •pluralism in Industrial Relations• (1975) 13 British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 309-316 and David Farnham and John Plmlott Understanding Industrial Relations 
(1979) 57-58. 
196see s 4 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. See also s 5 of the Act which affords employees and applica-
nts for positions protection when exercising their right to freedom of association (see also par 4.2.2 of 
chapter 4 where these two sections are discussed in detail). 
197 See par 4.2 of chapter 4 where the statutory promotion of collective bargaining is discussed more fully. 
198see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 603. This has also been the case in 
other countries such as the United Kingdom (see Allan Flanders Management and Unions: The Theory and 
Reform of Industrial Relations (1970) 138). · 
199see Catherine O'Regan •Possibilities for Worker Participation in Corporate Decision-making• in TW 
Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D Van Zyl Smit {eds) Labour Law (1991) 113 
at 132. See also chapter 5 in which the matters about which South African employers and trade unions 
have bargained collectively, are set out 
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A number of employers are even prepared to involve their employees, as opposed to the 
trade unions, for example, directly at shop floor level in labour related matters.200 The 
word "involve" is used as opposed to the word "bargain" as worker participation often 
does not entail more than the making available of information or the providing of training 
or the creation of opportunities for employees to get to know management201 or to air 
their views or complaints about their jobs.202 Recently, however, employers have been 
prepared to consider and/or introduce forms of worker participation that are more 
extensive such as negotiation, consultation and joint decision-making and the topics for 
such participation include ones that fall within the business sphere of the enterprise.203 
One of the reasons given for this preparedness is the changes in the country's labour 
law; particularly the provisions regarding workplace forums204 in the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995. 205 
1.7.3 Trade Unions' Perspective on the Extent of Employer Prerogative 
Trade unions' views on the extent or scope of employer prerogative differ from those of 
employers as they have other interests to protect and advance. A trade union's primary 
200see, for example, worker participation at Volkswagen which is discussed by Brian Smith "Volkswagen's 
Holistic Approach to Worker Participation• in Mark Anstey (eel) Worker Participation: South African Options 
and Experiences: Proceedings of the 1989 Conference on Worker Participation (1990) 225. See also Mark 
Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Analysis of 
Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 544-546 and 
550-556. 
201 See Brian Smith "Volkswagen's Holistic Approach to Worker Participation• in Mark Anstey (ed) Worker 
Participation: South African Options and Experiences: Proceedings of the 1989 Conference on Worker 
Participation (1990) 225 at 235-238. 
202see Steve Dewar "Total Worker Involvement at Toyota• in Mark Anstey (eel) Worker Participation: South 
African Options and Experiences: Proceedings of the 1989 Conference on Worker Participation (1990) 241 
at253-255. 
203see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 544-
546, 551-554. 
204A workplace forum is defined ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as •a workplace forum estab-
lished in terms of chapter V". For a detaUed discussion of workplace forums, their statutory functions and 
impact on employer prerogative, see par 4.3 of chapter 4. 
205see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 552. 
In terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 employers are obliged to consult workplace forums about a list 
of matters (see s 84 as welt as par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where this section, and its effect on employer 
prerogative, are discussed). The Act also lists a number of matters about which employers and workplace 
forums must jointly decide (see s 86 as well as par 4.3.3.2 of chapter 4 where this section, and its effect on 
employer prerogative, are discussed). 
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function is to protect and further the interests of its members, the employees,206 
whereas an employer seeks to promote the enterprise's and owners' interests.207 
It appears that most trade unions hold a pluralist view of industrial relations and that they 
regard collective bargaining as the factor which restricts employer prerogative.208 They 
seem to accept that the business or economic sphere of the business should be left to 
management but insist that matters which concern the employment relationship such as 
wages, job security, job safety and health, scheduling of shifts, job content and the trans-
fer of workers must be subject to collective bargaining. 209 
The major difficulty which employers and trade unions experience during negotiations is 
to reach agreement on the scope or range of matters which form part of the employment 
206see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 165-166 and 171-175. In University of 
the Western Cape and University of the Western Cape United Workers Union (1992) 13 IW 699 (ARB) the 
arbitrator set out the main aim of a trade union as follows, "[t]he union on the other hand is primarily 
although not exclusively concerned with the protection and improvement of the interests of its members 
with specific regard to their working conditions". See also Alan Fox Man Mismanagement 2 ed (1985) 262; 
Neil W Chamberlain "The Union Challenge to Management Control· (1962-63) 16 Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review 184 at 186 and Martin M Perline "Organized Labor and Managerial Prerogatives" (1971) 
xiv California Management Review 46 at 47. 
207see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 5. 
208see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 576. There are, however, trade unions 
that hold other views such as, for example, the so-called radical view of industrial relations (see the discus-
sion on this view later in this paragraph). Most trade unions in the Western world also hold a pluralist view. 
This is apparent from the following excerpt from Arthur Goldberg's speech (see "Management's Reserved 
Rights: A Labor View· in Jean T McKelvey (ed) Management Rights and the Arbitration Process, Pro-
ceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators (1956) 125-126), " ... the practices 
which grow up during decades of a collective bargaining relationship cannot be swept aside ... [they] 
inevitably represent the set of circumstances which formed the backdrop of the negotiation of the current 
agreement.. .. To the extent that present conditions and methods for change are not revised, they are 
accepted. Therefore, each party has the right to assume that changes in wages, hours or working condi-
tions not provided for by contract can be made only by mutual agreement or by following practices for 
making changes which have existed during the collective bargaining relationship ... To suggest that 
management can make changes at will unless the contract specifically bars it is unfair and can lead to plac-
ing so many bars in the contract as to make successful negotiation increasingly difficult and operation less 
and less flexible, with detailed consideration of the facts and merits of each case replaced by precise rules 
and regulations•. 
2091n a survey done by Perline and Poynter in the United States, (see Martin M Perline and David J Poynter 
"Union and Management Perceptions of Managerial Prerogatives: Some Insight into the Future of Co-
operative Bargaining in the USA• (1990) 28 British Journal of Industrial Relations 179 at 185) trade unions 
indicated that they accepted that aspects such as the pricing of goods and services, promotions to super-
visory positions, the distribution of products. financial policies. customer relations, decisions regarding the 
products to be manufactured, control of plant proPertY and services to be rendered, remained the preroga-
tive of the employer. See further Martin M Pertine "Organized labor and Managerial Prerogatives" (1971) 
xiv California Management Review 46 at 49 and Alan Fox Man Misrnanagement2 eel (1985) 35 and Harold 
W Davey, Mario F Bognanno and David L Estenson Contemporary Collective Bargaining 4 ed (1982) at 
155. 
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relationship and consequently should be subject to collective bargaining. Some trade 
unions have insisted that certain aspects which are generally regarded as part of the 
business sphere of an enterprise should be subject to collective bargaining where they 
impact on employees and the employment relationship.210 
Although most trade unions hold a pluralist view of industrial relations, there are a sub-
stantial number211 which hold a so-called radical view. 212 From a radical perspective, 
pluralist values are seen as reflecting merely a more sophisticated mode of maintaining 
an unacceptable system which witnesses wealth and ownership increasingly con-
centrated in the hands of employers at the expense of the employees who do not receive 
wages commensurate with the wealth they produce.213 Unions which subscribe to the 
radical view, demand to bargain in respect of both spheres of an enterprise.214 They 
argue that the imbalance in power will not be restored as long as they are prevented 
from bargaining collectively over issues which belong to _the economic or business 
sphere of the business. 
210For a discussion of some of the business aspects which trade unions have demanded should be sub-
ject to collective bargaining, see Ebrahim Patel "The Role of Organised Labour in a Democratic South 
Africa" in Ebrahim Patel (ed) Worker Rights: From Aj,artheid to Democracy - What Role for Organised 
Labour? 1 (1994) at 8 where Patel suggests that new technology and work organisation should be matters 
of compulsory negotiation. 
211 See Charles Nupen "Collective Bargaining Realities in South Africa: Problems and Potentials" in Mark 
Anstey (ed) Worker Participation: South African Options and Experiences: Proceedings of the 1989 Con-
ference on Worker Participation (1990) 35 at 37. 
212For a discussion of this view, see Mark Anstey Managerial Strategy in Industrial Relations: A Theoreti-
cal Review and Survey of Trends in the Port Elizabeth Uitenhage Area (1989) 20-21. See also Michael 
Salamon Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice 2 ed (1992) 36-39; Alan Fox Man Mismanagement 2 ed 
(1985) 32-36 and 149-150 and David Farnham and John Pimlot Understanding Industrial Relations (1979) 
62-64. 
213see Mark Anstey Managerial Strategy in Industrial Relations: A theoretical Review and Survey of 
Trends in the Port Elizabeth Uitenhage Area (1989) at 20. 
214David Farnham and John Pimlot Understanding Industrial Relations (1979) 63 state that "[t]hey [ie the 
radical trade unions] are challenging all the prerogatives which go with the ownership of the means of pro-
duction, not simply the exercise of control over labour power in industry". 8ements of the so-called radical 
view can be found in the comments made by the chairperson of the Western Cape United Workers Union 
whHst testifying during the arbitration proceedings of University of the Western Cape and University of the 
Western Cape United Workers Union (1992) 13 IW 699 (ARB) at 703G-J. 
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1. 7 .4 A Labour Law Perspective on the Extent of Employer Prerogative 
Most labour law writers and lawyers make the distinction between the economic and 
labour components of an enterprise.215 
In regard to the economic sphere, the majority are of the view that management has a 
decisive say over the conduct of the enterprise and over all business and commercial 
decisions.216 Jordaan, however, argues that employees have-"a-very-real stake" in the 
enterprise and that they should be allowed a say therein through some or other form of 
worker participation or co-determination, particularly where business decisions could 
affect their security of tenure.217 He states218 
but even if one accepts that there must be some decisions which fall exclusively within 
management's discretion, ... there is no reason, either in logic or in law, why the employees 
should not at least be 'consulted' about decisions which concern the economic position or 
future direction of the undertaking and, ultimately, their security oftenure ... .ln any event, the 
dividing line between the interests of the employer and those of the employee is notoriously 
difficult to draw. Every decision by management is potentially of consequence to the 
employee. The mere fact that the decision concerns the future direction of the undertaking 
does not make the employee's interest in the decision any less real or acute - quite the con-
trary, in fact. 
The presiding officers of the industrial court acting in terms of the Labour Relations Act 
28 of 1956 (hereafter the Labour Relations Act, 1956) held different views about the 
question whether or not employees should have a say in business decisions which could 
impact on their employment security such as decisions to temporarily219 or permanently 
close a business or a division220 thereof, to merge,221 or to mechanise.222 
215see Cameron's comments in Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & 
Allied Workers Union (1990) 11 ILJ 1352 (ARB) at 1365. See also Barney Jordaan "Managerial Prerogative 
and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) IRJSA 1 at 3. 
216see, for instance, Cameron in Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering 
& Allied Workers Union (1990) 11 /W 1352 (ARB) at 1365D-E. 
217Barney Jordaan ·Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11(3) IRJSA 1at3. See also 
B Jordaan "Transfer, aosure and Insolvency of Undertakings" (1991) 12 /W 935 at 958. 
218tn an article entitled "Transfer, Closure and Insolvency of Undertakings" (1991) 12 /W 935 at 958. 
219see the facts of Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA v SSH Cotton Mills (Pty) Ltd 
(1988) 9/W 1026 (IC) at 1031. 
220see, for example, Transport & General Workers Union & .Others v Putco (1987) 8 /W 801 (IC) at 806-
807. 
221 See the facts of Young & Another v Ufegro Assurance (1990) 11 IW 1127 (IC). 
222see, for instance, the facts of National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd 
(1992) 13 /W 405 (IC). 
35 
Origin, Nature and Extent 
In view of the appellate division's decision in Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA223 and ss a4224 and 1 a9225 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995, it could be argued that the labour court will require employers to at least consult 
with workplace forums or trade unions before implementing business decisions which 
may impact upon employees' employment security. Consultation, however, does not 
mean that the assent or co-operation of the workplace forum or trade union must be 
obtained before the employer can implement its decision. It only means that they must 
be afforded an opportunity to state their views and to make suggestions and recom-
mendations. 226 Strictly speaking therefore the employer's prerogative is limited only to a 
certain extent in that it retains the last say over these business issues.227 
The courts and arbitrators, acting in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 were of the 
view that business decisions which did not impact on employees' security of tenure, or in 
respect of which a linkage with job security was fairly difficult to determine, remained the 
prerogative of the employer. It has, for example, been held that investment decisions228 
remained the prerogative of the employer. 
But, in terms of s 84 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, employers will be expected to 
consult with workplace forums about certain matters which do not impact directly on 
223(1994) 15 /W 1247 (A). 
224see par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where the impact of this section on employer prerogative is discussed. 
225see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where this section and Its impact on employers' decision-making power, 
is discussed. 
226sectlon 85 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 requires that the employer must consult in good faith with 
the workplace forum. It must afford the workplace forum an opportunity to make representations; It must 
consider and respond to these representations and, if It does not agree with them, It must state the reasons 
for disagreeing. In addition, s 89 requires that the employer must disclose all relevant information to ensure 
effective consultation. See par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where these sections and their impact on the employer's 
decision-making power are discussed. Section 189(5) and (6) of the Act contain similar requirements where 
the employer must consult with the trade union about possible dismissals for operational reasons. These 
requirements are similar to those contained in s 85. The section (see subsecs (3) and (4) read with s 16) 
also contains requirements regarding the disclosure of information to the trade union during consultation. 
See par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 where these sections and their impact on employer prerogative is dis-
cussed. 
227For a detaDed discussion of the matters about which the employer must consult with workplace forums, 
see par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 and, for a detaUed discussion of the nature and extent of operational require-
ments as reason for dismissal, see par 3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3. 
228see University of the Western Cape and University of the Western Cape United Workers Union (1992) 
13 /W 699 (ARB). 
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employees' job security. The section requires, for instance, that the employer must con-
sult about product development plans and export promotion.229 
As far as the human resources component of the business is concerned, most labour 
law writers and lawyers seem to accept that employers' decision-making power is 
restricted. This is apparent from Brassey's description of employer prerogative. He 
states that230 
[t]he law gives the employer the right to manage the enterprise. He can tell the employees 
what they must and must not do, and he can say what will happen to them if they disobey. 
He must, of course, keep within the contract, the collective agreement and the legal rules 
that govern him ... But, even given these constraints, he still has a wide managerial discretion. 
He can decide which production line the employees should work on; whether they should 
take their tea break at ten or ten fifteen; when they may go on leave; and countless other 
matters besides. He can also decide what will happen to the employees if they do not work 
properly, if they go to tea early and so on. In short, it is he who, within the limits referred to, 
lays down the norms and standards of the enterprise. This - at least as far as the law is con-
cerned - is what 'managerial prerogative' entails, no more and no less. -
Brassey accepts that employer prerogative is not unlimited and considers it to be subject 
to legal constraints such as the contract of employment, collective bargaining, legislation 
and the unfair labour practice concept.231 
Poolman232 accepts that the employer's right to manage its employees is restricted by 
the common law, labour legislation233 and collective bargaining. 
Cameron234 identifies three limitations on employer prerogative namely collective 
229see par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where this is discussed in greater detail. 
2301n MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP OIMer The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals 
and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 74. 
231 Brassey expressed his views when the Labour Relations Act, 1956 was still in operation. In terms of 
Schedule 7: Transitional Arrangements (hereafter Schedule 7) annexed to the Labour Relations Act, 1995, 
the labour court or a commissioner of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (hereafter 
the Commission) may be required to determine an alleged unfair labour practice as defined in Schedule 7. 
232rheodorus Poolman Principles of Unfair Labour Practice (1985) 101. 
233see also Paul Pretorius "Status Quo Relief and the Industrial Court: The Sacred Cow Tethered" (1983) 4 
/W 167 at 183-184. 
234see his comments in Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied 
Workers Union (1990) 11IW1352 (ARB). 
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bargaining,235 the unfair labour practice concept236 and the rules of the contract of 
employment. 237 
Jordaan238 also identifies the contract of employment,239 statute,240 collective 
bargaining241 and the unfair labour practice concept242 as factors which restrict or limit 
employer prerogative. In addition to these factors, he identifies considerations of public 
policy243 and economic factors244 as factors which may limit employer prerogative. 
235Checkers SA L.td (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (1990) 
11 ILJ 1352 (ARB) at 1365E-F. See also SA Chemical Workers Workers Union & Others v Cape Lime Ltd 
(1988) 9 ILJ 441 (IC) at 445F-G and 446B and Metal & Allied Workers Union v Transvaal Pressed Nuts, 
Bolts & Rivets (Pty) Ltd supra note 5 at 7011-J. -
236Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (1990) 
11 IW 1352 (ARB) at 1365F-G. See also Ntuli & Others v Litemaster Products Ltd (1985) 6 IW 508 (IC) at 
518E-G and Building Construction & Allied Workers Union & Another v E Rogers & C Buchel CC & Another 
(1987) 8 ILJ 169 (IC) at 1721-173C. . 
237 Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (1990) 
11 ILJ 1352 (ARB) at 1365H-J. 
238Barney Jordaan "Managerial Prerogative and Industrial Democracy" (1991) 11 (3) 1. 
239He points out (at 4) that the employee is not obliged to obey orders falling outside the scope and 
agreed duties contained in the contract of employment. Furthermore, the employer cannot change the 
terms and conditions of a contract unilaterally. In terms of s 187(1 )(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, the 
dismissal of an employee in order to force him to agree to such a unilateral change, will constitute an auto-
matically unfair dismissal (see par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3 where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed). 
It is, however, possible for an employer to dismiss an employee fairly where he refuses to accept such 
changes and the employer can prove that the changes are necessary for economic reasons and the 
employee's refusal to agree to these changes has made him redundant (see par 3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3 in 
this regard). 
240At 5 and 6. 
241At 3 and 5. 
242At 3 and 7. He points out that the industrial court has been prepared to interfere in dismissal for mis-
conduct and incapacity (see, for example, Taylor v Edgars Retail Trading (1992) 13 IW 1239 (IC) at 1243E-
F). It has, however, not interfered to the same extent in dismissal for the operational requirements of the 
business. In the latter instance, Its interference has largely been restricted to the procedural aspects. Jor-
daan's comments were made when the Labour Relations Act, 1956 was stHI in operation. The legislature 
has restricted the employer's right to dismiss in chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. The 
statutory provisions are mostly based on the guidelines developed by the industrial court in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1956. For a detailed discussion on the statutory provisions regarding dismissal and 
how these provisions impact on the employer's right to dismiss, see pars 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 of chapter 3. 
243At 7. 
244At6. 
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1.8 CONCLUSION 
The majority of industrial relations writers, 245 employers246 and trade unions24 7 regard 
collective bargaining as the most important factor which restricts employers' prerogative 
although there are exceptions like Allan Flanders248 who also regard the law as an 
important restricting factor. The labour law exponents,249 however, consider both col-
lective bargaining and the law as important restricting factors of employers' prerogative. 
Collective bargaining undoubtedly plays an extremely important role in the restriction of 
employers' prerogative, particularly where trade unions and employers hold a pluralist 
view of industrial relations. But inextricably linked to collective bargaining and its effec-
tiveness in the restriction of employers' prerogative, is economic power.250 The 
stronger the economy, the stronger trade unions' bargaining power, the greater the 
impact on employer prerogative. 
The law also plays an extremely important role. Although the legal basis for employer 
prerogative is the contract of employment,251 the contract itself may also restrict 
prerogative. 252 This will occur where the parties agree to terms which effectively restrict 
the employer's prerogative. In addition, the common law also restricts the employer's 
prerogative in a number of ways. The employer may not, for example, unilaterally alter 
the terms and conditions of employment stipulated in the contract of employment. 253 
Certain statutes also restrict employers' prerogative regarding their employees. 254 The 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983 (hereafter the Basic Conditions of 
245see par 1.7.1 above. 
246see par 1. 7 .2 above. 
247see par 1.7.3 above. 
248see par 1.7.1 above. 
249see par 1.7.4 above. 
250see the comments made by both Alan Flanders (in par 1.7.1 above) and Barney Jordaan (in par 1.7.4 
above) in this regard. 
251 See par 1.4.2 above as well as chapter 2 in this regard. 
252see chapter 2 where this matter is discussed in greater detail. 
2531bid. 
254see chapter 3 where the role of labour legislation in the individual employment relationship is dis-
cussed. 
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Employment Act), for example, prescribes minimum terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (hereafter the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act) compels employers to provide healthy and safe work places for 
their employees. The L~bour Relations Act, 1995 requires that employees' dismissal 
must not only be lawful but also fair. Statutes like these are indicative of the legislature's 
concern for the plight of employees who are generally in a much weaker bargaining posi-
tion than their employers; they reflect the legislature's social awareness and conscience, 
which, in turn, is largely shaped by public policy.255 
There are also statutes which restrict employer prerogative in a more indirect man-
ner. 256 The Labour Relations Act, 1995, for instance, curtails employers' prerogative 
indirectly through its provisions which promote collective bargaining and employee parti-
cipation in decision-making in the workplace.257 The Act, for example, provides a right 
to freedom of association258 and protection when employees exercise this right. 259 It 
affords trade unions and employees organisational rights260 and structures for collec-
tive bargaining.261 These provisions are indicative of the fact that the legislature also 
holds a pluralist view of industrial relations. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that employers' prerogative is made up of 
those decisions which the law allows them to make about their businesses and which 
trade unions are content to leave to the employers' sole discretion or have been unable 
to subject to collective bargaining. 262 
John Storey defines employers' prerogative succinctly as follows263 
255see par 3.1 of chapter 3 where this matter is discussed in greater detaU. 
256see chapter 3 where these statutes are discussed in greater detail. 
257 See chapter 4 where these matters are discussed in detail. 
258see s 4 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 4.2.2 of chapter 4. 
259see s 5 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 4.2.2 of chapter 4. 
260see ss 12-16 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 4.2.3 of chapter 4. 
261 Such as bargaining councils (see s 27(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995) and statutory boards (see s 
39 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). See par 4.2.5 of chapter 4 where these structures are discussed. 
262paul Prasow and Edward Peters "New Perspectives on Management's Reserved Rights· (1967) 18(1) 
Labor Law Journal 3 at 5 describe this as the theory of management's reserved rights. According to them, 
this theory holds that management's authority is supreme In all matters except those it has expressly con-
ceded in the collective agreement. or in those areas where its authority is restricted by law. 
263The Challenge to Management Control (1980) 41. 
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As a working definition we ... consider managerial prerogatives to be the residue of discre-
tionary powers of decision left to management when the regulative impacts of law and col-
lective agreements have been subtracted. 
In the chapters that follow, the role of the law and collective bargaining with regard to 
employers' prerogative is examined in greater detail. Although the main emphasis of the 
law, particularly legislation, is on the limitation of employers'. prerogative, it also protects 
and even promotes it in certain instances. This is particularly true of the common law.264 
There are, however, also a number of statutory provisions which protect employers' 
prerogative. 265 
In view of the fact that the emphasis of the law is on the restriction of employers' 
prerogative, this thesis's focus is also on its restriction. Nevertheless, the protection 
afforded by the law is highlighted and discussed where appropriate. 
Chapter two deals with the common law. This has been considered a good starting point 
as it covers the contract of employment which is the source of an employer's decision-
making power. Furthermore, the common law favours the employer in a number of ways 
and it is deemed appropriate to first discuss that source of the law which not only 
provides the foundation but also enhances (to a certain extent) employers' prerogative. 
Nevertheless, the common law also restricts employers' prerogative and this aspect is 
also discussed in chapter two. 
Chapter three deals with the various statutes which impact on employers' (common law) 
decision-making power regarding their employees. In chapter four, the role of the law in · 
collective bargaining and the extent to which it encourages or promotes the use of col-
lective bargaining as a method to limit employer prerogative is considered. The role of 
the law in the democratising of the workplace through workplace forums, is also dis-
cussed in this chapter. 
264see chapter 2. 
265eonsider, for instance, the fact that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 requires the employer to consult 
and not to jointly decide about dismissals for operational reasons (see a 189 as well as par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of 
chapter 3). See also s 84 of the Act which requires the employer to consult and not to jointly decide about 
the matters listed in the section with the workplace forum (see par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4). See also s 86(4) of 
the Act which enables the employer to maintain the status quo ante where it cannot reach consensus with 
the workplace forum about the matters listed In s 86 (see par 4.3.3.2 of chapter 4). Consider also the fact 
that the Act affords the employer recourse to a lock-out to force its employees to accede to its demands 
(sees 64 as well as par 7.3 of chapter 7). 
41 
Origin, Nature and Extent 
In chapter five, the extent to which collective bargaining does, in practice, limit the scope 
of employer prerogative is examined. This is done through the examination of various 
collective agreements. 
Chapter six deals with the way in which the law regulates the use of economic power as 
a method to enforce employees' demands and to limit employers' prerogative. The exer-
tion of economic pressure as a means to enforce demands is not restricted to employ-
ees and their trade union. An employer may also resort to economic pressure to main-
tain or even further its prerogative. In chapter seven, the manner in which the law regu-
lates the use of economic power by an employer to achieve these aims is discussed. 
Chapter eight is headed "Summary and Conclusions". In this chapter, the restriction of 
employer prerogative by the law and collective bargaining is summarised and certain 
conclusions are drawn. 
CHAPTER2 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMON LAW ON TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
An investigation of the influence of the various sources of law and collective bargaining 
on the employer's decision-making power must commence with the common law.1 Not 
only does the contract of employment constitute the foundation of the employment rela-
tionship2 but it also provides the legal basis for the employer's right to manage an 
employee. 3 In addition, the employer's decision-making power is strengthened by some 
of the essential4 and residuals terms of the contract. The common law is furthermore 
based on the assumption of contractual freedom which increases the employer's 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the employee. 6 This enables the employer virtually to dictate 
those terms and conditions of employment which are not covered by the essential and 
residual terms of the contract. The common law, however, not only creates and pro-
motes the employer's right to manage; it also limits or restricts this power in a number of 
ways.7 
The following discussion of the employer's decision-making power in terms of the com-
mon law has been divided into two parts. In the first part, the employer's decision-
making power vis-a-vis an applicant for a job is investigated. 8 In the second part, the 
1 Common law entails the Roman-Dutch law as interpreted, developed and extended by our courts (see 
also note 8 of chapter 1). 
2see par 2.3 belo:vv where this fact is discussed in more detail. 
3see par 1.4.2 of chapter 1 as well as par 2.3 below where this fact is discussed in greater detail. 
4Essential terms are those terms which are required by law whether the parties desire to have them or not. 
AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) at 255 refers to these terms as "invariable provi-
sions". See also RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 177. 
5Residual terms are those provisions which the law adds to the contract in the absence of agreement of 
the parties (see AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 257). These terms are also 
referred to as the •naturalia" of the contract (see AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 
256). RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 177 describes naturalia or residual terms 
as the terms implied by law in every contract of a particular type unless expressly excluded. 
6see par 2.2 below In this regard. 
7This is particularly true in respect of the employer's right to give the employee Instructions regarding his 
labour potential (see par 2.4.2 below). 
Ssee par 2.2 below. 
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legal nature of the contract of employment9 and the employer's rights and duties in 
terms thereof10 are considered. 
2.2 THE EMPLOYER'S DECISION-MAKING POWER PRIOR TO THE CONCLU-
SION OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
Based on the common law principe of freedom of contract, 11 the employer can decide 
whom to employ. In terms of this principle, therefore, an employer may base its decision 
to employ or not to employ somebody on factors which may generally be regarded as 
improper or discriminatory, such as race, gender, sex, age, marital status et cetera. 
The common law principle of freedom of contract operates on the premise that the 
employer and the person seeking employment are on an equal footing when negotiating 
the terms and conditions of employment.12 In practice, however, this is seldom 13 the 
case. The employer commands capital, information and access to legal advice.14 An 
employee works in order that he and his family may s~rvive.15 In addition, there is fierce 
9see par 2.3 below. 
1 Osee par 2.4 below. 
11 For a discussion of this principle, see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour 
Law 2 ed (1992) 33; RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 14-15; AJ Kerr The Princi-
ples of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 8 and 107; GTS Eiselen "Kontrakteervryheid, Kontraktuele Gereg-
tigheid en die Ekonomiese Liberalisme• (1989) 52 THRHR 516 at 518; MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH 
Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law (1987) 160-161; Nicholas Haysom and Clive Thompson ·Labouring under the Law: South 
Africa's Farmworkers· (1986) 7 IW 218 at 221-222; Steven D Anderman The Law of Unfair Dismissal 2 ed 
(1985) 3; David M Beatty "Labour is not a Commodity" in Barry J Reiter and John Swan (eds) Studies in 
Contract Law {1980) 340-341 ; PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 403, 406 and 417 
and JSA Fourie "Status en Kontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg" (1979) 42 THRHR 79 at 84. 
12oavid M Beatty "Labour is not a Commodity" in Barry J Reiter and John Swan (eds) Studies in Contract 
Law (1980) 334 points out that in terms of the principle of freedom of contract "[i]n its pristine form, even 
children were said to have an equal opportunity to utilize the institution to develop their skills and make 
their contributions". 
13where a job is of a very specialised nature and demands a highly qualified person, the applicant for 
employment may be in a much stronger bargaining position (see Richard Hyman Industrial Relations: A 
Marxist Introduction (1975) 23 as well as MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New 
Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 5-6). 
14see RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 14-15; AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law 
of Contract 4 ed (1989) 6-8 and Hugh Collins "Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of 
Employment" (1986) 15 IW(UK) 1. 
15see par 1.6.1.2 of chapter 1. See also Paul Pretorius "Status Quo Relief and the Industrial Court: The 
Sacred Cow Tethered" (1983) 4 IW 167 at 170. 
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competition amongst persons seeking employment. Many jobs require little or no skm 16 
and consequently the majority of job seekers are able to do these jobs.17 Competition is 
also particularly fierce when the economy is in a downward phase and unemployment is 
rife. 
As a result of the above, the employer may also stipulate certain preconditions to the 
conclusion of a contract of employment. It may, for instance, demand that the person 
seeking employment terminates his trade union membership or ·his membership of any 
other employee organisation. It may also require the person to undergo a medical 
examination and tests for certain diseases. The employer may furthermore require the 
person to take certain tests such as a literacy test or a test to determine whether the per-
son has the necessary skills to do the work.18 
Finally, the fact that the employer is in a much stronger barg_aining position enables it to 
virtually dictate the terms and conditions of the contract of employment.19 Beatty20 
explains the position of a person seeking employment as follows 
The material and psychological constraints facing these persons Uob applicants] make 
them so dependent on the particular employment relationships which are made available 
to them as to preclude their serious participation in the distribution of rights and benefits 
within any of those relationships. 
16see par 1.6.1.1 of chapter 1 where the de-skilling of jobs is discussed. 
17see Paul Pretorius ·status Quo Relief and the Industrial Court: The Sacred Cow Tethered· (1983) 4 IW 
167 at 170. 
1 Srhe person seeking employment will be bound by any representations he makes regarding his com-
petence. He may also be bound by representations made in testimonials and references which he sub-
mitted. See John Grogan Riekerfs Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 37 as well as Ndamase v Fyfe-King 
NO 1939 EDL 259 at 262. 
19see HA Jordaan The Employment Relationship: Contract or Membership? LLD thesis, University of Cape 
Town (1991) 50 as well as 60-62 and the authorities therein referred to. 
20oavld M Beatty "Labour is not a Commodtty in Barry J Reiter and John Swan (eds) Studies in Contract 
Law (1980) 334. Richard Hyman Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (1975) describes (at 23) the 
realities during the conclusion of a contract of employment as follows, •eut the notion of a free contract 
between equals has little relevance in the real world. In practice, the ownership of capital represents con-
centrated economic power, a legal entitlement to dominate; hence the employer can virtually dictate the 
broad outlines of the employment contract". See also HA Jordaan The Employment Relationship: Contract 
or Membership? LLD thesis University of Cape Town (1991) 60 and the authorities therein referred to. 
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2.3 THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
The contract of employment constitutes the foundation upon which the employment rela-
tionship is founded.21 
The common law22 treats the contract of employment as a species of the contract of let-
ting and hiring.23 More particularly, it is treated as a contract of letting, by an employee, 
of his labour potential to the employer.24 
Judges25 and writers26 on labour law have found it extremely difficult to define a con-
tract of employment. This is understandable as that which needs to be defined in legal 
terms is a social relationship. Brassey27 explains the complex nature of the employment 
21see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 2-3 where he states that "[t]he common-
law contract of employment remains the basis of the employment relationship in the sense that the legal 
relationship between the employer and the employee is created by It". See also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS 
van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 52; JV du Plessis, MA Fouche, B Jor-
daan and MW van Wyk A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2 ed (1996) 8; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet 
en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 15 ed (1992) 384; Paul Davies and Mark 
Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 18 and 25; GC Kachelhoffer "Arbeidsreg: Die 
Wiehahn- en die Riekert-Verslag• (1979) 1 (2) MB 83; James Stephen Andrew Fourie Die Dienskontrak in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis University of South Africa (19n) 41 and Otto Kahn-Freund 
"Blackstone's Neglected Child: The Contract of Employment" (1977) 93 LOR 508 at 525. Contra, however, 
Barney Jordaan "The Law of Contract and the Individual Employment Relationship" in TW Bennett, DJ 
Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D van Zyl Smit (eds) Labour Law (1991) 73 at 88 where 
he states that "[a]t some stage in the history of its development the contract of employment probably 
reflected reality with a reasonable measure of accuracy. It no longer does so and its continued survival can 
only be explained in terms of its being 'a figment of the legal mind' •. 
22see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 7-9; 
Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 33; HA Jordaan The 
Employment Relationship: Contract or Membership? LLD thesis University of Cape Town (1991) 51-53 and 
Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 56D-61H, as well as the sources 
therein referred to for a historical overview of the contract of employment. See also James Stephen Andrew 
Fourie Die Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis University of South Africa (1977) 40. 
23Atso known as the locatio conductio contracts. See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South 
African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 32; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 1 5 ed (1992) 383 and Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 61A 
24Atso known as locatio conc:tuctio operarum. See Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 
(1) SA 51 (A) at 61A-B. 
25see Martin Brassey "The Nature of Employment8 (1990) 11 /W 889 at 893 and the cases therein referred 
to. 
26see Martin Brassey "The Nature of Employment" (1990) 11 ILJ 889 at 894 and the authors therein 
referred to. 
27Martin Brassey "The Nature of Employment8 (1990) 11 /W 889 at 920. 
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relationship and the problems experienced in determining the existence of such a rela-
tionship as follows 
Employment is a complex and multifaceted social relationship; its forms are protean, and 
its existence must be divined by a process whose application goes unremarked in most 
other branches of the law, the process of assessing all the relevant facts. 
The following definition by Jordaan28 is in accordance with the views held by most South 
African writers29 on what constitutes a contract of employment 
[a] contract of employment ... [is] an agreement in terms of which one party (the 
employee) agrees to make his personal services available to the other part{ (the 
employer) under the latter's supervision and authority30 in return for remuneration.3 
2.3.1 Subordination as an Element of the Contract of Employment 
Today, 32 most writers33 as well as the courts34 accept- that subordination by the 
employee to the employer must be one of the elements of the contract of employment. 
281n JV du Plessis, MA Fouche, B Jordaan and MW van Wyk A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2 ed (1996) 
7. 
29see further SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed 
(1996) 56; John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 17; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De 
Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 1 5 ed {1992) 384 and James 
Stephen Andrew Fourie Die Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis, University of South 
Africa (1977) 41. 
301t is submitted that the words "under the latter's supervision and authority" are indicative of the sub-
ordination element. 
31 In the Roman Law, renumeration was considered to be an essential element (see Smit v Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 56F although it appears that this was not the case in 
Roman-Dutch Law (see the Smit-case at 60G-61 ). See also C Norman-Scoble Law of Master and Servant in 
South Africa (1956) 2 who regards remuneration as an essential element of the contract of employment. 
Contra, however, Etienne Mureinik "The Contract of Service: An Easy Test for Hard Cases" (1980) 97 SAW 
246 at 249 note 16 where he states that remuneration itself is not an essential element of the contract of 
service. He states that the explicit statutory mention of the requirement of remuneration in the definitions of 
"employer" and "employee" in s 1 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 may be taken as implicit 
authority for its absence at common law. (Note that the definition of "employee• in s 214 of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995 also stipulates remuneration as a requirement.) See also Rodrigues & Others v Alves & 
Others 1978 (4) SA834 (A) at841D-E. 
32rflere appears to be some debate as to whether or not subordination constituted an element of the com-
mon law contract of employment. Some writers are of the view that this was not the case and that it was an 
element adopted from the English law (see Albert Beyleveld Die Essensiele Vereistes vir die Ontstaan van 
die Kontraksvorme Mandatum, Locatlo Conductio Operis en Locatlo Conductlo Operarum; 'n Prinsipiele 
Onderskeid LLD thesis University of Pretoria (1978) 112). 
33see Dr R Blanpain Handboek van het Belgisch Arbeidsrecht: I Collect/et Arbeidsrecht 2 ed (1968) 11 
where he states that, "Het sleutelelement blj het afbakenen van het arbeidsrecht Hgt, zoals gezegt. In het 
ondergeschikt verband". See also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendlum van Suid-Afrikaanse 
Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 33, 54 and 60-63; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African 
Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 35 and 62-63; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 15 ed (1992) 384; Martin Brassey "The Nature of Employment" 
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Davies and Freedland35 explain the fact that subordination is an element of the contract 
in the following terms 
But the relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it 
is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much 
the submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of 
the legal mind known as the "contract of employment". 
Although there appears to be general consensus that subordination constitutes an 
essential element of the contract of employment, the reason or reasons for this have 
been subject to debate. 
Some writers argue that the element of subordination is a relic of the status relationship 
which existed between the master and his servant. 36 The relationship was fixed by law 
and based on the status of the parties in society. One of the attributes of this relationship 
was that the status of master carried with it the right to command and discipline the ser-
vant.37 
(1990) 11 /W 889 at 902; Lord Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 3 ed (1986) 5; Etienne Mureinik "The 
Contract of Service: An Easy Tests for Hard Cases" 1980 97 SAW 246 at 263 and 266; GC Kachelhoffer 
"Arbeidsreg: Die Wiehahn- en die Riekert-Verslag" (1979) 1 (2) MB 83 and James Stephen Andrew Fourie 
Die Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis University of South Africa (1977) 41. 
34see, for example, Uberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 IW 673 (LAC) at 681J-682A 
and 682E-F; Smitv Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) 51 (A) at 60-61; Ongevallekommis-
saris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap AVBOB 1976 (4) SA 446 (A) at 456G-H and Colonial Mutual 
Ute Assurance Society Ltd v Macdonald 1931 AD 412 432-435. 
35Paul Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 18. 
36 See Lord Wedderburn The Worker and the Law 3 ed (1986) where he states (at 111) that, "[t]he judges 
carried over the earlier concept of service, built from the fourteenth century upon the status and legal 
imagery of pre-industrial society with agricultural and domestic labourers featuring prominently, ... giving to 
the masters powers to demand obedience that derive from the earlier relationships". See also Alan Fox 
Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (1974) 183-186 and Philip Selznick Law, Society, and 
Industrial Justice (1980) 122-130. 
37phftip Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (1980) explains this (at 124) as follows, "He [ie the 
master] could issue orders on any matter touching the conduct of the enterprise and expect to be obeyed.• 
At 125 he notes that, "[w]lth respect to the authority of the master, two points should be noted: (1) The 
master's right to command, and ths servant's duty to obey, were incidents of status and not terms of an 
agreement. (2) The master's authority was limited, at least in contemplation of law. He could administer 
'moderate' correction. His commands must be lawful_ He was answerable to the local court for cruel and 
oppressive conduct". It is submitted that this is indicative of the fact that the legislature realised that the ser-
vant was in a subordinate position to the master and unable to protect himself against unreasonable 
behaviour of the master. 
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Selznick38 argues that the contract of employment which developed in the first quarter 
of the nineteenth century, was a specific type of contract which, by the end of that 
century, protected and enhanced the decision-making powers of the employer. He 
refers to this contract as the prerogative contract. 39 According to him, the prerogative 
contract relied on two assumptions, namely that the parties entered into the contract 
voluntari1y40 and that the ownership of property by the employer automatically gave it 
the decision-making power over the employee. 41 
Both these assumptions may be criticised. Although a person is not forced by an 
employer to accept a job offer, social and economic considerations do play an important 
role in his decision to accept. 42 Furthermore, property rights afford the employer rights 
over its business premises and machinery - not over the people employed by it. 43 
Collins44 states that the source of the subordination element is twofold. It is firstly based 
on the market power of the employer. Collins argues that no equality of bargaining 
power in the labour market exists between the employer and the employee. The second 
source of the subordination element suggested by Collins is the bureaucratic organisa-
tion of an enterprise. 45 He46 argues that when the employee joins an enterprise, he 
joins a bureaucratic organisation where he finds himself in a relation of subordination 
38Philip Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (1980) 130-137. 
39Philip Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (1980) 135, "The main economic significance of the 
contract at will was the contribution it made to easy layoff of employees in response to business fluctua-
tions. But it also strengthened managerial authority. By the end of the nineteenth century the employment 
contract had become a very special sort of contract-in large part a legal device for guaranteeing to 
management the unilateral power to make rules and exercise discretion. For this reason we call it the 
prerogative contracr (author's emphasis). 
40tbid at 135. This resulted therein that the legislature saw no reason to interfere in the relationship. 
41 Ibid. This was based on the old master-servant relationship, or status relationship, in terms of which the 
master, who owned the farm, or the machinery et cetera. had the decision-making power in the relation-
ship. Selznick (at 136), also points out that, • .. the old master-servant model was only partially incorporated 
into the new law of employment. The traditional association of 'master' and 'authority' was welcomed, but 
in its modem dress authority was impersonalised, stripped of the sense of personal duty, commitment, and 
responsibility that once accompanied it, at least in theory". (author's emphasis). 
42see par 2.2 above where this matter is discussed in greater detaU. 
43see par 1.4.2 of chapter 1 in this regard. 
44Hugh Collins "Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment" (1986) 15 IW(UK) 1. 
45 tbid at 1. 
46 Ibid at 1-2. 
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with those above him in the system of ranks.47 However, it is suggested that the second 
ground advanced by Collins may be rejected. The bureaucratic organisation of an enter-
prise is not the reason for the employee's subordination. It is merely a structure devised 
by the employer to exercise maximum authority over its employees. 48 
Pauw49 argues that subordination became an essential element of a contract of employ-
ment as a result of the role which vicarious liability plays in labour law. When liability by 
an employer for torts committed by its-employee developed in England, it seemed unjust 
to hold the employer liable for torts committed by the employee at a time when the 
employer had no control over him. 50 According to Pauw, subordination as an element of 
the contract of employment was adopted by South African law from English law.51 
Brassey52 criticizes Pauw's explanation for subordination as an element of the contract 
of employment. He states that it is possible for one party to have sufficient control over 
- -
another for purposes of vicarious liability without an employment relationship existing 
between the parties. 53 He also argues that subordination was an essential element of 
the contract of employment in both Roman and Roman-Dutch law, and that it is accor-
dingly unnecessary to turn to English law in this regard.54 
Jordaan suggests that the subordination element has its origin in both the status rela-
tionship that existed between the master and his servant55 and legislation such as the 
47 Ibid. He states (at 1-2) that, "[t]his bureaucratic aspect of subordination arises from the organisational 
structure rather than from any initial inequality of bargaining power in the market, for It persists even when 
the employee, either individually or collectively, enjoys strong leverage". 
48see also par 1.4.2 of chapter 1 where Collins's views are discussed. 
49 P Pauw "Aspects of the Contract of Service• (1979) 1 MB 138. 
50see also Etienne Mureinik "The Contract of Service: An Easy Test for Hard Cases· (1980) 97 SAW 246 at 
247. 
51 At 138. See also A Beyleveld Die Essensiele Vereistes vir die Ontstaan van die Kontraksvorme 
Mandatum, Locatio Conductio Operis en Locatio Conductio Operarum: 'n Prinsipiele Onderskeid LLD 
thesis University of Pretoria (1978) 158. 
52Martin Brassey "The Nature of Employment" (1990) 11 /W 889 at 892. 
53 Ibid at 892 and 903 and see the cases referred to by him in notes 12-18 of his article. 
541bid at 898-899. Contra, however, Albert Beyleveld Die Essensiele Vereistes vir die Ontstaan van die 
Kontraksvorme Mandatum, Locatio Conductio Operis en Locatio Conductio Operarum; 'n Prinsipiele 
Onderskeid LLD thesis University of Pretoria (1978) 112. 
55see Allan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 62. 
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Master and Servant laws, 56 introduced to confirm and ensure the employee's sub-
ordination to his employer. 57 
All the aforementioned writers search for the reason for subordination as an essential 
element of the contract outside the parameters of the contract. It is submitted that status, 
the unequal bargaining relationship between the parties and the economic superiority of 
the employer, constitute nothing more than reasons for an employee's preparedness to 
conclude a contract in terms of which he will be subordinate to the employer.58 Also, 
legislation is not the originating cause of the subordination element. Although some of 
the Master and Servant Acts59 subscribed to the subordination element by, for example, 
branding an employee's refusal to adhere to the employer's demands as criminal 
offences, these statutes did nothing more than promote subordination in that they 
served as an incentive for the employee to be subordinate to the employer. 
It is submitted that the reason why subordination constitutes an element of the contract 
of employment is to be found in the contract itself.60 More particularly, it is to be found in 
that which the employee "hires out" to the employer, namely his labour potential. Labour 
potential is not separable from the employee and, as a rational being, he has full control 
over it.61 In order to ensure that the employee applies his labour potential in accordance 
56For an historical account of these laws, see Elizabeth Delport The Legal Position of Domestic Workers in 
South Africa LLM dissertation University of South Africa (1995) 88-98 and John Grogan Riekert's Basic 
Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 3-4. 
57Jordaan states in Alan Rycroft and Barney JordaanA Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 62-
63 that, • ... contractual regulation of the relationship was simply not sufficient to ensure the employee's sub-
ordination. Statutory intervention was required to do so. It came in the form of masters and servants legis-
lation of the 17th and later centuries. It was the draconian penal sanctions of the legislation which suc-
ceeded in finally securing the employee's subordination as an incident of the contract of employment". 
58rhe parties may expressly agree that the employee will be subordinate to the employer. However, 
should they not expressly include such a term, the employee still has this duty as subordination is an 
essential term of the contract of employment. 
59see, for example, the Natal Master and Servant Ordinance of 1850. In terms of this ordinance, it was a 
criminal offence for a servant to refuse or neglect to perform his stipulated duty or to perform work in a 
negligent or improper fashion. 
60see also Uberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 /W 673 (LAC) at 686E. 
61 JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 1 
5 ed (1992) 383 state that what is leased is not an irrational object, such as property, but the worker's 
labour, which is "edeler materiaal". See also Richard Edwards Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the 
Workplace in the Twentieth Century (1979) 12 where he states that, • ... unlike the other commodities 
involved in the production, labor power is always embodied in people, who have their own interests and 
needs and who retain their power to resist being treated like a commodity". See further Harry Braverman 
Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (1974) 54 and Peter F 
Drucker The Practice of Management (1961) 258-259. 
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with their agreement, it is essential that the employee is subordinate to the employer.621f 
subordination is not an element of the contract of employment, an employer will have no 
legal basis to demand that the employee applies his labour potential for the purpose the 
employer intended it to be applied. 
2.4 THE EMPLOYER'S DECISION-MAKING POWER AFTER CONCLUSION OF 
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The contract of employment is often described as a "two-tiered" structure. 63 It has a 
mercantile component in terms of which the employer undertakes to remunerate the 
employee for his labour. 64 But, in the second instance, it also has a "relational"65 com-
ponent in terms of which the employment relationship between the employer and 
employee is established and maintained. The employer undertakes to continue providing 
work whereas the employee undertakes to do the work allocated to him. 
The relationship has certain features which distinguish it from other contractual relation-
ships. The employee's labour potential cannot be separated from him and, with his own 
personality and character traits, he forms an integral part of the relationship. Accordingly, 
there must be constant interaction between the employee and his employer or 
manager. 66 Furthermore, unlike many other contractual relationships, the parties 
usuany67 intend it to continue indefinitely. 
62see also Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 /W 673 (LAC) at 682E where the court 
stated, "Nevertheless, once it is accepted, as I think it must be, that what is essential to the relationship of 
employment is that one person's capacity to work has been placed at the disposal of another, it seems to 
me most unlikely that this will be found to have occurred in practice without the recipient at the same time 
having assumed some measure of control over the manner in which that capacity is to be developed, for 
that is the very thing for which he contracted ... •. 
63see Bob Hepple "Restructuring Employment Rights" (1986) IW(UK) 69 at 71 and MR Freedland The Con-
tract of Employment (1976) 20-21. 
64see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 176 where Jor-
daan states that "[it] also involves more than a mere 'transactional' exchange, where particular goods are 
exchanged for a fixed sum of money, and where the obligations of the parties are more or less clearly 
defined." See also MR Freedland The Contract of Employment (1976) 20. 
65see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 22 and MR 
Freedland The Contract of Employment (1976) 20. 
66see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 176. 
67There are, however, exceptions such as fixed term contracts. 
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In the paragraphs that follow, the rights and duties of the employer in terms of the con-
tract of employment will be examined. Apart from the rights and duties flowing from the 
essential terms of the contract, attention will also be paid to the residual terms which 
have been read into the contract by the law and the extent to which they have either 
enhanced or restricted the employer's right to manage. In addition, the terms which the 
parties may include of their own accord, either express1y68 or impliedly,69 and the extent 
to which these terms affect the employer's right to manage, will be considered. 
2.4.2 The Employer's Decision-making Power in respect of the Employee's 
Labour Potential 
2.4.2.1 Introduction 
It is submitted that the employee's contractual duty to be subordinate to the employer 
constitutes the legal basis of the employer's right to manage the employee. 70 The 
element of subordination constitutes an obligation on the part of the employee to 
place his labour potential under the supervision and control of the employer. In 
Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied 
Workers Union71 the arbitrator explained it as follows 
... it is true that the parties agree not only to a specified ambit of responsibility, but also to 
an inevitable degree of subordination. This entails that, within the limits of the employee's 
degree of subordination, he or she is required to submit to the employer's instructions. 
The converse of this duty is the right of an employer to give orders or instructions to an 
employee regarding his labour potential. 72 Fourie 73 explains this right of the employer 
68Express terms are those terms which the parties have put in words (see AJ Kerr The Principles of the 
Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 255). 
691mplied terms are those terms which the parties had in mind but did not express (see AJ Kerr The Princi-
ples of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 257). 
70rhe employer's right to make decisions regarding the economic or business component of its business 
is not embedded in the employee's contractual duty to be subordinate. This right is essentially founded on 
the employer's property rights (see pars 1.2 and 1.4.2 of chapter 1 where this component of the business 
and the origin of the employer's decision-making power in this regard is discussed). 
71 (1990) 11 IW 1352 (ARB) at 13651. See also Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African 
Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 64 where Jordaan states that •[t]he employee's subordinate status [entails 
that] ... the employee is obliged to obey the employer's lawful commands•. 
72see Etienne Mureinik-rhe Contract of Service: An Easy Test for Hard Cases• (1980) 97 SAW 246 at 265 
where he states that, •[i]t follows that it is an essentiale of the contract that the servant owes a duty to be 
subordinate and the master disposes of a correlattve right to demand subordination• (author's emphasis). 
73James Stephen Andrew Fourie Die Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis University 
of South Africa (1977) 44. See further SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-
Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 62. 
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as follows 
As gevolg van die feit dat die werkgewer in 'n gesagsposisie teenoor die werknemer 
verkeer is die werkgewer geregtig om instruksies aan die werknemer te gee met betrekk-
ing tot dienste wat deur laasgenoemde verskuldig is. 
As will appear from the discussion below, this right of the employer has a number of 
facets and is accordingly fairly wide. Like all rights, however, it is subject to certain 
restrictions. Not only does the common law itself restrict it in a number of ways, but the 
contracting parties may also restrict it. 
2.4.2.2 The Right to Instruct the Employee What Work to do 
The employer's right to give instructions regarding the employee's labour potential 
entails that it can instruct the employee what work to do. 7 4 It may also tell the employee 
- -
what work he may not do. This right may even cover a period after termination of their 
contract. 75 
The common law itself restricts the employer's right to tell the employee what to do and 
what not to do by requiring that the employer's instructions must be lawful. 76 The 
employer cannot, for instance, instruct the employee to do work other than that which 
the employee has contractually agreed to perform. 77 The employer may also not 
degrade the status of the employee by instructing him to do work which should normally 
74see Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) 51 (A) at 60H where the appellate division 
stated, "It [the duty to be subordinate] includes inter alia the right of an employer to decide what work is to 
be done by the employee .. :. See further Leask v French & Others 1949 (4) SA 887 (C) at 891 as well as 
Moonian v Ba/moral Hotel 1925 NPD 215 at 217. In addition, see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck 
Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 61 and 128-129; MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH 
Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law (1987) 74 and JSA Fourie Die Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis 
University of South Africa (1977) 44. 
75This may happen where the contract includes a restraint of trade clause. 
76see Allan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) at 64 and the 
cases referred to in note 399 thereof. 
77 See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 53 and MSM 
Brassey, E Cameron. MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair 
Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 74. Should the employer try to do this. it would be breaching 
their contract of employment. The question of whether or not a particular instruction falls within the job des-
cription of the employee is a factual one. 
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be done by someone in a lower job category or with a lower ranking in the hierarchy.78 
Furthermore, the employer and employee cannot agree that the employee will do work 
which is illegal or contrary to good morals 79 or public policy. 80 
On occasion, the courts have further restricted this right of the employer by requiring that 
its instructions must also be reasonable.81 
It is submitted that this right is further restricted by the employer's common law duty to 
take reasonable care for the health and safety of its employees. In terms of this duty, the 
employer may not instruct the employee to do work or to work with machinery which 
presents a safety or health hazard. Or, where the employee must do such work or work 
with dangerous machinery in terms of his contract, the employer must provide the 
employee with the requisite materials and facilities for his protection. 82 
Lastly, as the common law affords only certain categories of employees a right to 
work83 there is nothing which prevents an employer from prohibiting an employee from 
78such degradation of an employee would constitute a breach of contract on the part of the employer. See 
C Norman-Scoble Law of Master and SeNant in South Africa (1956) 176. See also Smith v Cycle and Motor 
Trade Supply Co 1922 TPD 324 at 325-326 and Groenewald v Cradock Munislpaliteit 1980 (4) SA 217 (E); 
(1980) 1 IW 269 (E) at 272-3. In Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & 
Allied Workers Union (1990) 11 ILJ 1352 (ARB) 1357 at 1366C-F and Taylor v Edgars Retail Trading (1992) 
13 IW 1239 (IC) at 1241 F-1243D an arbitrator and presiding officer of the industrial court also confirmed 
this common law principle. 
79 An employer cannot, for example, engage a person to commit a crime. 
80see PJ Pretorius and DJM Pitman "Good Cause for Dismissal: The Unprotected Employee and Unfair 
Dismissal" in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D Van Zyl Smit (eds) 
Labour Law (1991) 133 at 136 as well as Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 
(A) at 891 G. The question of whether or not an instruction is against public policy is a factual one. 
81see, for instance, Frankfort Munisipaliteit v Minister van Arbeid en 'n Ander 1970 (2) SA 49 (0) at 56H-
57B and Cape Town Municipality v Minister of Labour & Another 1965 (4) SA 770 (C) at 779H. See also 
Building Construction & Allied Workers Union & Another v E Rogers & C Buchal CC & Another (1987) 8 /W 
169 (IC) at 1721 where the court stated, "It has been said that under the common law the contract of 
employment contains an implied term [that is a residual term] (over and above express terms agreed 
upon) that an employee undertakes to obey all reasonable orders given to him by his employer in the 
normal course of his employment" (presiding officer's emphasis). See also MR Freedland The Contract of 
Employment (1976) 189 where it is stated that, "[t]here are suggestions that the orders must be 
'reasonable' in order for disobedience to them to justify dismissal". See further Alan Rycroft and Barney 
Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 64 note 403. 
82see C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa {1956) 179. 
83see John Grogan Rlekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 61 and C Norman-Scoble Law of Master 
and Servant in South Africa (~ 956) 171-172. This will, for example, be the case where an employee works 
on a commission basis and his salary therefore depends on work being provided by the employer (see 
Faber/an v McKay & Fraser 1920 WlD 23 at 27). Employees who require the work in order to maintain or 
develop their skills or to maintain publicity also have a right to work (see Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v 
Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A) at 951G-H). An employer's refusal to provide such an employee with work may 
constitute a breach of contract (see C Norman-Scoble Law of Master and SeNant in South Africa (1956) 
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doing the work which they have contractually agreed the employee will do. All that is 
required is for the employer to pay the employee the· agreed wages. 84 This entitles the 
employer to suspend85 an employee with pay for an indefinite period without providing 
him with a reason for such suspension.86 
2.4.2.3 The Right to Instruct the Employee as to the Manner In which the 
Work must be done 
The employer's right to give instructions regarding the employee's labour potential also 
entails that it can tell the employee how he must do the work.87 The employer may 
therefore give the employee detailed instructions as to the manner in which the work 
must be done. 88 
An employer will often be in a position to exercise this right jn respect of- the majority of 
its employees as most of them will be doing work which is not very technical or special-
172 as well as Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A) at 951). 
84see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 61; James Stephen Andrew Fourie Die 
Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis University of South Africa (1977) 46-47 and C 
Norman-Scoble Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 171. 
85For a discussion of suspension on full pay, see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South 
African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 100 and the authorities therein referred to. 
86Normally the employer will suspend an employee while it is investigating suspected misconduct by the 
employee. 
87see Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Macdonald 1931 AD 412 at 432. See also Checkers 
SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (1990) 11 IW 1352 
(ARB) 1357 at 13651 where the arbitrator, while considering the nature of the contractual element of sub-
ordination by an employee, stated that "[t]his entails that, within the limits of the employee's degree of sub-
ordination, he or she is required to submit to the employer's instructions. These may relate to what exactly 
the employee is required to do or how he or she is required to do it" (my emphasis). See further SR van 
Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 62 and 64 and 
James Stephen Andrew Fourie Die Dienskontrak in die Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg LLD thesis University of 
South Africa (1977) 44. 
88see Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) 51 (A) at 60H where the appellate division 
stated, "It (the duty to be subordinate] includes inter alia the right of an employer to decide what work is to 
be done by the employee, the manner in which it is to be done by him, the means to be employed by him 
in doing it. .. •. See also R v AMCA Services Ltd and Another 1959 (4) SA 207 (A) at 212H where it was held 
that, " ... the employer ... has the right to control, not only the end to be achieved by the other's labour and 
the general lines to be followed. but the detailed manner in which the work is to be performed". See further 
Goldberg v Durban City Council 1970 (3) SA 325 (N) at 3300-331H. Note that an independent contractor 
cannot be instructed as to the manner in which he must do the work (see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van 
Eck Kompendium van Suid-Alrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 eel (1996) 71 ). 
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ised. 89 Where, however, the employee's job is of a specialised nature, the employer 
may often find it extremely difficult to exercise this right. 90 
The right to supervise how the work is to be done is also restricted by the common law in 
a number of ways. It is required that the employer's instructions must be lawful. The 
instructions may therefore not conflict with the employee's agreed contractual duties. 91 
The right is also restricted, to a certain extent, by the employer's common-law duty to 
take reasonable care of the health and safety of its employees. 92 The limitation is con-
tained in two facets of this duty. In the first instance, the employer must ensure that the 
work is done in such a manner that the possibility of injuries and work-related illnesses 
are minimised. 93 The employer must therefore organise the methods and procedures 
used in the production process in such a way that employees are not unnecessarily 
exposed to unreasonable risks. 94 It also means that, where necessarY~ the employer 
must train its employees how to use machinery and tools and how to do their work. 
In the second instance, the employer must ensure that the machinery or plant is safe to 
work on or in.95 This entails that the employer must provide and maintain proper 
89rhis is largely as a result of the deskilling of jobs (see par 1.6.1.1 of chapter 1 where this matter is dis-
cussed in greater detail). 
90see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 63. 
Consider, tor example the position of a surgeon or a pilot or a computer expert. 
91 See Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union 
(1990) 11 IW 1352 (ARB) at 13651-1366A where the arbitrator considered the common law contractual prin-
ciples regarding duties agreed to in a contract of employment. 
92see Carl Mischke and Christoph Garbers Safety at Work: A Guide to Occupational Health, Safety and 
Accident Compensation Legislation (1994) 2. 
931n MacDonald v General Motors South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 232 (E) at 237E-238A, for example, 
the court took into account that it was the general practice of the maintenance staff to climb onto 
machinery. This factor lent weight to the proposition that harm could not have been reasonably foreseeable 
on the part of the employer. In Lahrs v SA Railways and Harbours 1923 EDL 329 at 333-334 the court took 
into account that the usual method of taking hold of a crane cable was to hold it just beneath the hook. It 
held that the employer could not reasonably have foreseen that the particular employee would take hold of 
the hook itself, thereby incurring his injuries. 
94see Adrienne Scott ·safety and the Standard of Care• (1980) 1 IW 161 at 180 as well as the facts of Van 
Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1962 (4) SA 28 (T) at 31E-F; South African Railways 
and Harbours v Cruywagen 1938 CPD 219 at 226 and Barker v Union Government 1930 TPD 120 at 128. 
95see C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 179. 
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machinery96 and must ensure that the necessary protective measures97 are taken to 
avoid injuries to employees. 98 It may also entail that employees be provided with pro-
tective clothing and equipment99 and that experienced and properly qualified machine 
operators and supervisors be appointed.100 
2.4.2.4 The Right to Instruct the Employee Where the Work must be done 
The employer's right to give instructions- regarding the.employee's labour potential also 
means that the employer can tell the employee where he must work101 and where he 
may not work. 102 
The employer's instructions, however, must be lawful. Most importantly, it may not give 
instructions which are in breach of the provisions of the parties' contract of employment. 
The employer's right is also restricted, to a certain extent, by the employer's common-
law duty to take reasonable care of the health and safety of its employees. In terms of 
this duty, it must provide them with safe work premises.103 
96see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 79; Adrienne 
Scott "Safety and the Standard of Care• (1980) 1 /W 161 at 165 and 183 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of 
Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 179. The employer, however, is not compelled to provide the 
very best or the very latest patent devices (see Lahrs v SA Railways and Harbours 1923 EDL 329). 
97such as notices warning employees of the danger of machinery and barriers around dangerous 
machinery. 
98c Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 180 states that the test whether 
the employer has provided an efficient guard to parts of any machinery or not depends upon whether a 
reasonable person, who had given proper consideration to the habits of workmen would have considered It 
sufficient, and not whether it would be effective under any circumstances whatsoever (see also Barker v 
Union Government 1930 TPD 120 at 128-129). 
99such as ear muffs, goggles and safety belts. 
100see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 79; Adrienne 
Scott "Safety and the Standard of Care" (1980) 1 /W 161 at 181-182 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of 
Master and SerVant in South Africa (1956) 179. 
101see Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) 51 (A) at 60H where the appellate divi-
sion held that. "[i]t [the right to give instructions} includes the right of an employer to decide ... where It [the 
work] is to be done .. .". See also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse 
Arbeidsreg 2 ed {1996) 62. 
102An employer may, for example, refuse to allow a female employee to work underground. 
103see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 79 and 
Adrienne Scott "Safety and the Standard of Care" (1980) 1 /W 161 at 165 and 182-183. 
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2.4.2.5 The Right to Instruct the Employee When the Work must be done 
The employer's right to give the employee instructions regarding his labour potential also 
entails that it can instruct the employee when to work. 104 This right, however, is also 
limited by the common law as it stipulates that it is for the parties to either expressly or 
impliedly regulate the employee's working hours.105 The employer's instructions must 
therefore be in accordance with the agreed terms. 
If the parties have not reached agreement on the hours of work, the matter may be regu-
lated by custom. If a custom exists in that particular trade or industry, it may be read into 
the contract of employment as an implied term. According to Norman-Scoble, 106 
however, this can only happen if the custom is necessary and not merely reasonable, 
the evidence of the custom is clear and consistent, and both the employer and employee 
had knowledge of the custom or else it was universal in the area of occupation.107 
The parties may also agree, either expressly or impliedly, or there may be a custom in 
the trade, that the employee will work overtime. They may furthermore regulate work on 
Sundays and/or public holidays. 
Although the parties may agree on these matters, in practice the employer can virtually 
dictate the terms because of its greater bargaining strength.108 
2.4.3 The Right to Control and l~spect the Work of the Employee 
Flowing from the employer's right to give an employee instructions regarding his labour 
potential, is an implied right to control and inspect the work of the employee.109 
104see Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) 51 (A) at 60H where the appellate divi-
sion held that the right to give instructions to the employee includes "the time when• the work must be 
done. 
105see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 64 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of 
Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 194. 
106c Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 193. 
107see also RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 180-187 for a detailed discussion 
on the requirements for a term to be regarded as implied by trade usage. 
1 OBsee par 2.2 above where this matter is discussed in detail. 
109see Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 {1) 51 (A) at61H-61A where the appellate 
division held that the right to give instructions also implied ihe right of the employer to inspect and direct 
the work being done by the employee•. See also R v Feun 1954 (1) SA 58 (T) at 60-61 and SR van 
Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikasnse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 62. 
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In terms of this right, an employer can check whether an employee has followed its 
instructions as to the work that must be done 110 and the manner in which it must be 
done.111 In practice, this is usually done by supervisors and managers who have been 
vested with the necessary authority to inspect the work of employees. They may 
demand verbal or written reports from employees about their work. This may, for exam-
ple, entail the completion of production sheets. They may also check the various phases 
or steps involved in the production process as well as the end product. This may be 
done through an established quality control system or through sporadic quality control 
tests. 
The employer's right to tell an employee when 112 to work, also implies that the 
employer has the right to keep record of the hours worked by the employee. In practice, 
employers often expect their employees to keep record of their time spent on a particular 
job. 113 Employees are also frequently required to clock in and out for work.114 
2.4.4 The Employee must be ·Respectful towards the Employer and his Superiors 
The courts have held that the employee's duty to be subordinate 115 goes wider than 
contractual terms regarding where and when the work is to be done.116 They have held 
11 Dsee SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 64. 
See par 2.4.2.2 above where the right to give instructions regarding the work that must be done, is dis-
cussed. 
111 See SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 64. 
See par 2.4.2.3 above where the right to give instructions regarding the manner in which work must be 
done, is discussed. 
112see par 2.4.2.5 above where this right is discussed. 
1131t is submitted that another reason for this is to enable the employer to determine what it must charge 
the customer for the end product. 
1141t is, however, submitted that time keeping also serves to enable the employer to calculate employees' 
wages. 
11Ssee par 2.3.1 above where the nature and rationale for this duty is discussed. 
1.16see also PhUlp Selznick Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (1980) 136 where he states, • ... the law 
imported into the employment contract a set of implied terms reserving full authority of direction and con-
trol to the employer. Once the contract was defined as an employment contract, the master-servant model 
was brought into play. The natural and inevitable authority ot the master could then be invoked, for that 
authority had already been established as the defining characteristic of the master-servant relation. In this 
way, the continuing master-servant imagery lent a legal foundation to managerial prerogative ... The 
prerogative contract gave the employer an open-ended. sovereign power-. 
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that this duty also requires the employee to behave in a respectful manner towards the 
employer, his superiors 117 and the employer's customers.118 
By giving such a wide interpretation to this duty of the employee, the courts have taken 
cognizance of the special features of the employment relationship.119 It serves to pro-
mote harmonious co-existence and co-operation between the employee and manage-
ment. It also takes account of the business aspect of the employer's enterprise 120 as it 
serves to ensure that good retations between the employer and its customers are main-
tained. 
The duty to act in a "respectful manner" is an all-encompassing one because of the 
vagueness of the concepts "respect" and "respectful manner" and the fact that com-
pliance therewith is determined on the facts of the matter. The broad ambit of this duty 
actually serves to enhance the employer's prerogative as it will be extremely difficult for 
an employee to challenge the employer's views as to what constitutes this duty. 
2.4.5 The Employee must act in Good Faith towards the Employer 
The courts appreciated the special features of the employment relationship 121 and 
"infused it with a moral content"122 by reading a residual term into the contract of 
employment that the employee must act in good faith towards the employer.123 
This duty is fairly comprehensive and can be divided into three broad sections. The 
employee is firstly required not to use or divulge confidential information for his own 
117see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 64 where Jor-
daan states that, "[t]he employee's subordinate status is generally said to [entail that] ... the employee is 
obliged to ... behave in a respectful manner towards the employer and superiors•. See also SR van Jaarsveld 
and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AfrikaanseArbeidreg 2 ed (1996) 62 and 129-130 and C Norman-
Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 148-149. 
118see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 64 and C 
Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 148. 
119see par 2.4.1 above where the nature of the employment relationship is discussed. 
120see par 1.2 of chapter 1 where this aspect of an enterprise is discussed. 
121 See par 2.4.1 above where these features are discussed. 
122see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jorclaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 59. 
123see Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Rjen (1996) 17 /l.J 18 (A) at 260-G and Premier 
Medical & Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler & Another 1971 (3) SA 866 rN) at 867H. See further Alan 
Rycroft and Barney Jorclaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 59-60. 
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benefit. 124 Secondly, the employee is required to further the employer's business.125 
This duty entails that the employee must devote his working hours exclusively to his 
employer's business 126 and may not compete with it.127 Thirdly, the duty requires that 
the employee must be honest with regard to the employer's affairs.128 
The fact that the duty is so all-encompassing enhances the employer's prerogative.129 It 
allows the employer a broad discretion as to what constitutes this duty 130 and makes 
the challenging of its interpretation thereof extremely difficult. 
2.4.6 The Employee's Duty to Do his Work in a Competent Manner 
It is a residual term of the contract of employment that the employee warrants that he is 
able to do the work which he has contracted to do.131 In terms of this warranty, the 
124see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 60-61; Coo/air 
Ventilator Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Liebenberg & Another 1967 (1) SA 686 CH) at 689-90 and C Norman-Scoble 
The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 153. This duty may remain operative after the con-
tract has been terminated. 
125see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 61. 
126He may not therefore work simultaneously for another employer if its business is the same as that of the 
first employer (see Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd & Others 1981 (2) SA 
173 (T) and Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 (A) at 979). See also C Norman-Scoble The 
Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 152 .. 
127see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 61 note 381; C 
Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 152; Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) 
Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd & Others 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) at 198-199 as well as Premier Medical and 
Industrial Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Winkler & Another 1971 (3) SA 866 CH) at 868A. 
128rhe employee will be breaching his duty to act in good faith where he steals from the employer or com-
mits fraud (see C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and SeNant in South Africa (1956) 155-156) or 
obtains secret commissions (see Uni-erections v Continental Engineering Co Ltd 1981 (1) SA 240 CH) at 
252; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jorclaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 61 and C Norman-
Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 153-154). 
129see Philip Selznick's observations quoted in note 116 above. 
1301n Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen (1996) 17 IW 18 (A) at 25H-I, for instance, the 
actions of the employee were held not to amount to a repudiation of the contract in the ·narrow sense" of 
the word. The appellate dMsion nevertheless found that the employee's actions amounted to "'repudiation' 
in the wide sense· in that they constituted a breach of his duty to act in good faith. 
131see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AfrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 126-
127; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 58-59 and C 
Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 141. See also Wallace v Rand Daily 
Mail Ltd 1917 AD 479 at 482. 
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employee also guarantees that there are no factors, such as previous misconduct, which 
may make him unsuitable for certain types of work.132 
On the ground of this implied warranty, there is no duty or obligation on the part of the 
employer to train the employee for the job which he has contracted to do. The employer 
will nevertheless be entitled to give the employee instructions regarding the manner in 
which the work must be done and the machinery to be operated.133 · 
2.4. 7 The Employer's Duty to Remunerate the Employee 
Remuneration by the employer for work done by the employee is one of the essential 
elements of a contract of employment.134 
The common law does not contain any provisions regarding minimum wages or salary. 
Consequently, the amount of wages or salary must be arranged contractually. As the 
employer is usually in a stronger bargaining position, 135 it will be able to virtually dictate 
what the amount will be. 
Furthermore, the common law does not prohibit an employer from paying employees 
who are essentially doing the same work different wages or salaries. 136 
The general rule is that, as in the case of other contracts of letting and hiring, 137 the 
employee will only be entitled to his wages or salary if he has performed his services. 138 
132see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendlum van Suld-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 128 
and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 59. 
133see par 2.4.2.3 above where this right of the employer is discussed. 
134see par 2.3 above where the elements of a contract of employment are discussed. See also SR van 
Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1998) note 61 on page 64; 
John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 62; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide 
to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 67 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South 
Africa (1956) 202. 
135see par 2.2 above where this matter is discussed. 
136see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 68. 
137see par 2.3 above where it was stated that the contract oi employment is treated as a species of the 
contract of letting and hiring. 
138see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendiurn van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1998) 64 
and 85; JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van ~: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 
Vol 1 5 ed (1992) 384 and C Nonnan-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 203. 
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An employee, however, is entitled to his wages or salary where he is willing and able to 
work, 139 but is prevented by vis major from working 140 or the employer is either 
unable 141 or unwilling 142 to provide him with work. 
An employee who is dismissed summarily 143 for justifiable reasons 144 is not entitled to 
his wages or salary for the unexpired period of his contract. He is nevertheless entitled to 
be remunerated for the period that he worked. 145 There is some uncertainty as to 
whether or not an employee who has deserted- an employer is entitled to payment of his 
wages or salary for the period that he actually worked. According to Norman-Scoble, 146 
a deserter is not entitled to such payment. However, in view of the appellate division's 
decision in BK Tooling (Edmsj Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk, 147 it 
could possibly be argued that the deserter may be entitled to such payment. 148 
139usually, where an employee is employed on a fixed salary, a mere tender to perform will be sufficient to 
entitle him to his remuneration (see MSM Brassey "The Contractual Right to Work" (1982) 3 ILJ 247 at 262). 
140see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 63; MSM Brassey "The Contractual 
Right to Work• (1982) 3 /W 247 at 262 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South 
Africa (1956) 203. 
141consider, for instance, Johannesburg Municipality v O'Sullivan 1923 AD 201 where the employer was 
unable to provide the employees with work due to a strike by other workers. 
142An example where the employer may be unwilling to provide the employee with work is where it 
suspects that the employee is guilty of misconduct. Under such circumstances, it may prefer to suspend 
the employee on full pay pending a disciplinary enquiry (see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to 
South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 100; MSM Brassey "The Contractual Right to Work" (1982) 3 /W 247 
at 262 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 204-205). 
143summary dismissal entails dismissal without notice or payment in lieu of notice. See par 2.4.10.2 below 
where summary dismissal for a serious breach is discussed in greater detail. 
144usually an employer does not have to provide a reason for the dismissal of an employee (see par 
2.4.10.3 below where dismissal by giving notice is discussed). Where, however, it wants to dismiss an 
employee summarily, it must do so for a justifiable reason; usually gross misconduct (see par 2.4.10.2 
below where dismissal for breach of contract is discussed). 
145see C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 205-207. 
146c Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 207. 
1471979 (1) SA 391 (A). 
148see Valasek v Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd 1983 (1) SA 694 (N) where the supreme 
court actually ordered the deserter to be paid for the month that he had worked: See also John Grogan 
Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 62; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South 
African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 71 and Paul Benjamin ·An End to Desertion• 1981 (2) IW 231 at 242-244. 
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At common law there is nothing which precludes an employer from setting off a liqui-
dated debt owed to it by its employee against the wages or salary of the employee.149 
The law, however, only allows deductions in respect of illiquid claims by consent or by 
way of set-off.150 
2.4.8 The Rights and Duties to which the Parties have Specifically Agreed 
There are a number of employment matters which are not regurated by the common law. 
Accordingly, should the parties want these matters to form part of their contract, they 
must be expressly or impliedly included. 
Matters which may be included in this manner are increments and bonuses, 151 vacation 
leave, 152 sick leave, 153 study leave, maternity leave, paternity leave, compassionate 
leave, accommodation and food, 154 medical aid and pension fund membership. 
As the employer is usually in a stronger bargaining position, it will be able to virtually dic-
tate the terms of these matters.155 This is on the assumption that it is prepared to 
include these terms in the contract. Where the employer is not so amenable, there is 
usually little that the employee can do to convince the employer that these terms must be 
included. 
149see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 92 
and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 208. See also Schierhout v 
Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1926 AD 286 at 292 where the court held that the Union 
Government was entitled to set off taxed costs due by the employee against his wages. See further Keulder 
v Minister of Finance 1953 (2) SA 101 (N) at 104. 
150see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 76. 
151 See SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 92. 
152see C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 190 where he states that, 
• ... his [the employee's) right to holidays being dependant entirely upon his covenant with his master, 
express or implied·. See also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Atrikaanse 
Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 99; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed 
(1992) 82 and East London Municipality v Thomson 1944 AD 56 at 59. 
153see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 101 ; 
Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 82 and 84 and C 
Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 184. 
154see C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa {1956) 182. 
155see par 2.2 above where the unequal bargaining power of the parties is discussed. 
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2.4.9 The Employer's Right to Discipline 
In terms of the common law, the employer has the right to discipline an employee who is 
guilty of misconduct. The right to discipline is a residual term of the contract of employ-
ment. It is inextricably linked to the employer's right to give instructions. Anderman 156 
explains this in the following words 
Employers' disciplinary powers, ... are well developed in the terms implied in employment 
contracts. Even if nothing is put into. express terms .of employment contracts, the 
employer's disciplinary control is carefully preserved in the employee's duty to obey as an 
implied fundamental term of the contract. 
The employer's right to discipline is regulated by the common law principles of contract. 
It may summarily dismiss an employee if the latter's misconduct is of a serious nature 157 
or it may dismiss him by merely giving the required notice.158 
The employer, however, may not always want to rid itself of an employee guilty of mis-
conduct but may prefer to impose a less severe penalty .159 In such a case, common 
law contract principles determine that the penalty may not constitute breach of contract. 
The employer will thus be unable, without the employee's consent, to suspend the 
employee without pay 160 or to demote 161 or transfer him 162 or order forfeiture of an 
156steven D Anderman Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers' Rights (1992) 62. See also 
John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 86 where he states that this right forms "an 
integral part of the broader 'right to manage'" and that it "flows from the contract...". See further PAK le 
Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) note 6 on 99 where they 
state that, "From a narrower legal perspective, the power of the employer to regulate the conduct of an 
employee and to issue codes of conduct is primarily to be found in the implied common law duties of 
employees". 
157 See par 2.4.10.2 below where summary dismissal is discussed. 
158see par 2.4.10.3 below where dismissal by notice is discussed. 
159rhe employer always has a choice between dismissal or a lesser form of penalty. The concept of pro-
gressive discipline where dismissal may only be considered for a first occurrence in the case of serious 
misconduct or as the ultimate penalty for repeated offences, was essentially developed by the industrial 
court when it had to determine the fairness of a dismissal in terms of its unfair labour practice definition 
jurisdiction in the Labour Relations Act, 1956. This concept now essentially forms the basis of the approach 
of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 to discipline (see schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 entitled 
Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (hereafter referred to as the Code). See par 3.4.1 of chapter 3 where the 
concept of progressive discipline is discussed. 
160see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 99-100 where 
they Indicate that such a penalty would be treated as wrongful repudiation of the contract by the employer 
(see also 186). · 
161 See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 99-100 where 
they indicate that such a penalty would be treated as wrongful repudiation of the contract by the employer 
(see also 187). 
1621f the contract does not make provision for transfers. 
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agreed bonus 163 or part of his wages or salary.164 
The employer will nevertheless be able to suspend the erl_lployee on full pay 165 and to 
give him warnings, be they verbal or written.166 However, the effectiveness of these 
penalties are debatable. Suspension on full pay will in all likelihood have limited value as 
a deterrent. Warnings are also not that effective, unless they are linked to a more serious 
penalty, such as dismissal, for a future commitment of the offence. 
In practice, however, an employer's range of penalties will usually not be limited to those 
that fall within the ambit of the contract. Through its superior bargaining power 167 as 
well as its right to dismiss by merely giving the required notice, 168 the employer will 
probably be able to convince the employee to agree to a more serious penalty which 
would otherwise amount to a breach of contract. John Grogan 169 explains this as fol-
lows 
[t]here can be no doubt that the employer's unfettered legal right to dismiss forms the 
basis of his disciplinary power. His answer to the employee who contests his disciplinary 
rules can always be: "If you don't like it here, go and find another employer.• 
2.4.1 O The Employer's Right to Terminate the Contract of Employment 
2.4.10.1 Introduction 
The contract of employment can be terminated in a number of ways. It can be 
terminated in terms of the contract itself where, for instance, it provides that it will 
163see par 2.4.8 above. 
164see par 2.4. 7 above. 
165see par 2.4.2.2 as well as note 83 above. See also Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South 
African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 186. 
166For a discussion on warnings, see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour 
Law 2 ed (1992) 183-185. Contra John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 87 who is of 
the view that the employer's punitive powers in terms of the common law are limited to dismissal. 
167 See par 2.2 above. 
168see par 2.4. 10.3 below. 
169Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 88. 
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terminate upon the completion of a specific project 170 or after the expiry of a stipulated 
period.171 The contract may also be terminated by consent 172 or by the operation of 
law173 or impossibility of performance.174 Both the employer and employee are further-
more entit_led, in terms of common law contract principles, to cancel the contract on the 
ground of a serious breach thereof by the other party.175 In addition, both the employer 
and the employee can terminate the contract by giving no,tice as stipulated in the con-
tract or, where the contract does not contain any provisions in this regard, by giving 
reasonable notice.176 
The right to terminate a contract for a serious breach or to terminate it by simply giving 
the required notice, undoubtedly strengthens the employer's decision-making power 
regarding its employees. These rights, and the manner and extent to which they streng-
then the employer's prerogative, are discussed in the paragraphs hereunder. 
170see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AlrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 155; 
Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 90 and C Norman-
Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 318. 
171see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AlrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 155 
and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 313. 
172see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AlrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 155; 
Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 90 and C Norman-
Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 317-318. 
173A contract is automatically terminated by the sequestration of the employer's estate (see s 38 of the 
Insolvency Act 24of1936 as well ass 339 of the Companies Act). See also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van 
Eck Kompendium van Suid-Alrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 160-161; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 90-91 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Ser-
vant in South Africa (1956) 320 for a discussion of the termination of the contract by the employer's 
insolvency. 
174oue to, for instance, the illness or disability or death of one of the parties. See SR van Jaarsveld and 
BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Alrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 158-159; Alan Rycroft and Barney 
Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 91-94; Martin Brassey "The Effect of Superven-
ing Impossibility of Performance on a Contract of Employment" (1990) AJ 22 at 36-43 and C Norman-
Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 319 and 321-323. 
175see the discussion In par 2.4.10.2 below. 
176see par 2.4.10.3 below for a detaDed discussion of this method of termination of a contract. 
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2.4.10.2 Dismissal for Breach of Contract 
Should an employee fail to comply with any of his contractual duties, he would be in 
breach of the contract. In terms of the law of contract, 177 a breach which is serious and 
deliberate entitles the other party to cancel the contract 178 or, in labour law terms, it 
entitles the employer to dismiss the employee.179 
Under such circumstances, the employer will be entitled to dismiss the employee sum-
marily .180 In addition, it may claim damages.181 
The question of whether or not a breach is serious enough to warrant dismissal, is a fac-
tual one.182 The supreme court has held that gross insubordinance,183 persistent and 
serious insolence towards the employer 184 or customers, 185 assault of an employer or 
177see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 95-96 where 
Jordaan points out that the courts have always been prepared to apply the principles of the law of contract 
to contracts of employment. 
178see JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 
Vol 1 5 ed (1992) 214-222; RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 596-601 and AJ Kerr 
The Principles of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 445 and 549. 
179see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AfrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 162; 
John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 88; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide 
to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 97-98 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in 
South Africa (1956) 158. 
180see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 14 7; 
JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 1 5 
ed (1992) 285; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 97 and 
C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 158. 
181 See SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 147 
and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 158 and 163-164 and. For a 
discussion of this contractual principle, see JC de Wet and AH van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk: Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg Vol 1 5 ed (1992) 195, 214 and 222-234; RH Christie The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 577 and 597 and AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 4 ed 
(1989) 446 and 573. 
182see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jorclaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 97; Wallace v 
Rand Daily Mail Limited 1917 A 479 at 491; Schneier and London v Bennett 1927 TPD 346 at 349 as well as 
Moonian v Ba/moral Hotel 1925 NPO 215 at 219. 
183see Zieve v National Meat Suppliers Ltd 1937 AD 177 at 187 and Moonian v Ba/moral Hotel 1925 NPD 
215 at 219 where the court stated that it must be •a serious and deliberate refusal• to obey a lawful order. 
184see Zieve v National Meat Suppliers 1937 AD 192 at 188 and Strachan v Prinsloo 1925 TPD 709 at 718. 
185see Gogi v Wilson & Collins 1927 NLR 21 at 22. 
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a superior, dishonesty, 186 gross ·or habitual negligence, 187 gross incompetence, 188 
competing with the employer, 189 willful or repeated absence from work, 190 participation 
in a strike, 191 and drunkenness on duty 192 constituted such serious offences. 
The fact that the ordinary principles of the law of contract are applicable where the 
employer elects to dismiss the employee, places it in a very strong position. All that is 
required is for it to prove, on a balance of probabilities, 193 that there has been a serious 
breach. It does not have to give warnings.194 Nor does it- have.to hold a disciplinary 
enquiry before deciding to dismiss the employee. 195 It furthermore does not have to 
grant the employee an opportunity to improve his conduct.196 In addition, the employer 
186such as theft of the employer's property; fraud (see Federal Cold Storage Co Ltd v Angehrn and Piel 
1910 TPD 1347 at 1354) and taking secret commissions or lending himself to corruption. 
-
187see Wallace v Rand Daily Mail Limited 1917 AD 479 at 485 and 491-492. 
188see Negro v Continental Spinning and Knitting Mills (Ply) Ltd 1954 (2) SA 203 fY'I) at 214B-H. 
189rhis is one of the three broad sections of the employee's general duty to act in good faith towards the 
employer (see par 2.4.5 above). See Niemer v Hahn 1895 (16) NLR 84 at 88. 
190see Negro v Continental Spinning & Knitting Mills (Ply) Ltd 1954 (2) SA 203 fY'I) at 210-211. However, 
an isolated incidence of absence without leave will not justify summary dismissal (see Schneier and 
London Ltd v Bennett 1927 TPD 346 at 351 ). 
191 See Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1986) 7 /W 108 fY'I) 
at 115E-1; 117H-118A and 120C-D; Egbep Ltd v Black Allied Mining & Construction Workers' Union & 
Others 1985 (2) SA 402 (T); Ngewu & Others v Union Co-Operative Bark & Sugar Co 1982 (2) SA 390 (N) at 
405E-F and R v Smit 1955 (1) SA 239 (C) at 241H-142C. See further par 6.2 of chapter 6 where this matter is 
discussed in detail. 
192The question of whether or not such an offence warrants summary dismissal depends on circum-
stances such as the type of business that the employer conducts (see Schneier and London v Bennett 
1927 TPD 346 at 355). 
193see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A" Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 97 and C 
Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 158. 
194see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 96. 
195see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 95-95; MSM 
Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP OIMer The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair 
Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 4-5 as well as Griind/ing v Beyers 1967 (2) SA 131 fY'I) at 141. 
(See, however, Martin Brassey's argument in "The Common Law Right to a Hearing before Dismissal" 
(1993) 9 SAJHR 1n.) A public servant is nevertheless entitled to rely on the maxim audi alteram partem 
when his employer wants to dismiss him in terms of a statutory provision (see Administrator of the Trans-
vaal & Others v Traub & Others (1989) 10 /W 823 (A) at 827D-E). In Administrator, Transvaal & Others v 
Zenzile & Others (1991) 12 /W 259 (A) at 270G-I the appellate dMsion held that a public servant would also 
be entitled to an enquiry where he is dismissed in terms of his contract and not in terms of a statutory 
authority. 
196see Alan Rycroft and Barney JordaanA Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 96. 
70 
Common Law 
does not have to consider alternatives to dismissal. 197 It also does not have. to provide 
reasons for dismissat 198 The common law also allows the employer to justify a dis-
missal by facts which only became known after the dismissal.1 S9 
2.4.10.3 Termination of the Contract by Giving Notice 
In terms of common law contract principles, 200 contracts of employment which have 
been entered into for indefinite periods201 may be terminated--by-either party giving 
notice of such termination202 or by making payment in lieu of notice. 203 
The employer and employee may either expressly or impliedly provide for termination by 
way of notice in their contract. 204 They may also agree on the notice period as well as 
when and how notice must be given. Where they have not agreed on the notice period, 
1971bid. 
198see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed {1992) 97 as well as 
Nchobaleng v Director of Education (Tvl) & Another 1954 {1) SA 432 (T) at 438. 
199c Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 159 explains this as follows, "A 
master may justify his dismissal of an employee by proof of conduct justifying dismissal without notice, 
although he was ignorant of such conduct at the time of the dismissal, since the right to dismiss does not 
depend on the master's knowledge or ignorance, but on the conduct of the servant". See also Alan Rycroft 
and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed {1992) 97. 
200see RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 483-485 as well as AJ Kerr The Princi-
ples of the Law of Contract 4 ed (1989) 398 for a discussion on the general principles of the law of contract 
in this regard. 
201rhere are, however, writers who have argued that the implied duty of good faith could be used to 
extend to employers a duty not to terminate a contract of indefinite duration without a good reason (see 
John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed {1993) 53-54 as well as PJ Pretorius and DJM Pitman 
"Good Cause for Dismissal: The Unprotected Employee and Unfair Dismissal· in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, 
DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D Van Zyl Smit (eds) Labour Law (1991) 133 at 139). Fixed term 
contracts may normally not be terminated on notice before the expiry of the term, unless otherwise pro-
vided for by the contract (see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 54; Alan Rycroft 
and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 87 as well as C Norman-Scoble The 
Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 314). 
2021t is considered to be a residual term of the contract of employment. See John Grogan Riekert's Basic 
Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 52; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 
ed (1992) 86 and 88; PJ Pretorius and DJM Pitman "Good Cause for Dismissal: The Unprotected Employee 
and Unfair Dismissal" in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D Van Zyl Smit 
(eds) Labour Law (1991) 133 at 138 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa 
(1956) 169. 
203see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 88 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jor-
daan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 89-90. 
204see SR van Jaarsvek:f and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suld-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 156 
and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 88. 
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the courts have held that it must be a period which is reasonable under the circum-
stances. 205 Usually, the periodicity of payment is considered to be the most important 
factor.206 
In practice, the fact that both parties can terminate the contract by giving notice, is of 
little value to the employee as he is usua1Jy207 intent on keeping his job. 208 But for the 
employer this right has important implications regarding the amount of control which it 
can exercise over the emptoyee. Grogan209 states that 
The employer's unfettered power to terminate on notice is generally regarded as the cen-
tral instrument which ensures the preservation of his power over his employees. 
Beatty210 explains the implications of the right to dismiss on notice as follows 
Far from a means of self-actualization, the social control of what the individual does that is 
implicit in this power of termination, carries with It the potential for the complete manipula-
tion of that person. 
This right is far more important than its right to dismiss an employee for serious mis-
conduct. 211 In the latter instance, the employer must have a reason for the employee's 
dismissal, namely a serious breach of the contract. Accordingly, the reason may come 
205see Tiopaizi v Bulawayo Municipality 1923 AD 317 at 326. See also SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck 
Kompendium van Suid-Alrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 157 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 88. 
206see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AlrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 157 
and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 88. 
207There are exceptions where the employee has the greater bargaining power (see MSM Brassey, E 
Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour 
Practice in South African Law (1987) 5-6). 
208see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 87 note 561 
where they state that, •From the employee's point of view, his or her own right to terminate on notice is 
cold comfort in the absence of opportunities for suitable alternative employmern-. See also MSM Brassey, 
E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour 
Practice in South African Law (1987) 6. 
209John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 53. 
210oavid M Beatty •Labour is not a Commodity- in Barry J Reiter and John Swan (eds) Studies in Contract 
Law (1980) 328. 
211 See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 86. 
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under the scrutiny of the courts where the employee questions the lawfulness of his dis- .. 
missai.212 
But where the employer dismisses an employee by giving him the required notice, the 
reason for dismissal plays no role.213 All that is required is that the employer must have 
given the relevant notice and that it has done so in accordance with the agr~ed provi-
sions or the common law.214 Thus, the employer does not have to have a reason for 
dismissai.215 Where it does have a reason-, it may be a completely. arbitrary one and the 
employer is under no obligation to inform the employee thereof.216 Should it elect to tell 
the employee the reason, the latter will be unable to question either the lawfulness or the 
fairness thereof.217 The courts will also not be able to scrutinise the given reason.218 
212see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 eel (1993) 88 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jor-
daan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel (1992) 87. See also Sigwebela v Huletts Refineries Ltd 
(1980) 11 IW 51 (N) at 51H-52A. The court's investigation will nevertheless be restricted-to the lawfulness 
of the reason. The fairness thereof will not be be considered (see the Sigwebela-case at 54G-H). 
213see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 eel (1993) 53 where he states that, " ... neither the 
employer nor the employee is required to show any good cause for terminating the contract, or to inform 
the other of such reasons as there may be, or to follow any special procedure before termination". See also 
Grogan at 88. See further PJ Pretorius and DJM Pitman "Good Cause for Dismissal: The Unprotected 
Employee and Unfair Dismissal" in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D Van 
Zyl Smit (eds) Labour Law (1991) 133 at 134 and MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier 
The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 3. In 
addition, see Embling v Headmaster, St Andrews College (Grahamstown) and Another 1991 (4) SA 458 (E) 
at 467-468C. 
214see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 eel (1993) 88 and MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH 
Cheadle and MP OIMer The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law (1987) 3. 
215see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 eel (1993) 53; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel (1992) 86-87 and C Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Ser-
vant in South Africa (1956) 169. 
216see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 eel (1993) 53. Implied in this is the fact that there 
is no obligation on the employer to afford the employee an enquiry. 
217see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 eel (1993) 53 as well as Alan Rycroft and Barney 
Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel (1992) 87. The employee is not entitled to an enquiry 
during which he can ask for the reason or, where it has been given, to question Its lawfulness or fairness. 
But Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan point out (at 107-108) that, in terms of the decision in Sibiya & 
Another v Administrator, Natal & Another (1991) 12 /W 530 (D) at 532E-G public servants may be entitled to 
a hearing on the ground of the audi alteram partem principle. They nevertheless point out (in note 704) that 
the matter is far from settled. See also John Grogan ·unfair Dismissal of 'Contractual' Public Sector 
Employees• (1990) 11 IW 655 at 664 and PJ Pretorius and DJM Pitman •Good Cause for Dismissal: The 
Unprotected Employee and Unfair Dismissal• in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Mur-
ray and D Van Zyl Smit (eds) Labour Law (1991) 133 at 142. See also Embling v Headmaster, St Andrews 
College (Grahamstown) and Another 1991 (4) SA 458 (E) at 467 where the court held that, "[t]he rules of 
natural justice - succinctly expressed in the maxim audi alteram partern - have no application in the field of 
contract Contractual rights and obligations are governed by the law of contract. .. As the applicant's 
employment was terminated In accordance wittT the terms of contract he was not entitled to a hearing prior 
to the termination of the agreements. Neither respondent was obliged to give the applicant reasons for his 
dismissal·. 
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The right furthermore increases the employer's bargaining power vis-a-vis the employee. 
Prior to the conclusion of the contract of employment, the applicant's weak social posi-
tion forces him to agree to the employer's terms and conditions.219 But during the 
employment relationship, the fear of losing his job through notice will also play an impor-
tant role in the employee's preparedness to agree to new or additional terms and condi-
tions or to agree to changes to the original terms and conditions of employment. Bras-
sey220 summarises the practical effect for the employee of the right to dismiss by giving 
notice as follows 
The common law, in short, offers little protection against arbitrariness. It allows the party 
with the greater bargaining power to extract any bargain he wants, however oppressive, 
perverse or absurd it may be, provided that it is not illegal or immoral. It allows him to 
change it when it no longer suits him, by threatening to terminate the relationship unless 
the other party submits to the change. It allows him to flout the bargain whenever he 
likes ... 
It is submitted in conclusion that the employer's right to terminate the contract in this 
manner negates the relational aspect of the contract of employment221 and works 
against any notion of a right to a job or job security. In the words of Norman-Scoble222 
The mere fact that one person has employed another gives neither party a vested right to a 
continuance of such legal relationship for an indefinite period, consequently it is com-
petent for either party to terminate the contractual relationship ... provided he gives the 
other adequate notice thereof. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The common law clearly favours the employer. It allows the employer to impose the 
terms of the contract of employment as it essentially gives no effect to the social and 
economic realities surrounding the employment relationship. 223 
Upon conclusion of the contract of employment, it not only provides the legal basis for 
the employer's right to manage the employee, but also strengthens and promotes this 
21 Ssee Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 87. 
219see par 2.2 above. 
2201n MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP OIMer The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals 
and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 5. 
221 See par 2.4.1 above. 
222c Norman-Scoble The Law of Master and Servant in South Africa (1956) 169. 
223see par 2.2 above. 
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right in a number of ways. Through the subordination element of the contract of employ-
ment, the employer acquires the right to give instructions to the employee. 224 Through 
residual terms such as the duty to be respectful, 225 to work in a competent manner226 
and to act in good faith,227 this right of the employer is strengthened. Furthermore, the 
fact that these residual terms are phrased in such wide terms228 enhances the 
employer's prerogative as it affords the employer a wide interpretation of these duties. 
However, in view of the recent appellate division'-s decision in-Council for Scientific & 
Industrial Research v Fijen229 that the residual term to act in good faith is reciprocal in 
nature,230 the employee's position vis-a-vis the employer may be strengthened. The 
reciprocal nature of this duty entitles the employee to question the employer's conduct 
regarding him and the scope of this duty allows him to give a broad interpretation to it. 
The right to dismiss by giving the required notice undoubtee!IY plays the most important 
role in enforcing and strengthening the employer's right to manage.231 The fear of 
losing his job through notice and with no consideration to the concept of fairness, plays 
a pivotal role in the employee's preparedness to follow instructions and to comply with 
his other contractual duties. It also plays a crucial role in the employee's preparedness 
to agree to changes to the original terms and conditions of employment. 
The common law is also antagonistic towards a system of collective bargaining. At most, 
it permits freedom of association in the sense that nothing prevents employees from 
224see par 2.3.1 above. 
225see par 2.4.4 above. 
226see par 2.4.6 above. 
227 See par 2.4.5 above. 
228see the comments made in this regard in pars 2.4.4-2.4.6 above. 
229(1996) 17IW18 (A). 
230rhe court held (at 260-F) that, ~[i]t is well established that the relationship between employer and 
employee is in essence one of trust and confidence and that, at common law, conduct clearly inconsistent 
therewith entitles the 'innocent party' to cancel the agreement ... •. See also Angehm & Piel v Federal Cold 
Storage Co Ltd 1908 TS 761 at 777-na and Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd v Federal Council of Retail & 
Allied Workers Union & Others {1991) 12 /W 1032(LAC)at1037G. 
231 See par 2.4.10.3 above where this rlght is discussed. 
75 
Common Law 
forming and joining trade unions.232 However, by exercising its property rights, the 
employer may deny trade union officials access to its premises233 and, by exercising its 
superior bargaining strength, it may oblige an employee to cancel his trade union mem-
bership or to agree not to become a member.234 In addition, it brands the exercising of 
collective rights, such as the right to bargain, to strike and to picket, as breaches of 
employees' individual contracts of employment, 235 requiring a judicial form of settlement 
for which individualised, contractual remedies are prescribed. 236 
The common law's subscribing to the concept of freedom of contract which allows the 
employer to discriminate when selecting people for employment, 237 brings it into direct 
conflict with the Constitution238 which specifically prohibits unfair discrimination on 
grounds such as race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, age, disability et 
cetera.239 In addition, the common law's emphasis on lawfulness240 and its virtua1241 
negation of the concept of fairness, is also contrary to the Constitution which affords 
everyone the right to fair labour practices in the conducting -of labour rel~tions.242 Fur-
thermore, the common law's "antagonistic" approach to the collective aspect of industrial 
232-rhis is because the common law permits people to do anything which is not prohibited by law or which 
does not interfere with the rights of others (see AA Landman "Freedom of Association in South African 
Labour Law" in Labour Law 89 at 90). 
233see AA Landman "Freedom of Association in South African Labour Law'' in Labour Law 89 at 90. 
234see par 2.2 above where this matter is discussed. 
235see R v Smit 1955 (1) SA 239 (C) at 241H-142C; Ngewu & Others v Union Co-Operative Bark & Sugar 
Co 1982 (4) SA 390 (N) at 405E-F; Egbep Ltd v Black Allied Mining & Construction Workers' Union & 
Others 1985 (2) SA 402 (T) and Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & 
Others (1986) 7 IW 108 ~at 115E-I; 117H-118A and 120C-D. See further par 6.2 of chapter 6 where this 
matter is discussed in greater detail. 
236see Paul Pretorius "Status Quo Relief and the Industrial Court: The Sacred Cow Tethered" (1983) 4 /W 
167 at 173. See also par 6.2 of chapter 6 where these remedies are discussed in greater detail. 
237 See par 2.2 above in this regard. 
238This refers to the final constitution entitled the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996 published as notice 2083 in Government Gazette 17678 of 18 December 1996 (hereafter the Constitu-
tion). 
239see s 9 of the Constitution which deals with equality. 
24DThis is partJcular1y evident in the employer's right to dismiss by merely giving the required notice (see 
par 2.4.10.3 above where this right is discussed). 
241The courts have on occasion required that the employer's instructions must not only be lawful but also 
reasonable (see note 79 in par 2.4.2.2 above). 
242see s 23(1) of the Con~itution. 
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relations243 also brings it into direct conflict with the Constitution. The latter affords 
employees the right to associate244 and to strike.245 It also affords trade unions the 
right to organise246 and to engage in collective bargaining.247 
Clearly, legislation was necessary to bring the employment relationship in line with the 
Constitution and to address the unequal bargaining power between the parties. The 
legislature, often in response to collective demands of workers and their trade 
unions,248 introduced legislation which-prescribed minimum terms and conditions of 
employment. 249 It is currently in the process of drafting legislation which will protect 
applicants for jobs and employees against all forms of unfair discrimination. 250 It has 
introduced legislation which infused the employment relationship with the concept of fair-
ness. 251 Of principal importance in this regard was the statutory protection of employ-
ees against arbitrary dismissai.252 In addition, the legislature introduced legislation 
which dealt with the collective dimension of labour law.253 
In the next chapter the role of legislation in the individual employment relationship and its 
impact on the employer's right to manage are considered. 
243see the discussion earlier in this paragraph. 
244see s 23(2)(a). 
245see s 23(2)(c). 
246see s 23(4)(b). 
247see s 23(5). 
248see Paul Pretorius "Status Quo Relief and the Industrial Court: The Sacred Cow Tethered" (1983) 4 /W 
167 at 172. 
249see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3 in this regard. 
250see the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment and Occupational Equity Statute pub-
lished as Notice 804 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996. 
251 This was originally done through the introduction of the unfair labour practice definition in s 1 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1956. See par 3.1 of chapter 3 in this regard. 
252fhis was originally achieved through the unfair labour practice definition in s 1 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1956 as interpreted by the industrial court. It culminated in the right afforded in s 185 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 to every employee not to be unfairly dismissed. For a discussion of the development of 
the law regarding unfair dismissal, see pars 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 of chapter 3. 
253see chapter 4 in this regard. 
CHAPTER3 
THE INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATION ON TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
South African labour legislation has not challenged the basic common law premise that 
the employment relationship is a contractual one 1 and that the employer has the right to 
utilise and control the labour potential of the employee. 
However, it has imposed limitations on the employer's right to manage the employee in 
various ways. The court in R v Canqan2 explained the effect of legislation on the 
employer's right to manage as follows 
It appears to me that [the statutory provision concerned in that case] is designed to pro-
tect the interests of employees and to safeguard their rights, and Its effect is to limit the 
common law rights of employers and to enlarge the common law rights of employees. The 
history of social legislation discloses that for a considerable number of years there has 
been progressive encroachment on the rights of employers in the interests of workmen 
and all employees. 
The first legislation in this regard was introduced in 1911 when the Mines and Works Act 
12 of 1911 was promulgated. 3 This Act represented the first legislation on health and 
safety in the mines and was a response to the danger and harmfulness of mining. 4 
1 See the Basic Conditions of Employment Act which inter alia deals with aspects of the contract of employ-
ment such as notice periods (sees 14) and the furnishing of a certificate of service upon termination of a 
contract of service (sees 15). See also the Wage Act 5 of 1957 (hereafter the Wage Act} which also deals 
with aspects of the contract of employment such as the issuing of a certificate upon termination of the con-
tract (sees 8(1)(s)} and payment in lieu of notice of termination of the contract (sees 8(1)(u)}. See further 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which inter alia regulates the transfer of a contract of employment (sees 
197). The Act also regulates the position of contracts of employment vis-a-vis collective agreements and 
arbitration awards (sees 199). 
21955 (3) SA 360 (E) at 367H-368A. 
3This Act was amended in 1926 (see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 82). 
4see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 78 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan 
A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) .316-317 for a discussion of the main objectives of this 
Act It was later replaced by the Mines and Works Act 25 of 1956 (hereafter the Mines and Works Act)(see 
Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 318) which was in tum 
repealed by the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (hereafter the Minerals Act)( see s 68(1) thereof). This Act came into 
operation on 1 January 1992. Chapter V of this Act deals with safety and health in the mines (see SR van 
Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Abeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 420-422 where they 
discuss this Act). The health and safety provisions of the latter Act have been replaced by the provisions of 
the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 (hereafter the Mine Health and Safety Act) (see clause 8 of 
schedule 3 to the Act In terms of which the safety and health provisions of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 are 
repealed). This Act, with the exception of s 86(2) and (3), came into operation on 15 January 1997 (see 
notice R 4, 1997 in Government Gazette 17725 of 15 January 1997). 
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Health and safety in other industries was first regulated by the Factories Act 28 of 1918. 
The Act declared certain processes to be noxious. It regulated issues such as ventila-
tion, sanitation and nuisances in the workplace and made provision for the appointment 
of inspectors to ensure compliance with the Act. 5 
Between 1910 and 1924, South African workers, particularly those in the mining industry, 
became more socially aware and assertive. They tried to pressurise Government 
through strike action to introduce legislation which would protect them against exploita-
tion by employers. 6 The Government subsequently introduced a number of statutes 
aimed at providing employees with minimum terms and conditions of employment. 
The first statute was the Regulation of Wages, Apprent!ces and lmprovers Act 29 of 
1918. It regulated minimum wages and targeted primarily women and juveniles who were 
being exploited in so-called sweat-shop industries. 7 The Wage Act 27 of 19258 provided 
for the establishment of minimum wage rates in industries where collective bargaining 
structures were either non-existent or under-developed.9 The first legislation which regu-
lated minimum terms and conditions of employment other than minimum wages were 
the Shops and Offices Act 41 of 193910 and the Factories, Machinery and Building Work 
Act 22 of 1941. These Acts 11 prescribed terms and conditions such as the maximum 
weekly working hours, minimum overtime rates and paid leave. 
5see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 317 where they 
discuss this Act. In 1941, this Act was replaced by the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act 22 of 
1941 (for a discussion of this Act, see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 95 and 
149). The latter Act was replaced by the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act 6 of 1983 (for a discussion 
of this Act, see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 318-
328) which was in tum repealed by the Occupational Health and Safety Act (see s 49 of the Act). 
Ssee MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals 
and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 8. 
7For a discussion of this Act, see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 
ed (1992) 312. 
8For a discussion of this Act, see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 81 and 146 
and Alan Rycroft and Barney JordaanA Guide to South African LabourLaw2 ed (1992) 312. 
9see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 81 and 146. This Act was repealed by 
the Wage Act 44 of 1937 which was in tum repealed by the Wage Act 5 of 1957 (see Alan Rycroft and 
Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 312). 
1 Osee Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 299 where this 
Act is discussed. 
11The Basic Conditions of Employment Act consolidated the issue of minimum terms and conditions of 
employment by repealing the Shops and Offices Act 41 of 1939 as well as those sections of the Factories, 
Machinery and Building Work Act 22of1941 which dealt with minimum terms and conditions of employ-
ment. See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 299 where 
this Act is discussed. 
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After the 1922 strike by mine workers, 12 the Government realised the collective strength 
of workers and in order to contain further industrial unrest, introduced the Industrial Con-
ciliation Act 11 of 1924.13 This Act represented South Africa's first comprehensive piece 
of labour legislation on collective bargaining and the resolution of disputes between 
employers and employees.14 It was repeatedly amended until its repeal by the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 36 of 1937 which was in turn replaced by the Industrial Conciliation Act 
28 of 1956. This Act became the new basis for labour legislatfon regarding collective 
bargaining.15 It was later renamed the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.16 The Act was 
extensively amended over the years. Some of the most important amendments 17 were 
introduced in response to the suggestions made by the Wiehahn Commission of 
lnquiry.18 
Of particular importance was the introduction of the unfair labour practice concept 19 and 
the industrial court20 which was afforded jurisdiction to interpret and develop the con-
12Which became known as the Rand Rebellion (see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed 
(1996) 79). . 
13For a discussion of the events which led to the promulgation of this Act, see Sonia Bendix Industrial 
Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) n-ao. 
14For a discussion of the Act and its aims, see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed 
(1996) 81 as well as D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Rela-
tions Act of 1995 (1996) 3-6. 
15see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 87. 
1frrhe Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 was repealed by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (sees 212 
read with schedule 6 thereto) which came into operation on 11 November 1996 (see Proclamation R 66 of 
1996 in Government Gazette 17516 of 1 November 1996 headed Commencement of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 (Act No 66of1995) and the Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1996 (Act No 42of1996). 
17see the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979, the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 95 
of 1980, the Labour Relations Amendment Act 57of1981, the Labour Relations Amendment Act 51 of 1982 
and the Labour Relations Amendment Act 2 of 1983. 
18see the Report of the Commission of Inquiry imo Labour Legislation RP 47 /1979. 
19rhis was done in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979. The original purpose 
with the unfair labour practice provision was to protect minority groups from unfair practices by majority 
groups (see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 96 and 98). 
20rhis was done in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979. 
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cept.21 Through its interpretation of the unfair labour practice concept, the industrial 
court infused both collective and individual labour law with the concept of fairness. 
The fairness requirement affected every aspect of the employer's right to manage 
employees.22 The most far-reaching consequence of this requirement was, however, 
the limitation of the employer's right to dismiss by giving notice.23 The fact that it was no 
longer sufficient for a dismissal to be lawful, that the employer had to have a reason for 
dismissal and that that reason- had-to be a faiF- one, significaAtly affected the employer's 
right to manage. It could no longer force employees to comply with its instructions or to 
accept changes to their terms and conditions of employment by threatening them with 
dismissal on notice. 24 
The fairness requirement also impacted on the employer's decision-making power 
regarding collective bargaining. One of the most important _restrictions was the duty to 
bargain developed by the industrial court.25 This duty restricted the employer's right to 
decide whether or not to recognise a trade union as the representative of its employees. 
It also restricted its right to decide whether or not to bargain with a trade union about an 
employment matter or matters. 
The employer's right to manage their employees was also restricted by the 
Apprenticeship Act 37 of 1944. This was the first statute to regulate the training of 
employees.26 It made the training or retraining of employees the employer's 
responsibility and restricted the Government's role to a supporting one. 27 
21 See s 17(11) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. 
22The impact of the unfair labour practice definition on the various aspects of the employer's right to 
manage is pointed out where those various aspects are discussed in this chapter. 
23see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where the dismissal of employees by giving the required notice is dis-
cussed. See also par 3.4.3 below where the statutory restriction of this right is discussed. 
24see pars 2.4.10.3 and 2.5 of chapter 2 where the implications of the right to dismiss on notice for the 
employer's right to manage were discussed. 
25see note 27 in chapter 4 where the development of this duty by the industrial court is discussed. 
26statutes such as the Training of Artisans Act 38 of 1951 and the In-Service Training Act 95 of 1979 had 
similar objectives. These Acts were all repealed by the Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 (hereafter the 
Manpower Training Act) (sees 58(1) of the Act read with the schedule attached thereto). See also Sonia 
Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 95 and 158. 
27see JV du Plessis, MA Fouch6, B Jordaan and MW van Wyk A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2 ed 
(1996) 115. 
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The most important statutes currently in force regarding labour relations are the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act,28 the Wage Act,29 the Minerals Act, the Public Service 
Act,30 the Occupational Health and Safety Act,31 the Mine Health and Safety Act, the 
Manpower Training Act,32 the Labour Relations Act, 199533 and the Constitution. 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act prescribes general minimum terms and condi-
tions of employment, 34 other than wages, for employees in offices, factories and 
shops35 as well as for farm workers36 and domesticworkers;37 Minimum terms and 
conditions of employment, including minimum wages, may also be prescribed in terms 
of the Wage Act38 in respect of those employees who are not covered by collective 
agreements.39 In addition, the Minerals Act40 provides minimum terms and conditions 
28see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 138-146; SR van Jaarsveld and BPS 
van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 280-290 and Alan Rycroft and Barney 
Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 299-311 for a discussion of the-Act. 
29see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 146-148; SR van Jaarsveld and BPS 
van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 290-301 as well as Alan Rycroft and 
Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 311-316 for a discussion of the Act. 
30see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 304-
305 for a discussion of this Act. 
31see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 95 and 149 where she discusses this 
Act. 
32see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 158-160 for a discussion of the Act. 
33For an overview of the history of the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, which culminated in the 
promulgation of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 see John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed 
(1993) 6-7; Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 87, 96-97, 100-102 and D du Toit, 
D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 3-39. 
34see the long title of the Act. Supplementing the Act are regulations giving the maximum rates of 
remuneration before an employee is excluded from the provisions of the Act and the prescribed manner in 
which the employee's wage must be paid. 
35see s 1. 
36see s 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 104 of 1992. 
37 See s 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 137 of 1993 in terms of which domestic 
workers in private households were also included in this Act. 
38see the long title of the Act. 
39see s 2(3)(a) of the Act. See also Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 146 and 
SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 291. The 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Wage Act are to be replaced by a new Act which will be 
entitled the Employment Standards Act (see The Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment 
Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 9). 
40rogether with the regulations made in terms of the Act or those regulations made in terms of the Mines 
and Works Act 27 of 1956 which have not been repealed in terms of s 63 of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991. 
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of employment for certain categories of workers employed by the mines whereas public 
servants' terms and conditions of employment are regulated by the Public Service Act. 41 
As in the past, different Acts regulate health and safety in the mining industry and other 
industries. Health and safety in the mining industry will in future be regulated by the Mine 
Health and Safety Act42 whereas the Occupational Health and Safety Act imposes 
stringent health and safety conditions in the workplaces of other industries. 43 
The Manpower Training Act's principal aim is to regulate the training-of apprentices.44 It 
also allows for and encourages the establishment of training facilities suitable to the 
requirements of industry. 45 
Although primarily aimed at regulating collective bargaining and related issues (which 
can, of course, affect the employer's right to manage),46 the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
has a more direct impact on employer prerogative. The most important provisions of the 
Act in this regard are to be found in chapter VIII and the Code, which regulate the 
employer's powers to dismiss employees,47 and the residual unfair labour practices 
41 See SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 304-
305 for a discussion of the various terms and conditions of public servants regulated by this Act. See also 
John Grogan Riekert's Basic Employment Law 2 ed (1993) 6. 
42This Act's long title states that the purpose of the Act is. "[t]o provide for protection of the health and 
safety of employees and other persons at mines and, for that purpose-
to promote a culture of health and safety; to provide for the enforcement of health and safety measures; to 
provide for appropriate systems of employee, employer and State participation in health and safety mat-
ters; to establish representative tripartite institutions to review legislation, promote health and enhance 
properly targeted research; to provide for effective monitoring systems and inspections, investigations and 
inquiries to improve health and safety; to promote training and human resources development; to regulate 
employers' and employees' duties to identify hazards and eliminate, control and minimise the risk to health 
and safety; to entrench the right to refuse to work in dangerous conditions; and to give effect to the public 
international law obligations of the Republic relating to mining health and safety ... •. 
43see the Act's long title which sets out the Act's purpose as follows, "[t]o provide for the health and safety 
of persons at work and for the health and safety of persons in connection with the use of plant and 
machinery; the protection of persons other than persons at work against hazards to health and safety aris-
ing out of or in connection with the activities of persons at work; to establish an advisory council for 
occupational health and safety .. .". See also Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 
149-154 and SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-Afrikaanse Arbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 
411-420 where they discuss the aims and major provisions of the Act 
44see the long title of the Act See also Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 158. 
45see the long title of the Act See also Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 158. 
46see chapter 4 for a discussion of the collective bargaining provisions ot the Labour Relations Act. 1995 
and their impact on the employer's right to manage. 
47see par 3.4.3 below where these provisions of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 are discussed. 
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provisions in Schedule 7 which regulate disciplinary actions short of dismissal, such as 
suspension,48 and other actions or omissions by the employer which may constitute 
unfair labour practices such as unfair discrimination. 49 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 also contains an important innovation in that it now also 
regulates, addresses and limits the employer's contractual freedom to enter into employ-
ment contracts with persons of its own choosing. 50 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 also accepts the premise that rights granted to a person 
may be of little or no value unless effective mechanisms exist for the enforcement of such 
rights. A significant feature of this Act is therefore an emphasis on the creation of effec-
tive mechanisms for the resolution of disputes between employer and employee, includ-
ing those which may affect employer prerogative.51 
In future, the Constitution will also play an important role in the restriction of employers' 
right to manage. The legislature will have to ensure that labour legislation is in accord-
ance with the Bill of Rights52 and every court, tribunal or forum will have to promote the 
48see clause 2(1 )(c). 
49see clause 2(1 )(a) and (b). 
50see s 5 of the Act which deals with the protection of persons seeking employment against victimisation 
as well as clause 2(1), read with clause 2(2)(a) of Schedule 7, which deals with residual unfair labour prac-
tices against applicants for jobs by employers. See further par 3.2 below where these statutory restrictions 
on an employer's right to manage are discussed. 
51see the preamble to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists as one of its aims the providing of simple 
procedures for the resolution of labour disputes through statutory conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
and through Independent alternative dispute resolution services accredited for that purpose. See also the 
Ministerial Legal Task Team Explanatory Memorandum notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 
1 O February 1995 at 122. 
521n terms of s 8(1) of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights applies to all law •and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state•. The legislature gave effect to this provision when the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 was drafted. One of the purposes of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 contained 
in s 1 thereof is that the Act must give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by the Con-
stitution's labour relations provisions contained in its Bill of Rights. See also the foreword to the Green 
Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment and Occupational Equity Statute published as notice 804 
of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996 where it is stated that ·reJradicating all forms of dis-
crimination in the labour market is one of the fundamental objectives of the Government. This is demanded 
by the constitution and is an integral part of processes that would help achieve social justice in South 
Africa•. 
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spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation and 
when developing the common law. 53 
Of particular importance in this regard are the equality54 and labour relations provi-
sions55 of the Constitution. The equality provisions impact on employers' right to decide 
whom to employ. 56 They also restrict unfair discrimination on arbitrary grounds as 
regards terms and conditions of employment between employees. 57 The Constitution's 
labour relations provisions affect employers· right to manage in that they subscribe to the 
concept of fairness in labour relations. 58 In addition, they also promote collective 
bargaining by providing a right to freedom of association59 and to strike. 60 
In this chapter, the statutory limitations on employer prerogative will be discussed. An 
analysis of these statutes shows that the limitations can take three basic forms. The first 
set of limitations limits or regulates the ability of the employer to enter into contracts of 
employment.61 The second set limits the powers of the employer vis-a-vis a person 
already in employment. 62 In this regard, a distinction can be made between the 
employer's right to give instructions63 and the terms and conditions of employment. 64 
53see s 39(2) of the Constitution. See also s 3(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which stipulates that 
any person when applying the Act, must interpret its provisions in compliance with the Constitution. Presid-
ing officers of the industrial court also gave due regard to the spirit, purport and objectives in chapter 3 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (hereafter the interim Constitution) (see, for 
instance, Association of Professional Teachers & Another v Minister, of Education & Others (1995) 16 /W 
1048 (IC) at 10778-E; George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 /W 571 (IC) at 584E-F as 
well as AC Sasson "Labour Law and the Constitution" 1994 (57) THRHR 498 et seq). 
54sees9. 
55sees23. 
56see par 3.2 below in this regard. 
57 See par 3.2 below in this regard. 
58see s 23(1) which affords "everyone ... [with) the right to fair labour practices". 
59see s 23(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. See further par 4.2.2 of chapter 4 in this regard. 
60see s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution. See also par 4.2.1 of chapter 4 In this regard. 
61 See par 3.2 below in this regard. 
62see par 3.3 below in this regard. 
63see par 3.3.2 below in this regard. 
64see par 3.3.3 below in this regard. 
85 
Legislation 
The third set limits or restricts the employer's right to discipline and to dismiss.65 
3.2 LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE EMPLOYER'S ABILITY TO ENTER 
INTO CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT 
An employer's discretion as to whom to select for employment has been limited to a 
certain extent by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. It prohibits an employer from 
employing anyone under the age of 15-years66 and requiring. or permitting a pregnant 
employee to work during the four weeks prior to the expected date of her confinement 
and for eight weeks thereafter.67 
The Manpower Training Act also limits the employer's right to decide whom to take on as 
an apprentice since it prohibits the employer from taking on anyone under the age of 15 
years.68 In addition, the Minister of Manpower may restrict the number of apprentices 
that an employer may employ. 69 
An employer's discretion as to whom to select for employment has also been limited to a 
significant extent by the Labour Relations Act, 1995. A person who has been refused 
employment may rely on the residual unfair labour practice contained in Schedule 7 70 to 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and argue that the employer has committed an unfair 
65see par 3.4 below in this regard. 
66section 17(a). See also s 17(1 )(c) of the Manpower Training Act in te~s of which persons under the age 
of 15 years are not allowed to bind themselves as apprentices. See further s 32 of the Minerals Act in terms 
of which mines are prohibited from allowing persons under the age of 16 years to work underground. The 
Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 
in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 64 proposes that children below 15 years should not 
work and that children below 18 years may not perform work which is inappropriate for that child's age or 
which is hazardous or harmful to their health. 
67section 17(b). The Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published 
as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 61 proposes that an employee 
may not work for six weeks after the birth of a child (unless her doctor certifies that she is flt to return to 
work). 
68see ss 13(2)(a) and 17(1)(c). 
69see s 13(2)(q). 
70see clause 2(2)(a), read with clause 2(1 )(a) of the transitional arrangements contained in Schedule 7 to 
the Labour Relations Act., 1995. This schedule contains the transitional arrangements pending the introduc-
tion of more comprehensive equal opportunity legislation (see Andre van Niekerk ·oiscrimination in Selec-
tion and Recruitmenr- (1995) 4(10) CLL 105). 
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labour practice in that it has either directly71 or indirectly72 unfairly discriminated73 
against him on an arbitrary ground. 7 4 
In practice, this means that an employer may no longer unfairly discriminate on grounds 
such as race, gender, sex, age, marital status et cetera when advertising vacant or new 
positions. 75 It may also not unfairly discriminate on such grounds when interviewing job 
applicants. 76 Furthermore, it may not unfairly discriminate on such grounds when decid-
ing whom to employ. 77 The employer may also not unfairly discriminate with regard to 
the terms and conditions on which employment is offered. 
Schedule 7,78 however, makes specific provision for affirmative action. Accordingly, if an 
employer can prove that its selection was based on considerations of affirmative action, 
it may be permitted to proceed with its selection of employees on this basis. 
In addition, Schedule 7 allows an employer to discriminate where it can-prove that the 
inherent requirements of the particular job 79 necessitate it. The Labour Relations Act, 
1995 does not indicate which test or tests should be used to determine whether such 
"inherent requirements" exist. It has been suggested80 that the criteria listed in the 
(English) Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (hereafter the Sex Discrimination Act) for judging 
the validity of "inherent requirements" could be used for the purposes of Schedule 7. The 
71 For a discussion of "direct discrimination", see Andre van Niekerk's "Discrimination in Selection and 
Recruitment" (1995) 4(10) CLL 105 at 106-107. 
72For a discussion of "indirect discrimination", see Andre van Niekerk's "Discrimination in Selection and 
Recruitment" (1995) 4(10) CLL 105 at 107. 
73For a discussion on the concept discrimination, see Andre van Niekerk's "Discrimination in Selection and 
Recruitment" (1995) 4(10) CLL 105 at 106. 
741ncluded are grounds such as race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital status or family 
responsibility. 
75see Andre van Niekerk's "Discrimination in Selection and Recruitment" (1995) 4(10) CLL 105 at 106-107. 
761t may, for instance, not require only those belonging to a particular race or of a specific sex to take tests 
to determine whether they can actually do the job. 
78see clause 2(2)(b). See further section 9(2) of the Constitution which also provides for affirmative action. 
79see clause 2(2)(c). The Constitution does not contain a similar provision. In this sense, the qualifications 
to the right of equality in Schedule 7 are broader than those in the Constitution (see Andre van Niekerk 
"Discrimination in Selection and Recruitment" (1995) 4(10) CLL 105at107). 
SOsee D du Tait, D WOOfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 403-404. 
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list includes criteria such as authenticity,81 the need to preserve decency or privacy,82 
the sex of the recipient of the service, 83 the nature or location of workplaces which 
require employees to live-in, 84 the nature of the establishment within which the work is 
done,85 customer preference where certain personal services are provided,86 statutory 
81 See s 7(2)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act which provides a defence where "the essential nature of the 
job calls for a man for reasons of physiology (excluding physical strength or stamina) or, in dramatic per-
formances or other entertainment, for reasons of authenticity, so that the physical nature of the job would 
be different if carried out by a woman". See Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD thesis 
University of South Africa (1992) 199 where she discusses this defence. She points out that the defence is 
generally seen as applying to actors and models. See also D du Tolt, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D 
Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 404 where they discuss this defence. 
- -
82see s 7(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act. In terms of this provision, an employer will have a defence 
where a job needs to be held by a man to preserve decency or privacy because It is likely to involve physi-
cal contact with men in circumstances where they might reasonably object to it being carried out by a 
woman or where the holder of the job is likely to do his work in circumstances where men might 
reasonably object to the presence of a women because they are in a state of undress or are using sanitary 
facilities. See Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD thesis University of South Africa (1992) 
199-210 where she discusses this defence. See also D du Tolt, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch 
and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 404. 
83see s 7(2)(ba) of the Sex Discrimination Act. In terms of this provision, a defence will exist where the 
employee must work and/or live in a private home and the ob entails physical or social contract with a per-
son living in the home or will allow knowledge of intimate details of the person's life. The defence enables 
personal companions and nurses to be restricted to the sex of the recipient of the service. See Carol Louw 
Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD thesis University of South Africa (1992) 201 for a discussion of this 
defence. 
84see s 7(2)(c) of the Sex Discrimination Act. In terms of this provision, a defence exists where the nature 
or location of the workplace requires employees to live-in and the premise is not equipped with separate 
sleeping accommodation and sanitary facilities for employees of different sexes and it is also not 
reasonable to expect the employer to equip the premises with such separate accommodation and facilities. 
See Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD thesis University of South Africa (1992) 201-202 for 
a discussion of this defence. 
85see s 7(2)(d) of the Sex Discrimination Act. In terms of this provision, a defence exists where the work 
must be done in a hospital, prison or other establishment for persons requiring special care, supervison or 
attention and those persons are all of one sex. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable that the job 
should be done by someone of the same sex. See Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD 
thesis University of South Africa (1992) 202 where she discusses this defence. 
861n terms of s 7(2)(e) of the Sex Discrimination Act a defence exists where the employee provides individ-
uals with personal services promoting their welfare or education and those services can most effectively be 
provided by a person of a particular sex. Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD thesis 
University of South Africa (1992) 203 points out that this defence is a "narrow exception· to the general rule 
that customer preference is not regarded as a defence. According to her, this defence envisages a situation 
where the efficacy of welfare services is linked to the sex of the provider, eg persons working in rape crisis 
centres. The defence relates to the effectiveness of the performance of services rather than mere customer 
preference. 
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provisions which prohibit the employment of a particular sex for the specific job87 and 
where the job involves the performance of duties in a country whose laws or customs 
are such that the duties could not be performed by a person of the other sex. 88 
The employer's right to decide whom to employ has further been restricted by the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995, 89 which brands the selective non-re-employment of an ex-
employee as a dismissal. 90 It is for the employer to prove that the selective non-re-
employment was fair.91 The employer will have to prove that its Teason for non-selection 
falls within one ·of the three broad categories of reasons for a fair dismissal. 92 It will also 
have to be careful that its ground for non-selection does not constitute an automatically 
unfair dismissal. 93 
The employer's right to decide whom to employ is also restricted bys 186(b) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. 94 In terms of this section, an_ employer which refuses to 
renew a fixed term contract may be guilty of an unfair dismissat95 if the employee had 
reasonable grounds to expect that it would be renewed. 
87see s 7(2)(f) of the Sex Discrimination Act as well as Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD 
thesis University of South Africa (1992) 203-204 where she discusses this provision. A South African exam-
ple of this defence is in the Minerals Act which prohibits females from working underground. 
88see s 7(2)(g) of the Sex Discrimination Act. See also Carol Louw Sex Discrimination in Employment LLD 
thesis University of South Africa (1992) 204 where she discusses this defence. 
89see s 186(d). See also par 3.4.3.1 below where the statutory definition of dismissal is discussed. 
OOi"his statutory provision has its origin in the appellate division's decision in National Automobile & Allied 
Workers Union (now known as National Union of Metalworkers of SA) v Borg-Warner (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 
ILJ 509 (A). It was necessary for the legislature to insert selective non-re-employment in the definition of 
dismissal as the aggrieved ex-employee would otherwise be without a remedy in terms of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995. It is further submitted that the residual unfair labour practice definition in Schedule 7 is 
probably not wide enough to cover this scenario and, even if it is, it must be borne in mind that the 
Schedule is merely transitionary. 
91 See s 192(2). 
92see par 3.4.3.3 below. 
93see s 187 as well as par 3.4.3.2 below where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. 
94see also par 3.4.3.1 below in this regard. 
95The legislature has branded such an action as a "dismissal". This was necessary as an aggrieved ex-
employee would otherwise have been without a remedy under the Labour Relations Act, 1995. He would 
also have found it difficult to pursue his action in terms of Schedule 7 as the definition of a residual unfair 
labour practice is not as wide as the unfair labour practice definition of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. 
Even if it could be argued that the definition is wide enough, it must be borne in mind that Schedule 7's 
provisions are merely transitlonary. 
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Furthermore, the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 protecting freedom of 
association96 also limit the employer's freedom to choose whom to employ. Essentially, 
these provisions have removed the employer's freedom to employ only non-unionised 
persons. In terms of s 5 of the Act, the employer may not require an applicant not to be a 
union member,97 or not to become a member98 or to resign as member.99 It may also 
not prevent an applicant from exercising any right conferred by the Labour Relations Act, 
1995, including his statutory right to freedom of association.100 In addition, the employer 
may not prejudice an applicant because of past, present or anticipated trade union mem-
bership, 101 or because of his participation in forming a trade union 102 or in its lawful 
activities. 103 It may also not prejudice an applicant because of his past, present or 
anticipated exercising of any right conferred by the Act, including the right to freedom of 
association. 104 
3.3 LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS DURING EMPLOYMENT 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Statutory restrictions on the employer's right to manage during employment can be 
divided into two broad categories namely those restrictions that impact on the 
employer's right to give instructions 105 and those that impact on the terms and condi-
tions of employment.106 
96see s s of the Act. 
97see subsec (2)(a)(i). 
98see subsec (2)(a)(ii). 
99see subsec (2)(a)(iii). 
1 OOsee subsec (2) (b) read with s 4. 
101see subsec (2)(c)(I). 
102see subsec (2)(c)(ii). 
103see subsec 2(c)(iii). 
104see s 5(2)(c)(v0 read withs 4 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
1 ossee par 3.3.2 below where these restrictions are discussed. 
106see par 3.3.3 where these restrictions are discussed. 
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3.3.2 Legislative Restrictions on the Employer's Right to Give Instructions 
The legislature has accepted that the employer has the right to utilise 107 and control 108 
the employee's labour potential. The legislature, however, has restricted this right of the 
employer through a number of statutory provisions. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 restricts the right to give instructions to a significant 
extent by requiring that-an instructions must- not only- be lawful but also fair or 
reasonable. It does this, albeit indirectly, through its requirement that a dismissal must be 
for a fair reason 109 read with the guideline in the Code 110 that the validity or 
reasonableness of a work rule must be considered when the fairness of a dismissal is 
determined.111 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 112 and the Mine H~alth and Saf~ty Act 113 also 
107see par 2.4.2 of chapter 2 where the employer's (common law) right to give instructions in respect of 
the employee's labour potential is discussed. 
108see par 2.4.3 of chapter 2 where the employer's (common law) right to control and inspect the work of 
the employee is discussed. 
109see s 188(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
110see clause 7(b)(i) thereof. 
111This requirement was first laid down by the ordinary courts (see par 2.4.2.2 of chapter 2 in this regard). 
Thereafter, the industrial court, while deciding the fairness of alleged unfair dismissal cases, prescribed this 
requirement (see National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Driefontein Consolidated Ltd (1984) 5 IW 101 
(IC) at 141F; Ntuli & Others v Utemaster Products Ltd (1985) 6 IW 508 (IC) at 518E-F; Building Construc-
tion & Allied Workers Union & Another v E Rogers & C Buchel CC & Another (1987) 8 IW 169 (IC) at 173A; 
Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Another v Wooltru Ltd Va Woolworths (Randburg) 
(1989) 10 IW 314 (IC) at 314H-1; Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA & Others v JM 
Jacobsohn (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 107 (IC) at 112E-F; Madia/av Vynne & Tedder t/a Thornville Engineering 
(1990) 11 /W 394 (IC) at 395F-H; Tubecon (Pty) Ltd and National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 
(1991) 12 /W 437 (ARB) at 445G-I; and Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd v Federal Council of Retail & Allied 
Workers Union & Others (1991) 12 IW 1032 (LAC) at 1036H-1; Corobrik Natal (Pty) Ltd and Construction & 
Allied Workers Union (1991) 12 IW 1140 (ARB) at 11450-E; National Union of Mineworkers of SA v Haggie 
Rand Ltd (1991) 12 IW 1022 (LAC) at 1028C-D; Ntsibande v Union Carriage & Wagon Co (Pty) Ltd (1993) 
14 IW 1566 (IC) at 15701-J; National Trading Co v Hiazo (1994) 15 IW 1304 (LAC) at 1307E-F; National 
Union of Mineworkers on behalf of Mokgotho v Greenside Colliery (1995) 16 IW 387 (LAC) at 388G; and 
Ellman v Mossgas (Pty) Ltd(1) (1995) 16 IW 946 OC) at 954-955). See also MSM Brassey E Cameron, MH 
Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South 
African Law {1987) 430 and PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Dismissal (1994) 
140-141. 
112-rhis Act deals with health and safety in industries other than the mining industry (sees 1 (3)(a)). It also 
does not apply In respect of any load line ship, fishing boat. sealing boat and whaling boat as defined in the 
Merchant Shipping Ad 57of1951 or any floating crane (sees 1(3)(b)). 
113This Act deals with health and safety In mines (see s 1 read with s 103 of the Act). 
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restrict the employer's right to give instructions. As with the employer's common law 
duty of care, 114 these Acts limit the employer's right to give instructions regarding the 
work that must be done, the manner in which it must be done as well as where it must be 
done, by subjecting such instructions to considerations of health and safety. 
The duties imposed by the Occupational Health and Safety Act 115 are more detailed 
than the common law duty of care.116 It provides for a general duty 117 as well as a 
number of specific duties 118 regarding health and safety. The general duty is contained 
ins 8(1) of the Act. Essentially, it is a codification of the common law duty of care.119 In 
terms of this provision, the employer must provide and maintain, as far as is reasonably 
practicable, a working environment which is safe and without risk to the health of its 
employees.120 
The words "working environment" have a wide application and cover not only the place 
- -
where the work must be done, but also the type of work and the manner in which it must 
be done. Consequently, an employer's instructions regarding any of these aspects of 
work must be given with due regard to the safety and health of employees. 
114see pars 2.4.2.2-2.4.2.4 of chapter 2 where the various aspects of this duty are discussed. 
11 SThe discussion will focus on the Occupational Health and Safety Act's restriction of the employer's right 
to give instructions. Cross-references to similar provisions in the Mine Health and Safety Act are made in 
footnotes. However, those provisions of the Mine Health and Safety Act that regulate the giving of instruc-
tions in circumstances perculiar to the mining industry will also be discussed in the text. 
116see pars 2.4.2.2-2.4.2.4 of chapter 2 where the various aspects of this duty are discussed. 
111see s 8(1). 
118see s 8(2). 
119See Cart Mischke and Christoph Garbers Safety at Work: A Guide to Occupational Health, Safety and 
Accident Compensation Legislation (1994) 20 where they state thats 8(1) •is, in effect, an affirmation of the 
duty imposed by the common law. 
1201n terms of s 2(1 )(a) of the Mine Health and Safety Act, the owner must ensure that, as far as reasonably 
practicable, the mine is designed, constructed and equipped to provide conditions for safe operation and a 
healthy working environment Section 2(1 )(b) obliges the owner to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, 
that the mine is operated and maintained in such a way that employees can perform their work without 
endangering their health and safety. The Mine Health and Safety Act also has a general duty for managers 
which is described in slmDar terms to that of employers in s 8(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
In terms of s 5(1) thereof, a manager must, to the extent that it Is reasonably practicable, provide and main-
tain a working environment which is safe and without risk to the health of employees. 
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In addition, the employer's right to give instructions is restricted to the extent that it is 
"reasonably practicable 11 121 for it to comply with its duty of health and safety. This 
criterion for compliance differs from the common law's one of "reasonableness" .122 It 
has been suggested that "practicability" on its own is a more stringent test than that of 
"reasonableness" .123 However, by linking it to that of "reasonableness", the legislature 
has made it less stringent.124 Nevertheless, the statutory criterion appears to be more 
stringent than that of the common law. Consequently, the statutory restriction of the 
employer's right to give instructions is probably more extensive than that of the common 
law. 
Section 8(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act lists a number of specific duties 
regarding health and safety which also restrict the employer's right to give instruc-
tions.125 The employer's right to tell the employee what work to do, is for instance, 
restricted by its duty to establish what hazards are attached to any work and what 
precautionary measures should be taken and the obligation to provide the necessary 
means to apply such precautionary measures. 126 It must also, as far as is reasonably 
practicable, not allow an employee to do any work unless the precautionary measures 
stipulated in the Act 127 have been taken.128 The employer must furthermore ensure 
that work is performed under the supervision of a person trained to understand the haz-
ards associated with it.129 
121The criterion in the Mine Health and Safety Act in respect of managers' general duty is also that of 
"reasonable practicability" (sees 5(1)}. 
122see pars 2.4.2.2-2.4.2.4 of chapter 2 where the common law duty is discussed. 
123see Carl Mischke and Christoph Garbers Safety at Work: A Guide to Occupational Health, Safety and 
Accident Compensation Legislation (1994) 18. 
124The criterion "reasonably practicable" is defined in s 1 of the Act and, in terms thereof, factors such as 
the severity and scope of the hazard or risk; the state of knowledge reasonably available concerning the 
hazard or risk and of any means of removing or mitigating that hazard or risk; the availability and suitability 
of means to remove or mitigate the hazard or risk; and the cost of removing or mitigating that hazard or 
risk in relation to the benefits derived therefrom will be taken into consideration. 
125see subsecs (a)-ij). 
126see s 8(2)(d). 
127 See s 8(2)(b) and (d) in this regard. 
128see s 8(2)(f). 
129see s 8(2)(~. See also s 7(1 )(e) of the Mine Health and Safety Act in terms of which a manager must 
ensure that work is perfonned under the general supervision of a person trained to understand the hazards 
associated with the work and who has the authority to ensure that the precautionary measures laid down 
by the manager are implemented. 
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Some of the specific duties listed in s 8(2) restrict the employer's right to instruct the 
employee as to the manner in which the work must be done. The employer, for example, 
must ensure that the production, processing, use, handling, storage or transport of arti-
cles or substances are done in a manner which is safe and does not hold any risks to 
health and safety.130 The employer's right to tell the employee where to work, is also 
restricted by a number of these specific duties. The employer, for example, must provide 
and maintain a plant which is safe and without risks to health.131 
The right of the employer to instruct the employee where to work has been extensively 
restricted by the Mine Health and Safety Act. The Act affords an employee the right to 
leave any working place whenever circumstances arise at that working place which, with 
reasonable justification, appear to that employee to pose a serious danger to his health 
or safety .132 The employee also has the right to leave a working place whenever the 
health and safety representative responsible for the working _place directs. that employee 
to leave that working place. 133 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, Minerals Act 134 and the Manpower Training 
Act135 restrict the employer's right to instruct an employee as to when he must work. 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act regulates both the maximum daily 136 and 
130see s 8(2)(c). See also s 8(1)(a) of the Mine Health and Safety Act in terms of which managers must 
establish health and safety policies that inter alia describe the organisation of work. 
131see s 8(2)(a). The industrial court has also limited an employer's right to instruct employees where to 
work by stipulating that employees may refuse to work in a place which they fear is unsafe, provided that 
their fear is real and reasonable under the circumstances. See SA Laundry, Dry Cleaning, Dyeing & Allied 
Workers Workers Union & Others v Advance Laundries Ltd t/a Stork Napkins (1985) 6 /W 544 (IC) at 568A. 
132see s 23(1)(a). The industrial court has also limited a mine's right to tell employees where to work by 
stipulating that employees may refuse to work in a place which they fear is unsafe, provided that their fear 
is real and reasonable under the circumstances. See National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Driefontein 
Consolidated Ud (1984) 5 /W 101 (IC). 
133see s 23(1)(b). 
134see those regulations to the Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956 which deal with hours of work of persons 
employed in mines and which have not been repealed in terms of s 63 of the Minerals Act. Cross-
references will be made to this Act in footnotes where the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employ-
ment Act are discussed. 
135cross-references will be made to this Act in footnotes where the provisions of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act are discussed. 
136see s 4. See also s 6 which provides that a shop worker's ordinary daily working hours may be 
extended by 15 minutes per day but that in the aggregate extensions may not exceed one hour in a week. 
See also s 13(2)(k) of the Manpower Training Act. in tenns of which the Minister may determine the maxi-
mum number of ordinary daily working hours to be worked by apprentices. Consider further the Green 
Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in 
Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 46 which proposes a maximum working day of nine 
ordinary hours and eight hours for employees who work six days per week. 
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weekly 137 hours that may be worked by an employee. It also prescribes the maximum 
ordinary working hours per shift for shift workers.138 The Act furthermore prescribes the 
maximum period during which an employee may be required to work on any particular 
day .139 Although it does not make provision for tea or coffee breaks, the Basic Condi-
tions of Employment Act does prescribe a meal interval and the duration thereof.140 It 
stipulates that the employee must consent to work overtime.141 It also regulates the 
maximum overtime that may be worked.142 In addition, the Act requires the employer to 
137 See s 2. Regulations to the Minerals Act also prescribe the maximum weekly hours that an employee of 
a mine may work. See also s 13(2) (k) of the Manpower Training Act in terms of which the Minister may 
determine the maximum ordinary weekly working hours to be worked by apprentices. See further the 
proposal contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute pub-
lished as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 46 to the effect that the 
maximum weekly hours of work should be 45 hours. -
138see s 5. 
139see s 1 in which the term "spread-over" is defined as well as s 3 which sets out the maximum spread-
overs. Consider also the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute pub-
lished as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 46 which proposes that 
employees should not work more than 12 hours in a day. 
140see s 7 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. See also s 13(2)(k) of the Manpower Training Act in 
terms of which the Minister may determine the meal intervals and the duration thereof for apprentices. Con-
sider also the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as notice 
156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 51 which proposes a meal interval of at 
least 30 minutes. It also suggests that an employee should be entitled to payment for meal intervals if the 
employee is required to remain in control of machinery or a vehicle during the meal interval, or if he works 
for longer than ten hours or if the employee is required by the employer to take a meal interval of longer 
than one and one-quarter hours. 
141 See s 8(1) as well as Moswane & Others v Quick Freeze (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 IW 473 (IC) at 4760 where 
the court stated in respect of s 8(1), "It can further be deduced that overtime might be considered to be 
voluntarily worked by an employee in the sense that he would not be obliged to work overtime if he elects 
not to do so·. See also Plascon Evans Paint (Natal) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others 
(1987) 8 IW 605 (0) at 605H and Masengane v Speedbox (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 IW 879 (IC) at 882F-H. Where 
an employer has dismissed employees who have refused to work voluntary overtime the court has held 
that their dismissal was unfair (see National Union of Textile Workers & Others v Jaguar Shoes (Pty) Ltd 
(1986) 7 IW 359 (IC) at 365C-O and Khan & Others v Rainbow Chicken Farms (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 IW 60 (IC) 
at 72A-B). Consider also the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute pub-
lished as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 47 which proposes that 
overtime must be voluntary. 
142see s 8. The industrial court has h01d in Masengane v Speedbox (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 IW 879 (IC) at 
882G that the dismissal of an employee who refuses to work overtime- in excess of the maximum hours 
stipulated in s 8 will be unfair. See also the regulations to the Minerals Act which prescribe the maximum 
overtime which may be worked by someone employed by a mine. See furthers 13(2)0) of the Manpower 
Training Act in terms of which the Minister of Manpow&r may stipulate the maximum period of overtime to 
be worked by apprentices. Consider further the Green Paper: Polley Proposals for a New Employment 
Standards Statute published as notice 156of1996 In Government Gazette 17002 of 23February1996 at 47 
which proposes a maximum of ten hours' overtime per week. 
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obtain the written permission of an inspector for an employee to work on Sundays.143 
However, the Act does not restrict the employer's right to insist that an employee works 
on a Public Holiday.144 The Act also prohibits an employer from requiring a pregnant 
employee to work four weeks prior to and eight weeks after her confinement. 145 
The Manpower Training Act restricts the employer's right to give instructions to an 
apprentice in various ways. Training boards, for instance, frame conditions of 
apprenticeship.146 The Minister, on the recommendation of a training board, may pres-
cribe the full-time training courses which apprentices must attenc:t, the period or periods 
of attendance and the intervals at which those courses must be attended.147 He may 
also prescribe the types of work in which the employer must provide practical training, 
and the proportion of the working hours during which the employer must provide such 
training.148 If a training board is of the view that an apprentice is not receiving adequate 
training, it may order the employer to take steps to ensure that the apprentice receives 
such training.149 The board may specify the classes of work in which the apprentice is 
to be trained and when he should be so trained.150 It may also specify the method and 
place of work.151 
3.3.3 Legislative Restrictions Regarding Terms and Conditions of Employment 
As indicated in chapter 2, the common law principle of freedom of contract operates on 
the premise that the employer and the employee are on an equal footing when negotiat-
143see s 1 o of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Sees 9(1 )(c) of the Mines and Works Act in terms 
of which employees employed in a "works" operating as a continuous chemical, metallurgical or smelting 
process can be expected to work on a Sunday. Consider the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New 
Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156of1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 Febru-
ary 1996 at 50 which proposes that the requirement of obtaining the necessary permission to work on a 
Sunday in factories, shops and mines should be repealed. 
144See s 11. See also s 9(1)(c) of the Mines and Works Act in terms of which employees employed in a 
"works" operating as a continuous chemical, metallurgical or smelting process can be expected to work on 
Christmas day, Day of the Covenant and Good Friday. 
145see s 17(b). 
146see s 120(1)(b). 
147see s 13(2)(f). 
148see s 13(2)(g). 
149see s 19(1). 
1sosee s 19(2). 
1511bid. 
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ing the terms and conditions of employment.152 In practice, however, this is seldom the 
case; The employer is usually in a much stronger bargaining position because of its eco-
nomic and social power. These factors enable it to prescribe the terms and conditions of 
employment.153 
The legislature has addressed the unequal bargaining power through legislation pres-
cribing minimum terms and conditions of employment. 
From the employee's perspective, the most important term in a contract of employment 
is usually remuneration. The legislature's attitude has been that it is a matter which 
should preferably be determined through collective bargaining. Accordingly, in areas and 
industries where trade unions are active and collective bargaining does take place, it has 
left it to the collective bargaining parties to determine minimum wages.154 
In certain instances, however, the legislature has statutorily provided for the regulation of 
minimum wages. In terms of the Wage Act minimum wages can be determined by a 
wage board155 in areas and industries where trade unions do not really feature or are 
not well organised and effective collective bargaining does not therefore exist. 156 Also, 
in the Manpower Training Act, it has afforded the Minister of Manpower the power to 
prescribe the minimum wages of apprentices.157 
Although the Basic Conditions of Employment does not stipulate minimum wages, it 
does contain a number of provisions regarding renumeration. It stipulates the minimum 
remuneration for overtime work, 158 work on Sundays 159 and public holidays 160 and 
152see par 2.2 of chapter 2. 
153see par 2.2 of chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the unequal bargaining relationship between an 
employer and an employee. 
154see par 5.3.2.4 of chapter 5 where the determination of minimum wages through collective bargaining 
is discussed. 
155see s 8(1). See, for example, clause 3(1) of the wage determination published as notice R5560 of 1995 
in Government Gazette 16627 of 25 August 1995 which inter alia regulates minimum wages in certain areas 
of the commercial distributive trade. 
156see s 2(3). 
157see s 13(2)(c). 
158see s 9(1 ). See also the proposals contained in the Green Paper. Policy Proposals for a New Employ-
ment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 
at47. 
159see s 10(2). See also the proposals contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employ-
ment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 
at SO. 
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sets out the formulae according to which such remuneration must be calculated. It also 
makes provision for paid annual leave 161 and sick leave.162 
The Act also contains a number of provisions regarding certain acts relating to payment 
of remuneration.163 An employer may not require an employee to pay or repay to it any 
remuneration payable or paid to that employee in accordance with the Act. 164 It may 
also not do anything as a direct or indirect result of which an employee is deprived of the 
remuneration, or a portion thereof, which has been paid to him. 165 The employer may 
also not require an employee to give a receipt for more than he actually received by way 
of remuneration.166 Furthermore, it may not levy a fine against an employee for any act 
or omission committed in the course of his employment. 167 The employer may also not 
deduct any amount from the employee's remuneration except with the latter's written 
consent168 or in accordance with a court order or a provision of any law.169 Lastly, the 
Act stipulates that the employer must remunerate the employee on the day agreed upon 
between them.170 
160see s 11. See also the proposals contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employ-
ment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 
at57. 
161see s 12(1)(a). Consider also the proposals contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New 
Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 Febru-
ary 1996 at 56. 
162see s 13(1). Consider also the proposals contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New 
Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 Febru-
ary 1996 at 58. 
163see s 19. See also Regulation 2A to the Act which sets out the prescribed manner in which an 
employee's wage must be paid. The Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards 
Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 71 proposes 
that the protections contained in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act should be retained as there is no 
basis to depart from Its approach. 
164see s 19(1)(a). 
165see s 19(1 )(a). See also s 42(1) of the Manpower Training Act. 
166see s 19(1)(c). See also s 42(2) of the Manpower Training Act 
167see s 19(1)(d). 
168see s 19(1)(e)(I). 
169see s 19(1)(e)(iQ. 
11osee s 19(2). 
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The Labour Relations Act, 1995, albeit indirectly, also restricts the employer's decision-
making power regarding remuneration. In terms of Schedule 7, the employer's unfair 171 
discrimination between employees regarding remuneration on arbitrary grounds such as 
gender or race 172 may constitute an unfair labour practice.173 
Apart from remuneration, the legislature has also specifically provided for a number of 
matters which are not dealt with by the common law.174 In the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, it has provided- employees with-paid -vacation leave 175 and sick 
leave.176 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act does not regulate maternity leave. Although it 
stipulates that pregnant employees may not work four weeks prior to their confinement 
and eight weeks thereafter, 177 this cannot be regarded as maternity leave as these 
employees are not afforded any form of job security and/or payment for the period dur-
ing which they are prohibited from working.178 These are accordingly matters for 
171 The employer is not absolutely prohibited from discriminating as long as it can prove that such dis-
crimination is fair under the circumstances. Consider in this regard Raad van Mynvakbonde v Minister van 
Mannekrag en 'n Ander 1983 (4) SA 29 (T); (1983) 4 IW 202 (T) at 209A-C where the court held that it was 
acceptable for an employer to differentiate between employees and the remuneration paid to them where 
their jobs were different. See further MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New 
Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 66-69. 
172see also SA Chemical Workers Union & Others v Sentrachem Ltd (1988) 9 /W 410 (IC) at 429F where 
the industrial court held that wage discrimination based on race is an unfair labour practice. See further 
Sentrachem Ltd v_John NO & Others (1989) 10 IW 249 (YV) at 259C-D. 
173see clause 2(1)(a). This provision is also in accordance with the Constitution's anti-discriminatory provi-
sions contained ins 9(4) thereof. 
174see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2 where the matters which are not dealt with by the common law are dis-
cussed. 
175see s 12. Consider also the proposals contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New 
Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 Febru-
ary 1996 at 56. The Manpower Training Act also regulates paid leave for apprentices (sees 13(2)(m)). 
176see s 13. Consider also the proposals contained in the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New 
Employment Standards Statute publish~ as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 Febru-
ary 1996 at 58. 
177see s 17(b). 
178rhis ,view is confirmed by the fact that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 differentiates between maternity 
leave granted in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of employment (sees 186(c)(Q) and 
absence from work tor the periods stipulated in s 17 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (see s 
186(c)(ii)). Consider the Green Paper: Polley Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute pub-
lished as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 61 which proposes four 
months' maternity leave during which the employee's security of employment is protected. 
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negotiation. 179 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995, however, has provided a measure of job security for 
female emproyeeS'·tttroi:rgtT:_its~preyisiefts~·r~ardfng~·tfrtfatr·diSf'l'lrssaf:180· 1t .. brands .. th.e 
... -~·~·.,·~~·~""'"" - .. '' ' ' ' ' ". ,. - ' ' ' - •' , "-~- .. - ,, -
refusal of an employer to allow a female employee to resume work after she took agr~ed 
~aternify-leavear··wa~f·aose·nt ·far ttie· corripul$ory.pefk>d stiptrlated"1n·tfier e·asic condi-
ticm'S'oTEnfpTOyinent:Aci·; as a dismissat.181 In additior+,+t"br8flds .. a·dismissatof a female 
employee because of her pregnancy, or intended pregnancy, or any reason related to 
her pregnancy, as automatically unfair.182 
There are also a number of other matters which the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
does not regulate. It does not contain, for instance, any provisions regarding paternity 
leave, 183 compassionate leave or study leave. It also does not regulate matters such as 
increments, bonuses, training and the provision of accommodation and food. Nor does it 
contain any provisions regarding medical aid and pension fund membership and con-
tributions to these funds by either the employer or the employee. Accordingly, all these 
matters remain topics for bargaining. 
A number of these matters have been regulated in wage det~rminations by the wage 
board acting in terms of the Wage Act. The Wage determination in respect of the com-
mercial distributive trade 184, for example, regulates issues such as transport expenses 
and allowances, 185 subsistences expenses and allowances, 186 compassionate 
179consider the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as 
notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 60 which recommends that con-
sideration must be given to the regulation of maternity pay. 
180see s 186(c) as well ass 187(1)(e) read with 187(2)(a). 
181sees 186(c). 
182see s 187(1)(e). See also par 3.4.3.2 below where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. 
183eonsider the Green Paper: Policy Proposals tor a New Employment Standards Statute published as "'· 
notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 62 which proposes three days' 
paid paternity or chOd-care leave during the year of the birth of the child for employees with more than one 
year's service. 
184pubfished as notice R5560 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16627 of 25 August 1995. 
185see clause 3(5). 
186see clause 3(6). 
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leave, 187 and uniforms, overalls and protective clothing.188 
The employer's prerogative regarding these terms and conditions is restricted by the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. In terms of Schedule 7, the employer's unfair189 discrimina-
tion between employees regarding any terms and conditions of employment on arbitrary 
grounds 190 such as gender, race, 191 age or marital status 192 may constitute an unfair 
labour practice.193 
Furthermore, Schedule 7 brands unfair conduct by the employer relating to promotion, 
demotion or training of an employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an 
employee as· an unfair labour practice.194 The term "benefits" is not defined in the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. According to Le Roux, if common usage is any guide, most 
benefits accorded to employees would also constitute terms and conditions of employ-
ment.195 He points out, 196 however, that if such a wide inte_rpretation is given to "bene-
fits", they would also constitute matters of mut.ual interest in terms of the definitions of a 
187 See clause 8. 
1 BBsee clause 12. 
189rhe employer is not absolutely prohibited from discriminating as long as it can prove that such dis-
crimination is fair under the circumstances. See the comments made by the industrial court in this regard in 
Association of Professional Teachers & Another v Minister of Education & Others (1995) 16 ILJ 1048 (IC) at 
10850. 
190see Mthembu & Others v Claude Neon Lights (1992) 13 IW 422 (IC) at 423F-G where the court held 
that differentiation between employees regarding merit increases on the ground of productivity did not con-
stitute an arbitrary ground and was therefore fair. 
191 See also Chamber of Mines of SA v Council of Mining Unions (1990) 11 /W 52 (IC) at 71J-72A where 
the industrial court held that separate but equal facilities based on racial grounds constituted an unfair 
labour practice. 
192-fhe industrial court in George v Western Cape Education Department & Another (1995) 16 IW 1529 (IC) 
held (at 1544J-1545B-C) that the employer's policy to exclude married female employees whose husbands 
were not permanently unfit to work from the benefits of its house allowance scheme constituted unfair dis-
crimination in terms of the interim Constitution and (at 1549), that the discrimination was also unfair in 
terms of the Education Labour Relations Act 146 of 1993. See also the facts and findings of the industrial 
court in Association of Professional Teachers & Another v Minister of Education & Others (1995) 16 IW 
1048 (IC) at 1076-1084 and 1090F-G. 
193see clause 2(1 )(a). This provision is also in accordance with the Constitution's anti-discriminatory provi-
sions contained ins 9(4) thereof. 
194see clause 2(1)(b). 
195see PAK le Roux ·economic Disputes and the New Unfair Labour Practice• (1997) 6(7) CLL 67 at 68. 
1961bid. 
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strike 197 and lock-out 198 read with the definition of a collective agreement. 199 
However, they cannot be the subject of strike action or a lock-out as s 65(1)(c) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 specifically stipulates that a strike or lock-out cannot take 
place if the issue in dispute is one that a party has to refer to arbitration in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995.200 As disputes about unfair labour practices in terms of 
clause 2(1)(b) must be referred to arbitration,201 it would mean that "benefits" disputes 
cannot be the subject of a strike or lock-out. This would constitute a significant limitation 
of the right to strike which may have constitutional implications .. 202 
Le Roux203 suggests that an interpretation of "benefits" has to be found which prevents 
the arbitration of what would otherwise be interests disputes and which does not unduly 
limit the right to strike or lock-out. One suggestion advanced by him is to limit the term to 
matters which do not form part of the traditional economic issues which are the subject 
of collective bargaining and industrial action. However, he p9ints out tha~ this approach 
would not accord with everyday usage of the term.204 
Another approach suggested by Le Roux205 is to categorise "benefits" so as to distin-
guish between disputes regarding changes to terms and conditions of employment and 
disputes about the interpretation and application of existing contractual benefits. The for-
mer would be the classic interest dispute which should be resolved through the exercise 
197 See s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 6.3.2 of chapter 6 where the statutory defini-
tion of a •strike" is examined. 
198see s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 7.3.2 of chapter 7 where the statutory defini-
tion of a lock-out is examined. 
199see s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 6.3.2 of chapter 6 where the definition of a 
collective agreement is examined. 
200see par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6 where s 65(1 )(c) is discussed in detail. 
201 See clause 3(4)(b) of Schedule 7. 
202Particularty in view of s 23(2)(c) of the Bill of Rights, which affords every worker the right to strike, read 
with s 3(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which enjoins any person applying the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 to interpret its provisions in compliance with the Constitution. 
203pAJ< le Roux "Economic Disputes and the New Unfair Labour Practice· (1997) 6(7) CLL 67 at 68. 
204PAK le Roux "Economic Disputes and the New Unfair Labour Practice" (1997) 6(7) CLL 67 at 70. 
205tbid. 
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of economic power. 206 The latter would deal with the typical rights dispute about the 
interpretation and application of a contractual provision which would fall within the ambit 
of clause 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7. 
In conclusion, it is foreseen that the interpretation and application of clause 2(1)(b), par-
ticularly the term "benefits", is going to be the subject of debate and judicial scrutiny. In 
the words of Le Roux, "[i]ts formulation is such that a suitable answer is difficult to 
determine and amendments may be necessary to resolve the issue".?07 
3.4· LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS REGARDING DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As was pointed out in chapter 2, the employer has a common law right to discipline an 
employee. 208 In many cases the disciplinary sanction would- have been d-ismissal, either 
summarily or on notice. Sanctions less severe than dismissal, such as suspension 
without pay or demotion, were only permitted if they did not amount to a breach of the 
contract of employment.209 In practice, however, an employer's range of penalties was 
U$ually not limited to those which fell within the ambit of the contract as it was able, 
through its superior bargaining power210 and its right to dismiss by merely giving the 
required notice, 211 to "convince" the employee to agree to a more serious penalty which 
would otherwise have amounted to a breach of contract. 212 
206see East Rand Gold and Uranium Co and National Union of Mineworkers (GA 193) where the com-
missioner acting as arbitrator held that the dispute about a proposed implementation by the employer of a 
new medical aid scheme constituted a dispute about the unilateral change to the terms and conditions of 
employment which was an economic or interest dispute which should be the subject of industrial action 
rather than arbitration. The commissioner's finding was perhaps prompted by the fact that the union had 
originally characterised the dispute as one dealing with a unilateral change to terms and conditions of 
employment. PAK le Roux "Economic Disputes and the New Unfair Labour Practice" (1997) 6(7) CLL 67 at 
69 asks whether the arbitrator's conclusion is supported by the wording of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
According to him, medical aid schemes are a "benefit" for purposes of clause 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7. 
207PAK le Roux "Economic Disputes and the New Unfair Labour Practice" (1997) 6(7) CLL 67 at 70. 
208see par 2.4.9 in this regard. 
2091bid. 
21 Osee par 2.2 of chapter 2 where the superior bargaining power of the employer is discussed. 
211 See par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where this common law right of the employer is discussed. 
212see par 2.4.9 of chapter 2 in this regard. 
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In addition to this, the right to dismiss on notice213 enabled the employer to dismiss an 
employee in a completely arbitrary fashion. It could dismiss the employee for no reason 
whatsoever, or for a very minor offence or for a first occurrence of a particular form of 
misconduct. Where it did have a reason for dismissal, it did not have to give it. If, 
however, it elected to give the reason, neither the lawfulness nor the fairness thereof 
could be challenged in a court of law. 
The industrial court, through the -exercising of. its .unfair labour .practice jurisdiction, 
developed the principles regarding unfair dismissal.214 These principles did not rescind 
the employer's right to discipline215 and to dismiss216 but seriously restricted them, 
principly by eradicating arbitrariness. 
In terms of these principles, it was not sufficient for a dismissal to be lawful, it also had to 
be fair.217 For a dismissal to be fair, there had to be a fair reason218 for the dismissal 
. . 
and it had to be effected in accordance with a fair procedure.219 
There were three primary grounds on which the employer could justify the dismissal of 
an employee, namely misconduct, the incapacity of the employee or the operational 
requirements of the business.220 
The fact that an employer had to have a fair reason to dismiss significantly affected the 
ability of an employer to dismiss. The fairness of an employer's disciplinary and work 
213see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where this common law right of the employer is discussed. 
214see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 345; PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 2 
and 20-28 as well as Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel {1992) 
193-195. 
215see National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co (Witwatersrand) 
Ltd (1988) 9 /W 859 (IC) at 879 where the court stated that "[d)iscipline is after all the prerogative and duty 
of management". 
216see Zulu v Empangeni Transport Ltd (1990) 11 /W 123 (IC) at 127C. 
217 See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel (1992) 193-195 where 
they discuss the development by the industrial court of the concept of unfair dismissal. 
218see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 3 and Alan 
Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel (1992) 195-196. 
219see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal {1994) 3 and Alan 
Rycroft and Barney JordaanA Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 196. 
220see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 3. 
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performance standards were subjected to the scrutiny of an independent third party, the 
industrial court. Furthermore, the employer could no longer use the threat of dismissal 
by notice to force an employee to agree to changes to terms and conditions of employ-
ment, unless this could be justified on the basis of the operational requirements of the 
business. 
Within the context of discipline, the guidelines developed for dismissals based on mis-
conduct were the more important. The industrial. court held-that a dismissal would be for 
a fair reason if the circumstances indicated that dismissal was a fair sanction or penalty. 
The court developed a number of guidelines for determining whether dismissal was a fair 
sanction. Of particular importance were the nature and seriousness of the offence,221 
the provisions of an existing disciplinary code, 222 previous warnings for the same or 
similar offence,223 the nature of the employer's business224 and consistency.225 
These guidelines were all indicative of the court's view that dismissal was the ultimate 
penalty to be imposed only in serious cases.226 This view was also the basis for the 
concept of progressive discipline.227 In accordance with this concept, discipline is 
regarded as a means by which employees know and understand the behaviour which is 
required of them. Efforts must be made to correct an employee's behaviour through a 
system of graduated disciplinary measures such as counselling and warnings. Repeated 
misconduct would warrant warnings, which themselves could be graded according to 
221see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 97 and Alan 
Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 199-201. 
222see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 97. 
223see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 201-202. 
224see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 97. 
225see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 202-203. 
226see National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) Ltd -
President Steyn Mine; President Brand Mine; Freddies Mine (1992) 13 IW 366 (IC) at 3861 where the court, 
when it considered the fairness of dismissal as sanction, stated, ·eonsidering that dismissal should be the 
sanction of last resort and that it is especially serious for mineworkers because of the limited scope for re-
employment, I am not persuaded that dismissal was an unfair sanction•. 
227see Changula v Bell Equipment (1992) 13 /W 101 (LAC) at 111C-D where the labour appeal court 
stated that ·cs]ound industrial relations practice requires an employer to endeavour to correct misconduct 
and adopt a policy of progressive discipline, except in circumstances where the conduct complained of is 
serious enough in itself to justHy terminating the employment relationship•. For a discussion on the concept 
of progressive discipline. see National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Dee/kraal Gold Mining Co Ltd 
(1993) 14 /W 1346 QC) at 13528-D as well as Alan Rycroft and· Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African 
Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 179. 
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degrees of severity. More serious offences or repeated misconduct could result in a final 
warning, or other action short of dismissal for instance, such as suspension without pay 
and demotion. Dismissal was considered the most severe penalty only to be imple-
mented in cases of serious misconduct or repeated offences. 228 
Dismissal on the grounds of incapacity was justified where the employee could not per-
form the duties the job entailed. This may have been because he did not have the neces-
sary skill or aptitude, health or other physical or mental abilityto do the job.229 
Dismissal on the grounds of operational requirements was justified where the needs of 
the business justified this. 230 The most common example of dismissal for this reason 
was where employees' services had to be terminated because they became redundant 
to the needs of the business. A number of factors could cause their redundancy such as 
an economic downturn,231 technological changes,232 the sale of the business233 and 
mergers. 234 The industrial court has also held that dismissals could be justified on the 
grounds of operational requirements in situations other than redundancy.235 Employees 
could, for instance, be dismissed for this reason where they have been unable or unwill-
ing to comply with certain operational needs of the business236 or where the employer 
has a justifiable suspicion that the employee has been guilty of some form of misconduct 
but does not have the evidence to prove it. 237 
22Bsee clause 3(2) and (3) of the Code in which the concept "progressive discipline" is explained. 
229see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 3 and Alan 
Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 211. 
230see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 4. 
231 See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 240. 
2321bid. 
233see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 240-242. 
234see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 242-243. 
235see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 4. 
236see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 4 as well as 
par 3.4.3.3.4.1 below where this operational reason for dismissal Is discussed. 
2371bid. 
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Although there have been relatively few cases dealing with this,238 the industrial court 
has also been prepared to consider the fairness of disciplinary sanctions short of dis-
missat. 239 
The guidelines developed by the industrial court have now been given statutory recogni-
tion in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. The relevant provisions are found in chapter 
v111.240 Section 188, for example, states that a dismissal will be unfair unless the 
employer can show that it has a fair reason to dismiss related- to the employee's con-
duct, or capacity, or related to the operational requirements of the business. A fair proce-
dure also has to be followed. 241 The general principles contained in chapter VIII are 
expanded in the Code. This regulates dismissal on the grounds of conduct or incapacity. 
In terms of s 188(2) any person considering the fairness of a dismissal must take into 
account this Code. 242 Disputes over the fairness of dismissals based on the conduct or 
capacity of an employee will usually be arbitrated by a com~issioner of th_e the Commis-
sion, or by a person employed for this purpose by a bargaining or statutory council or an 
accredited agency.243 The fairness of dismissals on the basis of the operational require-
ments of the employer will normally be adjudicated by the labour court. 244 
In the paragraphs below, the statutory restrictions on the employer's right to dis-
cipline245 and to dismiss246 in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 will be con-
sidered. 
238see Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 eel (1992) 183. 
239see, for instance, National Union of Mineworkers & Others v Transvaal Navigation Collieries & Estate 
Co Ltd (1986) 7 IW 393 (IC) at 397C where the court indicated that it regarded suspension, as opposed to 
dismissal, as a fair penalty under the circumstances. See also Rikhotso & Others v Transvaal Alloys (Pty) 
Ltd (1984) 15 /W 228 (IC) at 242C-E where the court considered the appropriateness of warnings and 
suspension as alternatives to dismissal. See further Wahl v AECI Ltd (1983) 4 /W 298 (IC) at 3078. 
240see s 185 which affords every employee the right not to be unfairly dismissed. See further s 186 which 
defines dismissal and s 187 which defines automatically unfair dismissals. These sections are discussed in 
detail in par 3.4.3 below. 
241 See par 4.3.4 below where s 188 is discussed in detail. 
242The provisions of the Code is discussed in detail in par 3.4.3 below. 
243see s 191 (5)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
244see s 191 (5)(bWi) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
245see par 3.4.2 below. 
246see par 3.4.3 below. 
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3.4.2 Legislative Restrictions on the Employer's Right to Discipline 
As far as dismissal based on the conduct of employees is concerned, the Code recog-
nises the supremacy of collective agreements. 24 7 Where such agreements exist, they 
should take precedence over the provisions of the Code. 
In the absence of such a collective agreement, clause 3(1) of the Code states that 
employers should adopt disciplinary rules which-establish-the-standard of conduct 
required of employees. This implies that the employer retains the ability to set the 
standards.248 However, clause 7 of the Code permits the arbitrator to decide whether 
the standard is a valid or reasonable one when determining the substantive fairness of a 
dismissal for misconduct. 249 This, at least in part, will be determined with reference to 
the Code. 
- -
The Code provides examples of serious offences which would warrant dismissal. 250 
However, the list does not impact on the employer's decision-making power as all of 
2471n clause 1 (2) of the Code the legislature acknowledges the supremacy of collective agreements. It has 
accordingly not made the provisions of the Code applicable to disciplinary codes and procedures where 
these are the subject of collective agreements or the outcome of joint decision-making by an employer and 
a workplace forum. 
248This was also the view of the industrial court (see National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Western 
Areas Gold Mining Co Ltd (1985) 6 /W 380 (IC) at 3860; Sweet Food & Allied Workers Union & Another v 
Delmas Kuikens (1986) 7 ILJ 628 (IC) at 635A), the labour appeal court (see Empangeni Transport (Pty) Ltd 
v Zulu (1992) 13 IW 352 (LAC) at 357C-O) and the supreme court (see Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v 
Roux NO & Another (1988) 9 IW 45 (C) at 52H-J). See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South 
African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 99 and MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The 
New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 65, 74-
75. It is, however, suggested that the decision-making power of the bigger employers in this regard (see s 
80 which provides that workplace forums can only be established in a workplace which has more than 100 
employees) has been limited by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists the disciplinary code as a matter 
for joint decision-making by the employer and a workplace forum (sees 86(1)(a) as well as par 4.3.3.2 of 
chapter 4 where joint decision-making and its effect on the decision-making power of employers is dis-
cussed in detail). 
249see clause 7(b)(i). This is in accordance with the courts' view that they should be entitled to interfere 
where the rule is "grossly unreasonable" (see Empangeni Transport (Pty) Ltd v Zulu (1992) 13 IW 352 (LAC) 
at 357) or "wholly capricious· (see Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v Roux NO & Another (1988) 9 IW 45 
(C) at 521). 
250see clause 3(4) in terms of which gross dishonesty, wUful damage to the employer's property, wilful 
endangering of the safety of others, physical assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or 
customer and gross insubordination are listed as examples of serious misconduct 
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these offences have also been branded by both the common law251 and the industrial 
court252 as serious offences. 
However, the Code does limit the employer's decision-making power regarding sanc-
tions to a certain extent by endorsing the concept of progressive discipline and dismissal 
as the ultimate sanction for serious or repeated offences. 253 
The Code specifically provides that some rules may be so well established and known 
that it is unnecessary to communicate them. 254 Whether th rs· is· so; is a factual ques-
tion. 255 A rule or standard, however, may also be considered to be well established by 
virtue of common law contract principles.256 In terms of these principles, an employee 
will be guilty of misconduct where he breaches his implied duty to act in good faith257 or 
to be respectfu1258 or to be subordinate. 259 
It does not prescribe the exact form of the disciplinary code but it does urge larger 
businesses to adopt "a more formal approach" to discipline. 260 Smaller enterprises will 
251 See par 2.4.10.2 of chapter 2. 
252see, for instance, Bhengu & Others v Union Co-Operative Ltd (1990) 11 IW 117 (IC) at 122E (failure to 
work honestly and accurately); SA Chemical Workers Union & Others v Noristan Holdings Ltd & Others 
(1987) 8 IW 682 (IC) at 690F (wilful damage to property); Abrahams v Pick 'n Pay Supermarkets OFS (Pty) 
Ltd (1993) 14 IW 729 (IC) at 731J-7321 (assault on subordinates) and Zwane v Umgeni Iron (Pty) Ltd (1993) 
2 LCD 268 (IC) (gross insubordination). 
253see clauses 3(3) and (4). The industrial court as well as the labour appeal court also listed previous 
warnings for a particular offence as a factor which could play a role in determining the appropriateness of 
dismissal as sanction (see, for instance, King v Beacon Island Hotel (1987) a /W 485 (IC) at 491 O and 
Rhodes v SA Bias Binding Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 /W 106 (IC) at 1200-E; Nodlele v Mount Nel-
son Hotel & Another (1984) 5 IW 216 (IC) at 2258; Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & 
Another v Wooltru Ltd t/a Woolworths (Randburg) (1989) 10 IW 311 (IC) at 315H-J and Dee/kraal Gold 
Mining Co Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1994) 15 /W 573 (LAC) at 5830-G). 
254see clause 3(1). 
2551t, for instance, may depend on the nature of the business and the type of work that the employee does. 
The fact that the employer has in the past always disciplined employees who have committed a particular 
act may also be indicative of the existence of such a rule. 
256see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 101-102. 
257see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2. 
258see par 2.4.4 of chapter 2. 
· 259see par 2.3.1 of chapter 2. 
260see clause 3(1 ). It is suggested that such a ·more formal approach• may entail a written code of con-
duct or disciplinary code which sets out both the conduct expected from the employee and the penalty 
should he misbehave. Or, it may entaD a formal initiation period during which the employee is informed 
what conduct is expected from him and what the penalty will be if he misbehaves (see, for example, Dee/k-
raal Gold Mining Co Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1994) 15 IW 573 (LAC) at 579C). 
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apparently merely have to advise new employees during, for instance, an informal dis-
cussion, what is expected of them.261 In addition, the Code requires that the standards 
of conduct must be clear and made available to employees in a manner which is easily 
understood. 262 
Different opinions exist over the interpretation of disciplinary codes. In a number of deci-
sions there has been a tendency to interpret codes in a way similar to that in which a 
contract might be interpreted: In terms· of such an-approach,· an-employer is usually held 
to the code which it has drafted and voluntarily applied to its plant.263 However, the 
court may be prepared to interfere where the employer's "standard of industrial justice" 
falls short of that which it would have applied under the circumstances.264 Where, 
however, the standard to be applied by the employer is higher than that which the court 
would have applied, it may not intervene "as a matter of course". The court stated in 
Sweet Food & Allied Workers Union & Another v Delmas Kuik~ns265 
It may perhaps be said that this approach places too high a premium on contractual prin-
ciples (or established practice) whilst it should be concentrating on equity. It should be 
remembered that equity may have its roots in contract or in an established practice or 
commitment. It seems appropriate for this court to acknowledge the standards of justice 
set in a given relationship and to see that they are observed. 
Le Roux and Van Niekerk,266 however, are of the view that this approach is incorrect. 
According to them, a code is best viewed as a set of guidelines. There are a number of 
industrial and labour court decisions that have also adopted such a less technical 
261see clause 3(1). 
262see clause 3(1). It is suggested that a written disciplinary code must be written in clear and 
unambiguous terms. Such a code may be attached to employees' contracts of employment or to notice 
boards in the workplace or a copy thereof may be available for inspection. Where the code has not been 
reduced to writing, an employer may be expected to inform· the employee verbally thereof in such a man-
ner that the employee understands what is expected of him. 
263see Sweet Food & Allied Workers Union & Another v Delmas Kuikens (1986) 7 IW 628 (IC) at 634J-
635A and Rampersad v BB Bread Ltd (1986) 7 /W 367 (IC) at 373F-I and 3748. See also Dee/kraal Gold 
Mining Co Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1994) 15 /W 573 (LAC) at 5821 where the labour 
appeal court held the same view. 
264see Sweet Food & Allied Workers Union & Another v Delmas Kuikens (1986) 7 /W 628 (IC) at 6358. 
265(1986) 7 /W 628 OC) at 635. 
266rhe South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 90. 
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approach. See, for example, Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Another v Hoechst 
(Pty) Ltd267 where the industrial court stated that 
[a) disciplinary code should not be a hierarchical code of conduct. It is clear that no code 
can cater for all possible forms of misconduct. An employer would still have a discretion in 
instances where a disciplinary code does not specifically provide for a specific offence. A 
disciplinary code is not an immutable set of commandments which have to be slavishly 
adhered to. 
It is submitted that the latter view is to be preferred.· It is impossible for an employer, 
when drafting a code, to anticipate and cater for all offences that might be committed. It 
is equally impossible to determine a penalty for a specific offence which will be fair under 
all possible circumstances.268 Nevertheless, when the employer elects a penalty, it must 
ensure that it is one which is fair under the circumstances as the fairness thereof may be 
determined by a commissioner of the Commission acting as arbitrator in terms of the 
residual unfair labour practice provisions contained in Sched~le 7. 269 
3.4.3 Legislative Restrictions on the Employer's Right to Dismissal 
3.4.3.1 Introduction 
The legislature's direct statutory interference270 with the employer's right to dismiss 
undoubtedly represents one of the most far-reaching erosions of the employer's 
267 (1993) 14 IW 471 (IC) at 475E-F. See also National Education Health & Allied Workers Union & Others v 
Director-General of Agriculture & Another (1993) 14 /W 1488 (IC) at 15000-G and Changula v Bell Equip-
ment (1992) 13 IW 101 (LAC) at 1098-E. · 
2681t is nevertheless suggested that the employer should preferably provide in its code that it is not an all-
encompassing document which caters for all eventualities and that circumstances may demand a penalty 
different to the one listed in the code for a particular offence. 
269see clause 2(1)(c) read with clause 3(4)(b). 
270see chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 read with the Code. Most of the requirements have 
their origin in the guidelines developed by the industrial court when it had to determine the fairness of a dis-
missal in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. The court, in tum, found guidance in some of the con-
ventions of the International Labour Organisation regarding fair dismissal (such as the Recommendation 
Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 119 of 1963 and the Convention 
entitled Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 158 of 1982) and also English Law. It is 
submitted that the industrial court will continue to play a role in regard to the law of fair dismissal, as it is 
foreseen that it will be some time before it will have determined all the cases that have been referred to it 
(see AA Landman Industrial Court Communique 20/1995 as well as MAE Bulbulia Industrial Court Com-
munique 1/1997). In addition, the legislature's provisions in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 provide the 
broad outlines for fair dismissal. It is impossible for it to cover all eventualities. Also, the Code is written in 
wide and general terms (see clause 1 {1) where it states that it deals with •some of the key aspects of dis-
missals for reasons related to conduct and capacity"). It Is foreseen that both the Commission and the 
labour court will tum to the decisions of the industrial court for guidance. 
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decision-making power. Its main aim was to prevent arbitrary dismissat.271 Linked to 
this, were its aims to provide a measure272 of job security; to ensure that dismissal is the 
employer's last option273 and to promote industrial peace.274 
The most important of the statutory provisions aimed at achieving these objectives is s 
185 of the Labour Relations Act, 1"995. It stipulates that every275 employee has the right 
not to be unfairly dismissed. This means that it is no longer sufficient for an employer to 
ensure that the dismissal of an employee is lawful in that it has given the required 
notice276 or has made payment in lieu of notice;277 it must also ensure that such a dis-
missal is fair. Even where the employer is entitled to dismiss an employee summarily for 
a serious offence,278 it must ensure that such a dismissal is fair. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995, read with the Code, sets out the requirements for a fair 
dismissal. All that it requires of the dismissed employee is to prove that he has been dis-
271see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where the employer's common law right to dismiss by way of notice is 
discussed. 
272-fhe Ministerial Legal Task Team accepted that a balance had to be struck between work security and 
the efficiency of the enterprise (see chapter VI of Explanatory Memorandum as notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259of10 February 1995). 
273see clause 3(4) of the Code regarding dismissal for misconduct and clauses 8(2), 9(b)(iii), 10(1) and 11 
of the Code in respect of dismissal for incapacity. See s 189(2) (a) (i) in the case of dismissal for operational 
requirements. 
274tn the past, the dismissal of an employee often sparked industrial action by co-workers. This was 
actually allowed by the Labour Relations Act, 1956 which entitled co-workers to collectively refuse to work 
until the dismissed workers had been reinstated (see the definition of a stnke ins 1 of the Act). The indus-
trial court, however, regarded this type of strike as "less acceptable" since the dismissed employee had 
recourse to it in terms of s 46(9) (see Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Bevaloid (Pty) Ltd 
(1988) 9 /W 447 (IC) at 4511-452F). Section 65(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 specifically prohibits 
strikes over issues which a party can refer to arbitration. As an employee who has been dismissed has the 
right to refer the unsettled dispute to arbitration (see s 191 (5)(a)(i)), his co-workers are prohibited from 
striking over his dismissal. See further par 6.3.2 of chapter 6 where the definition of a strike in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 is discussed. 
275The Labour Relations Act, 1995 covers all employees except members of the National Defence Force, 
the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service (see s 2). 
276see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where the common law provisions regarding dismissal through notice is 
discussed. See also s 14 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act where the statutory notice periods are 
discussed. Consider further the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute 
published as notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 69 which contains 
more favourable terms in respect of employees who are given notice. 
2nsee par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where payment in lieu of notice is discussed. 
278see par 2.4.10.2 of chapter 2 for a discussion of the employer's common law contractual right to dis-
miss summarily in the case of a serious breach. 
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missed. 279 Once the existence of the dismissal has been established, the onus is on the 
employer to prove that the dismissal is tair.280 
The Act defines "dismissal" in very wide terms.281 The definition covers the more typical 
forms of dismissal, namely termination of the contract by notice or the payment of salary 
in lieu of notice as well as summary dismissal.282 It also goes further and includes 
actions and omissions which would not ordinarily be regarded as dismissat.283 It 
covers, for example, selective non-re-employment284- and the refusal to renew a fixed 
term contract or an offer to renew it on less favourable terms. 285 It also covers construc-
tive dismissa1286 and an employer's refusal to allow a female employee to resume work 
after the expiry of maternity leave287 or the period stipulated in the Basic Conditions of 
279see s 192(1). 
280see s 192(2). This brings an end to the debate which has been raging about the question of onus in dis-
missal cases. For a discussion on the various views, see P le Roux "The Onus of Proof in Unfair Dismissal 
Disputes" in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D Van Zyl Smit (eds) Labour 
Law (1991) 100. 
281see s 186. 
282see s 186(a). 
283see s 186(b)-(e). These actions and omissions have been the subject of much litigation in the past. The 
industrial court held that these actions and omissions constitute unfair labour practices. By including them 
in the definition of dismissal, the legislature wanted to ensure that employees are not left without a remedy; 
particularly as the unfair labour practice definition in Schedule 7 may not be wide enough to cover such 
actions and omissions and as the definition is a temporary provision. See also AA Landman "Unfair Dis-
missal: The New Rules for Capital Punishment in the Workplace: (Part oner (1995) 5(5) CCL 41 at 42 where 
he explains the reasons for the detailed definition in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as follows, "Because 
dismissal is such a crucial concept and because there are several interpretations as to what this may mean 
and as the legislature was anxious to preserve the concept of a constructive dismissal the legislature has 
defined, probably exhaustively, the meaning of 'dismissal'•. 
284see s 186(d) as well as par 3.2 above where this form of dismissal is discussed. 
285see s 186(b) as well as par 3.2 above. 
286see s 186(e). This concept was introduced to South African dismissal law by the industrial court (see 
PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 84). The legislature 
has specifically included it in the definition as an employee would otherwise be without a remedy in terms 
of chapter VIII. In addition, the employee may have problems relying on the unfair labour practice definition 
contained in Schedule 7 as it is not as wide as the definition in the Labour Relations Act, 1956. It is also a 
temporary provision. 
287 See s 186(c)(i). This provision reflects a greater awareness of the plight of pregnant employees in South 
Africa and is an attempt to provide them with a measure of job security. It is also an attempt to bring South 
African law in line with the international labour standards. These standards are based on an acceptanee of 
the important role which women have come to play in the labour market and of their role in ensuring the 
continued existence of society. Nevertheless, until such time as the legislature makes paid maternity leave 
obligatory, it will not have gone far enough in addressing the discrimination against pregnant employees. 
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Employment Act during which she is prohibited to work. 288 
In addition, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 prescribes procedures for the resolution of 
disputes regarding the fairness of dismissals.289 These procedures are relatively 
simple290 and inexpensive291 and are aimed at the speedy resolution of such dis-
putes. 292 It furthermore prescribes reinstatement or re-employment as the primary 
remedies in the case of an unfair dismissal. 293 The Act also places a statutory limitation 
on the maximum amount of compensation that may be ordered in the event of a finding 
that a dismissal was unfair.294 
288see s 186(c)(ii) read with s 17 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. This provision was neces-
sary and founded on equity. It is grossly unfair for an employee to lose her job because of her compliance 
with an obligatory statutory requirement. 
289see s 191 read with ss 133, 135~145 and 157-158. 
290see chapter VI of the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task T earn notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259of10February1995. However, these procedures are not always as simple and 
straightforward as the task team had strived for them to be (see Annali Sasson and Elize Strydom "The 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995: The Resolution of Disputes about Alleged Unfair Dismissals" (1996) 8(1) 
SAMercW 1 ). One of the difficulties is for the employee to select the correct dispute-resolution procedure 
(see AC Sasson and EML Strydom "Draft Negotiating Document in Bill Form: Some Thoughts 1995 (59) 
THRHR 46 at 64). An attempt, however, has been made to address this problem ins 148 which affords the 
Commission the right to provide advice about the dispute resolution-procedure to be followed. Further-
more, in terms of s 149, the Commission may arrange, together with the Legal Aid Board, advice or 
assistance by a legal practitioner for either the employee or employer. 
291There are a number of aspects which ensure inexpensiveness: legal representation is minimised (sees 
135(4)), the Commission may only charge a fee under certain circumstances (sees 123), the labour court 
may only make an order for costs where the law and fairness requires it (see s 162(1)) and a commissioner 
may only make an order for costs where a party acted in a frivolous or vexatious manner in either pro-
ceeding with or defending the matter (sees 138(10)). 
292see chapter VI of the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259 of 10 February 1995. See also Annali Sasson and Elize Strydom "The Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995: The Resolution of Disputes about Alleged Unfair Dismissals· (1996) 8(1) SAMer-
cW 1 at 12-13 where the problems experienced under the Labour Relations Act, 1956 as a result of the 
delay between the date of the dismissal and the date of the court's order, are pointed out. 
293see s 193(1)(a) and (b) read with (2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This provision ensures that 
employers will carefully consider the fairness of their decision to dismiss. See also Annali Sasson and Elize 
Strydom ~e Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Resolution of Disputes over Alleged Unfair Dismissals" 
(1996) 8(1) SAMercW 1 at 24. 
294see s 194. This provision attempts to address the criticism levelled against the system in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1956 which made it possible to grant open-ended compensation orders. The limiting 
of compensation will lead to greater certainty and wilt enable both the employer and the aggrieved 
employee to gauge what the approximate amount of compensation might be (see also Annan Sasson and 
Elize Strydom lhe Labour Relations Act of 1995 and the Resolution of Disputes over Alleged Unfair Dis-
missals" (1996) 8(1) SAMercW 1 at 24). 
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The Act distinguishes between two main categories of unfair dismissal namely dismissals 
that are automatically untair295 and those which only become unfair if they are not for a 
fair reason and in accordance with a fair procedure.296 
3.4.3.2 Dismissals which are Automatically Unfair 
Section 187 lists a number of reasons which will make a dismissal automatically 
unfair. 297 The rationale for this- provision is that dismissal for any of these reasons 
infringes certain basic rights of an employee. This makes the unfairness of the dismissal 
self-evident298 and leaves the employer with no defence. 299 
The section protects an employee against dismissal for exercising his statutory rights 
regarding collective bargaining300 and collective action.301 It also protects him against 
victimisation where he institutes legal action against his employer in terms of the Act. 302 
It furthermore protects him against an infringement of his contractual rights in that it 
brands a dismissal in order to compel him to accept a demand303 in respect of any mat-
295see s 187. 
296see s 188(1). 
297The concept of the automatically unfair dismissal is derived from art 5 of the International Labour 
Organisation's convention entitled Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 158 of 
1982. 
298see PAK le Roux ·oevelopments in Individual Labour Law" in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, C Thomp-
son and Andre van Niekerk (1995) Current Labour Law 1 at 8. 
299see AA Landman "Unfair Dismissal: The New Rules for Capital Punishment in the Workplace: (Part 
oner (1995) 5(5) CCL 41 at 44. 
300see the introductionary part of s 187(1 ). These automatically unfair dismissals are discussed in par 
4.2.2 of chapter 4 below. 
301 See s 187(1) (a) and (b). These automatically unfair dismissals are discussed in par 6.3.6.2 of chapter 6. 
302see s 187(1)(d). The section probably has wider import and would also include dismissals due to the 
exercising of rights in terms of the Act such as the right to freedom of association (sees 4), the right to 
strike (sees 64) and to take part in protest action (sees TT). It is submitted that the exercising of these 
rights, however, are also covered by the general provision in s 187(1) as well as subsecs (a) and (b) 
thereto. 
303see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where the dismissal of an employee by giving the required notice in order 
to achieve this purpose was discussed. 
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ter of mutual interest as automatically unfair.304 The section also endeavours to protect 
employees against dismissal on unfair discriminatory grounds305 such as race, gender, 
age, disability, marital status, pregnancy,306 intended pregnancy, or any reason related 
to her pregnancy.307 
Although this section curtails the employer's right to dismiss fairly drastically, it does not 
provide an employee with absolute protection against dismissal for any one of these 
reasons under all circumstances. The section itself stipulates certain requirements which 
must be complied with by the employee before being entitled to its protection. 308 It also 
affords the employer two statutory defences for using discriminatory grounds for dis-
missal. 309 The section stipulates that a dismissal may be fair if the employer can prove 
that the reason for it was not based on considerations of a discriminatory nature, but 
rather on the inherent requirements of the particular job.310 It stipulates furthermore that 
304See s 187(c). In terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, the dismissal of a number of employees for 
this purpose constituted a lock-out which might have been legal if the employer had complied withs 65. In 
terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, however, such action does not constitute a lock-out (see the 
definition of a lock-out in s 213 as well as par 7.3.2 of chapter 7 below where the lock-out as economic 
weapon of the employer and its effect upon the employer's decision-making power is discussed). It is 
nevertheless submitted that an employer may be able to dismiss an employee who refuses to accept new 
terms and conditions of employment on the ground that the operational requirements of the business 
require employees who are willing and able to work under such new terms and conditions (see PAK le 
Roux "Developments in Individual Labour Law" (1995) Current Labour Law 1 at 9 as well as par 3.4.3.3.4 
below where this ground for dismissal is discussed in greater detail). 
305see s 187(1)(e) and (f). These provisions are also in accordance with the Constitution which prohibits 
unfair discrimination (sees 9(3)). 
306The industrial court has also indicated that the dismissal of an employee on the grounds of pregnancy 
could be an unfair labour practice (see, for instance, Randall v Progress Knitting Textiles Ltd (1992) 13 IW 
200 (IC) at 204A as well as Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonaria Branch)-A Division of ABSA Bank Ltd 
(1994) 15IW1398 (IC) at 1407H and 1409-1412). 
3071t is submitted that •any reason related to her pregnancy" includes incapability due to, for instance, 
medical and/or emotional complications. PAK Le Roux "Developments in Individual Labour Law" (1995) 
Current Labour Law 1 at 10, however, suggests that an employer should be able to dismiss a pregnant 
employee on this ground where the complications lead to her being permanently incapable of doing her 
work or if the incapacity is for a lengthy period of time. But see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 111. 
See further par 3.4.3.3.3 below where dismissal for incapacity is discussed. 
308For instance, the strike or protest action provided for ins 187(1)(a) must be protected in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. See also s 187(1 )(b) which requires that the strike must be a protected one. 
The legislature's aim was to limit its protection to those employees who are themselves acting within the 
parameters of the Act. 
309see s 187(2). 
31 Osee s 187(2)(a). Under such circumstances, the discriminatory consideration makes the employee inca-
pable or unsuitable for the job. The real ground for dismissal is therefore the employee's incapacity or inca-
pability to do the job (see par 3.4.3.3.3 below where dismissal for incapacity or incapabililty is discussed) 
not the discriminatory ground. 
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a dismissal based on age may be fair if the employer can prove that the employee has 
reached the normal or agreed retirement age.311 
In addition, it remains possible for the employer to dismiss such employees for one or 
more of the reasons distinguished ins 188(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.312 The 
onus will nevertheless be on it to prove that it actually dismissed for such a reason313 
and that it did not merely serve as a cover-up for the real (automatically unfair) 
reason.314 
The prohibition of discriminatory dismissals apart, 315 from a practical perspective, the 
most important potential limitation of employer prerogative is to be found ins 187(1)(c). 
In terms of this section, a dismissal which is aimed at compelling an employee to accept 
a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest is automatically unfair. 
The employer was able to use this strategy during the operation of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1956. In terms of the definition of a lock-out in s 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, 
a dismissal in order to force employees to agree to or comply with any demands con-
cerning terms and conditions of employment or to accept any change in the terms and 
conditions of employment, constituted a lock-out as defined. Provided the employer had 
complied with the statutory requirements for a legal lock-out in s 65 of the Act, it became 
entitled to the protection afforded in s 79 of the Act against civil claims for losses suffered 
by the employees as a result of the lock-out. These statutory provisions disturbed the 
balance in the bargaining power between employers and employees in favour of the 
employer. They enabled the employer to enforce its unilateral changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment on employees. 316 
311 See s 187(2)(b). It is submitted that this provision is of particular importance for an employer which 
wants to dismiss employees of retirement age as an alternative to retrenchment, or which has decided on 
age as selection criterion during retrenchment (see par 3.4.3.3.4 below where the requirements for a fair 
retrenchment are discussed). 
312consider, for example, the fact that the employer may be entitled to dismiss a striker in a protected 
strike for misconduct or because of the operational requirements of the business (see s 67(5) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995). See further par 6.3.6.2 of chapter 6 where the dismissal of strikers is discussed. 
313see s 192(2). 
314Contra PAK le Roux "Developments in lndMdual Labour Law" 1 at 12 in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, 
Oive Thompson and Andre van Nlekerk Current Labour Law 1995 (1995) 12 who suggests that where the 
employee argues that the reason for dismissal is one which is automatically unfair, it is for him to prove 
this. 
315see s 187(1)(e) and (f) as well as the discussion earlier in this paragraph. 
316For a discussion of the definition of a lock-out Ins 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, see par 7.3.2 of 
chapter7. 
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The definition of a lock-out in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not include dismissal 
as one of the actions that the employer can resort to in order to compel employees to 
accept its changes to the terms and conditions of employment.317 This factor, together 
with the provision contained ins 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, significantly 
limits the employer's ability to utilise its stronger bargaining position318 and right to 
terminate by notice319 so as to enforce changes in respect of matters of mutual interest. 
In addition, the concept matter of "mutual interest" used ins 187(1)(c) is very wide. It 
covers all matters relating to the employment relationship and may also cover anything 
which, bona fide, relates to the industry or which, in the words of the court in Rex v 
Woliak, 320 "can be fairly and reasonably regarded as calculated to promote the well-
being of the trade concerned".321 
In conclusion it is submitted that, although s 187(1)(c) may be necessary in the interests 
of industrial justice, it could significantly affect an employer's-ability to adapt to changing 
conditions and the needs of flexibility. 
3.4.3.3 Other Unfair Dismissals 
3.4.3.3.1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that an employer is entitled to satisfactory conduct and work per-
formance from employees. 322 The legislature has also placed a premium on the efficient 
and profitable running of the business.323 Accordingly, it distinguished three broad 
categories of reasons for which an employer may dismiss namely misconduct, 
317see par 7.3.2 of chapter 7 where the definition of a lock-out in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
is discussed. 
318see par 2.2 of chapter 2 in this regard. 
319see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 in this regard. 
3201939 TPD 428 at 430-431. 
321For a detailed discussion of the concept "matters of mutual interesr', see par 6.3.2 of chapter 6 where 
the concept is discussed in the context of the definition of a strike. 
322see clause 1 (3) of the Code. 
3231bid. 
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incapacity and the operational requirements of the business. 324 The employer may dis-
miss for any of these three categories of reasons provided that such a dismissal is both 
substantively and procedurally fair. 325 
The legislature's main aim with its requirement of substantive fairness is to ensure that a 
dismissal is not effected arbitrarily. The employer must prove that there is a reason for 
dismissal and that this proffered reason is fair under the circumstances.326 Generally, a 
reason will be fair if the employer can prove that itexistsr that-it i&a serious reason; that 
the employee knew that he could be dismissed for that reason and that the penalty of 
dismissal is the appropriate penalty under the circumstances. 327 
Procedural fairness is aimed at ensuring that the affected employee is afforded an 
opportunity to either state his version328 or to explain329 or to make suggestions. 330 
This, in turn, ensures that the employer's decision to di~miss is a considered and 
informed one. 331 
324see s 188(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This distinction was taken over from the industrial court 
(see Gumede & Others v Richdens (Pty) Ltd t/a Richdens Foodliner (1984) 5 IW 84 (IC) at 93 and National 
Automobile & Allied Workers Union v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 ILJ 369 (IC) at 374H-
375B and 378A-B) which, in tum, has adopted it from the International Labour Organisation's Convention 
158 of 1982 entitled Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer. 
325see s 188(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This requirement is in accordance with the decisions of 
the industrial court which also required that a dismissal for any one or more of these reasons had to be 
substantively and procedurally fair (see, for instance, National Automobile & Allied Workers Union v 
Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd (1985) 6 IW 369 (IC) at 376). 
326see s 188(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
327 See the discussion in pars 3.4.3.3.2.1; 3.4.3.3.3.1 and 3.4.3.3.4.1 regarding substantive dismissal for the 
different categories of reasons for dismissal. 
328This is the case in misconduct cases (see par 3.4.3.3.2.2 below where the fairness of disciplinary 
enquiries is discussed). 
329consider the requirements for a procedurally fair dismissal for incapacity (see par 3.4.3.3.3.2 below) 
where the employee must be afforded an opportunity to explain why his work is below the required 
standard. 
3301n the case of dismissal for operatlonal reasons, the employee must be afforded an opportunity to make 
suggestions regarding alternatives to dismissal or regarding the timing of dismissals or to suggest which 
selection criteria must be used (see par 3.4.3.3.4.2 below where the procedural requirements for a fair dis-
missal for operational reasons are discussed). 
331see also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 152-
153. 
119 
Legislation 
The Code sets out the guidelines for substantive and procedural fairness regarding a 
dismissal for misconduct332 and for incapacity.333 These guidelines are fairly detailed. 
They are, however, mere guidelines and not hard and fast rules.334 This means that the 
employer's non-compliance with a particular guideline will not necessarily make the dis-
missal unfair. 335 The question of whether or not non-compliance with a particular 
guideline is in order, will depend on the facts of the matter.336 Nevertheless, an 
employer should carefully consider whether or not circumstances are such that non-
compliance will be in order, as the Labour Relations Act, 1995 -specifically requires that 
the fairness of a dismissal must be judged against the guidelines of the Code.337 
The legislature has set out the requirements for a fair dismissal for operational reasons in 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 itself. 338 This was probably done as the guidelines for a 
fair dismissal for this reason were not as developed and clear as those for the other two 
reasons for dismissal. 339 The requirements are not mere guidelineg_340 and non-
compliance makes_ the dismissal statutorily unfair. The employer's decision-making 
power regarding dismissal for this reason, therefore, appears to be more restricted than 
in the case of the other two reasons. This was probably also motivated by the fact that 
"operational reasons" is an extremely wide concept which affords employers with virtually 
limitless scope for dismissal.341 
332see clauses 3(4)-(6), 4 and 7 of the Code. 
333see clauses 9 and 11. 
334see clause 1 (1) which stipulates that the Code is "intentionally general" and that "[e]ach case is unique, 
and departures from the norms established by this Code may be justified in proper circumstances" . 
335This is in line with the labour appeal court's decision in Seven Abel CC Va The Crest Hotel v Hotel & 
Restaurant Workers Union (1990) 11 IW 504 (LAC) at 507H-1 where it held that the courts developed mere 
guidelines and that parties could depart from them under appropriate circumstances. 
336see clause 2(1) of the Code. 
337see s 188(2). 
338see s 189 read with ss 16 and 196. 
339see chapter 6 of the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259 of 1 o February 1995. 
340see, for example, s 189(1) where it is stipulated that the employer "must" consult. See also s 189(2)-(3) 
and (5)-(7) as well as s 196(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
341 See par 3.4.3.3.4.1 below where the breadth of the concept "operational requirements" is discussed. 
The breadth thereof probably also led to the legislature's inclusion of dismissal for this reason to the list of 
matters that the employer must consult the workplace forum about (see s 84{1 )(e) of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 as well as par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4j. 
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The onus is on the employer342 to prove that there has been substantial compliance 
with either the guidelines or the statutory provisions and it must prove this on a balance 
of probabilities. 343 When considering whether there has been sufficient compliance, the 
commissioner and the labour court will probably take all facts into consideration; includ-
ing those which only became known after the dismissal. 344 
As the details regarding substantive and procedural fairness differ in respect of the three 
broad categories of reasons for dismissal, they are discussed separately. 
3.4.3.3.2 The Requirements for a Fair Dismissal for Misconduct 
3.4.3.3.2.1 Substantive Fairness 
Substantive fairness in misconduct cases essentially revolves around the disciplinary rule 
which the employee has allegedly contravened. 
In terms of the Code, the employer must prove that the rule existed345 and that the 
342see s 192 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
343Neither the Labour Relations Act, 1995 nor the Code stipulates the standard by which the employer 
must prove this. It is suggested that the standard should be that which is required in civil cases. This will be 
in accordance with the view of most of the presiding officers of the industrial court (see, for example, Lefu 
& Others v Western Areas Gold Mining Co Ltd (1985) 6 IW 307 (IC) at 3148-C as well as PAK le Roux and 
Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 105). In Chemical Workers Industrial 
Union v Reckitt & Colman SA (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 1319 (IC) at 1328E-F and Food & Allied Workers Union 
& Another v SA Breweries Ltd (Denver) (1992) 13 IW 209 (IC) at 214G-215B the reasonable employer test 
in terms of which the employer needs only show that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the 
offence was committed, was expressly rejected. 
344Most presiding officers of the industrial court (see, for instance, Govender v SASKO (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Richards Bay Bakery (1990) 11 ILJ 1282 (IC) at 1286H-I and Visagie & Andere v Prestige Skoonmaak-
dienste (Edms) Bpk (1995) 16 IW 421 (IC) at 4258-E) treated the matters before them as de nova hearings. 
The labour appeal court had also expressed the view that a complete rehearing of the matter took place 
before the industrial court (see Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Another (1993) 14 
ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 14568). Arbitrators have also treated the arbitration as a de novo hearing (see Pick 'n Pay 
Retailers (Pty) Ltd (Gallo Manor Branch) and Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA (1990) 11 
/W 1352 (ARB) at 1356H-1357B). 
345see clause 7(1) of the Code. If there is a written disciplinary code which contains the relevant rule, or if 
it is contained in the contract of employment or in a notice on the notice board, the employer's task is fair1y 
easy. However, even where it is not contained in such documents, the employer's task may remain fair1y 
easy, particular1y where the rule appears to be one founded on the common law (see clause 3(1) as well as 
par 3.4.2 above in this regard) or in legislation such as, for instance, the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act (see, for instance, ss 14 and 15 thereof). Where, however, the rule is not contained in the employer's 
code or in any of the other sources mentioned, it may experience greater difficulty to prove the rule's exist-
ence. The employer could argue that circumstances are such that the rule may be read into its disciplinary 
code. Under such circumstances. the success of the employer's argument wit largely depend on the com-
missioner's interpretation of a disciplinary code. In other words, whether he regards a code as merely a set 
of guidelines or as something akin to a contract (see par 3.4.2 above where this matter is discussed). 
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employee has contravened the rule. 346 The employer must also pro~e that the rule or 
standard was valid or reasonable.347 In general terms, a rule or standard will be valid or 
reasonable if the facts indicate tha~ it is lawful and that it can be justified with reference to 
the needs and circumstances of the business.348 
In addition, the employer must prove that the employee was aware, or could reasonably 
be expected to have been aware, of the rule or standard.349 The rationale for this 
guideline is obvious; an employee should only be· penalised for actions or omissions 
which he knew were unacceptable. Also implied in this requirement is that the employee 
must have known that a transgression of this rule may lead to dismissal. 350 
346see clause 7(a) of the Code. 
347see clause 7(b)(i). The industrial court also considered the validity or reasonableness of a rule when 
deciding on the substantial fairness of a dismissal (see, for example, Amos v Stuttafords Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 
506 (IC) at 508H-509B). This provision curtails the employer's right to decide on the disciplinary rules of the 
workplace and serves to ensure that the rules are not unreasonable (see also par 3.4.2 where the 
employer's right to discipline its employees is discussed). 
348see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 108. There 
are a number of factors which may help to determine whether or not a rule is so justified namely the nature 
of the business (see, for instance, Black Allied Workers Union & Others v One Rander Steak House (1988) 
9 IW 326 (IC) at 330G-H as well as PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair 
Dismissal (1994) 108 and the other cases referred to in note 50 thereof), the circumstances in which the 
business operates (see, for instance, Swanepoel v AECI Ltd (1984) 5 IW 41 (IC) at 431-446 as well as PAK 
le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 108 and the other cases 
referred to in note 51 thereof), the type of work the employee did (see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk 
The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 108) and the consistency with which the employer 
applied the rule in the past (see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dis-
missal (1994) 109). 
349see clause 7(b)(ii). It was also generally accepted by the industrial court and the labour appeal court 
that an employee can only be disciplined for contravening a rule if he knew of its existence (see National 
Union of Mineworkers & Others v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) Ltd - President Steyn 
Mine; President Brand Mine; Freddies Mine (1993) 14 IW 341 (LAC) at 3580-E and SA Laundry, Dry Clean-
ing, Dyeing & Allied Workers Union & Others v Advance Laundries Ltd t/a Stork Napkins (1985) 6 IW 544 
(IC) at 567H-568A). 
350see SA Laundry, Dry Cleaning, Dyeing & Allied Workers Union & Others v Advance Laundries Ltd t/a 
Stork Napkins (1985) 6 /W 544 (IC) at 567H-568A. The employer will be able to satisfy this guideline where 
the rule is contained in its disciplinary code or in a document (see Knoetze v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 
Ltd (1985) 6 IW 450 (IC) at 452E-1 where the industrial court held that the dismissal of Knoetze was fair as 
he had signed a document in which it was explicitly stated that employees found guilty of assaulting some-
body belonging to a different race group would be subject to dismissal) or written briefs and the docu-
ments are available to its employees (see clause 3(1) of the Code). Knowledge of a rule may also be 
ensured through meetings with workers and notices on notice boards. Furthermore, certain forms of mis-
conduct may be so well known and generally accepted in the workplace that employees can reasonably be 
expected to know that they may face dismissal for transgression thereof. Another factor which may serve 
as proof of the employee's knowledge is previous warnings which he may have in respect of this rule. 
122 
Legislation 
Furthermore, the employer must prove that it has applied this rule consistently.351 The 
reason for this guideline is that an employer, as far as possible, must treat its employees 
the same where they have committed the same or similar offences. In other words, the 
employer must be consistent in the meting out of discipline. 352 
Lastly, the employer must prove that dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the con-
travention of the rule or standard. 353 The Code lists a number of factors which must be 
taken into consideration when determining this question354- namely the gravity of the 
misconduct, 355 the employee's circumstances, 356 the nature of the job, 357 the circum-
stances of the infringement itse1f358 and the consistency with which the employer has 
351 See clause 7(b)(ii) of the Code. 
352Two types of inconsistency can be distinguished namely historical inconsistency and con-
temporaneous inconsistency. Historical inconsistency occurs where the employer has in the past, as a 
matter of practice, not proceeded against its employees when they have contravened a certain rule but 
then suddenly decides to proceed against an employee for contravening that particular rule. Con-
temporaneous inconsistency takes place where employees who breach the same rule at roughly the same 
time are not all disciplined, or where they are all disciplined receive different penalties. See PAK le Roux 
and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 110-111 for a more detailed dis-
cussion on these two types of inconsistency. 
353see clause 7(b)(iv) of the Code. 
354see clause 3(5) and (6). 
355The Code subscribes to the concept of progressive discipline (see clause 3(2)) and stipulates that dis-
missal is not appropriate for a first offence, except if the misconduct is serious (see clause 4(4)). See also 
par 3.4.2 above where the employer's right to discipline its employees is discussed. 
356such as length of service, previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances (see clause 3(5) of 
the Code). These factors were also taken into account by the industrial court (see, for instance, Nadasen v 
CG Smith Sugar Ltd (1992) 13 IW 1571 (IC) at 1583C-D). However, some debate arose regarding the 
importance of a good disciplinary record and long service as mitigating factors and the labour appeal court 
appeared to be of the view that these factors should not play such an important role (see Central News 
Agency v Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Another (1991) 12 IW 340 (LAC) at 344H-I 
and Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komjwayo (1992) 13 IW 573 (LAC) at 5921-593A). 
This dispute has now been resolved as the Code clearly indicates that these factors should be taken into 
account in determining whether dismissal is the appropriate sanction. 
357consider, for instance, Black Allied Workers Union v One Rander Steak House (1988) 9 IW 326 (IC) at 
330G-1 where the industrial court took into account the fact that efficient and quick service was essential in 
a restaurant functioning on the principle of low price and high turnover, and decided that the employees' 
disobedience and slack and inefficient service consituted a fair reason for dismissal. See also PAK le Roux 
and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 113 and the cases discussed 
there. 
358surrounding circumstances may have a tempering effect, not on the seriousness of the offence as 
such, but on the severity of the penalty (see. for instance, Nkomo v Pick 'n Pay Retailers (1989) 1 o IW 937 
(IC) at 940G-H). 
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dismissed other employees for the same offence in the past. 359 
None of these factors in isolation can determine the appropriateness of dismissal as a 
penalty. They must all be considered and weighed up against each other. To decide 
whether or not dismissal is the appropriate penalty may be a fairly difficult task, particu-
larly where factors such as consistency and the personal circumstances of the employee 
must be balanced. 360 
Both the industrial court and the labour appeal court increasingly subscribed to the 
reasonable employer test when they had to determine the appropriateness of dismissal 
as penalty.361 They often took a less interventionist approach and did not substitute the 
employer's penalty with one which they thought would be fair, if it was clear that a 
reasonable employer would have imposed the same penalty. In Bhengu & Others v 
Union Co-Operative Ltd, 362 for instance, the industrial court _explained this approach as 
follows 
It is now well established that this court will not interfere with the sanction decided upon by 
the employer unless that sanction falls outside the range of sanctions which a fair 
employer would be likely to impose. The fact that the presiding officer, if he had to impose 
a penalty himself, would have imposed some other penalty is not a relevant consideration. 
The authors of The Labour Relations Act of 1995363 are doubtful whether this approach 
by the industrial court and the labour appeal court can still be valid in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995. They point out thats 23(1) of the Constitution entitles every person 
to "fair" labour practices. According to them364 
[t]his implies that the common law should be interpreted as requiring the employer to 
behave not only reasonably but fairly in exercising its disciplinary power. 
359see clause 3(6) of the Code. Two types of inconsistency can be distinguished namely historical and 
contemporaneous inconsistency. In the case of historical inconsistency, the employer dismisses an 
employee for an offence in respect of which it has not in the past dismissed. Contemporaneous 
inconsistency entails that an employer dismisses one employee for a particular offence but elects not to 
dismiss another who has committed the same offence at roughly the same time as the first employee. 
360see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 117-118 
where they discuss the difficulties surrounding the selection of the appropriate penalty. 
361 See PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 118-120. 
362(1990) 11 IW 117 (IC) at 1211. See also National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Western Areas Gold 
Mining Co Ltd (1985) 6 /W 380 (IC) at 3860. 
3630 du Toit, 0 Wootrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, O Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 354. 
364At354. 
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In addition, the commissioner determining the fairness of a dismissal is enjoined by 
clause 7(b)(iv) of the Code to consider whether dismissal is an "appropriate" sanction. 
The authors of The Labour Relations Act of 1995365 suggest that the term "appropriate" 
must be read in the light of the purpose of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. They argue 
that366 
[i]t would be difficult to maintain that the aims set out in section 1, in addition to the con-
stitutional right to fairness, permit the arbitrator to require no more than 'reasonableness' 
on the part of the employer. It is submitted-that the arbitrator must also. consider whether 
the employer's sanction was fair, thus broadening the scope for legal intervention and the 
protection extended to employees. 
3.4.3.3.2.2 Procedural Fairness 
Clause 4 of the Code sets out the requirements for a procedurally fair dismissal for mis-
conduct. It is here that, arguably, the Code adopts a different approach367 from that of 
the jurisprudence developed by the industrial court. 368 Although there were differing 
approaches, generally speaking, the industrial court required fairly high standards of 
procedural fairness.369 It appears that the Code does not subscribe to this approach. It 
requires a substantially fair procedure rather than compliance with prescribed for-
malities. 370 
365D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 354. 
366At354. 
367see Andre van Niekerk and PAK le Roux "Procedural Fairness and the New Labour Relations Act" 
(1997) 6(6) CLL 51 where they state, "One of the most important but understated changes introduced by 
the 1995 Labour Relations Act relates to procedural fairness in dismissal. The precise nature and extent of 
these changes will have to be determined by the labour courts in due course, but the wording of the Act 
and in particular, the Code of Good Practice on unfair dismissal, suggest that they are far reaching•. See 
further (at 52) where they suggest that the new provisions represent a shift from a model based on respect 
for dignity, to one that more fully accounts for considerations of efficiency. 
368For a discussion of the court's jurisprudence, see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South 
African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 152-176; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African 
Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 203-210; Edwin Cameron "The Right to a Hearing before Dismissal - Part 1" (1986) 
7 IW 183 and Edwin Cameron "The Right to a Hearing before Dismissal - Problems and Puzzles" (1988) 9 
IW 147. 
369For a discussion of the industrial court's requirements for a procedurally fair dismissal, see Andre van 
Niekerk and PAK le Roux "Procedural Fairness and the New Labour Relations Act" (1997) 6(6) CLL 51 at 
53; D du Tolt, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 357; PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 154 and 
Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 204. 
370see D du Tait, O Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, O Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 357. 
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The Code states that the employer should conduct an investigation, which does not 
need to be a formal enquiry, to determine whether there are grounds for dismissal.371 
Van Niekerk and Le Roux372 point out that although the word "enquiry" is used in the 
Code, it is clear that what was envisaged by the Code is not the formal disciplinary 
enquiry often contemplated by the industrial court. 373 
The Code lists a number of minimum requirements for such an investigation. Firstly, the 
employer must notify the employee of the allegations using a form and language that the 
employee can reasonably understand.374 Secondly, the employee should be allowed 
the opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations against him.375 Thirdly, the 
employee should be afforded a reasonable time to prepare his response376 and, 
fourthly, he should be entitled to the assistance of a trade union representative or fellow 
employee. 377 
After the investigation, the Code requires the employer to communicate the decision 
taken and preferably furnish the employee with written notification of that decision. 378 
371 See clause 4(1 ). 
372Andre van Niekerk and PAK le Roux "Procedural Fairness and the New Labour Relations Act• (1997) 
6(6) CLL 51at57. 
373see, for instance, Mahlangu v CIM Deltak, Gallant v CIM Deltak (1986) 7 /W 346 (IC). 
374see clause 4(1). The industrial court also laid down this guideline (see PAK le Roux and Andre van 
Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 156-157 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 208). 
375see clause 4(1). The industrial court developed the same guideline (see PAK le Roux and Andre van 
Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 157-161 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 208). 
376see clause 4(1). The industrial court developed a similar guideline. It required that the employer afford 
the employee timeous notice of the hearing to enable him to prepare for it (see PAK le Roux and Andre van 
Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 157 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A 
Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 208). 
3nsee clause 4(1). The industrial court developed a similar guideline. It allowed the employee to be 
assisted by someone during the hearing (see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 161-162 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour 
Law 2 ed (1992) 208). 
378see clause 4(1 ). The industrial court also developed the guideline that the employer had to inform the 
employee of its decision. It did not, however, require that it had to be done in writing (see PAK le Roux and 
Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 169 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jor-
daan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 208). 
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The Code contains special provisions in the case of disciplinary action against trade 
union representatives379 or an employee who is an office-bearer380 or officia1381 of a 
trade union. It requires the employer not to institute such disciplinary action against 
these employees without first informing and consulting the trade union. 382 The aim of 
this provision is probably to afford these employees a measure of protection against bias 
or victimisation by the employer. 
If the employee is dismissed, the Code· requires that the employee should be given the 
reason for dismissa1383 and reminded of any rights to refer the matter to a counci1384 
with jurisdiction or to the Commission or to any dispute resolution procedures estab-
lished in terms of a collective agreement. 385 It is important that the employee be 
informed of the reason for dismissal, particularly if he intends to pursue the matter in 
terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, as the Act prescribes different dispute resolu-
tion procedures for the various reasons for dismissal. 386 
The Code does not make provision for an appeal against a dismissal to a higher author-
ity in the hierarchy of the enterprise.387 This is to the advantage of the employer as it 
379A trade union representative is defined in s 213 as "a member of a trade union who is elected to 
represent employees in a workplace". For a discussion of trade union representatives, see par 4.2.3.4 of 
chapter4. 
380An office bearer of a trade union is defined ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as a person who 
holds office in a trade union and who is not an official. See further par 4.2.3.5 of chapter 4 where reference 
is made to office bearers. 
381 An official of a trade union is defined in s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as a person employed 
as the secretary, assistant secretary or organiser of a trade union, or in any other prescribed capacity, 
whether or not that person is employed in a full-time capacity. See further par 4.2.3.5 of chapter 4 where 
reference is made to officials of trade unions. 
382see clause 4(2). The industrial court did not develop such a guideline. 
383rhe industrial court also developed such a guideline (see PAK le Roux and Andre van Nlekerk The 
South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 169 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South 
African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 208). 
384see par 4.2.5 of chapter 4 for a discussion of the various types of councils provided for in the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995. 
385see clause 4(3). 
386see s 191. 
387 Compare this with the industrial court which often required that an employee had to be afforded an 
appeal (see, for example, Mahlangu v CIM Deltak, Gallantv CIM Deltak (1986) 7 /W 346 (IC) at 357A-F). 
For a discussion of this requirement, see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 169-174 and Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour 
Law 2 ed (1992) 208. 
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entails a saving in production hours and manpower. However, it is also advantageous for 
the (dismissed) employee as he will be able to refer the matter to the Commission388 for 
speedy settlement by an objective third party.389 
Lastly, the Code provides that the employer may dispense with pre-dismissal proce-
dures in exceptional circumstances where the employer cannot reasonably be expected 
to comply with the Code's guidelines regarding a fair procedure. 390 The question of 
whether or not exceptiona1··circumstances are present is a factual one: Nevertheless, it is 
suggested that the exceptional circumstances distinguished by the industrial court, 
namely the so-called crises-zone cases391 and the instances where the employee has 
waived his right to an enquiry,392 will serve as guidelines for the commissioners of the 
Commission. 393 
3.4.3.3.3 The Requirements for a Fair Dismissal for Incapacity 
3.4.3.3.3.1 Substantive Fairness 
The Code distinguishes between two broad categories of incapacity394 namely poor 
388see s 191 (1) (b) if the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
389see s 191 (1) in terms of which the employee must refer the dispute within 30 days of the dismissal as 
well as s 191 (5) in terms of which the commissioner must endeavour to conciliate the dispute within 30 
days of receipt of the referral. 
390see clause 4(4). The industrial court also identified exceptional circumstances where the employer 
could dispense with a hearing (see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair 
Dismissal (1994) 174-176). 
391 See, for example, Lefu & Others v Western Areas Gold Mining Co Ltd (1985) 6 IW 307 (IC) at 313C and 
National Union of Mineworkers v Buffelsfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd (Beatrix Mines Division) (1988) 9 IW 
341 (IC) at 348A-D. 
392see, for instance, Mfazwe v SA Metal and Machinery Co Ltd (1987) 8 IW 492 (IC) at 4930. 
393see also the comments by D du Tolt, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The 
Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 359 and A van Niekerk and PAK le Roux "Procedural Fairness and the 
New Labour Relations Act" (1997) 6(6) CLL 51 at 57. 
394The industrial court also distinguished between these two fonns of incapacity. See PAK le Roux and 
Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 219 where they discuss these two 
forms of incapacity distinguished by the court. 
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work performance395 and ill health or injury.396 In essence, the guidelines for a sub-
stantively fair dismissal for these categories are the same. 397 
In the case of dismissal for poor work performance, the Code provides for a reasonable 
probationary period.398 The aims of such a period are normally twofold: to allow the 
employer to determine the employee's suitability for the job and to enable it to dismiss an 
unsuitable employee for reasons which are "less compelling"399 than would be required 
in the case of ordinary employees. However, the guidetines for a fair dismissal of a 
probationary employee prescribed by the Code400 are essentially the same as those for 
an ordinary dismissal. 401 
An employer which wants to dismiss an employee for poor work performance402 must 
firstly prove that there was a performance standard and that the employee failed to meet 
395see clauses 8 and 9. The dividing line between incapacity and misconduct in the case of poor work 
performance is often very fine. The cause for poor work performance must be carefully considered. If there 
is some measure of culpability on the part of the employee, his dismissal would probably be based on his 
misconduct and not on incapacity. See further PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law 
of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 219 as well as John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 114. 
396see clauses 1 o and 11. The employer must be careful that a dismissal for permanent or serious 
temporary incapacity does not amount to an automatically unfair dismissal (see par 3.4.3.2 above where 
automatically unfair dismissals are discussed). The employer will be able to avoid this where it can prove 
that it is not the employee's disability which is the reason for his dismissal but rather the inherent require-
ments of the job which make the disabled person incapable of doing the work. The employer may also 
possibly dismiss a disabled person for operational reasons. Under such circumstances, the emphasis will 
be on the harm which the employee's incapacity is inflicting on the economic well-being of the business 
and not on the incapacity as such (see par 3.4.3.3.4 below where dismissal for operational reasons is dis-
cussed). 
397The Code deals with the substantive guidelines for these two categories under separate headings 
merely to accommodate the peculiarities of the different categories. · 
398see clause 8(1). 
399see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 114. 
400see dause 8(1). 
401This is largely in accordance with the view expressed in the majority of industrial court decisions 
namely that the requirements for a substantially fair dismissal during probation are essentially the same as 
those for an ordinary dismissal. See John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 113-114. 
402Essentially, the Code has codified the guidelines developed by the industrial court for a substantively 
fair dismissal (see D du Toil, O Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Rela-
tions Act of 1995 (1996) 360). See PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dis-
missal (1994) 221-222 for a discussion of the court's guidelines). 
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the required performance standard.403 In the second instance, the employer must 
prove that this reason for dismissal was fair under the circumstances. In this regard, it 
must prove that the employee knew what was expected of him;404 that he was given a 
fair opportunity to meet the required standard405 and that dismissal was the appropriate 
sanction. 406 
In the case of dismissal for ill health or injury, 407 the employer will have to prove that the 
employee was ill or that he was injured and that this made the employee incapable of 
doing his work. 408 In the second instance, the employer must prove that ill health or 
injury was a fair reason for dismissal under the circumstances. In this regard, the 
employer must indicate that the extent to which the employee was unable to perform his 
work was substantial;409 that it was not possible or feasible to adapt the employee's 
403see clause 9(a). The required standard is essentially that which is required in terms of the common law, 
namely that the employee is able to do the work that he has undertaken to do (see par 2.4.6 of chapter 2 
where this duty of the employee is discussed). However, the circumstances of the job may be such that a 
certain amount of training or guidance or instruction is required from the employer. Under such circum-
stances, the employer must prove that the employee did not meet the standard demanded by the pecu-
liarities of the job or the workplace. 
404see clause 9(b)(i) read with clause 8(2)(a). Normally, it could be argued that the employee would have 
been aware of the requirements as he had indicated, by accepting the job offer, that he could do the work. 
The Code (see clause 8(2)(a) nevertheless appreciates that circumstances may be such that the employer 
may be required to evaluate, instruct, train, guide or counsel the employee. All these actions are aimed at 
informing the employee what is expected of him and how he must go about achieving this. 
405see clause 9(b)(ii) read with clause 8(2)(b). 
406see clause 9(b)(iii) of the Code. In this regard, aspects such as the nature of the performance standard, 
the period given for improvement, the number of chances given for improvement, the employee's personal 
circumstances, his explanation for non-compliance as well as the alternatives to dismissal which have been 
considered, will be relevant. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair 
Dismissal (1994) 227 where they suggest that the employer must show that the possibility of alternative 
employment was at least considered. 
407rhe guidelines for a substantively fair dismissal are those which have been developed by the industrial 
court (see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 360 and 364). See PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dis-
missal (1994) 229 for a discussion of the industrial court's guidelines). 
408see clause 11 (a) of the Code. 
409see clause 11 (b)(i) read with clause 10(3) of the Code. In the case of temporary incapacity, it must 
prove that the extent of the Incapacity is so great that continued employment is not a feasible option. It 
may prove this where the facts show that the employee wll be absent for an unreasonably long time (see 
clause 10(1) of the Code). Where an employee is permanently incapable, the employer must prove that it 
cannot accommodate his disabDity by adapting his duties or work circumstances or that there is no alterna-
tive employment (see clause 10(1) of the Code). 
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work circumstances or to change his duties410 and that no suitable alternative work was 
available. 411 
3.4.3.3.3.2 Procedural Fairness 
The Code does not provide a structured list of procedural guidelines in respect of poor 
work performance or ill health or injury. This is probably because procedural fairness is 
linked to substantive fairness. 412 · 
In the case of poor work performance, be it in respect of a probationary employee or an 
ordinary employee, the employer must counsel the employee. 413 During such counsell-
ing, the employee must be informed what is expected of him414 and warned that dis-
missal is a real possibility. 415 Provision may also be made for further counselling ses-
sions during which the employee's progress will be monitoi:ed.416 Where appropriate, 
410see clause 11 (b)(ii) of the Code. The Code indicates that an employer's duty to accommodate an 
employee who is injured at work or who is suffering from a work-related illnes is more onerous under these 
circumstances (see clause 10(4)). 
411 See clause 11 (b)(iii) of the Code. In clause 10(4) the Code stipulates that the duty on the employer to 
try and find suitable alternative work is more onerous where the illness or injury is work-related. 
412see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 222 where 
they state, "The requirement of fair procedure ... is inextricably linked to that of substantive fairness; the 
process of assessment, advice, guidance, and ultimately warning are an integral part of the dismissal". See 
also D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 365. 
413See clause 8(1) in respect of probationary employees and clause 8(2)(a) in respect of ordinary employ-
ees. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 224. 
414see clause 8(1) in the case of probationary employees and clause 8(2)(a) in respect of ordinary 
employees. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 
224. 
415see clause 9(b)(i) of the Code. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 225. There has been a difference of opinion as to whether or not warnings are 
necessary in the case of managerial employees. In Stevenson v Stems Jewellers (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 IW 318 
(IC) at 324H the court held that managerial employees should be capable of judging for themselves 
whether or not they are meeting the standard set by the employer. In Oe Klerk v Del lngenieurswerke 
(Edms) Bpk (1993) 14 IW 231 (IC) at 233H and Visser v Sa/air Freighters (Edms) Bpk (1989) 10 IW 529 (IC) 
at 534H-I, however, the court held that a manager is entitled to receive warnings. It could be argued that 
the Code also provides for this possibility by providing (in clause 9(b)(Q) that an employee ·could 
reasonably be expected to have been aware of the required performance standard•. 
416see clauses 8(2)(b) and 9(b)0iQ which provide that an ordinary employee must be given a reasonable 
period to Improve. See also PAK le RQUX and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal 
(1994) 224. It Is submitted that an oppornnty for improvement is also implied In clause 8(1) in respect of 
probationary employees. PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk at 225, however, indicate that there may be 
circumstances where the consequences due to poor performance are so serious that the employee need 
not be afforded an opportunity to improve. 
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the employer may be under a duty to provide training and instruction to an 
employee. 417 
The overlap between substantive and procedural fairness in cases of poor work perform-
ance is clear from clause 8(2)(b). It states that the procedure leading to dismissal should 
include an investigation to establish the reasons for unsatisfactory work performance 
and that the employer should consider alternatives to dismissal. In terms of clause 8(4) 
the employee is also entitted to be heard· and to be assisted by a trade union representa-
tive or a fellow employee during the investigation process. 
Where the employee is incapable because of ill health or injury, the employer must also 
enter into an investigative process and hold discussions with the employee. 418 During 
these discussions, the employee must be informed what impact his incapacity has on his 
job security.419 Provision may also be made for further discussions420 during which 
progress regarding his physical well-being is considered421 and, where relevant, alter-
natives422 to dismissal or the adaptation of his duties is discussed.423 In the process of 
investigation, the employee should be given an opportunity to state his case and to be 
assisted by a trade union representative of fellow employee. 424 
41 7see clause 8(1) in the case of probationary employees and clause 8(2)(a) in the case of ordinary 
employees. 
418-rhis is implied in clause 10(1) and (2) of the Code. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The 
South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 230. 
41 9see clause 10(1) of the Code. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 230. 
420see clause 10(2) where mention is made of the "process• of the investigation. 
421 aause 10(3) enjoins employers to consider counselling and rehabilitation in the case of alcoholism and 
drug abuse. John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 117 states that rehabilitative steps need not be 
undertaken at the employer's expense. 
422with regard to the question of alternatives, see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African 
Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 231-232. Le Roux and Van Niekerk point out that the employer is not 
required to create a job for the employee. 
423see clause 10(1) of the Code. aause 10(4) states that the duty on the employer to accommodate the 
incapacity of the employee is more onerous where the employee was injured at work or is suffering from a 
work-related Dlness. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dis-
missal {1994) 231-232. 
424see clause 10(2). 
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3.4.3.3.4 The Requi~ements for a Fair Dismissal for Operational Reasons 
3.4.3.3.4.1 Substantive Fairness 
Although the Labour Relations Act, 1995 provides a definition of what constitutes "opera-
tional requirements",425 the definition does not provide clear guidance as to when dis-
missals on this ground will be justified. 
Both the industrial court and the labour appeal court, in exercising their jurisdiction in 
terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, developed certain guidelines as to what con-
stituted a fair reason to dismiss based on the operational requirements of the 
employer. 426 It is likely that the labour court will look to these guidelines in interpreting 
the statutory definition in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
The question of whether or not an employee's dismissal for operational reasons is sub-
stantively fair is a factual one. The employer will firstly have to prove that the proffered 
reason is one based on the operational requirements of the business. 
The term "operational requirements" is defined as "requirements based on the economic, 
technological, structural or similar needs of an employer".427 "Technological reasons" 
refer to the introduction of new technology428 which leads to the redundancy of employ-
ees. 429 "Structural reasons" refer to posts becoming redundant following a restructuring 
of the enterprise. 430 
425see s 213. 
426For a discussion of these guidelines see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 235-289. 
427 See s 214 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
428Which may involve introducing technologically more advanced machinery, mechanisation or com-
puterisation. 
429see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 235. 
430see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 235. The 
restructuring may be effected by the employer or by the purchaser of a business. It also often follows upon 
a merger or amalgamation between two or more businesses. Such a restructuring is not restricted to the 
cutting of costs and expenditure; it may also be aimed at making a profit (see, for example, Morester 
Sande (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Another (1990) 11 /W 687 (LAC) at 689A-B) or 
increasing a profit or even ensurfng a more efficient enterprise (see Seven Abel CC t/a the Crest Hotel v 
Hotel & Restaurant Workers Union & Others (1990) 11 /W 504 (LAC) at 508H-l). 
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"Economic reasons" is a very broad concept, covering all those reasons which relate to 
the economic well-being of the enterprise. 431 One of the most common economic 
reasons is financial difficulties experienced by a business, for example, due to a 
downturn in the economy. This causes employees to become redundant and neces-
sitates their retrenchment. 432 
"Economic reasons" may also include circumstances where the employees do not 
actually become redundant, but economic considerations necessitate their dismissal. 433 
An investigation into the various other economic reasons which the courts have distin-
guished over the past fifteen years indicate that, although there can be no numerus 
clausus of economic reasons, a measure of categorisation of such reasons is possible. 
The industrial court accepted, for example, that an employer is entitled to dismiss 
employees who are unable or unwilling to comply with certain operational needs of the 
business. In Steel, Engineering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Trident Steel 
(Pty) Ltd, 434 it held that the employer was entitled to dismiss435 employees who were 
unwilling to work overtime as the enterprise required workers who were prepared to 
work overtime as and when business demands necessitated it. 436 
431see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 235. 
432see Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v The President, Industrial Court (1986) 7 IW 489 (A) at 
494A as to the meaning of retrenchment. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African 
Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994) 241. 
433Under such circumstances, their dismissal does not amount to a retrenchment but to an ordinary dis-
missal for economic reasons. See also PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 279. 
434(1986) 7 IW 86 (IC) at 95A-B read with 96A. See also National Union of Food Workers v Elliot Bros (East 
London) (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 575 (IC). In National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Three Gees Galvinising 
(1993) 14 /W 372 (LAC) the employer also argued the case on the basis of the requirements of the busi-
ness. The court, however, failed to distinguish between misconduct and the operational requirements of 
the business. It treated the matter as one of unfair industrial action on the part of the employees. 
435rhe employer should nevertheless be careful that its dismissal of the employees refusing to comply 
with its demand is not construed as a dismissal aimed at compelling them to accept its demand. Under 
such circumstances, the dismissal may be branded as automatically unfair in terms of s 187(1)(c) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 (see par 3.4.3.2 above in this regard). 
436Where the employer relies on business needs to dismiss employees who are either refusing or are 
unable to work overtime, the question of whether the overtime is compulsory or voluntary is irrelevant. 
However, where the overtime is compulsory, the employer may have another ground for dismissal namely 
misconduct in that the employee has breached his contract of employment by refusing to work such over-
time. It may also possibly dismiss an employee obliged to work overtime on the ground of incapacity 
where the employee is willing but unable to work overtime for an unreasonably long time. In terms of the 
definition of a strike ins 213 of the labour Relations Act, 1995 a concerted refusal to work either voluntary 
or compulsory overtime for one of the purposes mentioned in the definition may amount to a strike. If the 
strike is protected In terms of the Act, the employer wm not be able to dismiss the strikers for participating 
in such a strike. It may nevertheless be entitled to dismiss such strikers in terms of s 67(5) where it can 
prove that operational requirements necessitate it. The operational requirement may be one presently 
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The court has also accepted that an employee whose presence or actions negatively 
affects the economic well-being of te business, could be fairly dismissed. 437 This could 
occur where certain actions of the employee create disharmony amongst co-workers438 
or detrimentally affect the relationship between the employer and the rest of its employ-
ees439 or a customer. 440 It could also occur where the dismissal is based on the fact 
that the employee concerned had a special relationship with a co-worker. 441 
under discussion namely that the business needs people who are willing and able to work overtime. It 
could also be based on another economic ground, namely that the business has reached Its level of eco-
nomic tolerance and that It needs to dismiss the strikers and to employ people who are prepared to work 
overtime in order for It to survive economically (see the discussion of this economic reason for dismissal in 
par 6.3.6.2 of chapter 6 where the dismissal of strikers is discussed). 
4371t is suggested that were an employee's inability or incompatibility has a fairly limited effect on the busi-
ness, the reason for dismissal could be his incapability (see par 3.4.3.3.S- above where tflis reason for dis-
missal is discussed). However, where his inability or incompatibility has such a negative effect on other 
employees or customers that the economic well-being of the business as a whole is threatened, the reason 
for dismissal could be an economic one. D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S 
Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 367 hold a different view. They maintain that 
incompatibility should be treated as a form of incapacity. According to them, "[i]ncompatibility relates 
wholly to the subjective relationship between the employee and others in the enterprise and bears no rela-
tion to the definition of operational requirements". 
438The employee may, for instance be incompatible. See, for example, Erasmus v BB Bread Ltd (1987) 8 
ILJ 537 (IC) at 543J where the employee's uncompromising and difficult attitude as well as his racist 
remarks created disharmony amongst his co-workers. See also SA Quilt Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v Radebe 
(1994) 15 ILJ 115 (LAC) at 123G-I and 124A-C; Larcombe v Natal Nylon Industries (Pty) Ltd 
Pietermaritzburg (1986) 7 IW 326 (IC); Stevenson v Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 IW 318 (IC); King v 
Beacon Island Hotel (1987) 8 IW 485 (IC); Wright v St Mary's Hospital (1992} 13 IW 987 (IC) at 1003J and 
1004A; Lubke v Protective Packaging (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 IW 422 (IC) at 424A-B and Visagie & Andere v 
Prestige Skoonmaakdienste (Edms) Bpk (1995) 16 /W 421 (IC) at 438A-C. lncompatabillty must be distin-
guished from eccentricity (see Joslin v Olivetti Systems & Networks Africa (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 /W 227 (IC) at 
230H-I). 
439see, for instance Mazibuko & Others v Mooi River Textiles Ltd (1989) 10 ILJ 875 (IC) where the 
employer endeavoured to justify the dismissal of employees who were all members of a minority union, on 
the ground that their dismissal had become necessary to ensure continued productivity and industrial 
peace in the workplace. The court accepted that there was a commercial rationale for the employer's deci-
sion to dismiss but held that the dismissals were not legitimate in the face of protective provisions on free-
dom of association of the Labour Relations Act. 1956. This comment should be read in context as at the 
time of the judgment interference with an employee's freedom to associate was specifically branded as an 
unfair labour practice (see par 0) of the unfair labour practice definition in s 1 of the Act as it read between 
1 September 1988 and 30 April 1991). It is suggested that the labour court will probably also regard It as a 
substantively unfair dismissal as both the Constitution (sees 23(2)(a) and (b)) and the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 (see s 4) afford employees a right to freedom of association. See also Jonker v Amalgamated 
Beverage Industries (1993) 14 IW 199 (IC) at 208E-F. 
440consider, for instance, Rostoll & 'n Ander v Leeupoort Minerale Bron (Edms) Bpk (1987) 8 /W 366 (IC) 
af370H-J. 
441 For instance. where the employee Is married to the co-worker (see Govender & Another v MA Motla/a 
Lads Hostel (1987) 8 IW 809 (IC) at 8120-F; Rostoll & 'n Ander v Leeupoort Minera/e Bron (Edms) Bpk 
(1987) 8 IW 366 (IC) at 3691 and Trompeter & 'n Ander v Barnard h/a Plaas Kruisaar (1995) 16 IW 745 
(ALC) at 756H-7570). 
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The decisions of the courts under the Labour Relations Act, 1956 made it clear that, 
although the right to dismiss in these circumstances could be justified, this was only the 
case in exceptional situations. 442 The same is likely to be the case in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995, especially where dissatisfaction or disharmony is caused by 
the employee's race, sex, disability, marital status et cetera as dismissal under these cir-
cumstances could possibly constitute an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of s 
187(1)(e) and (f).443 
The industrial court and the labour appeal court were also prepared to accept that a dis-
missal could be justified on the basis of the operational requirements of the business 
where an employee's conduct had lead to a breakdown of the trust relationship between 
him and the employer. This could occur, for example, where the employer suspected the 
employee of breaching the duty to act in good faith444 or of serious dishonesty, but did 
not have sufficient evidence to establish this. Provided the employer could establish 
good grounds for such suspicion, dismissal could be justified. 445 
The industrial court and the labour appeal court also accepted that business require-
ments could be such that changes needed to be made to existing employees' terms and 
442see, for example, G v K (1988) 9 /W 314 (IC) at 316J-317A where it was held that dismissal under these 
circumstances could be construed as discrimination. 
443see par 3.4.3.2 above where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. 
444see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2 where this common law duty of an employee is discussed in detail. 
445An examination of the industrial court decision indicates that, at first, the court was not amenable to the 
argument that an employer should be able to dismiss on a mere suspicion of theft (see Mahlangu v CIM 
Deltak, Ga/Jantv CIM Deltak (1986) 7 /W 346 (IC)). Brassey in MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and 
MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Stri/<es, Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law 
(1987) at 97 has the following to say in regard to the Mahlangu case, "One can quarrel about whether 
Mahlangu falls within the doctrine, but what one cannot dispute, it is submitted, is the validity of the doc-
trine itself: namely that in appropriate circumstances it will not be unfair to dismiss a person on mere 
suspicion of misconduct. This is not, it should be clear, an exception to the rules governing dismissal for 
misconduct: It is the application of the rules governing dismissal for operational reasons". At present, the 
industrial court appears to be prepared to consider the argument and, under certain circumstances, to 
endorse It (see Electrical & Allied Workers Union & Another v The Productions Casting Co (Pty) Ltd (1988) 
9 /W 702 (IC) at 708G-J; Moletsane v Ascot Diamonds (Pty) Ltd (1993) 2 LCD 310 (IC) and Food & Allied 
Workers Union & Others v Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd (1994) 15 /W 630 (IC) at 644C-G). The 
labour appeal court In Dion Discount Centres v Sarah RantJo (NH 11 /2/16821 dated 23 August 1995) at 8 
of the typed judgement warns that the test should not be a "reasonable" or "strong" suspicion, but a 
suspicion ·on a balance of probabilities•. 
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conditions of employment. 446 Where employees were not prepared to agree to such 
changes, the courts were prepared to accept that their dismissals were fair, provided 
that the changes were reasonable.447 However, an employer trying to persuade the 
labour court of the fairness of a dismissal on this ground, could face the problem of s 
187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. In terms of this section, a dismissal to com-
pel an employee to accept changes to his terms and conditions of employment, is 
branded as automatically unfair. 448 
Another category of economic reasons distinguished by the industrial and labour appeal 
courts was the economic harm caused by employees to the enterprise through industrial 
action.449 As economic harm through industrial action was both expected and accepted 
by all the parties involved in collective bargaining, 450 the employer had to prove that the 
economic harm caused by the industrial action was more than it could have been 
expected to suffer under the circumstances.451 In other words, it had to prove that the 
446see, for example, Ndlela v SA Stevedores Ltd (1992) 13 IW 663 (IC) where the employer reorganised its 
staff requirements by changing the command structure and the job requirements of the posts in the new 
command structure. See also Manganese Metal Co (Pty) Ltd and National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
(1993) 14 ILJ 500 (ARB) at 505C where the arbitrator stated, "Unquestionably the company is entitled to 
ensure that its staff is employed to the maximum efficiency and consequently it is entitled to effect transfers 
in order to achieve this particular objective". See further Alert Employment Personnel (Pty) Ltd v Leech 
(1993) 14 /W 655 (LAC) at 658C-D where the company proposed a four-day week as a measurement to 
save it from going bankrupt. 
447see, for instance, Chatty v Raydee (Pty) Ltd t/a St James Accomodation (1988) 9 IW 318 (IC) where the 
court held that the employee's dismissal upon her refusal to accept new terms and conditions was unfair as 
the new terms and conditions were unfair (she was inter alia required to work 16 hours a day). In Steyn-
fields Restaurant CC v Ndlovu & Others (1994) 15 IW 297 (LAC) at 304A the court also held that there were 
no operational requirements necessitating new contracts of employment in terms of which the permanent 
employees would become casual labourers. The court also held in Ndlela v SA Stevedores Ltd (1992) 13 
IW 663 (IC) at 6661-667 A that were the change in the terms and conditions of employment entails a trans-
fer, the employer must endeavour to ensure that the new position does not amount to a demotion. Where, 
however, this cannot be avoided, the employer must take steps to ensure that •as little harm to the employ-
ees as possible arises·. 
448see par 3.4.3.2 above where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. 
449see par 6.3.6.2 of chapter 6 where the dismissal of employees participating in industrial action is dis-
cussed in detail. 
4501n MAN Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd and United African Motor & Allied Workers Union (1991) 12 IW 181 
(ARB) at 189H-I the arbitrator stated that, ·industrial action is the exercise of collective muscle in support of 
collective goats•. See also Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel 
(1993) 14 IW 963 (LAC) at 9701and972B and Perskorporasie van SA Bpk v Media Workers Association of 
SA (1993) 14 IW 938 (LAC) at941. 
451 See, for example, Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC Va Blue Waters Hotel 
(1993) 14 /W 963 (LAC) at 972F. 
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economic harm had become unbearable. 452 The Labour Relations Act, 1995 adopts the 
same approach with regard to the dismissal of protected strikers. 453 
Secondly, for a dismissal for operational reasons to be substantively fair, the employer 
will have to prove that the operational reason actually existed and that it was the real 
reason454 for the retrenchment or dismissal. 
In many of the disputes regarding the fairness of dismissats based on the operational 
requirements of the business, the courts also had to decide to what extent they would 
consider the business merits of the decision. Here two approaches emerged. The one 
approach was that the court should not investigate the merits of the employer's decision. 
The industrial court in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines 
(Pty) Ltd, 455 stated456 
We are somewhat doubtful...- after all in business frequently not always the best, nor the 
correct decision is taken. Perhaps management has a right to be foolish as long as it is 
strictly bona fide in Its deliberations. 
Le Roux and Van Niekerk, 457 while examining the law regarding dismissal for opera-
tional reasons in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, also endorsed this approach. 
452-rhis may prove to be fairly difficult, the question being when will the harm be sufficient to warrant dis-
missal? PAK le Roux and AJ van Niekerk "The Dismissal of Strikers: Ten Years On .. ." (1993) 2(12) CLL 131 
at 138 phrase the question as follows, " ... at which point will the employer's right to continue its business 
trump the right to strike?" This question is considered in detail in par 6.3.6.2 of chapter 6 where the dis-
missal of strikers is discussed in detail. 
453see par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6 where the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 regarding the dis-
missal of protected strikers on the ground of the operational requirments of the business is discuss in 
detail. 
454consider, for Instance, SA Chemical Workers Union & Others v Toiletpak Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd & 
Others (1988) 9 /W 925 QC) where the industrial court found the employees' dismissal to have been unfair 
as the real reason for their dismissal had been their misconduct (see also Kebeni & Others v Cementile 
Products (Ciskei) (Pty) Ltd & Another (1987) 8 /W 442 (IC)). See further Simelane & Others v Audell Metal 
Products (Pty) Ltd (1987) 8 /W 438 (IC) where the ·industrial court found that a drop in the sales figures of 
the employer was not its real reason for closing down. It appeared that the real reason was its desire to rid 
itself of a particular trade union and those employees who were actively involved In trade union activities. 
See also MOrester Sande (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Meta/workers of SA & Another (1990) 11 IW 687 
(LAC) at 6898. 
455(1992) 13 IW 405 (IC). See also De Vries & Andere v Lanserac Hotel & Andere (1993) 14 /W 432 (IC) at 
435-436; Mobius Group (Pty) Ltd v Corry (1993) 2 LCD 193 (LAC); Building Construction & Allied Workers 
Union & Another v Murray & Roberts Buildings (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 /W 112 (LAC) at 119 and Transport 
& General Workers Union & Others v City Council of the City of Durban & Another (1991) 12 IW 156 (IC) at 
158F-I. 
456At408A. 
457pAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal (1994). 
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They argued that, if an operational reason for a dismissal existed, judicial intervention 
had to be resticted to dismissals in bad faith or for improper motives. They stated 
that458 
[i] n the absence of the enactment of legislation which establishes a system of co-
determination, it is submitted that the role of the industrial court should not extend beyond 
the enforcement of procedural standards which permit employees and their representa-
tives the right to proper consultation prior to a final decision to implement the proposed 
changes. While it has been suggested that the industrial court ought to have the capacity 
to intervene in the merits of a decision affecting the operational requirements of the busi-
ness, the court has neither the expertise nor the procedural means to evaluate the com-
mercial sense of an employer's decision and impose an economic outcome. The only 
exception, it is suggested, is where the employer acts in a ma/a fide459 fashion. 
The labour appeal court in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel 
Engines (Pty) Ltd, 460 however, held a different view. It stated461 
What is at stake here is not the correctness or otherwise of the decision to retrench, but 
the fairness thereof. Fairness in this context goes further than bona fldes and the commer-
cial justification for the decision to retrench. It is concerned, first and foremost, with the 
question whether termination of employment is the only reasonable option in the circum-
stances. It has become trite for the courts to state that termination of employment for dis-
ciplinary and performance-related reasons should always be a measure of last resort. That, 
in our view, applies equally to termination of employment for economic or operational 
reasons. 
In terms of the labour appeal court's dictum in the Atlantis Diesel Engines case, a court 
is not only entitled to investigate the bona tides of the employer and the merits or sound-
ness of its decision to dismiss'-flJr operational reasons; it is also entitled to determine 
., 
whether this decision is the best 61"'-{)'lost reasonable one under the circumstances. In 
., 
other words, it is entitled to determineWhether there are other options apart from dis-
missal and to compare them with the option of dismissal in order to determine whether 
the latter option is the best or only reasonable one under the circumstances. 
' . 
According to the authors of The·Labour Relations Act of 1995 462 this dictum "comes 
close to recognising a property right in a job by requiring the decision to 'expropriate' 
that right to be fair and reasonable". 
458At 237-238. 
459Authors' emphasis. 
460(1993) 14 /W 642 (LAC). See also Mohamedy's v Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA 
(1992) 13/W1174 (LAC) at 1179H-1. 
461 At 648C-D. 
4620 du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 370. 
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The said authors463 argue that the approach adopted by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
appears to be that employees have a real contribution to make to the substantive 
decision-making process. Accordingly, the decision to retrench should be subject to the 
greatest possible degree of consultation464 with them, not simply for reasons of proce-
dural fairness, but also to establish whether substantive grounds for dismissal are pre-
sent. 
They argue further that, in terms of the Act, the labour court "has a clear responsibility to 
ensure that the provisions of the Act are complied with".465 In terms of s 192(2), the 
onus is on the employer to prove that the dismissal is fair.466 As indicated earlier in this 
paragraph, "fair" means that an operational reason for dismissal must exist and that it 
must be the real reason for dismissal. This places the onus on the employer to present 
evidence of such a reason. 467 If the employer's evidence is disputed, the labour court 
will have to weigh up the opposing arguments and make a finding as to whether the 
employer's proffered reason for dismissal is valid within the meaning of s 189 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
In conclusion, two issues must be highlighted regarding the labour court's determination 
of the fairness of the employer's business decision to dismiss. Firstly, judges of the 
labour court will not necessarily possess the required expertise to determine the busi-
ness merits of the employer's decision to dismiss. 468 The authors of The Labour Rela-
tions Act of 1995,469 however, point out that this should not necessarily present a prob-
lem as the court could rely on the assistance of expert assessors to help it determine the 
463see D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 370. 
464see s 189 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which regulates consultation in respect of dismissals based 
on operational requirements. This section is discussed in greater detail in par 3.4.3.3.4.2 below. See also s 
84(1 )(e) which lists dismissal for reasons based on operational requirements as one of the matters for con-
sultation with workplace forums. This section is discussed in greater in detail in par 4.3.3.1 below. 
465see D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 370. 
466see also par 3.3.3.3.1 above where the question of onus in dismissal cases is discussed. 
4671bid. 
468rhe judge president, deputy judge president as well as the judges.are all members of the legal profes-
sion (sees 153(2) and (6) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). This argument was also raised regarding 
presiding officers of the industrial court (see PAK le Roux and Andre van Niekerk The South African Law of 
Unfair Dismissal (1994) 237-238). 
4690 du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 370. 
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business merits of the employer's decision.470 Secondly, the court may be judging the 
fairness of the employer's decision with hindsight as it may have facts at its disposal that 
were either unavailable or unknown to the employer when it made the decision to dis-
miss. It is suggested that the court should take this factor into consideration when 
determining the fairness of the employer's decision and the remedy to be awarded to the 
employees. 
3.4.3.3.4.2 Procedural Fairness 
The requirements for a procedurally fair dismissal for operational reasons are set out in s 
189 (read with s 16) and s 196 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. They are a mixture of 
the old guidelines developed by the industrial court in terms of its unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction under the Labour Relations Act, 1956 and new requirements.471 
In essence, there are three requirements. Firstly, the employer must consult about the 
possibility of dismissal.472 Secondly, it must disclose information473 and thirdly, it must 
select employees for retrenchment according to certain selection criteria.474 
The legislature is fairly prescriptive as far as the obligation to consult is concerned. Not 
only does it require the employer to "consult" but it also instructs the employer when to 
consult, 4 75 with whom to consult, 4 76 how to consult4 77 and about what to consult. 4 78 
Section 189(1) requires that consultation must take place when an employer "con-
templates" dismissal. The word "contemplate" clearly indicates that the employer must 
consult at the stage when it has not yet reached a final decision to dismiss, but has only 
470see D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 {1996) 370 note 125. 
471see also D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act 
of 1995 (1996) 371. 
472see s 189(1)-(2) and (5)-(6). 
473see s 189(3)-(4) read withs 16. 
474see s 189(7). 
475see s 189(1). 
476see s 189(1)(a)-(d). 
477see s 189(2), (5) and (6). 
47Bsee s 189(2). I 
'\ 
\ 
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foreseen the possibility of dismissal. 4 79 This ensures that the other side is afforded the 
opportunity to influence the employer in its (final) decision to dismiss or not. 
Section 189(2) requires that the parties must "attempt to reach consensus".480 These 
words indicate how the employer must consult. Essentially, the parties must embark on 
a joint problem-solving exercise, striving for consensus where possible.481 The 
employer must consult in good faith in that it must not have made up its mind prior to 
consultation to dismiss. This can be deduced -from the statutrny requirements that the 
employer must allow the other party an opportunity to make representations, 482 which it 
must consider and respond to483 and if it does not agree with the other party's repre-
sentations, the employer must state its reasons for disagreeing.484 Should the parties 
fail to reach agreement, the final decision remains that of the employer.485 
479rhis brings to an end the controversy which existed about the timing of consultation. A number of 
presiding officers of the industrial court distinguished between two stages in the dismissal. During the first 
stage, the employer makes its decision to retrench and, during the second stage, it consults with the other 
side as to the best means by which the employer's decision to dismiss may be implemented fairly. In other 
words, the other side is merely informed of the employer's final decision to dismiss and is then afforded an 
opportunity to make recommendations regarding only the timing of the dismissals and the selection criteria 
to be used (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 IW 405 
(IC) at 409J-41 OB as well as Karbusicky v Anglo American Coroporation of SA Ltd (1993) 14 /W 166 (IC) at 
1698). Others argued that at the consultation the employer must consult with the other side regarding its 
decision to retrench. It implies that the employer's decision to dismiss cannot be final at that stage. At 
most, it must have an intention to retrench (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel 
Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 IW 642 (LAC) at 650A-C and 648H-I; Mohamedy's v Commercial Catering & 
Allied Workers Union of SA (1992) 13 IW 1174 (LAC) at 1179H; Hoogenoeg Andolusite (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Mineworkers & Others (1) (1992) 13 /W 87 (LAC) at 93H-I; Morester Sande v National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA (1990) 11 /W 687 (LAC) at 6890-F; Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v 
Sopelog CC (1994) 15 IW 90 (LAC) at 104A-B and Kellogg SA (Pty) Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & 
Others (1994) 15 /W 83 (LAC) at 89C-D). 
480see also s 85(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which deals with the employer's duty to consult with 
the workplace forum where the employer is also enjoined to consult the workplace forum "and to attempt 
to reach consensus with it". See further par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where the employer's duty to consult with 
the workplace forum is discussed. 
481see Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA(1994) 15 IW 1247 (A). In 
this case, the advocate acting on behalf of the trade union argued that consultation should amount to a 
"joint problem-solving exercise with the parties striving for consensus where possible". The court, in its 
response to the advocate's contention, had the following to say (at 1253F-G), "I agree that consultation, if 
circumstances permit, should be geared to achieve that purpose (ie that consensus be reached] ... •. 
482see s 189(5). 
483see s 189(6). 
484tbld. 
485see Metal & Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 /W 478 (IC) as well as Atlantis Diesel Engines 
(Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA(1994} 15 /W 1247 (A) where the appellate division stated 
(at 1253F-G), ·1 agree that consultatlon, If circumstances permit, should be geared to achieve that purpose 
(bearing in mind that problem solving is something distinct from bargaining and that the final decision, 
where consensus cannot be achieved, always remains that of management)9. 
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Apart from having to consult about its intention to dismiss, section 189(2) also lists a 
number of other matters about which the employer must attempt to reach consensus. It 
must firstly consult about ways in which dismissal can be avoided. 486 Where they are 
agreed that dismissal is unavoidable, it must attempt to reach consensus about minimis-
ing the number of dismissals, 487 the timing of dismissals, mitigating the adverse effects 
of the dismissals, 488 selection criteria489 and the amount490 of severance pay to be 
paid to dismissed employees. 
486Examples of alternatives to dismissal are the granting of either paid or unpaid leave; the reduction or 
elimination of overtime; the reduction or elimination of work on Sundays; the transfer of employees to other 
positions in the same undertaking; the spreading of the retrenchment over a period of time in order to allow 
time for a natural reduction in personnel numbers to occur and the training or retraining of employees to 
enable them to take up alternative positions in the same undertaking. Another possible alternative to retren-
chment is to reduce salaries (see Mkhize & Others v Kingsleigh Lodge (1989) 10 IW 944 (IC)). 
487This may include the transfer of redundant employees to other positions or sections in the same 
undertaking; asking employees to volunteer for retrenchment; the spreading of the retrenchment over a 
period of time in order to allow time for a natural reduction in personnel numbers to occur through, for 
instance, resignations, and the training or retraining of redundant employees to enable them to take up 
alternative positions in the same undertaking. 
488rhe employer and trade union may agree that the employer will assist the employee in finding alterna-
tive work. The employer, for instance, may allow the employees selected for retrenchment time off, without 
loss of pay, to search for alternative work and to go for interviews. The employer may also make an office 
available which retrenched employees may use to complete job application forms and to telephone from in 
respect of advertised positions and to make appointments for interviews. The employer, in addition to the 
certificate of service which he or she is compelled to furnish in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employ-
ment Act, may also provide employees with references. The employer and the trade union may also con-
clude an agreement in terms of which the employer undertakes to give priority to those who are to be 
retrenched should vacancies arise or should business improve and the employer needs to employ more 
people. The enforceability of such a re-hiring agreement was the subject of a lot of controversy and debate 
in both the industrial court and the labour appeal court. It also came under the scrutiny of the appellate 
division (see National Automobile & Allied Workers Union (now known as National Union of Metalworkers 
of SA) v Borg-Warner SA (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 IW 509 (A)). This matter is also discussed in par 3.2 above. 
489Selection criteria are discussed in greater detaH later in this paragraph. 
4901n view of the fact that section 196(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 makes the payment of 
severance pay obligatory, it is suggested thats 189(2)(c) refers only to a possible agreement on the actual 
amount of severance pay payable. Furthermore. ass.196(1) also sets out the minimum severance pay, it is 
suggested that s 189(2)(c) Is only applicable where the trade union or employees are actually demanding 
more than the minimum stipulated ins 196(1). 
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As a second procedural requirement, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 requires the 
employer to disclose, in writing,491 all "relevant information" to the other party.492 This 
is an extremely important provision and is aimed at ensuring effective consultation. 
The Act does not define "relevant information". It nevertheless provides that the concept 
includes all information which will allow the other party to consult effectively493 and it 
specifically includes information on those matters in respect of which.the Act requires the 
parties to try and reach consensus. 494 
"Relevant information" is clearly a very broad concept which must be decided on the 
facts.495 The onus will probably be on the employer to prove that the information 
demanded by the other party is not relevant.496 In addition, it may be expected to take 
whatever reasonable steps necessary to obtain relevant information which is unavailable 
to it at the time it is requested. 497 
The other party's right to demand relevant information, however, is not unrestricted. The 
Act provides that the employer is not required to disclose information which is legally 
privileged498 or which it is prohibited to disclose by any law or court order.499 It also 
provides that an employer is not required to disclose confidential information which, if 
491 Verbal assurances, explanations and information will not constitute compliance with this requirement. 
492See s 189(3). The Labour Relations Act, 1956 did not contain such a provision and trade unions had to 
rely on the unfair labour practice definition and argue that the employer's failure or refusal to provide 
information constituted an unfair labour practice. 
493see s 189(4) read withs 16(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
494see s 189(3)(a)-(h). 
495oisputes regarding the of question whether or not information is "relevant" may be referred to the Com-
mission for possible conciliation and, where the dispute remains unsettled, for arbitration. Sees 189(5) 
read withs 16(6), (8)-(9) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This factual question has also been the subject 
of a number of industrial court and labour court decisions. Even the appellate division had occasion to con-
sider this question in Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1994) 15 /W 
1247 (A) at 1253-1257. 
496see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 /W 642 (LAC) at 
652E. 
497see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 /W 642 (LAC) at 
6520. 
498Privilege is usually claimed In respect of documents prepared for the purpose of obtaining professional 
legal advice; State documents and communications made "without prejudice•. 
499see s 189(4) read withs 16(5)(a)-(b). 
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disclosed, may cause substantial harm to it or an employee. 500 It furthermore provides 
that an employer is not required to make private personal information501 relating to an 
employee available unless the employee consents to such a disclosure. 502 
The restriction regarding confidential information and personal information relating to an 
employee is not absolute. The Act affords a commissioner with a discretion to order the 
disclosure of such information. 503 In order to decide if he must make such an order, the 
commissioner must balance .. the. harm which--the-disclosui:e-is likely to cause the 
employee or the employer against the harm which the failure to disclose the information 
is likely to cause to the ability of the trade union to perform effectively its functions or the 
ability of the trade union to engage effectively in consultation. 504 
The legislature appreciated the serious implications which such a disclosure may hold 
for the employee or the employer and has accordingly prov!ded some S?feguards. The 
commissioner may order the disclosure on terms designed to limit the harm likely to be 
caused. 505 In addition, he must take into account any breach of confidentially by the 
trade union in the past and may refuse to order the disclosure for a period specified in 
his award. 506 Furthermore, if a dispute ensues about an alleged breach of confidentiality 
SOOsee s 189(4) read withs 16(5)(c). See also Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal-
workers of SA (1994) 15 /W 1247 (A) at 1253J. Confidential information entails information which, if it 
becomes known, will impact negatively on the employer's competitiveness. Examples of such information 
are trade secrets (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 
/W 642 (LAC) at 652C and Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1994) 
15 ILJ 1247 (A) at 1254), price consessions obtained from customers and price reductions which have 
been negotiated with suppliers of raw material or of components necessary for the production of the 
employer's products (see Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1994) 
15 /W 1247 (A) at 12531-J). 
501 Such information includes an employee's medical record compiled through obligatory regular medical 
check-ups with the enterprise's doctor. 
502see s 189(4) read with s 16(5)(d). 
503see s 189(4) read with s 16(6)-(12). In this regard the legislature went further than the appellate division 
in Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1994) 15 /W 1247 (A) at 12531-J 
where it held that an employer could not be expected to disclose information which "could harm the 
employer's business interest for reasons other than its relevance to the consultation process, eg trade 
secrets and other confidential information·. See also National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Atlantis Diesel 
Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 JLJ 642 (LAC) at 652C. The commissioner, however, may not order an 
employer to disclose legally privileged information or information which the employer is prohibited from 
disclosing in terms of a court order (sees 16(11)). 
504tbid. 
50Ssee s 189(4) read withs 16(12). 
506see s 189(4) read withs 16(13). 
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by the trade union, the commissioner may order that the right to disclosure of informa-
tion be withdrawn for a stipulated period. 507 This represents a fairly serious curtailment 
of trade unions' right to information as such an order apparently covers all relevant 
information. 508 
The third procedural requirement becomes relevant once it is clear that dismissal is the 
only viable solution. The Act509 requires the employer to select employees for dismissal 
according to agreed selection criteria51-0 or criteria that-are--fair and objective.511 
In terms of s 196 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 the employer must pay the employ-
ees who have been selected for dismissal severance pay. 512 The Act is prescriptive as 
far as the payment of severance pay is concerned. It sets out the manner in which it 
must be calculated and prescribes the minimum513 to which an employee would be 
entitled. 514 
507see s 189(4) read with 16(14). 
508see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 98. 
S091n terms of s 189(7) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
510see s 189(2)(b) in terms of which the method for selecting the employees to be dismissed is listed as 
one of the matters over which the consulting parties must attempt to reach consensus. 
511The industrial court has set out guidelines as to what would constitute fair and objective criteria. For a 
detailed discussion, see PAK le Roux and Andre van Nlekerk The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal 
(1994) 253-262. The employer must be careful that the dismissal of an employee through the imple-
mentation of a selection criterion does not amount to an automatically unfair dismissal (see par 3.4.3.2 
above where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed). Age is such a criterion. It is often applied in 
jobs which requires physical fitness and strength; the argument being that a person's physical fitness and 
strength lessens as he or she ages. Non-residency (see National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v 
Televisions and Electrical Distributors (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 /W 738 (IC)) and double income families (see 
Manquidi & Others v Continental Barrel Plating (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 IW 400 (IC) at 407-408) may also con-
stitute such criteria. Where, however, the employer and workplace forum or trade union have agreed on 
these selection criteria. the dismissed employee will probably not be allowed to attack the fairness of his 
dismissal as he has selected these bodies as his representatives (see, for instance, Mbobo & Others v 
Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co (1992) 13 IW 1485 (IC) and Ramolesane & Another v Andrew Mentis & 
Another (1991) 12 IW 329 (LAC) at 336A). 
512see s 196(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This provision brings to an end the debate which has 
raged in both the industrial court and the labour appeal court as to whether or not an employer is obliged 
to pay severance pay (for an overview of the different arguments, see Elize Strydom and Kathleen van der 
Unde "Severance Packages: A Labour Law and Income Tax Perspective" (1994) 15 /W 447-449). 
513The words "at leasr ins 196(1) indicate that the section prescribes the minimum severance pay that 
must be paid. The parties, however, may agree on more favourable terms during consultation (sees 
189(2)(c)). 
514see s 196(1). 
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The employer's duty to pay severance pay, however, is not absolute. Of importance is 
the fact that the Act provides that the employer is not obliged to pay severance pay to an 
employee who unreasonabty515 refuses to accept alternative emptoyment.516 In addi-
tion, the employer may apply for an exemption.517 This provision is to be welcomed as 
there will definitely be instances where the employer will be unable to pay severance pay 
(particularly where it must dismiss because of financial difficulties) or where such a pay-
ment will cause undue hardship for the employer. 518 
3.4.3.4 Notice Periods 
The employer's right to dismiss is not only restricted in that it must ensure that a dis-
missal is fair, it must also ensure that the dismissal is lawful. This entails that the 
employer must give the employee the required notice of termination of the contract of 
employment or make payment in lieu of such notice.519 If the notice period is regulated 
in the contract of employment520 or in a collective agreement521 or a wage determina-
tion in terms of the Wage Act, 522 the employer must give notice in accordance with 
these provisions. 
515The question of whether or not an employee's refusal is "unreasonable• is one of fact. It is suggested 
that where the offered position is largely on a par with the employee's old job, his refusal may be regarded 
as unreasonable. Where, however, the offered position effectively amounts to a demotion, his refusal may 
be regarded as reasonable. 
516see s 196(3). 
517 See s 196(1) and (5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
518some of the presiding officers of the industrial court held that fairness dictates that the circumstances 
of the employer must also be taken into consideration when determining whether the employer should be 
ordered to pay severance pay (see, for example, Construction & Allied Workers Union & Others v Hens-
berg Bros (1992) 13 /W 116 (IC) at 171 0-H and Transport & Genera/ Workers Union v Action Machine 
Moving & Warehousing (Pty) Ltd (1992) 13 /W 646 (IC) at 6531-654C). 
519see s 14(4) of the Basic Conditions of Employment. See also s 8(1)(u) of the Wage Act which lists the 
payment of an amount in lieu of notice as one of the matters about which the wage board can make 
recommendations. 
520see s 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act which affords precedence to con-
tractual terms, provided they are more favourable than the staMory terms. 
521 See s 1 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act which affords precedence to collective agree-
ments concluded in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
522see s 8 of the Wage Act which lists the matters about which the wage board may make recommenda-
tions. The section does not contain specific provisions regarding the gMng of notice, apart from subsec 
(1)(u) which provides tor payment In lieu of notice, but its catch-all provision at the end of the list of matters 
is broad enough to include provisions in this regard. 
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If the period is not regulated in this manner, the employer must give notice in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. The Act distin-
guishes between employees who have been in employment for four weeks or less and 
those who have more than four weeks' service. Employees who have been in employ-
ment for four weeks or less are entitled to one working-day's notice of termination.523 
Those who have more than four weeks' service and are paid weekly, are afforded a 
week's notice524 whereas employees who are paid on a monthly basis are entitled to 
two weeks' notice. 525 The-Act also regutates the manner526· ii'l which notice must be 
given as well as when notice must be given. 527 It also requires the employer to pay the 
employee his agreed wages during the notice period. 528 
In conclusion, the provisions regarding the giving of notice are reciprocal in nature in that 
they are also applicable to the employee who wants to resign. In practice, however, the 
fact that the employee can terminate the contract by giving notice, is of little value to him 
as he is usually intent on keeping his job. In addition, the option of payment in lieu of 
notice is not of much value to the employee as he will usually not be able to afford such a 
payment. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The legislature achieved the objectives which it set for itself namely to prevent or limit the 
exploitation of employees and to promote job security. 529 It did not alienate the 
employer's common law right to manage in order to achieve these aims but limited or 
restricted this right and infused it with the concept of fairness. 
523see s 14(1)(a). 
524see s 14(1)(b). 
525tbid. 
526rhe Act requires that notice must be given in writing except in the case of an illiterate employee (see s 
14(2)). 
527see s 14(2). 
528see s 14(3). 
529see par 3.1 above. 
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Accordingly, the employer still has the right to elect whom it wants to employ provided it 
is not statutorily prohibited from employing the applicant and it does not unfairly dis-
criminate against an applicant on arbitrary grounds. 530 
An employer has also retained the right to give instructions regarding the work which 
must be done provided that the instructions are lawful and reasonable and are in accord-
ance with certain statutory measures regarding the work that must be done, the manner 
in which the work must be done, the- place where the work must -be done and when the 
work must be done.531 
In addition, employers have retained the right to discipline. However, the employer's 
right to decide on rules of conduct has been restricted by the requirement that rules 
must be reasonable or fair.532 Furthermore, the Code's subscribing to the concept of 
progressive of corrective discipline, restricts the employer·~ right to elect a penalty. In 
accordance with this concept, it will have to implement penalties with due consideration 
of the severity of the offence and will only be able to dismiss for a serious offence or for 
repeated offences. 533 
Nevertheless, the common law right to demand respect534 and good faith535 on the 
part of employees has remained relatively unaffected by legislation and will accordingly 
continue to play an important role in determining acceptable conduct of employees in 
the workplace. The right to demand good faith will remain particularly important. 
Because of its broad import, it will, as in the past, enable an employer to rely on it in mis-
conduct cases, particularly if the offence the employee is accused of is not listed in the 
disciplinary code. 536 
Although the legislature has not rescinded the employer's right to dismiss, it has 
restricted it severely. Through its provisions regarding dismissal in chapter VI 11 and the 
530see par 3.2 above. 
531 See par 3.3.2 above. 
532see par 3.4.3.3.2.1 above where It was pointed out that the fairness or reasonableness of a rule must be 
' considered when the substantive fairness of a dismissal for misconduct is considered. 
533see pars 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 above in regard to the concept of progressive discipline. 
534see par 2.4.4 of chapter 2. 
535see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2. 
53Ssee par 3.3.6 of chapter 3. 
149 
Legislation 
Code, the legislature has succeeded in its aim to prevent arbitrary dismissals. It has pro-
vided employees, irrespective of whether they are probationary or ordinary employees or 
even fixed term employees, with a substantial measure of job security. 
The legislature has also succeeded in limiting the exploitation of employees through its 
minimum terms and conditions of employment. 537 Nevertheless, there remains a vast 
number of employment matters which have been left for the parties to bargain about. 
The legislature, except in certain instances,-has- not mad& provision for minimum 
wages. 538 It has also left matters such as bonuses, increments, training, bursaries, 
maternity leave, paternity leave, study leave, compassionate leave, accommodation, 
meals, clothing, travel allowances, housing subsidies and other allowances to the parties 
to bargain about. 539 However, the employer's prerogative regarding these terms and 
conditions is restricted by Schedule 7 in that it must ensure that it does not commit an 
unfair labour practice in terms thereof when structuring the t~rms on which it is prepared 
to afford these benefits to employees. 540 
But the legislature has not only used minimum standards to prevent exploitation and to 
promote bargaining equality between an employer and an individual employee. It has 
also endeavoured to do this through the concept of collective bargaining and its 
statutory promotion thereof. 541 In fact, it has clearly indicated that it regards collective 
bargaining as the preferred method to determine all terms and conditions of employ-
ment, including those in respect of which it has stipulated minimums. 542 
In the next chapter, the steps which the legislature has taken to promote collective 
bargaining will be examined. 
537see par 3.3.3 above. 
538see par 3.3.3 above. 
5391bid. 
540see par 3.3.3 above where the implications of Schedule 7 for the employer's prerogative regarding 
terms and conditions of employment are discussed. 
541 See par 3.1 above as well as chapter 4 in this regard. 
542see its aims set out in the preamble to the Act; s 1 (c) and (d)(i) and clause 1 (2) of the Code. See also s 
1 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act which provides that collectively bargained minimum terms 
and conditions of employment override the statutory provisions. See also the Green Paper: Policy 
Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as notice 156 of 1996' in Government 
Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 at 9. 
CHAPTER4 
THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND WORKPLACE FORUMS IN THE 
RESTRICTION OF EMPLOYER PREROGATIVE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The role of collective bargaining in redressing the bargaining imbalance between 
employers and employees, and in this limiting employers' prerogative, was referred to in 
chapter 3.1 In this chapter, the role of the law in regulating collective bargaining and its 
affecting or regulating employer prerogative is discussed. 2 
It was pointed out in chapter 23 that the common law does not promote collective 
bargaining. At most, it permits freedom of association. It allows employers, by exercising 
their property rights, to deny trade union officials access to their premises. It also allows 
employers to exercise their superior bargaining strength and to oblige employees to can-
cel their trade union membership or to agree not to become members. The common law 
also brands the exercising of collective rights such as the right to bargain, to strike and 
to picket as breaches of employees' individual contracts of employment, requiring settle-
ment by ordinary courts whose remedies are contractual and individualised in nature. 
Such actions could also give rise to possible delictual claims. 4 
Legislative intervention was necessary to provide a legal framework more favourable to 
collective bargaining. 5 The framework is found in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 6 This 
chapter analyses the approach by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 towards collective 
bargaining. 7 
1 See par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
2see par 4.2 below. 
3see par 2.5 of chapter 2. 
4See par 6.2 of chapter 6 where possible delictual liability for such actions in terms of the common law is 
discussed. 
5see the comments made in this regard in par 2.5 of chapter 2 as well as par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
Ssee s 1 (c) thereof which lists the provision of a framework within which employers and employees and 
their trade unions can collectively bargain as one of the primary objectives of the Act The Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 has its origin in the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, South Africa's first comprehensive 
piece of labour legislation on collective bargaining. For an historical account of South African legislation on 
collective bargaining, culminating in the Labour Relations Act., 1995, see par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
7 See par 4.2 below. 
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The primary purpose of collective bargaining is the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment. 8 Davies and Freedland9 explain trade unions' main objective with collective 
bargaining as follows 10 
By bargaining collectively with management, organised labour seeks to give effect to its 
legitimate expectations that wages and other conditions of work should be such as to 
guarantee a stable and adequate form of existence and as to be compatible with the physi-
cal integrity and moral dignity of the individual, and also that jobs should be reasonably 
secure. 
Collective bargaining also plays an important role in the resolution of disputes.11 
Bendix 12 describes 13 this function of collective bargaining as follows 
At the least, the process of bargaining endows the parties with equal status. It also rests on 
the presuppositions that neither party is completely right or completely wrong, that con-
cessions by either party do not necessarily signify weakness in that party and that, while 
the individual goals of the parties may be important, the ultimate achievement of these 
goals should not occur at the cost of disrupting the organisation as a whole. For these 
reasons collective bargaining, though not ideal, has hitherto served as the most feasible 
and mutually beneficial method of resolving basic and ongoing conflicts between the 
parties to the labour relationship. 
•, 
Notwithstanding the importance they attached to collective bargaining, the drafters of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 also realised its shortcomings in the South African context. 
They argued that a second channel of communication was necessary between 
employers and employees to make it easier for South African industry and commerce to 
adapt to the changes. 14 The result has been the introduction of provisions which 
Ssee s 1 (c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which stipulates the determining of wages, terms and condi-
tions of employment and other matters of mutual interest as the objective or purpose of collective bargain-
ing. See also s 28(a) which lists the conclusion of collective agreements as one of the functions of bargain-
ing councils and the definition of a collective agreement in s 213 which defines it as a written agreement 
concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest. For a discussion of 
the meaning of the concept "matters of mutual interesr, ee par 4.2.6 below. See further chapter 5 where 
the matters about which collective bargaining parties have been prepared to bargain, are discussed. 
9Paul Davies and Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983). 
10At69. 
11 See s 28(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists the prevention and resolution of labour disputes 
as one of the functions of bargaining councils. See also s 28(d) in terms of which bargaining councils are 
afforded the function to perform the dispute resolution functions referred to ins 51 of the Act. See further 
par 4.2.1 O below in this regard. 
12sonla Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996). 
13At255. 
14see the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in Government 
Gazette 16259of10February1995atpage135. 
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envisage the establishment of workplace forums.15 The bodies can be seen as sup-
plementing rather than undermining collective bargaining.16 Nevertheless, they could 
give employees in a workplace significant power to influence managerial decision-
making. The potential influence of these bodies on the extent of managerial prerogative 
will also be discussed in this chapter.17 
4.2 THE PROMOTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY THE LABOUR RELA-
TIONS ACT, 1995 -
4.2.1 Introduction 
In formulating the Labour Relations Act, 1995, the legislature was influenced by a variety 
of considerations.18 From a legal perspective, the most important factor to be con-
sidered were the provisions of the interim Constitution 19 of_ relevance to labour law in 
general and collective bargaining in particular.20 
Section 23 of the Constitution deals with labour relations. It contains a number of provi-
sions regarding collective bargaining. The section promotes freedom of association. It 
affords every worker the right to form and join a trade union21 and to participate in the 
15see chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which deals with workplace forums. See also par 4.3 
below where workplace forums are discussed. 
16see the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in Government 
Gazette 16259 of 10 February 1995 at page 135 where it is stated that "[t]heir [ie workplace forums'] pur-
pose is not to undermine collective bargaining but to supplement it. They achieve this purpose by relieving 
collective bargaining of functions to which it is not well suited". 
17 See par 4.3 below. 
1 Bsee s 1 of the Act which lists its primary objectives. See also the Explanatory Memorandum of the Minis-
terial Legal Task T earn notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 1 O February 1995 at 110-111. 
19fhe interim Constitution was in operation when the Labour Relations Act, 1995 was being drafted. In this 
chapter, all further references to constitutional powers will be made in relation to the Constitution and not 
the interim Constitution. 
20see s 1 (a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists the gMng effect to and regulating of the funda-
mental rights conferred by s 27 of the interim Constitution (ie s 23 of the Constitution) as one of the primary 
objectives of the Act. See also the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 
of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 1 O February 1995 at 111. 
21 See s 23(2)(a). 
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activities and programmes thereof.22 The section furthermore affords trade unions the 
right to organise.23 In addition, it affords trade unions, employers' organisations and 
employers the right to engage in collective bargaining. 24 
Also of importance was the legislature's express desire to formulate legislation that con-
formed to International Labour Organisation standards. 25 
The central question facing the legislature-was-whether- collective-bargaining should be 
compulsory;26 whether the legally enforceable duty to negotiate established by the 
industrial court acting in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 195627 should find express-
ion in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
22see s 23(2)(b). 
23see s 23(4)(b). 
24see s 23(5). 
25see s 1 (b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists the effectuation of International Labour Organisa-
tion standards as one of the primary objectives of the Act. See also the Explanatory Memorandum by the 
Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 1 O February 1995 at 11 o. 
See further the Report of an International Labour Organisation Commission entitled "Prelude to Change: 
Industrial Relations Reform in South Africa: Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on 
Freedom of Association Concerning the Republic of South Africa" (1992). The conclusions reached by this 
commission were published in (1992) 13 IW 739. 
26see the explanatory memorandum of the ministerial legal task team annexed to the Draft Negotiating 
Document in the Form of a Labour Relations Bill published as general notice 97 of 1995 in Government 
Gazette 16259of10February1995at121. 
271t is suggested by DM Davies "Voluntarism and South African Labour Law - Are the Queensbury Rules an 
Anachronism?• in TW Bennett, DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D van Zyl Smit (eds) 
Labour Law (1991) 50 that the Labour Relations Act, 1956 was also underpinned by a form of voluntarist 
philosophy. The industrial court has, however, changed this through Its creation of a duty to bargain (see 
SA Clothing & Textile Workers Union v Maroc Carpets & Textile Mills (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW (IC) 1101 at 
1104E where the court stated, ·Let it at once be said that, despite some earlier decisions to the contrary, it 
is clear that this court today unequivocally recognizes the existence of an enforceable duty upon all 
employers to bargain with trade unions representative of their employees, in respect of all matters concern-
ing their relationship with those employees"). See also Buthelezi & Others v Labour For Africa (1989) 1 o IW 
867 (IC) at 869C; SA Woodworkers Union v Rutherford Joinery (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 695 (IC) at 7000; 
National Union of Steel & Allied Workers v Besaans Du Plessis (Pretoria Foundries) (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 
359 OC) at 367G; Radio Television Electronic & Allied Workers Union v Tedelex (Pty) Ltd & Another (1990) 
11 IW 1272 (IC) at 1275H and Steel Engineering & Allied Workers Union v BRC Weldmesh (1991) 12 IW 
1304 (IC) at 1307C. 
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Controversially,28 the drafters decided against a general legal obligation to bargain.29 
However, they did not adopt a "neutral" position but opted for a policy of actively 
encouraging and promoting collective bargaining through a variety of mechanisms. 30 
They did so in various ways. Firstly, by providing extensive protection for the right of 
employees and employers to form, join and participate in the lawful affairs of trade 
unions and employers' organisations.31 Secondly, by providing for the acquisition of 
organisational·rights.32 Thirdly, by providing for the establishment of collective bargain-
ing structures such as bargaining councils-.33 Fourthly; byregalating the legal nature 
and enforceability of collective agreements.34 Fifthly, by making provision for the right to 
strike to enforce collective bargaining rights, subject to the prior requirement of obtaining 
28The trade unions were opposed to the removal of a duty to bargain and demanded a statutory duty to 
bargain collectively (see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour 
RelationsActof 1995 (1996) 28). 
29see the Explanatory Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in Government 
Gazette 16259 of 1 o February 1995 at 121. 
30see the preamble to the Act which states that one of its purposes is "to promote and facilitate collective 
bargaining at the workplace and at sectoral level·. See also s 1 (d) which states that the purpose of the Act 
is "to promote - (i) orderly collective bargaining; (iQ collective bargaining at sectoral level". See further the 
explanatory memorandum by the ministerial legal task team annexed to the Draft Negotiating Document in 
the Form of a Labour Relations Bill published as general notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 
1 o February 1995 at 122. 
31see ss 4(1)-(3) and 5(1)-(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This right to freedom of association, 
however, has been restricted by the statutory requirement of registration. In terms of s 27(1) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995, only registered trade unions and employers' organisations may establish a bargaining 
council which is the primary statutory body through which agreements about terms and conditions of 
employment will be concluded. See par 4.2.2 below where the statutory right to freedom of asssociation is 
discussed in greater detail. 
32-fhe Labour Relations Act, 1995 makes provision for trade union access to the workplace (sees 12), for 
the deduction of trade union subscriptions (sees 13) and for the election of trade union representatives in 
the workplace (sees 14). See par 4.2.3 below where these organisational rights are discussed in greater 
detail. 
33see s 27 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which deals with the establishment of bargaining councils. 
See also par 4.2.5 below where the various statutory structures for collective bargaining are discussed. 
34see s 23 of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 which deals with the legal effect of collective agreements. See 
also ss 31 and 32 which respectively deal with the binding nature of collective agreements concluded in 
bargaining councHs and the extension of such collective agreements. See further par 4.2. 7 below where the 
binding force of collective agreements is discussed. 
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an advisory award.35 And, sixthly, by limiting unilateral decision-making by the 
employer.36 
In the paragraphs that follow, these statutory mechanisms for the promotion and encour-
agement of collective bargaining are considered in greater detail. 37 
4.2.2 The Right to Freedom of Association 
The right to freedom of association is regulated in ss 438 and s39 of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995. 40 In terms of s 4, employees have the right to form41 and to become 
members of trade unions.42 In addition, they have the right to participate in lawful trade 
35see s 64(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This requirement reflects the drafters' views that no 
statutory duty to bargain should be enforced by the courts and that the intervention of skilled mediators in 
these types of disputes can promote their resolution without resort to industrial action (see the Explanatory 
Memorandum by the Ministerial Legal Task Team notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 10 
February 1995 at 129). 
36see s 64(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which an employer can be forced not to 
unilaterally change terms and conditions of employment, or, if it has already implemented the change 
unilaterally, require it to restore the terms and conditions that applied before the change (see further par 
7.3.6 of chapter 7). See also s 187(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which the dismissal of 
employees in order to force them to agree to their employer's changes to their terms and conditions of 
employment is branded as an automatically unfair dismissal (see par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3 where automati-
cally unfair dismissals are discussed). See also s 5(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which 
an employer is prohibited from affording employees an advantage in exchange for them not exercising any 
statutory right such as the right to strike (see par 7.3.6 of chapter 7 wheres 5(3) in relation to employees' 
statutory right to strike is discussed). 
37The first four mechanisms mentioned in the previous paragraph are discussed in this chapter. However, 
the right to strike is considered in par 6.3.3 of chapter 6 and the statutory limitation of unilateral employer 
decision-making is discussed in par 7.3.6 of chapter 7. 
38sect1on 4 regulates the right in respect of employees. 
39section 6 regulates the right in respect of employers. 
40-rhis is in accordance with the International Labour Organisation's Convention Concerning Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 87 of 1948. The origin and nature of the freedom to 
associate in its international context is comprehensively discussed by AC Sasson "Die Vryheid om te 
Assosieer (Deel 1)9 (1991) 3 SAMercLJ 171 et seq. See also A Pankert "Freedom of Association" in R Blan-
pain (ed) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 3 ed (1987) 173 et seq. It is also in accordance 
with s 18 of the Constitution which makes provision for a general right to freedom of association (be it for 
religious. political or labour objectives). The Constitution also specifically affords employees the right to 
form and join trade unions (sees 23(2)(a) and (b)). Section 78(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 had not 
explicitly conferred such a right on employees. 
41see s 4(1)(a). 
42see s 4(1)(b). 
156 
Collective Bargaining 
union activities,43 to participate in the election of the union's office-bearers, officials or 
trade union representatives44 or to stand for election as office bearers, officials45 or 
trade union representatives. 46 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords this right to "every employee" covered by it.47 
Section 2 of the Act, however, excludes certain categories of workers from its ambit. 
They include members of the National Defence Force, 48 the National Intelligence 
Agency and the South.African. Secret Servicer- -
Furthermore, those employees covered by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 may find that 
their right to freedom of association is restricted by one of two statutory trade union 
security arrangements, namely closed shop agreements and agency shop agree-
ments. 49 In addition, the Act's requirement that only registered trade unions are entitled 
to the statutory organisational rights50 and may participa~e in the establishment of a 
bargaining counci151 might also restrict employees' right to decide which trade union 
they would like to represent them. 
The mere affording of a right to associate, however, will be of scant value if persons are 
not also protected against pressure exerted by employers not to exercise this right or 
against discrimination or victimisation for exercising this right. Such protection is pro-
43see s 4(2) (a). Examples of such activities are participation in a protected strike or protest action. 
44see s 4(2)(b). 
4Ssee s 4(2)(c). 
46see s 4(2)(d). 
47see s 4(1). 
48i-heir exclusion is accepted by most international bodies (see AC Sasson "Die Vryheid om te Assosieer 
(Deel 1)" (1991) 3 SAMercW 171 at 180 and 183 et seq as well as the Report of an International Labour 
Organisation Commission entitled ·Prelude to Change: Industrial Relations Reform in South Africa: Report 
of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association Concerning the Republic of 
South Africa• (1992) par 726 on page 282). 
49see par 4.2.4 below. 
SOsee s 11 of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 which stipulates that only a registered trade union may 
become a representative trade union. 
51Sees27(1). 
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vided in s 5 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 52 The protection is not only afforded to 
employees but also to persons seeking employment. 53 The legislature recognised that 
most job applicants are in an extremely weak bargaining position54 and may easily be 
pressurised into agreeing not to exercise their right to freedom of association. 
Section 5(1) commences with a general prohibition. No person may discriminate against 
any person for exercising any right conferred by the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Section 
5(2) sets out more specific-prohibitions.-An-employer is-prohibited from requiring an 
employee or applicant not to be a member, not to become a member, or to resign as a 
member of a trade union. 55 It also prohibits an employer from preventing an employee 
or an applicant from exercising his right to associate. 56 It furthermore prohibits an 
employer from prejudicing or victimising57 an employee or an applicant because he has 
exercised this right or intends to exercise it. 58 It also prohibits an employer from promis-
52-rhis is in accordance with article 11 of the International Labour Organisation's Convention Concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 87 of 1948 which stipulates that every 
member of the Organisation must take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers may 
exercise freely the right to organise. · 
53See s 5(2)-(3). This makes the ambit of s 5 much wider than that of article 11 of the International Labour 
Organisation's Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 87 
of 1948 as this article deals only with employees. It is also wider than s 78(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 
1956. Contra, however, AA Landman HFreeclom of Association in South African Labour Law6 in TW Bennett, 
DJ Devine, DB Hutchison, I Leeman, CM Murray and D van Zyl Smit (eds) Labour Law (1991) 89 at 91 who 
is of the view that s 78(1) was also inclusive of applicants. 
54see par 2.2 of chapter 2 where the weak bargaining power of an applicant for a job is discussed. 
55see s 5(2)(a). Such a demand was also held by the industrial court to constitute an unfair labour practice 
(see United African Motor & Allied Workers Union and Others v Fodens (SA) (Pty) Ltd (1983) 4 IW 212 (IC) 
at 213H read with 227E; 214F read with 227E; and 214H read with 227E; National Automobile & Allied 
Workers Union v ADE (Pty) Ltd & Others (1990) 11IW342 (IC) at 344B and KeshwarvSanca (1991) 12 IW 
816 (IC) at 818G-819A). 
56see s 5(2)(b). 
57Vlctimisation can take a number of forms. It may entail the altering of the terms and conditions to less 
favourable terms (see, for instance, United African Motor and Allied Workers Union & Others v Fodens (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd (1983) 4 IW 212 (IC) at 214H read with 227E) or the advancement of other employees in prefer-
ence to the employee or even dismissal. In Keshwar v SANCA (1991) 12 ILJ 816 (IC) at 821 H, for instance, 
the employee was dismissed because she refused to relinquish her position as a union official (see also 
National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Unisel Gold Mines Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 398 (IC) at 403A-B and 
National Union of Food Workers v Champ Food Manufacturing Group (1988) 9 IW 469 (IC) at 471 H). 
58see s 5(2)(c). This provision Is very simlar to s 66 of the Labour Relations Act. 1956. It is, however, wider 
in the sense that It does not only cover victimisation for having exercised this right, but also includes victim-
isation in anticipation of exercising this right 
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ing an employee or applicant some benefit in exchange for not exercising his right to 
associate. 59 
In addition to the protection afforded in s 5, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 also brands 
the dismissal of an employee because he has exercised his right to freedom of associa-
tion as automatically unfair.60 
4.2.3 Organisational Rights· 
4.2.3.1 Introduction 
The granting of organisational rights to unions in certain circumstances is one of the cen-
tral features of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.61 It is based on the assumption that if a 
trade union or unions are granted such rights, it would enable them to organise and to 
act effectively within the workplace. This would entrench their position in the workplace 
and enhance the possibility that the employer will be prepared to enter into a collective 
bargaining relationship with them, without the necessity of making use of legal compul-
sion.62 
59such action was also labelled as unfair by the industrial court (see, for instance, National Automobile & 
Allied Workers Union v ADE (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 342 (IC) at 344C). In National Union of Mineworkers v 
East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 ILJ 1221 (A), however, the appellate division held that the 
making of such an offer in order to get employees not to go on strike (ie not to take part in the lawful 
activities of the union - sees 4(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995), only amounted to an unfair labour 
practice where an impasse had been reached and the trade union had been bargaining in good faith. In 
other words, such an offer would not amount to an unfair labour practice where an impasse had been 
reached and the union had bargained in bad faith. It seems that in terms of s 5(3) of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995, an employer will no longer be able to make such an offer, irrespective of whether an impasse 
has been reached as a result of bargaining either In bad or in good faith. This statement, however, is made 
on the assumption that the strike will be a protected one. Where this is not the case, employees will not 
enjoy the protection afforded by s 5. For a discussion of s 5(3) and its impact on exercising of certain forms 
of economic pressure by employers, see par 7.3.6 of chapter 7. 
SOsee the introductory provisions to s 187(1) as well as subsecs (a) and (d) thereof. See also par 3.4.3.2 of 
chapter 3 where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. 
61 See the preamble to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which has as one of its aims the regulation of 
organisational rights of trade unions. See also part A of chapter Ill of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. These 
provisions are in accordance with s 23(4)(b) of the Constitution which provides trade unions with the right 
to organise as well as art 11 of the International Labour Organisation's Convention Concerning Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 87 of 1948. 
62see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 278. 
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The rights granted by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 are the following: access to the 
workplace, 63 the deduction of trade union subscriptions, 64 the election of trade union 
representatives, 65 leave for trade union activities66and the disclosure of all relevant 
information that will allow the trade union representative to perform effectively the func-
tions referred to ins 14(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.67 
The Act envisages that these rights can be acquired (or retained) in a variety of ways. 
Collective bargaining parties may conclude-an.agreement thatregulates organisational 
rights.68 The authors of The Labour Relations Act of 199569 submit that such an agree-
ment will not exclude the rights provided for in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. However, 
if such an agreement specifically regulates some of these rights, they submit that it will 
replace the corresponding provisions of the Act. 
A registered trade union will automatically acquire these rights if it is recognised as the 
- -
collective bargaining agent in an existing collective agreement concluded in terms of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1956. 70 A registered trade union also automatically acquires the 
right of access to the workplace and to trade union subscriptions by virtue of it being a 
party to a bargaining councit.71 However, to acquire the other statutory rights, it will have 
to follow the procedures set out in s 21 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
The statutory organisational rights may also be acquired by a registered trade union 
through an award by the Commission if it has followed the procedures in s 21 of the 
63see s 12. See also par 4.2.3.2 below where this right is discussed. 
64see s 13. See also par 4.2.3.3 below where this right is discussed. 
65see s 14. See also par 4.2.3.4 below where this right is discussed. 
66see s 15. See also par 4.2.3.5 below where this right is discussed. 
67 See s 16(2) read with s 14(4). See also par 4.2.3.6 below where this right is discussed. 
68see s 20 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which collective bargaining. parties are entitled to 
conclude a collective agreement that regulates organisational rights. See also par 5.2.1 of chapter 5 where 
examples are given of organisational rights to which parties have voluntarily agreed. 
69o du Toit. D Wool.trey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 90-91. 
70see clause 13(1)-(3) of Schedule 7. 
71 See s 19 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
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Labour Relations Act, 1995 and the parties have been unable to conclude an agreement 
regulating these rights. 72 
In the paragraphs below, the various statutory organisational rights will be discussed in 
greater detail. 
4.2.3.2 Access to the Workplace 
Section 12 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 73 affords trade unions the right of access 
to a workplace74 for the purpose of recruiting employees,75 to communicate with 
mebers 76 and to hold meetings with them. 77 
However, the right is not unconditional. It must be exercised at a time and place that is 
reasonable and necessary to safeguard life and property or to prevent the undue disrup-
tion of work. 78 - -
72see s 21 (7) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
73The Labour Relations Act, 1956 did not provide such an explicit right of access. The industrial court 
developed such a right through its unfair labour practice jurisdiction. It held, for instance, in National Union 
of Mineworkers & Others v Buffelsfontein Gold Mining Co (1991) 12 IW 346 (IC) at 351H-1 that employers' 
restrictions on mass meetings on their premises without valid reasons could in principle be regarded as 
unfair. See also the obiter remarks by the supreme court in Kloof Gold Mining Co Ltd v National Union of 
Mineworkers (1987) 8 IW 99 (T) at 107G-J. 
74Access has proved to be a particularly serious problem where employees actually live on premises 
belonging to the employer, such as in the case of miners who live in hostels on the mine's premises. In the 
Report of an International Labour Organisation Commission entitled "Prelude to Change: Industrial Rela-
tions Reform in South Africa: Report of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Asso-
ciation Concerning the Republic of South Africa" (1992) 274 it was suggested that until housing replaces 
mine compounds, it is important that access should be granted freely to unions for the purpose of carrying 
out normal trade union activities. It is also extremely difficult for trade union officials to organise farm 
labourers who live on farmers' land and live-in domestic workers. The International Labour Organisation 
Commission suggested that the protection provided under the Labour Relations Act should be extended to 
these categories of workers (see page 272 of the report). The legislature has afforded this right of access to 
trade unions who want to recruit farmworkers. It has, however, restricted this right in the case of a domestic 
worker in that it does not include the right to enter the employer's home, unless he agrees (see s 17(2)(a) 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
75see s 12(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
76see s 12(1). This right was also acknowledged by the labour appeal court in Doomfontein Gold Mining 
Co Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1994) 15 IW 527 (LAC) at 5421..J. 
nsee s 12(2). 
78see s 12(4). This proviso was also articulated by the labour appeal court In Doomfontein Gold Mining Co 
Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1994) 15 /W 527 (LAC) at 543A 
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4.2.3.3 Deduction of Trade Union Subscriptions or Levies 
A source of income for trade unions is membership contributions. Section 13 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 provides an efficient mechanism for the collection of such 
funds. In terms of this section, employers which have received written authorisation by 
employees must deduct trade union subscriptions from their wages and remit the 
amount deducted to the union. 79 
4.2.3.4 The Election of Trade Union Representatives in the Workplace 
The m~st visible manifestation of a trade union's presence within a workplace is the 
activities of its representatives as shop stewards. Since the Seventies, 80 unions have 
placed great emphasis on the election of shop stewards who represent the interests of 
the union and its members in the day to day dealings with the employer.81 Many collec-
tive agreements recognise and regulate the activities of such representatives. 82 
Section 14 recognises the importance of these representatives and makes provision for 
the election of trade union representatives. Where a union, or two or more unions acting 
jointly, represent the majority of employees in a workplace, the members of the union or 
unions are entitled to elect from among themselves trade union representatives. 83 
The section also regulates trade union representatives' functions. At the request of an 
employee, a trade union representative has the right to assist and represent him in a 
grievance or disciplinary proceeding. 84 Trade union representatives also have the right 
to monitor the employer's compliance with the workplace-related provisions of the 
79see subsecs (1) and (2). This is the only organisational right which the Labour Relations Act, 1956 
expressly provided for (sees 78). 
SOsee Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 187 where she points out that with the 
advent of the so-called "new" unions in the Seventies, shop steward representation gained increased prom-
inence. 
81see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 184-186 for a discussion of the role of 
the shop steward in the workplace. 
82see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 187. For a discussion of some of the 
provisions regarding trade union representatives contained in collective agreements, see par 5.2.1 of chap-
ter 5. 
83see s 14(1) and (2). 
84see s 14(4)(a). 
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Labour Relations Act, 1995, any law regulating terms and conditions of employment85 
and any binding collective agreement. B6 They may report any alleged contravention of 
any of these provisions to the employer, the trade union and any responsible authority or 
agency. B7 In addition, trade union representatives have the right to perform any other 
function agreed to between the trade union and the employer.BB 
Shop stewards, however, remain employees. In order to assist them in the exercising of 
their duties,B9 the legislature has-afforded-them the right to-take reasonable time off with 
pay to perform their functions. 90 It has also afforded them the right to take time off for 
training in any subject relevant to the performance of these functions.91 
4.2.3.5 Leave for Trade Union Activities 
In terms of s 15 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, employe~s who are office-bearers92 
of a trade union are entitled to take reasonable leave during working hours for the pur-
pose of performing the functions of that office. 93 The employer and trade union may 
agree to the number of days of unpaid leave, the number of days of paid leave and the 
conditions attached to any leave. 94 Where they are unable to reach agreement, a com-
SSsuch as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 
86see s 14(4)(b). 
87see s 14(4)(c)(i)-(iii). 
aasee s 14(4)(d). 
89see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 186 where she discusses the difficulties 
experienced by shop stewards when they must perform their internal or workplace functions during normal 
working hours. 
90see s 14(5)(a). 
91 See s 14(5)(b). 
92An office-bearer is defined in s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as a person who holds office in a 
trade union and is not an official. "Official" is defined in the same section as a person employed as the sec-
retary, assistant secretary or organiser of a trade union or in any other prescribed capacity. 
93see subsec (1). 
94see s 15(2) of the Labour Relations Aet, 1995. Of Interest Is that they are afforded leave and not time off 
with full pay as in the case of shop stewards exercising their functions (see s 14(5) as well as par 4.2.3.4 
above). 
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missioner of the Commission acting as arbitrator, may make an award which regulates 
the matter.95 Such an award remains in force for 12 months.96 
4.2.3.6 Disclosure of Information 
For a shop steward to be able to perform his functions effectively, 97 he must have all the 
relevant information. Information is also one of the essential ingredients for effective col-
lective bargaining. Davies and Freedland98-explain the-necessityforsuch information as 
follows99 
Negotiations do not deserve its name if one of the negotiating parties is kept in the dark 
about matters within the exclusive knowledge of the other which are relevant to the agree-
ments. · 
Ins 16 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, the legislature has provided shop stewards 
and trade unions with a right to information.100 It is, however, a qualified right in that 
they can only demand relevant information.101 
The Act furthermore limits this right by providing that the employer need not disclose 
information which is legally privileged102 or which the employer is prohibited from dis-
closing in terms of a court order. 103 The employer is also not required to disclose 
95see s 15(3). 
96tbid. 
97See par 4.2.3.4 above where shop stewards' functions are discussed. 
98Paul Davies and Mark Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 21 o. See also SA Com-
mercial Catering & Allied Workers Union v Southern Sun Hotel Corporation (Pty) Ltd & Others (1992) 13 IW 
132 (IC) at 151A-C and Metal & Allied Workers Union & Others v Natal Die Casting Co (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 /W 
520 (IC) at 5430-F. 
99At 210. 
100Section 16 deals with the disclosure of information for purposes of collective bargaining or negotiation. 
This section, however, has also been made applicable to consultations regarding dismissal because of the 
operational requirements of the business (sees 189(3)-(4) read withs 16 as well as par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chap-
ter 3). Note further that this right to information does not apply to the domestic sector (see s 17(2) (b) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995). The reason for this exclusion was probably the personal nature of the informa-
tion and the possible infringement of the constitutional right to privacy of the employer (see s 14 of the 
Constitution). 
101see subsec (2). 
102see subsec (5)(a). 
103see subsec (5)(b). 
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information which is confidential and, if disclosed, may cause substantial harm to an 
employee or the employer, 104 nor is it required to disclose information which is private 
personal information relating to an employee, 105 unless that employee consents to the 
disclosure of that information.106 
However, if there is a dispute about which information must be disclosed and a com-
missioner of the Commission finds that the requested information is relevant, 107 he may 
order it to be disclosed,- even if it is confidential or- private. personal-information relating to 
an employee and the latter has not consented to the disclosure of that information.108 
In order to decide if he must make such an order, the commissioner must balance the 
harm that the disclosure is likely to cause the employer against the harm that the failure 
to disclose the information is likely to cause to the ability of the shop steward to perform 
effectively his functions or the ability of the trade union to engage effectively in consulta-
tion or collective bargaining.109 
The legislature appreciated the serious implications that such a disclosure may hold for 
the employee or the employer and has accordingly provided some safeguards. The 
commissioner may order the disclosure on terms designed to limit the harm likely to be 
caused.110 In addition, he must take into account any breach of confidentially by shop 
stewards or the trade union in the past and may refuse to order the disclosure for a 
period specified in his award.111 Furthermore, if a dispute ensues about an alleged 
breach of confidentiality by shop stewards or the trade union, the commissioner may 
order that the right to disclosure of information be withdrawn for a stipulated period.112 
104see subsec (5) (c). An example of such information is trade secrets (see National Union of Metal-
workers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14 /W 642 (LAC) at 652C quoted with approval in 
Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1994) 15 /W 1247 (A) at 12531. 
105such as medical records. 
106see subsec (5)(d). 
101see s 16(6)-(10). 
108see s 16(11) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. However, he may not order an employer to disclose 
legally privileged Information or information which the employer is prohibited from disclosing in terms of a 
court order. · 
109Jbid. 
11osee s 16(12). 
111see s 16(13). 
112see s 16(14). 
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This represents a fairly serious curtailment of shop stewards' and trade unions' right to 
information as such an order apparently covers a// relevant information.113 
4.2.4 Trade Union Security Arrangements 
Closed shop and agency shop agreements have often been regarded as infringing free-
dom of association as they limit employees' right not to be a member of a trade 
union.114 Nevertheless, such agreements can assist unions to-increase and/or maintain 
their membership, thus strengthening their position in a workplace and, at least 
arguably, increasing the possibility of effective collective bargaining. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 accepts this approach and makes provision for both 
closed shop and agency shop agreements. In terms of s 26(1) of the Act, a closed shop 
agreement is defined as a collective agreement between a tr~de union and an employer 
which requires all employees covered by the agreement to be members of the trade 
union. An agency shop agreement 115 is defined in s 25(1) of the Act as a collective 
agreement between a trade union and an employer which requires the employer to 
deduct an agreed agency fee from the wages of its employees who are identified in the 
agreement and who are not members of the trade union.116 
In order to lessen the possibility of a constitutional challenge to the validity of ss 25 and 
26 on the basis that they infringe freedom of association, 117 the Labour Relations Act, 
113see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 98. 
114see SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Kompendium van Suid-AfrikaanseArbeidsreg 2 ed (1996) 216 
and the authorities referred to in note 176 thereof. 
115rhe arbitration agreement in Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA v Veldspun (Pty) Ltd 
1993 (14) IW SA 1431 (A) was a precursor to the agency shop agreement in that it allowed the employer to 
make deductions from non-members to be paid over to a charity agreed on between the union and the 
employer. 
11 61t is aimed at so-called free riders; employees who benefit from union efforts without paying for it. It is 
suggested that denying non-members the benefits of collective bargaining may constitute an unfair labour 
practice in terms of clause 2(1 )(a) and (b) of schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act, 1995. It may also be 
unconstitutional in terms of s 9(1) and (2) of the Constitution which stipulates that everyone is equal and 
that equality includes the full and fair enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
117The protection of freedom of association in the Constitution (see s 23(2) (a) and (b) thereof) places the 
closed shop and agency shop agreements in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 at risk of constitutional attack. 
However, in terms of s 23(6) of the Constitution, the legislature is authorised to make provision for these 
agreements in the Labour Relations Act, 1995, provided that the statutory provisions regarding these 
agreements comply withs 36(1) of the Constitution. In terms of this section, the constitutional right to free-
dom of association may be limited only in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 ~e by the closed shop 
and agency shop provisions) to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including - the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limita-
tion, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relationship between the limitation and its purpose and less 
166 
Collective Bargaining 
1995 sets fairly stringent requirements that have to be met before such agreements will 
be valid.118 
As far as closed shop agreements are concerned, the Act stipulates various require-
ments.119 Only a majority union, or two or more unions who represent a majority of the 
employees in the workplace or sector, can conclude such an agreement.120 The 
employees themselves must indicate whether or not they are in favour of such an agree-
ment by way of a ball or and two thirds· of those· voting· must-vote-in-favour of it.121 The 
closed shop must be a post-entry one in the sense that employees will only be required 
to become members after they have become employees. 122 Employees at the time a 
closed shop agreement is concluded may not be dismissed for refusing to join the trade 
union which is a party to the agreement.123 Employees who refuse to join the trade 
union which is a party to the agreement on grounds of conscientious objection, may not 
be dismissed.124 A trade union which is a party to an agJ"eement may. not refuse an 
restrictive means of achieving the purpose. See also D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch 
and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 33. They appear uncertain abouts 25's chances to 
survive constitutional challenge (at 71-74) but are more optimistic abouts 26's chances (at 74-75). 
118see also s 5(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which agency shop and closed shop 
agreements not in compliance with the provisions of ss 26 and 25 will be invalid. 
1191n terms of clause 12(3) of Schedule 7 a closed shop agreement concluded in terms of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1956 will be deemed to be a closed shop agreement concluded in compliance with s 26 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 except that the requirements in ss 26(3)(d) and 98(2)(b)(ii) of the Act become 
applicable at the commencement of the next financial year of the trade union party which is a party to the 
agreement. In accordance withs 26(3)(d), it is required that trade union subscriptions be used to advance 
or protect the socio-economic interests of the employees. And, in terms of s 98(2)(b)(ii) the auditor of the 
trade union must express an opinion as to whether or not the trade union has complied with the provisions 
of s26. 
120see s 26(2). This requirement also ensures that the employer does not conclude a closed shop agree-
ment with a so-called sweetheart union which may be a minority union. 
121 See s 26(3)(a) and (b). Although the Act requires that two thirds of the employees and not an ordinary 
majority must vote in favour, the Act links this requirement to the employees who have actually voted (see s 
26(3)(b)). This may result therein that a minority of the employees in the workplace can ensure that such an 
agreement becomes binding! 
122see s 26(3)(c). This requirement also protects applicants for jobs as it ensures that trade union mem-
bership does not become a precondition to employment (see par 2.2 of chapter 2 where the weak bargain-
ing position of job applicants is discussed). It Is also in line with s 5 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which 
protects a job applicant against an infringement of his right to freedom of association (see par 4.2.2 above 
where this section is discussed). 
123see s 26(7)(a). However, those who are employed after the agreement was concluded, may be dis-
missed for refusing to join the trade union which Is a party to the agreement (sees 26(6)(a)). 
124see s 26(7)(b). 
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employee membership or expel an employee from the trade union unless the refusal or 
expulsion is in accordance with its constitution and the reason for the refusal or expul-
sion is fair .125 Finally, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 requires that trade union subscrip-
tions be used to advance or protect the socio-economic interests of the employees. 126 
In the case of agency shop agreements, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 also stipulates a 
number of requirements. In the first place, only a majority union or a number of unions 
who represent the majority of- the- employees in- the-workplace or-sector may conclude 
such an agreement.127 Secondly, the agreement may not compel employees who are 
non-members of the representative trade union to become members.128 Thirdly, the fee 
payable to the union must either be the same or less than the membership fees. 129 
Fourthly, the agency fee must be paid into a separate account 130 and used for the 
advancement or protection of the socio-economic interests of employees.131 
4.2.5 Structures for Collective Bargaining 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 provides three structures through which trade unions 
and employers can bargain with one another 132 namely bargaining councils, 133 the 
125see s 26(5). 
12esee s 26(3)(d)(i)-(iii). 
127see s 25(2). A minority union is therefore not entitled to conclude such an agreement. It also ensures 
that an employer does not allow a so-called sweetheart minority union to benefit from such an agreement. 
12Bsee s 25(3)(a). This requirement was necessary as such a provision will not only be contrary to s 4 of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 but it will also be unconstitutional (sees 23(2)(a) of the Constitution). 
129see s 25(3)(b). This provision ensures that non-members are not treated less favourably than members. 
130see s 25(3)(c). 
131see s 25(3)(d)(i)-(HQ. 
132see parts C-F of chapter Ill of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
133see s 27(1). They are essentially the successors to the industrial councils which were established in 
terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. Of interest is the fact that a single employer cannot be a party; it 
must form part of an employers' organisation (sees 27(1)). The exception, however, is the State as 
employer; it does not have to form an employers' organisation or be part of one to be able to be a party to 
a bargaining council (sees 27(2)-(3)). 
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public service co-ordinating bargaining counci1134 and statutory councils.135 
Bargaining councils for a sector and area are voluntarily 136 established by one or more 
registered trade unions and one or more registered employers' organisations by adopt-
ing a constitution which meets the requirements of s 30 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 and obtaining registration of the bargaining council in terms of s 29 of the Act.137 
Those industrial councils registered in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 
immediately before the commencement ofthe-Labour Relations Act; 1995, are deemed 
to be bargaining councils under the latter Act. 138 
Application may be made for the establishment of a statutory council in a sector and 
area in respect of which no bargaining or statutory council is registered.139 Such an 
application may be made by one or more registered trade unions whose members con-
stitute at least 30% of the employees in that sector and area or one or more registered 
employers' organisations whose members employ at least 30% of the employees in that 
sector or area.140 The application must meet the requirements of s 39 read with s 29 of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in order to establish a statutory council in terms of s 40(1) 
of the Act. 141 
134see s 35 which provides for the establishment of a bargaining council for the public service as a whole, 
known as the public service co-ordinating bargaining council. It is supposed to deal with matters which are 
regulated by uniform rules and standards applicable across the public service as well as terms and condi-
tions of service which apply to two or more sectors of the public service (sees 36). Thereafter, specific 
bargaining councils may be established for particular sectors within the public service (sees 37). As the 
emphasis of this thesis is on the private sector (see par 1.2 of chapter 1), the public service co-ordinating 
bargaining council will not be discussed in any detail. 
135The Act makes provision for the establishment of a so-called statutory council for a sector and area in 
respect of which no council is registered (see s 39). The registrar may establish such a council on applica-
tion by trade unions whose members constitute at least 30% of the employees in that sector and area or by 
employers' organisations whose members represent at least 30% of the employees in that sector or area 
(sees 39(1)-(2)). 
136see s 27(1) where It is stated that registered trade unions and employers' organisations •may" establish 
a bargaining council. See also D du Tott, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The 
Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 139. Compare this with s 35(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
which states that there "win• be a bargaining council for the public service known as the Public Service Co-
ordinating Bargaining Council and for any sector within the public service that may be designated in terms 
of s 37 of the Act. 
137see s 21(1). 
138see clause 7(1) of Schedule 7. 
139see s 39(2). 
140see s 39(1). 
141see s 40(1) read with ss 39 and 29(2)-(10). 
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Upon establishing the statutory council, the registrar invites the registered trade unions 
and employers' organisations in that sector and area to attend a meeting in order to con-
clude an agreement on which of the trade unions and employers' organisations will be 
parties to the council and to formulate a constitution that meets the requirements of s 30 
of the Act.142 Trade unions and employers' organisations may involuntarily become 
parties to such a council.143 This may happen where no agreement can be reached as 
to who will be party to the statutory council. In terms of s 41 (3) of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995, the Minister- must admit- the- applicant and-registered. trade unions and 
employers' organisations which ought to be admitted, taking into account the factors 
referred to in s 40(5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.144 
It is interesting to note that, in accordance with the express objective of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995 of encouraging sectoral bargaining, 145 all the above structures are 
envisaged as operating at sectoral level. 146 This approac::h is seen to have various 
advantages. Sectors faced with increased competition on internal and overseas markets, 
can develop co-ordinated and coherent sectoral policies to meet the challenge. Collec-
tive agreements at sectoral level dealing with pension, provident and other social 
security schemes hold obvious advantages.14 7 The legislature also envisages sectoral 
bargaining structures playing an important role in dispute resolution.148 
142see s 40(2)(a) and (3). 
143see also D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act 
of 1995 (1996) 139 and 145. 
144The factors which the Minister must take into account are the primary objectives of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995, the diversity of registered trade unions and employers' organisations in the sector and area 
and the principle of proportional representation. 
145see s 1 (d)(ii) in which the promotion of collective bargaining at this level is listed as one of the Act's pri-
mary objectives. 
146see s 27(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in respect of bargaining councils; s 35(b) which provides 
for the establishment of a bargaining council for any sector within the public service and s 40(1) which 
provides for the establishment of a statutory council for a sector. 
147see s 28(g) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which bargaining councils may establish and 
administer pension, provident, medical aid, sick pay, holiday, unemployment and training schemes or 
funds. See also D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations 
Act of 1995 (1996) 138. See further par 5.3.2.23 of chapter 5 where examples of the funds to which collec-
tive.bargaining parties have agreed are discussed. 
148see s 28(c) and (d) read withs 51 in the case of bargaining councBs. Sees 43(1)(a) read withs 51 in 
the case of statutory councils. See further par 4.2. 1 O below where dispute resolution by bargaining councils 
is discussed. 
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From a trade union perspective and also possibly from a wider perspective, the most 
important advantage of sectoral bargaining is the potential it holds for extending the 
scope of collective bargaining to employees and employers who would not be covered 
by a collective agreement if collective bargaining took place only at workplace or enter-
prise levet.149 Sectoral bargaining creates the possibility of collective agreements which 
will bind all employers and employees falling within the sector, irrespective of whether 
they were represented at the negotiations which led to the entering into of the agree-
ment.150 
This clearly has the potential for increasing the significance of collective bargaining as a 
mechanism for limiting managerial prerogative in workplaces where collective bargaining 
does not take place. An analysis of how bargaining council agreements come into force, 
their legal value and whom they may bind is therefore necessary. 
4.2.6 The Conclusion of Bargaining Council Agreements 
Section 28 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 sets out the functions of bargaining coun-
cils. 151 One of their most important functions is the conclusion of collective agree-
ments.152 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 defines a collective agreement.153 In terms of the defini-
tion, the agreement must deal with "terms and conditions of employment or any other 
matters of mutual interest" for the parties to the council. 154 The authors of The Labour 
149see s 32 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
150see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 166-167. This was also one of the reasons for the bigger trade 
unions' insistence on central bargaining at NEDLAC (see Clive Thompson ·collective Bargaining" in Halton 
Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Cu"ent Labour Law: A Review of Recent 
Developments in Key Areas of Labour Law (1995) 30 at 31). See also 0 du Toil, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S 
Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 137-138. 
151 The functions of statutory councils are set out in s 43 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and are more 
limited than those of bargaining councils. 
152see subsec (a). See also Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Cu"ent 
Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour Law (1995) 35. Although the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not expressly afford statutory councils the right to conclude collective 
agreements, it affords them the possibility to amend their constitution to include this function. See s 43(2) 
in terms of which statutory councils may amend their constitutions to include any of the other functions of a 
bargaining councU referred to in s 28 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
153see s 21a. 
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Relations Act of 1995155 suggest that the expression "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" refers to the express or implied terms of the contract of employment in the narrow 
sense and does not include the physical conditions or the surrounding circumstances of 
employment. Concerning the interpretation of the expression "matters of mutual inter-
est," guidance can be sought in the supreme court's interpretation thereof. It would 
appear that it has given an extremely wide interpretation to it. In Rex v Woliak 156 it 
held157 that it included those matters that were in the interest of the industry as a whole. 
In Rand Tyres and Accessories (Pty) Ltd.and-Appel-V-lndustrial--Council for the Motor 
Industry (Transvaal), Minister for Labour, and Minister for Justice 158 the court gave a 
similar interpretation. It held159 
Whatever can be fairly and reasonably regarded as calculated to promote the well-being of 
the trade concerned must be of mutual interest to them; and there is no justification for 
restricting in any way powers which the Legislature has been at the greatest pains to frame 
in the widest possible language. Mr Roper's construction, which seeks to confine "any 
matter whatsoever of mutual interest to employers and employees" to conditions of 
employment, would deprive these words of all effect... · 
Unlike s 24 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 there is no section in the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 which lists the matters for possible inclusion in a collective agreement. 
However, ss 28 and 43 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which set out the functions of 
bargaining and statutory councils respectively, provide some guidance in this regard. It 
is further suggested that the matters listed in ss 84 and 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 for consultation and joint decision-making between employers and workplace 
forums, could also become subjects for collective bargaining. Both these sections take 
cognisance of this possibility.160 In addition, it is pointed out by the authors of The 
Labour Relations Act of 1995161 that, given the requirement that only a representative 
1550 du Toit, O Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 159. 
1561939 TPO 428. It had to interpret the concept as provided for in s 24 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 
of 1937. 
157At 431. 
1581941 TPO 108. It had to interpret the concept as provided for ins 24 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 
of 1937. 
159At 115. 
160Both s 84(1) ands 86(1) begin with the proviso "unless the matters for consultation (sees 84(1)) /joint 
decision-making (sees 86(1 )) are regulated by a collective agreement. .. •. 
1610 du Toit, 0 Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, 0 Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 160. 
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trade union may bring into effect the establishment of a workplace forum, 162 the Act 
clearly expects the consultation and joint decision-making processes to yield collective 
agreements and therefore it is arguable that the matters listed in ss 84 and 86 are mat-
ters of mutual interest as contemplated by the definition of a collective agreement. 
From the discussion above, it appears that the matters about which the parties to 
bargaining councils can collectively bargain are extremely wide. They include not only 
terms and conditions of employment, but·a1so·business·o1economic matters that may 
affect job security.163 They may even include business or economic issues that have no 
direct or immediate foreseeable impact on job security.164 
4.2. 7 The Legal Effect of Collective Agreements 
For collective bargaining to be effective, collective agreements must be binding on the 
parties who have concluded them. 165 The Labour Relations Act, 1956, with one excep-
tion, 166 did not regulate the legality of collective agreements unless they had been 
promulgated in terms of s 48 thereof. Section 23(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, 
however, specifically provides that all collective agreements bind the parties to the 
agreements.167 It furthermore provides that a collective agreement binds each party to 
the agreement and the members of every other party to the agreement, in so far as the 
provisions are applicable between them.168 
In terms of s 23(1), the members of a registered trade union and the employers which 
are members of the registered employers' organisation which are party to the collective 
162see s 80(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
163Consider some of the matters listed ins 84 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 such as the restructuring 
of the workplace (see subsec (1)(a)), partial or total plant closures (see subsec (1)(c)) and mergers (see 
subsec (1)(d)). 
164see, for instance, some of the matters listed in s 84 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 such as product 
development plans (subsec (1)ij)) and export promotion (see subsec (1)(k)). 
165see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 169 where he states that, "[T]he object of collective bargain-
ing between management and organised labour is to reach binding agreements in terms of which their 
relationship is formalised ... •. 
166see s 31A(1) of the Act which made unenforceable certain collective agreements entered into by 
unregistered trade unions which had not complied with specific reporting provisions of the Act. 
167see subsec (a). 
168See s 23(1)(b). See also D du Toil. D Wodfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch ands Christie The 
Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 161 for an analysis of the different contractual relationships which may 
be created through this provision. 
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agreement are also bound, if it regulates terms and conditions of employment or the 
conduct of the employers in relation to their employees or the conduct of the employees 
in relation to their employers.169 These employees and employers remain bound to 
such an agreement for the duration thereof.170 They will accordingly be unable to resile 
from such a collective agreement by resigning from the signatory parties. This provision 
ensures that employees will not forfeit the terms and conditions of employment 
negotiated on their behalf by their unions if their employers resign as members of the 
employers' organisation which is party to the collective-agreement:-
In terms of s 23(1), a collective agreement also binds employees who are not members 
of the registered trade union or unions which are party to the agreement if they are 
identified in the agreement, the agreement expressly binds them and the trade union or 
unions which have as their members the majority of employees employed by the 
employer in the workplace.171 This provision promotes uniformity in the terms and con-
ditions of employment in a workplace. It also ensures that employees belonging to smal-
ler unions or those who are not unionised are not exploited by their employers. 
Section 23 further stipulates that a collective agreement varies any contract of employ-
ment between an employee and employer who are both bound by the collective agree-
ment.172 Accordingly, its provisions take precedence over similar provisions in con-
tracts of employment. This provision is in line with the legislature's preference for collec-
tive bargaining as a means to determine terms and conditions of employment.173 In 
addition, it ensures a greater measure of uniformity in terms and conditions of employ-
ment of employees. 
So far, the discussion has centered on the legal effect of collective agreements generally 
and not on collective agreements concluded by bargaining councils in particular. The 
definition of a collective agreement is extremely wide. All that is required, is that the 
agreement must be concluded by a registered trade union or unions on the one hand 
and a registered employers' organisation and/or employer on the other and, of course, 
169see subsec (c). 
170see s 23(2). 
171 See subsec (d). 
172see subsec (2). 
173see the preamble to the Labour Relations Act.. 1995 whlctt lists the promotion of collective bargaining at 
the workplace and at sectoral level as one of the purposes of the Act See also s 1 thereof which lists the 
promotion of collective bargaining as one of the primary objectives of the Act 
174 
Collective Bargaining 
that it must deal with terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual 
interest.174 Clearly, agreements by bargaining councils about these matters fall within 
the definition of a collective agreement. However, the definition may also cover shopfloor 
or factory level agreements. 175 In addition, it may include a recognition agreement or a 
shopfloor agreement or an industrial council agreement, which has not been promul-
gated in terms of s 48 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, 176 and in force immediately 
before the commencement of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.177 
Subscribing to sectoral level bargaining in accordance with the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 affords collective agreements concluded by bargaining councils special treatment. 
Section 31178 of the Act regulates the legal enforceability of such agreements.179 In 
terms of this section, such an agreement binds the parties to the council which are also 
parties to the collective agreement. 180 Secondly, it binds each party to the collective 
agreement and the members of every other party to the agre~ment in so far as the provi-
sions thereof apply to the relationship between such party and the said members.181 
Thirdly, the agreement binds the members of a trade union which is a party to the agree-
ment and the employers which are members of an employers' organisation which is 
such a party, if the agreement regulates terms and conditions of employment or the con-
duct of the employers in relation to their employees or the conduct of the employees in 
relation to their employers.182 
17 4see the definition of a collective agreement in s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
175Provided, of course, that the trade union and employers' organisation are registered and the agreement 
deals with the matters specified in the definition of a collective agreement. See also D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J 
Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 164. 
176eompare this with industrial agreements promulgated in terms of s 48 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 
and in force immediately before the commencement of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. In terms of clause 
12 of Schedule 7, these agreements remain In force for 18 months or until their expiry, whichever is the 
shorter period. 
1771n terms of clause 13 of Schedule 7, these agreements are all deemed to be collective agreements for 
purposes of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
178rhis section was extensively amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
1791ts provisions are very similar to those contained in s 23(1 )(a)-(c) dealing with the legal effect of collec-
tive agreements generally. 
180see s 31(a). In terms of s 27(7) read withs 48(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, it was possible for 
the collective agreement to be made binding on parties to the council which were not party to the agree-
ment. 
181 See s 31 (b). 
182see s 31 (c). 
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4.2.8 The Extension of Collective Agreements Concluded in Bargaining Councils 
The special treatment afforded by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to collective agree-
ments concluded by bargaining councils is most obvious in the Act's provisions regard-
ing the extension of such agreements to non-parties to these agreements.183 Only col-
lective agreements by bargaining councils can be so extended. 
In terms. of s 32(1) of the Act,. a bargaining council. may ask the Minister to extend a col-
lective agreement concluded in the council to any non-parties to the agreement which 
are within the council's registered scope.184 This may be done, if the trade unions 
whose members constitute the majority of the members of the trade unions which are 
party to the council and the employers' organisations, whose members employ the 
majority of employees of the members of the employers' organisations which are party 
to the council, have voted in favour of the extension. 
The Minister may not extend a collective agreement unless he has satisfied himself of a 
number of issues. Firstly, that the decision by the bargaining council to request the 
extension complies with the voting requirements set out ins 32(1).185 Secondly, that the 
majority of all the employees who, upon extension of the agreement, will fall within the 
scope thereof, are members of the trade unions which are parties to the bargaining 
councit 186 Thirdly, that the members of the employers' organisations which are parties 
to the council will, upon the extension, be found to employ the majority of all the employ-
ees who fall within the scope of the agreement.187 Fourthly, the non-parties specified in 
the request for extension fall within the council's registered scope.188 Fifthly, the collec-
tive agreement establishes an independent body to grant exemptions to non-parties and 
to determine the terms of those exemptions.189 In the sixth place, the collective agree-
183see s 32. Statutory council agreements concluded in terms of s 43(1)(d) may also be extended in 
accordance with the provisions of s 32 (see s 43(3) in this regard). 
184The term "registered scope" is defined ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and, in the case of a 
bargaining or statutory council, means the sector and area in respect of which such councils are 
registered. "Sector" is defined in s 213 to mean an industry or a service and "area" is defined as any number 
of areas, whether or not contiguous. 
185see s 32(3)(a). 
186see s 32(3)(b). This section was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
187see s 32(3)(c). This section was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
1sssee s 32(3)(d). 
189see s 32(3)(e). 
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ment contains criteria which must be applied by the independent body when it considers 
applications for exemptions, and that those criteria are fair and promote the primary 
objects of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.190 Finally, that the terms of the collective 
agreement do not discriminate against non-parties.191 
If the Minister is satisfied that all the requirements mentioned in the paragraph above 
have been met, he is obliged to extend the collective agreement within 60 days of receiv-
ing the request.192 However, the_Minister is _afforded a measure of discretion regarding 
the extension of a collective agreement where it appears that, upon such an extension, 
the majority of the employees covered will not be members of the trade unions which are 
parties to the council and the members of the employers' organisations which are parties 
to the council will not employ the majority of all the employees who fall within the scope 
of the (extended) collective agreement.193 In terms of s 32(5), he may extend the agree-
ment if the parties to the council are sufficiently representative within the registered 
scope of the council in the area in respect of which the extension is sought 194 and is 
satisfied that the failure to do so may undermine collective bargaining at sectoral 
levet 195 
The provisions regarding the extension of collective agreements concluded in bargaining 
councils are indicative of the preference for sectoral bargaining manifested in the Act.196 
The aim of these provisions is to ensure uniformity in the industry and the area for which 
the bargaining council is registered with regard to terms and conditions of employment, 
most importantly wages, and other matters of mutual interest. It also serves to protect 
non-unionised employees and those who belong to minority unions against exploitation 
by their employers. 
190see s 1 of the Act which sets out those primary objects. 
191see s 32(3)(g). 
192see s 32(2) in terms of which the Minister "musr extend the agreement 
193see s 32(5)(a). This subsec was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42of1996. 
194see subsec (a). 
195see subsec (b). This subsec was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
196see s 1 in terms of which the promotion of collective bargaining at sectoral level is listed as one of the 
primary objectives of the Act 
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4.2.9 The Enforcement of Collective Agreements 
The effectiveness of collective bargaining in general and collective agreements in particu-
lar will be greatly reduced if such agreements cannot be enforced against those legally 
bound by them. The Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords bargaining councils the power to 
enforce collective agreements. 197 In addition, it entitles bargaining councils to request 
the Minister to appoint a person as the designated agent of that council to help it enforce 
any collective agreement concluded in that council; 198-Such a-designated agent has 
most of the powers conferred on a commissioner of the Commission by s 142199of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 when attempting to resolve a dispute regarding alleged non-
compliance with the collective agreement. 200 
The Act furthermore affords trade union representatives the right to monitor an 
employer's compliance201 with a collective agreement binding on it and to report any 
contravention thereof to the employer, the representative trade union and any 
responsible authority or agency. 202 
4.2.1 O The Prevention and Resolution of Disputes 
The prevention and resolution of disputes between employers and trade unions is one of 
the primary purposes of collective bargaining. It plays a vital role in the promotion and 
maintenance of labour peace which, in turn, may promote economic development.203 
The legislature regulates this important function of collective bargaining in the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995. 
197see s 28(b). Statutory councils may also acquire this power (sees 43(2) read withs 28(b)). 
198see s 33(1 ). 
199Except the powers conferred bys 142(1)(d) and (e). 
2oosee s 33(3). 
201see s 14(4)(b). See also par 4.2.3.4 above where the election and duties of trade union representatives 
are discussed. 
202see s 14(4)(c)Qi). See also par 4.2.3.4 above where the election and duties of trade union representa-
tives are discussed. 
203fhese are two of the main purposes of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 set out in s 1 thereof. 
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Bargaining councils are given the power to prevent and resolve labour disputes. 204 In 
addition, they are afforded the power to perform the dispute resolution functions ins 51 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.205 In terms of s 51 (1), the disputes to be resolved by 
a bargaining council are disputes about "matters of mutual interest" between a trade 
union/sand/or employee/son the one side and an employers' organisation/sand/or 
employer/son the other side. It is suggested that the term "matters of mutual interest" 
must be afforded the same meaning given to it in connection with collective agree-
ments. 206 Accordingly, it may include terms and conditions-of employment as well as 
those matters covered in ss 28, 43, 84 and 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. In addi-
tion, a bargaining council must also endeavour to resolve those disputes referred to it in 
terms of other provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This includes disputes about 
the interpretation or application of the provisions of chapter II of the Act which deals with 
the right to freedom of association,207 disputes that form the subject matters of a pro-
posed strike or lock-out,208 disputes in essential services,209 about unfair dismiss-
als,210 about severance pay211 and about unfair labour praCtices.212 -
In terms of s 51 (2)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, the parties to a bargaining 
council must attempt to resolve any dispute between them in accordance with the coun-
cil's constitution.213 For purposes of this subsection, "party" includes the members of 
any registered trade union or registered employers' organisation which is a party to the 
council. 214 . 
204see s 28(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Statutory councils may also acquire this right (see s 
43(2) read with s 28 of the Act). 
205see s 28(d). Statutory councils are also given the power to perform the dispute resolution functions 
referred to ins 51 (sees 43(1)(a) of the Act). 
206see par 4.2.6 above where the meaning of the term as used in the definition of a collective agreement in 
s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 is discussed. 
207see s 9(1). 
208see s 64(1). See also par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6 where s 64 is discussed. 
209see s 74. 
21 Osee s 191 (1 )(a). 
211 See s 196(6)(a). 
212see clause 3(1) in Schedule 7. 
213see subsec (a)O). This subsection was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
214see s 51 (2)(a)OQ which was Inserted in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by the Labour Relations Amend-
ment Act 42 of 1996. 
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A party to a dispute who is not a party to the council, but who falls within its registered 
scope, may refer the dispute to the councf1.215 In terms of s 51 (3) of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995, if the dispute so referred is one which must be referred to the council in 
terms of the Act, the council must attempt to resolve it through conciliation216 and, if the 
dispute remains unresolved, the council must arbitrate the dispute if the Act requires 
arbitration and any of the parties to the dispute has requested that it be so resolved or all 
the parties to the dispute consent to arbitration under the auspices of the council.217 
If, however, one or more of the parties to the dispute which has been referred to the 
council do not fall within the registered scope of the council, it must refer the dispute to 
the Commission.218 
A bargaining council may conclude an agreement with the Commission or an accredited 
agency219 in terms of which the Commission or agency is to perform, on behalf of the 
council, its dispute resolution functions in terms of s 51 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995. 220 If the bargaining council elects to perform the dispute resolution functions in s 
51 (3),221 it must apply to the Commissioner for accreditation to perform those functions 
or appoint an accredited agency to perform same. 222 
215see s 51 (2)(b) . 
. 
216see subsec (a). 
217see subsec (b). 
21ssee s 51 (4). 
21 9An accredited agency is a private agency which has been accredited by the governing body of the 
Commission to resolve disputes through conciliation and abitrating disputes which remain unresolved after 
conciliation if the Labour Relations Act. 1995 requires arbitration (see s 127 of the Act). 
220See s 51 (6) which was added to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act. 1995. 
221 See the discussion earlier regarding a council's dispute resolution function in terms of s 51 (3). 
222see s 52(1). Section 52 was substituted in terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
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4.3 WORKPLACE FORUMS 
4.3.1 Introduction 
With the opening up of the international economic market, the need for South African 
businesses to become more competitive has become imperative.223 In order to achieve 
this, productivity needs to be improved.224 This may entail the restructuring of work-
places, the introduction. of new technology_ and_ new_ work methods, changes in the 
organisation of work as well as mergers. 
The drafters of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 appreciated that collective bargaining was 
not the ideal channel for the realisation of these objectives. Collective bargaining is 
adversarial in nature and is essentially geared to the distributive aspects of industrial rela-
tions such as higher wages, bonuses, leave pay, sick pay et cetera. What was needed, 
was a second channel of industrial relations which could deal with these workplace 
related issues. 
This second channel has found form in workplace forums provided for in chapter V of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Their purpose is not to undermine collective bargaining 
but to supplement it. In essence, they are meant to relieve collective bargaining of func-
tions to which it is not well suited. 225 
Workplace forums are meant to afford employees a greater say or greater degree of par-
ticipation in workplace related issues and to improve relations between labour and 
management. 226 The drafters hoped that increased worker participation in the day-to-
day running of the workplace through these forums would, in the long run, increase pro-
223see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative 
Analysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 257 
and 265. 
224see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ministerial Legal Task Team published as notice 97of1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259of10February1995at135. 
225see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ministerial Legal Task Team published as notice 97of1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259of10February1995 at 135 and 137. See also D du Tolt, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, 
S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 227 and Mark Anstey Corpo-
ratism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Analysis of Change in the South 
African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 532-533. 
226see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ministerial Legal Task Team published as notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259 of 1 o February 1995 at 136. 
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ductivity and so promote the country's competitiveness in the international economic 
market.227 
In the paragraphs below, the manner in which workplace forums come into existence 
and their functions will be analysed. These aspects will be considered in the context of 
the overriding question - how do workplace forums affect employer prerogative? 
4.3.2 The Establishment of Workplace Forums-- -
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 makes provision for the establishment of workplace 
forums in workplaces228 in which more than a 100 employees229 are employed.230 
The establishment of workplace forums are therefore limited to larger employers. The 
rationale was probably that the establishment of workplace forums would be too bur-
densome and expensive231 for smaller employers.232 
The establishment of workplace forums are effected by trade unions.233 Employers 
therefore have no say in the initial decision to establish forums at their workplaces. The 
227see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ministerial Legal Task Team published as notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259 of 1 o February 1995 at 115 as well as 135 where they state Hin creating a struc-
ture for ongoing dialogue between management and workers, statutory recognition is given to the realiza-
tion that unless workers and managers work together more effectively they will fail adequately to improve 
productivity and living standards". See also D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S 
Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 227. 
22Bnworkplace" is defined ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Essentially, it means the place or 
places where the employees of an employer work. If an employer carries on two or more operations which 
are Independent of one another by reason of their size, function or organisation, the place or places where 
employees work in connection with each independent operation, constitutes the workplace for that opera-
tion. 
229•employee" is defined in chapter V of the Act to mean any person who is employed in a workplace, 
except a senior managerial employee whose contract of employment or status confers the authority to 
represent the employer in dealings with the workplace forum or to determine policy and take decisions on 
behalf of the employer which may be in conflict with the representation of employees in the workplace (see 
s 78(a)). 
230see s 80(1 ). 
231 Consider, for instance, the fact that the employer must, at its cost, provide fees, facilities and materials 
necessary for the conducting of elections. It must also, at its cost, provide administrative and secretarial 
facilities (see clause B(a)(i) and (ii) of Schedule 2 to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 entitled "Guidelines for 
constitution of workplace forum" (hereafter referred to as Schedule 2). 
232rhis becomes apparent when one considers the number of different meetings that must held at the 
workplace. A small enterprise might not have the necessary managerial manpower to hold all these meet-
ings. 
233see s 80(2) which provides that any representative trade union may apply for the establishment of a 
forum. 
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reason for this is to alleviate the fears of trade unions that workplace forums would 
undermine them. 234 
Not every trade union can apply for the establishment of a workplace forum. In terms of 
s 80(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, application may be made by a "representative" 
trade union. A "representative" trade union is defined as a registered trade union, or two 
or more registered trade unions acting jointly, which have as members the majority of the 
employees in the workplace. 235-The-Act also entitles a-representative trade union which 
is recognised by the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect of all 
employees in a workplace, to apply for the establishment of a workplace forum.236 
The procedure for applying for the establishment of a workplace forum is regulated in the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. It is fairly simple. The representative trade union must apply 
to the Commission in the prescribed237 form.238 In addition,_ it must satisfy the Commis-
sion that a copy of the application has been served239 on the employer.240 Upon 
receiving the application, the Commission must consider it and satisfy itself that the 
employer employs more than 100 employees,241 that the applicant is a representative 
234see the Explanatory Memorandum of the Ministerial Legal Task Team published as notice 97 of 1995 in 
Government Gazette 16259of10February1995 at 137. 
235see s 78(b). 
236see s 81 (1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch 
and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 243 state that this provision •appears to be a con-
cession to COSATU's proposal that the composition of the workplace forum should be the shop steward 
committee•. The authors point out, however, that unions are seldom likely to comply with these require-
ments because they are usually recognised as bargaining agents for particular bargaining units and not for 
workplaces as required in this subsection. 
237•Prescnbed• is defined ins 213 to mean prescribed from time to time by regulation in terms of s 208 of 
the Act. Section 208 is headed "regulations• and provides that the Minister, after consulting NEDLAC and 
when appropriate, the Commission, may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act relating to inter alia 
any matter that in terms of the Act may or must be prescribed. 
238see s 80(2). 
239-serve" is defined in s 213 to mean send by registered post, telegram, telex, telefax or to deliver by 
hand. 
240see s 80(3). 
241see s 80(5)(b)(i) read withs 80(1). Section 80{5)(b)(i) actually states that •100 or more• employees must 
be employed. However, in view of s 80(1), the employer must employ more than 100. 
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trade union242 and that there is no functioning workplace forum established in terms of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 243 
If the Commission is satisfied that all these requirements have been met, it must appoint 
a commissioner to assist the parties to establish a workplace forum by collective agree-
ment or, failing that, to establish one in terms of chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995.244 By making provision for the employer to be involved in the establishment of a 
workplace forum, it is afforded a larger say in the forum's composition. 
The commissioner must convene a meeting with the applicant, the employer and any 
registered trade union which has members employed in the workplace, 245 in order to 
facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement. 246 If a collective agree.ment is con-
cluded, 247 the provisions of chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 do not 
apply.248 The exclusion of chapter V has important implicati9ns for the way in which the 
workplace forum will operate. It allows the applicant and the employer to regulate every 
aspect regarding the workplace forum including its composition, the election of its mem-
bers, the appointment of an election officer, the procedure and manner in which elec-
tions and ballots must be held, the terms of office of its members and the circumstances 
and manner in which meetings must be held. 
The exclusion of chapter V also allows the parties to regulate the functions of the work-
place forum.249 Nevertheless, the statutory provisions regarding a workplace forum's 
242see s 80(5)(b)(ii) read with s 80(2) and 78(b). 
243see s 80(5). It appears that if there is a functioning non-statutory workplace forum, the Commissioner 
must ignore it and proceed with the other requirements in s 80 for the establishment of a workplace forum. 
244see s 80(6). 
245rhose trade unions which are included in the meeting as workplace forums are established for all the 
employees in the workplace (see s 79(a) which stipulates that workplace forums must seek to promote the 
interests of "all employees in the workplace, whether or not they are trade union members"). 
246see s 80(7). 
2471n tenns of s 80(7), the agreement is to be concluded by all three parties but if that is not possible, only 
the applicant union and the employer need to conclude the agreement. 
248see s 80(8). 
249Section 80(8) was amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. Before its amend-
ment, it read as follows, "If a collective agreement is concluded, the remaining provisions of this Chapter do 
not apply". The Labour Relations Amendment Act deleted the word "remaining". Accordingly, not only the 
provisions from s 80(9) onwards In chapter V are excluded, but also those which preceded s 80(8), includ-
ing s 79 which regulates the general functions of a workplace forum. 
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functions will usually constitute the minimum terms.250 If the employer refuses to agree 
to (at least) the statutory terms, there may be no collective agreement and the provisions 
of chapter V, including those regulating a workplace forum's functions, come into opera-
tion. There may, however, be instances where a trade union is prepared to agree to 
terms less favourable than the statutory ones. Usually, this will be as a trade off for 
something else, or where the union does not want to undermine existing collective 
agreements. 
If no collective agreement is concluded, chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
regulates the establishment of a workplace forum.251 The commissioner must meet with 
the parties in order to facilitate agreement between them on the provisions of a constitu-
tion for the workplace forum in accordance with s 82 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, 
taking into account the guidelines in Schedule 2.252 Section 82 regulates the way in 
which a workplace forum operates. It lays down 23 topics~253 which the constitution 
must regulate such as the workplace forum's composition,254 the election of its mem-
bers, 255 the appointment of an election officer, 256 the procedure and manner in which 
elections and ballots must be held,257 the terms of office of its members258 and the cir-
cumstances and manner in which meetings must be held. 259 
In addition to these obligatory terms, s 82 lays down three topics which the constitution 
may deal with. 260 One is the inclusion of provisions which "depart'' from ss 83-92 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995.261 In terms of this provision, the parties may regulate the 
250see s 79 read with ~s 84 and 86. See also par 4.3.3 below where the statutory functions of a workplace 
forum are discussed. 
2s1see s 80(6). 
2s2see s 80(9). 
253see s 82{1) (a)-(w). Subsec (w) was added by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 42 of 1996. 
254see subsec (1)(a) and (b). 
25Ssee subsec (1 )(c). 
256see subsec (1)(d). 
257see subsec (1)(g). 
258see subsec (1)(k). 
259see subsec (1 )(n). 
260see subsec (2)(a)-(c). 
261 See subsec (2)(c). 
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workplace forum's consultation and joint decision-making functions in the constitu-
tion.262 However, the statutory provisions regarding these functions will usually con-
stitute the minimum terms. 263 A trade union will in all probability only agree to terms less 
favourable than those in ss 84 and 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as a trade off for 
something more important to it and its members or where the union does not want to 
undermine existing collective agreements. 
If no agreement is reached on any264 of the provisions ala constitution, the com-
missioner must establish a workplace forum and determine the provisions of the con-
stitution in accordance with s 82, taking into account the guidelines in Schedule 2. 265 
Under these circumstances, the consultation and joint decision-making functions of the 
workplace forum are regulated by s 79 read with ss 84 and 86 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995.266 
4.3.3 The Functions of Workplace Forums 
Workplace forums established by collective agreement267 function in terms of that 
agreement and are not subject to chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995's provi-
sions regarding the functions of workplace forums, unless the parties have stipulated 
that those provisions are included in the agreement. 
262rhese functions are regulated in ss 84 and 86. 
263This is because the parties are covered by all the provisions in chapter V including s 79, which regulates 
the functions of workplace forums and ss 84 and 86 which deal in detail with these two functions. Should 
they be unable to reach consensus about these functions in the constitution, the statutory provisions will 
prevail. 
2640 du Tolt, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 241 point out that the word "any" is ambiguous. According to them, It could mean that the com-
missioner must step in if the parties fail to agree on any given one of the provisions or, alternatively, if they 
cannot agree on any at all. However, clause 1 (2) of Schedule 2 offers a guideline. It provides that "if agree-
ment is not possible, either in whole or in part, the commissioner must refer to this Schedule, using Its 
guidelines in a manner that best suits the particular workplace involved". According to the authors, this sug-
gests that •any" should be read as meaning ·one or more". 
265see s 80(10). 
2661t is suggested that the commissioner drafting the constitution is unlikely to interfere with the statutory 
provisions regulating the consultation and joint decision-making functions of the workplace forum by imple-
menting s 82(2)(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
267 See s 80(6) as well as par 4.3.2 above. 
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The functions of workplace forums established in terms of chapter V are regulated in the 
chapter.268 Section 79 lays down four functions. Two are in the form of duties269 
whereas the other two are rights which workplace forums enjoy as against the 
employer. 270 
With regard to the duties, workplace forums are firstly enjoined to seek to promote the 
interests of all employees271 in the workplace, whether or not they are trade union 
members.272 This distinguishes workplace_ forums from trade unions whose primary 
objective is to promote the interests of their members. Otten, however, the advantages 
negotiated on their members' behalf are also extended by the employer to its non-
unionised employees. 273 
Secondly, workplace forums must seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace. 27 4 This 
duty is owed to the employer and is reflective of one of the primary reasons for the 
statutory regulation of workplace forums. 275 This duty also sets workplace forums apart 
from trade unions which do not owe such a duty towards employers. Their duty is to pro-
tect and promote their members' interests in the workplace. They are thus focussed on 
the distributive aspects of industrial relations such as increases and bonuses and on 
issues such as safety and health.276 
As was mentioned earlier, s 79 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords workplace 
forums two rights. They are entitled to be consulted by the employer with a view to 
268see s 80(6) read with subsecs (9) and (10). 
269see subsecs (a) and (b). 
270see subsecs (c) and (d). 
271 •Employee" is defined in s 78(a) to exclude senior managerial employees whose contracts of employ-
ment or status confers the authority to represent the employer in dealings with the workplace forum or 
determine policy and take decisions on behalf of the employer which may be in conflict with the represen-
tation of employees in the workplace. 
272see s 79(a). 
273This factor is one of the rationales behind the agency shop agreement provided for in s 25 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. See par 4.2.4 above where this agreement is discussed. 
274see s 79(b). 
275see par 4.3.1 above in this regard. 
276see par 1.6.1.2 of chapter 1 where the aims of employees and their trade unions are discussed. See 
also par 4.3.1 above where reference is 1'(1ade to trade unions, their objectives and the adversarial nature of 
collective bargaining. 
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reaching consensus about a number of matters referred to in s 84 of the Act. They are 
also entitled to participate in joint decision-making about the matters referred to in s 86 
of the Act. 
In order to exercise these two rights effectively, a workplace forum needs information. 
Section 89 regulates the disclosure of information by the employer to the workplace 
forum. In terms of this section, the employer must disclose all relevant information that 
will allow the forum to engage effectively-in consultation and· joint decision-making.277 
The employer is not required to disclose information that is legally privileged278 or that it 
is prohibited to disclose by any law or court order.279 It also provides that an employer 
is not required to disclose confidential information which, if disclosed, may cause sub-
stantial harm to it or an employee.280 It furthermore provides that an employer is not 
required to make private personal information relating to an employee available unless 
the employee consents to such a disclosure.281 
The restriction regarding confidential information and personal information relating to an 
employee is not absolute. The Act affords a commissioner with a ~iscretion to order the 
disclosure of such information.282 tn order to decide if he must make such an order, the 
commissioner must balance the harm that the disclosure is likely to cause to an 
employee or employer against the harm that the failure to disclose the information is 
likely to cause to the ability of the workplace forum to engage effectively in consultation 
and joint decision-making. 283 
The legislature appreciated the serious implications that such a disclosure might hold for 
an employee or employer and has accordingly provided some safeguards. The com-
missioner may order the disclosure on terms designed to limit the harm likely to be 
caused.284 In addition, he must take into account any breach of confidentially in respect 
2nsee s 89(1). 
278Privilege is usually claimed in respect of documents prepared for the purpose of obtaining professional 
legal advice; State documents and communications made "without prejudice". 
279see s 89(2)(a) and (b). 
280see s 89(2)(c). 
281see s 89(2)(d). 
282see s 89(3)-(8). 
283see s 89(8). 
284see s 89(9). 
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of information disclosed in the past in terms of s 89 at that workplace and may refuse to 
order the disclosure of the information or any other confidential information which might 
otherwise be disclosed for a period specified in his award. 285 
A workplace forum's functions to consult about and to jointly decide certain matters with 
an employer, and their effect on employer prerogative, are discussed below. 
4.3.3.1 The Right to be Consulted __ 
Section 85 is headed "consultation" and regulates the meaning of consultation for pur-
poses of chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Section 85(1) requires an 
employer, prior to implementing a proposal in relation to any matter listed in s 84(1) of 
the Act, to consult the workplace forum and attempt to reach consensus about it. 
-
A few comments abouts 85(1) are warranted. It restricts the initiation of consultation 
about matters listed ins 84(1) to the employer. Accordingly, the workplace forum cannot 
initiate consultation. This distinguishes consultation in terms of s 85(1) from collective 
bargaining where both the employer and the trade union may initiate negotiations about 
matters of mutual interest. 286 
The word "proposal" indicates that the employer may not have decided the issue when 
consultation commences. 287 The fact that the employer must "attempt to reach con-
sensus" with the workplace forum significantly changes the distinction between consulta-
tion and collective bargaining. The distinction is no longer that, when consulting, the 
employer needs only to seek advice or confer.288 It must now, as in the case of collec-
tive bargaining, seek to reach agreement. 289 The distinguishing feature between con-
2sssee s 89(10). 
286see D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 248. 
287With regard to the timing of consultation in the context of retrenchment, s 189(1) of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995 requires that consultation must take place when an employer "contemplates" dismissal. The 
word "contemplate" clearly indicates that the employer must consult at the stage when it has not yet 
reached a final decision to dismiss, but has only foreseen the possibility of dismissal. See par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of 
chapter 3 where consultation in the context of retrenchment is discussed. 
288see Metal & Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 IW 478 (IC) at 493H-I. 
289see Metal & Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd (1985) 6 IW 478 (IC) at 493H-I where bargaining was 
defined as "to haggle or wrangle so as to arrive at some agreement on terms of give and take". The 
statutory meaning of consultation is simUar to the appellate dMsion's Interpretation of "consult" in the con-
text of retrenchment In Atlantis Diesel Engines (Ply) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1994) 15 
IW 1247 (A) at 1253E where it held that it should be seen as a "joint problem-solving exercise with the 
parties striving for consensus where possible". See par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 where consultation in the 
context of retrenchment is discussed 
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sultation in terms of s 85(1) and collective bargaining is essentially the manner in which 
the parties must try to reach agreement. Collective bargaining is adversarial in nature 
and the parties try to reach consensus through the exertion of various forms of pressure 
including economic pressure such as strikes and lock-outs.290 The parties involved in 
consultation in terms of s 85(1), however, try to reach agreement by means of concilia-
tion.291 
Section 85 regulates the manner in· which the-employer musttry-to-reach consensus with 
the workplace forum. It must allow the workplace forum an opportunity during the con-
sultation to make representations and to advance alternative proposals. 292 It must con-
sider and respond to the representations or alternative proposals made by the work-
place forum and, if it does not agree with them, it must state the reasons for disagree-
ing. 293 
If the parties are unable to reach consensus, two possibilities arise. If the employer and 
the trade union have not made provision for a deadlock-breaking mechanism in the 
workplace forum's constitution, the employer may unilaterally implement its proposal 
regarding the particular matter or matters listed in s 84(1). If, however, the constitution 
contains such a mechanism, the deadlock must be dealt with in accordance with it.294 
This may entail that the deadlock must first be conciliated and if this fails to break the 
deadlock, it must be arbitrated. 295 
Section 84(1) states that "unless the matters for consultation are regulated by a collective 
agreement with the representative trade union", a workplace forum is entitled to be con-
sulted about the matters listed in the section. It is suggested that two interpretations can 
be accorded to the quoted words. The words may be taken to mean that, unless the 
matters listed in s 84 have been collectively bargained about by the representative trade 
290see chapter 6 where the different forms of economic pressure exerted by the union and its members 
against the employer are discussed. See chapter 7 where the different forms of economic pressure exerted 
by the employer against the trade union and its employees are discussed. 
291 See 0 du T oit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 247. 
292see s 85(2). 
293see s 85(3). 
294see s 85(4) read withs 82(2)(a). 
295see s 82(2)(a). 
L 
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union and the employer and regulated in a collective agreement, they are subject to con-
sultation. 296 In terms of this interpretation, only those matters listed in s 84 which have 
not been collectively bargained about will be subject to consultation by the workplace 
forum. 
In the second instance, the quoted words may be interpreted to mean that, unless the 
trade union and the employer have determined which matters will be fit for consultation 
by a workplace forum in a collective_ agreement~_the _workplace forum will be entitled to 
consult about the matters listed in s 84. 
Nearly half of the matters listed ins 84(1) relate to the economic or business component 
of an enterprise. 297 The rationale for the inclusion of these matters was probably that, 
although most economic or business decisions impact to some extent upon employees, 
the impact of these matters was more direct and far-reaching. 
The employer must, for instance, consult about the restructuring of the workplace, 
including the introduction of new technology and new work methods. 298 It must also 
consult over partial or total plant closures.299 Section 84 furthermore requires the 
employer to consult over mergers300 and transfers of ownership301 in so far as they 
have an impact on the employees. 
296see also D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act 
of 1995 (1996) 254 who seem to support this interpretation. 
297 See par 1.2 of chapter 1 where the distinction is made between the business or economic sphere of an 
enterprise and the human resources or labour component thereof. 
298see subsec (a). Such a restructuring does not cause the employees to become redundant, but their 
dismissal may become necessary for operational reasons if they refuse or are unable to learn how to use 
the new machinery (see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where dismissal for operational reasons is discussed). 
299see subsec (c). This may not necessarily lead to employees' redundancy, but they may be required to 
agree to a transfer or to learn different skills so as to be able to do different jobs. Where they do not agree 
to such alternatives their dismissal may become necessary for operational reasons (see par 3.4.3.3.4 of 
chapter 3 where this ground for dismissal is discussed). 
300see subsec (d). The empk>yer must consult if the merger requires employees to move to other offices, 
or to accept a transfer or to report to other managers et cetera Where employees are unable or refuse to 
accept such changes, they may face dismissal for operational reasons (see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 
where this reason for dismissal is discussed). 
301Although s 197 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 provides that a contract of employment may be trans-
ferred from one employer to another without the employee's consent under certain circumstances, such a 
transfer may impact on the employee. Under such circumstances. the employer is required in terms of s 
84(1)(d) to consult with the workplace forum about the matter. 
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In addition, the section requires the employer to consult about product development 
plans302 and export promotion. 303 The listing of these two economic or business mat-
ters is not as self-explanatory as that of the other economic aspects. Although they have 
some impact on employees, it will clearly not be as direct as in the case of the other mat-
ters. In addition, it requires a certain amount of expertise to be able to make constructive 
suggestions about these matters; something which very few of the members of the 
workplace forum will possess. 
In addition to these economic or business matters, s 84(1) also lists a number of matters 
which are directly related to the employees and the day-to-day running of the business. 
One of the most important of these matters is the dismissal of employees for reasons 
based on the operational requirements of the business.304 It was listed because it 
affects employees' job security under circumstances where they are usually305 not at 
fault. Section 84(1) also lists changes in the organisation of work. 306 This matter may 
also affect employees' job security.307 In addition, it lists job grading,308 criteria for 
merit increases or the payment of discretionary bonuses,309 education and training310 
as matters for consultation with the workplace forum. 
It is possible for the list of matters in s 84(1) to be extended. Section 84(2), read with s 
280) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, entitles a bargaining council to confer on a work-
place forum the right to be consulted about additional matters in workplaces which fall 
within the registered scope of the bargaining council. In terms of s 84(3), a representa-
tive trade union and an employer may conclude a collective agreement conferring on the 
forum the right to be consulted about any additional matters in the workplace. Subject to 
occupational health and safety legislation such as the Occupational Health and Safety 
302see subsec 0). 
303see subsec (k). 
304see subsec (e). 
305see par 3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3 where it was shown that not all dismissals for operational reasons are 
faultless. 
306see subsec (b). 
307see par 3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3 where dismissal for operational reasons is discussed. 
308see subsec (g). 
309see subsec (h). 
310see subsec (i). 
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Act and the Mine Health and Safety Act, a representative trade union and an employer 
may agree that the employer must consult with the workplace forum with a view to initiat-
ing, developing, promoting, monitoring and reviewing measures to ensure health and 
safety at work.311 
In conclusion, it is submitted that, although the list of matters in s 24 is extensive and the 
statutory duty to consult fairly onerous, the employer's prerogative regarding the listed 
matters is not severely restricted.-The statutory duty to consult.is essentially a procedural 
restriction. If the employer has complied with all the statutory requirements and no con-
sensus is reached and provided the workplace forum's constitution does not contain a 
deadlock breaking mechanism, the employer may unilaterally implement its proposal. 
4.3.3.2 The Right to Participate in Joint Decision-making 
Section 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 regulates workplace forums' right to partici-
pate in joint decision-making about the matters referred to in the section. Section 86(1) 
requires the employer to consult and reach consensus with a workplace forum before 
implementing any proposal concerning the matters listed in the section. 
As in the case of the duty to consult, it is for the employer to initiate the joint decision-
making process about the matters listed ins 86.312 It may also not have decided the 
matter when initiating the process.313 However, this duty is more onerous than the one 
concerning consultation.314 The employer must not merely consult and "attempt" to 
reach consensus, it must reach consensus. The obligation to reach agreement also sets 
it apart from collective bargaining which does not require consensus by the parties. 
Section 86 also regulates the situation where the parties are unable to reach consensus. 
If the workplace forum's constitution contains a deadlock-breaking mechanism, the 
employer may refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of this mechanism.315 The work-
311 See s 84(5)(a). 
312see s 86(1). 
313see s 86(1) which requires consultation and the reaching of consensus about a •proposai-. 
314see par 4.3.3.1 above where this duty is. discussed. 
315see s 86(4)(a) read withs 82(2)(a). 
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place forum may not make the referrai.316 In addition, the word "may" denotes choice. 
The employer is not obliged to make such a referral. If it elects not to submit the dead-
lock to arbitration, the status quo before the employer initiated the joint decision-making 
process is retained. This discretion is not afforded to the employer if a deadlock 
develops during its duty to consult and the constitution of the workplace forum makes 
provision for a deadlock-breaking mechanism. Under such circumstances, the employer 
must invoke the mechanism.317 
If the constitution does not contain such a mechanism, the employer may refer the dis-
pute to the Commission.318 The workplace forum may not make the referral.319 The 
Commission must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 320 If the dispute 
remains unresolved, the employer may request that the dispute be resolved through 
arbitration.321 Once again, the employer is under no obligation to refer the deadlock to 
the Commission and, if it elects to do so, it retains the discretjon of whether or not to ask 
the Commission to arbitrate the matter. 
Section 86(1) states that "unless the matters for joint decision-making are regulated by a 
collective agreement with the representative trade union", a workplace forum is entitled 
to jointly decide the matters listed in the section. It is suggested that two interpretations 
can be accorded to the quoted words. The words may be taken to mean that, unless the 
matters listed in s 86 have been collectively bargained about by the representative trade 
union and the employer and regulated in a collective agreement, they are subject to joint 
decision-making.322 In terms of this interpretation, only those matters listed in s 86 
316However, a newly established workplace forum which has requested a meeting with the employer to 
review disciplinary codes and procedures and/or rules relating to the proper regulation of the workplace in 
so far as they apply to conduct not related to work performance of employees in the workplace, may refer 
the dispute to arbitration (sees 87(1)(b) and (c) read with subsec (4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
317 See s 85(4) read with s 82(2)(a) as well as par 4.3.3.1 above where this duty of the employer is dis-
cussed. 
318see s 86(4)(b). 
319However, a newly established workplace forum which has requested a meeting with the employer to 
review disciplinary codes and procedures and/or rules relating to the proper regulation of the workplace in 
so far as they apply to conduct not related to work performance of employees in the workplace, may refer 
the dispute to the Commissioner (sees 87(1)(b) and (c) read with subsec (4) of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995). 
320see s 86(6). 
321 See s 86(7). 
322see also D du Tolt, D Wodfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act 
of 1995 (1996) 254 who seem to support this interpretation. 
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which have not been collectively bargained about will be subject to joint decision-making 
by the workplace forum. 
In the second instance, the quoted words may be interpreted to mean that, unless the 
trade union and the employer have determined which matters will be fit for joint decision-
making by a workplace forum in a collective agreement, the workplace forum will be 
entitled to jointly decide the matters listed in s 86. 
In terms of subsec (a), the parties must jointly decide about disciplinary codes and pro-
cedures. In the past, employers and trade unions have often concluded agreements 
about disciplinary procedures323 but it has been generally accepted that disciplinary 
codes are employers' prerogative.324 Subjecting this matter to joint decision-making 
with a workplace forum represents a drastic curtailment of employers' right to decide 
which conduct will be acceptable in the workplace. 
Subsection (b) stipulates that employers and workplace forums must jointly decide on 
rules relating to the proper regulation of the workplace in so far as they apply to conduct 
not related to the work performance of employees. This matter relates to rules about 
workplace safety such as the wearing of safety equipment and clothing, the handling of 
machinery and the reporting of faulty equipment and machinery. The rationale was prob-
ably that the employees' physical well-being is at stake and, seeing that they are the 
ones doing the work, they will be able to make some valuable suggestions. 
In terms of subsec (c), the employer and the workplace forum must jointly decide on 
measures325 designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by unfair dis-
crimination. The introduction of affirmative action programmes is usually an emotive mat-
ter. Employees who are to benefit from such programmes are obviously in favour of 
them whereas those who are not are often sceptical and distrustful. Workplace forums' 
involvement in the designing of such programmes may promote industrial peace. 
Subsection (d) stipulates that employers and workplace forums must jointly decide on 
changes by the employer, or by the employer-appointed representatives on trusts or 
323see Halton Cheadle "Workplace Forums" in H Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Oive Thompson and Andre van 
Nlekerk Cu"ent Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour Law (1995) 74. 
See also par 5.3.2.25 of chapter 5 where examples are given of collective agreements which contain dis-
ciplinary procedures. 
324see par 3.4.2 of chapter 3 in this regard. 
325such measures may include training programmes for disadvantaged workers and an undertaking by 
the employer not to take on outsiders to fill vacancies but to offer them to employees. 
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boards of employer-controlled schemes, to the rules regulating social benefit schemes. 
Schemes such as pension and provident funds are linked to the social and economic 
welfare of employees and it therefore seems appropriate for them to have this right. 
It is possible for the list of matters in s 86(1) to either be extended or restricted by a col-
lective agreement between a representative trade union and an employer.326 The list 
may also be extended by any other law conferring on a workplace forum the right to par-
ticipate in joint decision-making about additional· matters. 327 -
In conclusion, the range of matters about which a workplace forum can jointly decide 
with an employer is very limited compared to the range of matters about which it can 
consult with the employer. 328 However, the reason for this is probably because the 
workplace forum's right to participate in joint decision-making is undoubtedly more 
restrictive of the employer's prerogative than its right to be consulted. Once the 
employer has initiated the joint decision-making process, it must reach consensus with 
the workplace forum.329 If this does not happen, its choices are very limited. It may 
either decide to risk arbitration or it may decide to retain the status quo.330 In addition, 
this discretion of the employer may be restricted in terms of s 87 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995. In terms of this section, a newly established workplace forum may initiate a 
meeting with the employer to review two of the matters listed in s 86(1) for joint decision-
making namely disciplinary codes and procedures and rules relating to workplace 
safety.331 A review of these matters is conducted in accordance with the provisions of s 
86(2)-(7) except that, where a deadlock ensues, either the employer or the workplace 
forum may refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of the deadlock-breaking mechanism 
in the constitution or to the Commission. 332 
326see s 86(2). 
327 See s 86(3). 
328see par 4.3.3.1 above where the matters about which the employer must consult the workplace forum 
are discussed. 
329see s 86(1) as well as the discussion earlier in this paragraph. 
330see s 86(4)-(7) as well as the discussion earlier in this paragraph. 
331 See subsec (1 ). 
332see subsec (4). 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
In the Labour Relations Act, 1995 collective bargaining is clearly seen as a method of 
limiting or regulating employer prerogative. Nevertheless, the support of collective 
bargaining in the Act does not extend as far as implementing compulsion. 333 It does, 
however, provide effective mechanisms for encouraging or promoting collective bargain-
ing.334 
The effectiveness of collective bargaining as a means of regulating employer prerogative 
is, of course, dependent on the topics about which collective bargaining can take place. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 is phrased in very wide terms and does not restrict the 
collective bargaining parties' freedom in this regard.335 In addition, the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act affords precedence to collective agreements which regulate terms 
and conditions of employment also regulated in the Act. 336 
The restriction of employer prerogative through collective bargaining is buttressed by the 
right to strike afforded to employees by the Labour Relations Act, 1995337 and their pro-
tection against dismissal. 338 
Clearly, collective bargaining has the potential for restricting employer prerogative. In the 
next chapter, 339 the actual topics which collective bargaining parties have been 
prepared to regulate in co~lective agreements are examined. 
As far as workplace forums are concerned, their function to consult does not represent a 
severe restriction of employer prerogative as this function is essentially procedural in 
nature. If the employer has complied with all the statutory requirements and no con-
sensus is reached, providing that the workplace forum's constitution does not contain a 
333see par 4.2.1 above. 
334see par 4.2 above for a discussion of the statutory framework for collective bargaining provided in the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
335see, for example, the definition of a collective agreement in s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and 
the discussion thereof in par 4.2.6 above. 
336see s 1 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 
337 See par 6.3.3 of chapter 6 where the statutory right to strike is discussed. 
338see par 6.3.5.2 of chapters where the statutory protection afforded to strikers is discussed. 
339see chapter 5. 
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deadlock-breaking mechanism, the employer may unilaterally implement its 
proposal. 340 The range of matters about which a workplace forum can exercise its joint 
decision-making function is limited compared to that about which it can consult, but its 
joint decision-making function is more restrictive on employer prerogative. Once the 
employer has initiated the joint decision-making process, it must reach consensus with 
the workplace forum. If this does not happen, its choices are very limited. It may either 
decide to risk arbitration or to retain the status quo. 341 
As was mentioned, a workplace forum's purpose is not to undermine collective bargain-
ing but to supplement it. 342 In practice, however, it appears that a workplace forum is 
actually subordinate to collective bargaining. The establishment of a workplace forum is 
effected by a representative trade union343 and its powers and functions are either regu-
lated in a collective agreement or by chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.344 In 
addition, a representative trade union may also effect the _dissolution of a workplace 
forum by requesting a ballot to dissolve the forum. 345 Furthermore, it is foreseen that 
matters listed in ss 84 and 86 which are regulated in a collective agreement will not be 
relinquished by a trade union to a workplace forum even though it may effectively control 
the forum.346 A representative trade union's bargaining power is stronger than that of a 
workplace forum. It is not prohibited from invoking agreed dispute resolution procedures 
as is the workplace forum.347 The union also has different forms of economic pressure 
at its disposai.348 A trade union, however, may consider effecting the establishment of a 
340See par 4.3.3.1 above where this function of workplace forums is discussed. 
341 See par 4.3.3.2 above where this function of workplace forums is discussed. 
342see par 4.3.1 above. 
343See par 4.3.2 above. 
3441bid. 
345see s 93(1). 
34&frade unions effecting the establishment of workplace forums (sees 80(2) as well as par 4.3.2 above). 
In addition, in the case of a trade union which has been recognised as the representative trade union for all 
employees in a workplace, the members of the forum may be elected from among its elected representa-
tives (see s 81 (2)). Also, office-bearers or officials of the representative trade union may attend meetings of 
the workplace forum, including meetings with the employer or the employees (see s 82(1 )(u)). Further-
more, the trade unions and employers may agree about which matters the forum must be consulted (see s 
84(1) read with (3)) or about which it will have joint decision-making power (sees 86(1) read with (2)). 
3471n the case of consultation and matters which must be jointly decided (see ss 85(4) and 86(4) as well 
as pars 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2 above). 
348see chapter 6 where the exercising of trade unions' economic power is discussed. 
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workplace forum if it is unable to reach consensus with the employer during the 
renegotiation of matters listed in ss 84 and 86. This may be a particularly viable option 
with regard to the matters listed in s 86 for joint decision-making. 
In conclusion, therefore, it appears that collective bargaining remains employees' pri-
mary method through which employer prerogative can be restricted and that the degree 
to which a workplace forum restricts employer's prerogative is largely determined by the 
representative trade union and collective bargaining ... - -
CHAPTERS 
THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
An indication of the extent to which collective bargaining limits employers' decision-
---
making power in practice can be obtained fro~_~r::u~.~?!!lim~ttQ!l otth~9.Q[IJ~!]!~of collec-
tiv-;agreemenrs-:-Thereasaofor .. tttis~ls.!h;lJh§_gr_gyi.§!QJJ§ .. Qt~uch agreements findlCate 
which matters have bee~ th~--~~~j~~tgtj_<:>.i,nt re.9.~l~!ig.~ thro~gh .. collective"bargaintng 
rather than the subJect of unil?teral employer determinatio~:·slanpain.2"expTa1ns"fffeeffect 
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of collective agreements on employers' decision-making power as follows 
Bargaining, even when limited to subjects such as wages, working time, job classification, 
grievances and the like, necessarily means that the employer does not decide alone on 
these matters and that those decisions are the result of negotiation and agreement 
between the employer and the trade unions. 
In South Africa, a substantial number of its 14 497 0003 economically active citizens' 
terms and conditions of employment are regulated by collective agreements. 4 In the pri-
vate sector, 823 823 employees' terms and conditions of employment, inclding wages, 
are regulated by industrial council agreements. 5 Three industrial council agreements do 
1 Although there is nothing which prevents parties from concluding only one agreement covering all the 
matters about which they have reached agreement, they may also conclude a number of agreements. 
Parties may, for Instance, first conclude an agreement in terms of which the trade union is recognised as 
the employees' bargaining agent and the bargaining relationship is established (see par 5.2.1 below in this 
regard). Thereafter, the employer and the trade union may negotiate that which is often referred to as the 
"main agreement". In this agreement, the minimum terms and conditions of employment and other matters 
of mutual interest are normally regulated. The provisions of such a main agreement, especially those deal-
ing with wages and other types of remuneration, will usually be open to re-negotiation on a regular basis 
(see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 285). In addition to the main agreement, 
the parties may also enter into further, separate agreements in terms of which, for instance, pension and 
other provident funds are created or the agreed procedures are set out for retrenchment, dispute settling et 
cetera (see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 285-286). It is also possible that 
an employer and employees may be bound by a statutory collective agreement, such as a bargaining 
councU agreement, as well as a private or non-statutory agreement which regulates aspects peculiar to that 
particular enterprise. 
2Roger Blanpain "The Influence of Labour on Management Decision Making: A Comparative Legal Survey" 
(1974) 3 IW(UK) 5 at 9. 
3see page 1 of the statistical supplement to the Annual Report: Public Service Commission 1995 RP 
76/1996. 
4Aft the figures mentioned In this paragraph were obtained from reports compiled for the year ending 1995. 
5see page 15 of the Annual Report 1995: Department of Labour RP 101/1996. Seealso Mark Anstey Cor-
poratism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Analysis of Change in the 
South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth {1997) 429. 
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not regulate wages but they do regulate the other terms and conditions of employment 
of an additional 698 823 private sector employees. 6 The Public Service 7 employs 1 270 
112 people.8 Approximately 1 031 1009 of these workers' terms and conditions of 
employment are regulated in collective agreements concluded in the various chambers 
of the Public Service Bargaining Councit.10 In the mining industry, approximately 410 
863 workers' terms and conditions are regulated by collective agreements concluded by 
trade unions and the Chamber of Mines.11 The education sector employs approximately 
364 545 educators. 12 Their terms and conditions-of employment- are -also regulated in 
collective agreements concluded by the Education Labour Relations Council. 13 The 
Police Service comprises of 140 941 members. 14 Their terms and conditions are regu-
lated in collective agreements concluded by a national and provincial negotiating forums 
established in terms of the regulations for the South African Police Service.15 In addition 
to these figures, the following must be added: approximately 30 000 employees whose 
6see page 16 of the Annual Report 1995: Department of Labour RP 101 /1996 as well as Mark Anstey Cor-
poratism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Analysis of Change in the 
South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 429. 
7Public Service personnel are employed by the national departments and the nine provincial administra-
tions as indicated in schedules 1 and 2 of the Public Service Act. 
8see page 1 of the statistical supplement to the Annual Report: Public Service Commission 1995 RP 
76/1996. 
9rhe terms and conditions of employment of members of the Department of Defence, excluding the admin-
istrative staff of the Department, are not regulated in collective agreements as there are no unions which 
bargain on behalf of these members. According to the statistical supplement of the Annual Report: Public 
Service Commission 1995 RP 76/1996 (see page 3), the Department consists of 98 071 members. Mem-
bers of the Department of Safety and Security's (ie Police Service members) terms and conditions of 
employment are regulated at a separate collective bargaining forum (see the discussion later in this para-
graph). 
10see the Public Service Labour Relations Act. 102 of 1993 where the different collect.ive bargaining struc-
tures in the Public Service and their funct.ions are regulated. This Act must be read in conjunction with 
clauses 14, 15 and 20 of Schedule 7. 
11 See page 16 of South African Mining Industry: Statistical Tables 1995. This figure covers people 
employed in gold and coal mines. It does not include workers in diamond mines and other types of mines. 
12See page 75 of the Department of Education Annual Report 1996 RP 55/1997. The figure includes 
educators in both public and private ordinary schools as well as educators in special schools, technical 
colleges and teacher training centres. 
13tn terms of the Education Labour Relations Act. 146 of 1993. These collective agreements are usually 
transmitted to the Minister of National Education who extends them to non-unionised educators (sees 
12(6)(a) of the Act.). This Act. must be considered in conjunction with clauses 16 and 17 of Schedule 7. 
14see page 4 of the Annual Report: Public SetVice Commission 1995 RP 76/1996. 
15Publlshed as notice R 1489 in Government Gazette 16702 of 27 September 1995. See also clause 18 of 
Schedule 7 which makes provision for the continued existence of the National Negotiating Forum. 
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terms and conditions of employment are governed by the non-statutory national bargain-
ing forum in the automobile industry 16 and a further 100 000 employees in the chemicals 
sector whose terms and conditions are also regulated by a non-statutory forum. 17 
It appears that the terms and conditions of employment of approximately 3 600 095 
employees are regulated by collective agreements. This figure represents 24,83% of the 
14 497 000 economically active citizens of the country and 50,86% of the 7 078 00018 
employees in formal wage employment. -
In the paragraphs below, the matters about which employers and trade unions have 
reached agreement are considered.19 It must be stressed that the scope of collective 
bargaining or, put differently, the matters about which employers and trade unions have 
reached agreement, vary from one bargaining relationship to another.20 Consequently, 
the matters referred to below have not necessarily been agreed to by a// collective 
bargaining parties in South Africa. They also do not represent an exhaustive list of the 
matters about which employers and trade unions have reached agreement. 
The matters have been divided into different categories. In the first category, matters 
relevant to collective bargaining are examined.21 In the second category, matters relat-
ing to the individual employment relationship are discussed.22 Here, the methodology is 
essentially the same as that adopted in chapters two23 and three.24 Accordingly, 
16see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Anal-
ysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 430. 
17tbid. 
18According to the statistics of the Department of Labour, the total number of persons in formal wage 
employment in 1995 were 7 078 000 (see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise 
Participation: A Comparative Analysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University 
of Port Elizabeth (1997) 429). 
19tn this regard, published industrial council agreements, concluded in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 
1956, as well as non-statutory collective agreements, have been examined. On occasion, matters in 
respect of which parties have reached agreement have been gleaned from newspapers and periodicals 
dealing with collective bargaining such as the South African Labour News. 
20see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) at 261. 
21 See par 5.2 below. 
22see par 5.3 below. 
23see par 2.1 of chapter 2 where the methodology adopted for that chapter iaset out 
24see par 3.1 of chapter 3 where the methodology adopted for that chapter is set out 
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preconditions to employment are considered first.25 Thereafter, terms and conditions of 
employment are examined.261n the third category, matters which have no direct bearing 
on the employment relationship, such as economic policies and political issues, are con-
sidered. 27 
5.2 MATTERS RELEVANT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
5.2.1 Recognition and Organisational Rights -
By recognising a trade union as the representative of all or a number of its employees, 
an employer explicitly indicates that at least certain aspects of the employment relation-
ship as well as other facets will be the subject of negotiation and joint regulation rather 
than being the subject of the sole prerogative of the employer.28 
-
Recognition normally includes the affording of organisational rights to the trade union. 
The organisational rights contained in collective agreements are often similar to those 
provided for in the Labour Relations Act, 199529 but, in certain instances, they are more 
favourable. 
Collective agreements often afford trade union officials access to employers' premises 
for bargaining purposes,30 meetings with members,31 the distribution of trade union 
25see par 5.3.1 below. 
26see par 5.3.2 below. 
27 See par 5.4 below. 
28see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 289-290; Edwin Cameron, Halton 
Cheadle and Oive Thompson The New Labour Relations Act: The Law after the 1988 Amendments (1989) 
at 27 and Johan Piron Recognition or Rejection? Trade Union Recognition in South Africa 2 ed (1984) 7-9. 
See also Black Allied Workers Union (SA) v PEK Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 /W 1095 (IC) at 
1097G-H. 
29For a discussion of the organisational rights afforded by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 see par 4.2.3 of 
chapter 4. Of interest is the fact that none of the collective agreements that have been examined make 
provision for the disclosure of relevant information by the employer to shop stewards. It is, however, 
foreseen that agreements concluded in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 will probably contain such 
provisions. 
· 30see clause 20 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand 
published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, in terms of which the employer, 
after prior arrangement with the trade union, must allow trade union officials to enter its establishment at 
off-peak periods. See also clause 3.4.1 of the agreement entered into between Amcoal Colliery & Industrial 
Operations Limited, EJandsrand Gold Mining Company Umited, Freegold Consolidated Gold Mines (Opera-
tions) Limited, Vaal Reefs Exploration & Mining Company Limited and Western Deep Levels Limited (the 
mine parties) and the National Union of Mineworkers (hereafter referred to as the Code of Conduct), in 
terms of which the right of access to company property by union officials is acknowledged as a labour 
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documentation32 and the use of the employer's notice boards for notices by the 
union.33 They also frequently contain provisions arranging check-off facilities.34 Often, 
agreements contain provisions about the election of shop stewards, 35 the manner in 
which they are to be elected,36 their number and whether they will be full-time or part-
time shop stewards. 37 Agreements also frequently afford shop stewards facilities such 
right. 
311n terms of clause 3. 7 of the Code of Conduct the parties agree that the following principles will underpin 
the terms upon which the union will be entitled to hold mass meetings with its members: on union request, 
management must make meeting facilities available wherever practically possible; attendance at such 
meetings will be voluntary and no employee will be coerced in any way to attend mass meetings; tradi-
tional cultural expression in the form of singing and dancing will be allowed and the union will ensure that 
behaviour which incites violence does not occur at mass meetings. See also clause 22(2) of the Building 
Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement published as notice R 805 in Government Gazette 16452 
of 9 June 1995. 
321n terms of clause 14(3) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 
in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992 the trade union is entitled to distribute its newspaper 
on company premises. 
33see in this regard clause 9 of the Recognition Agreement between Mercedes-Benz of South Africa (Pty) 
Limited (East London) and the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa concluded on 13 July 1989 
(hereafter the Recognition Agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA) in terms of which the union is 
entitled to make use of specifically demarcated sections of company notice boards for the display of union 
notices and union documents subject to the condition that the shop stewards must first submit every 
notice or document to the industrial relations manager before it is displayed. 
34see, for instance, clause 20(2) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991 in terms of which 
the employer must deduct from the wages the subscription and/or levy payable by an employee to the 
trade union and must forward, for the benefit of the union, the total amount so deducted during any one 
month, together with a list showing the names of the employees, to the secretary of the industrial council 
by no later than the 15th day of the month following that in which the deductions were due. See also clause 
3.4.1 of the Code of Conduct in terms of which the right to stop order facilities is acknowledged as a labour 
right. See further clause 21.2 of the Building Industry (Transvaal) Main Agreement published as notice R 
1994 in Government Gazette 16095of19November1994. 
35see clause 22 of the Building Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement published as notice R 
805 in Government Gazette 16452 of 9 June 1995. 
36rhe actual organising of the election is normally left to the trade union. See, for example, clause 6 of the 
Recognition Agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA where it has been agreed that shop stew-
arcis are to be elected in accorciance with the union's constitution. The union must give the employer writ-
ten notice of any pending elections prior to calling for nominations and must furnish the company in writing 
with the names of the elected shop stewards. 
37see, for instance, clause 7 of the Recognition Agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA and 
clause 9 of the Contract Cleaning Industry (Natal) Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice R 
620 in Government Gazette 15596 of 31 March 1994. 
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as office space, 38 telephones, fax machines and notice boards, 39 stationery and other 
administrative requirements and even transport. 40 A number of agreements also afford 
shop stewards time off to attend to their duties41 and/or grant them paid leave for the 
periods in which they undergo training. 42 
Recognition may also include agreement on the bargaining leve143 as well as the 
381n terms of clause 7.4 of the Recognition Agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA, full-time 
shop stewards are entitled to work from an office provided by the company. See also clause 13(2) of the 
Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 
13 November 1992. 
39see clause 13(2) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal which is published as notice R 
3124 in Government Gazette 14395of13November1992. 
40see "TGWU to Raise Pressure for Centralisation• (1992) 4(3) South African Labour News 12. It is interest-
ing to note that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not make provision for the making.available of such 
facilities to shop stewards. However, it does require that the constitution of a workplace forum contain 
provisions about such facilities (see s 82(1 )(r) read with clause 8 of Schedule 2). 
41 See, for example, clause 20(3) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991. In terms of clause 
13 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in Government Gazette 
14395 of 13 November 1992, shop stewards are granted four days per year paid leave on condition that all 
such leave is subject to the operational requirements of the establishment. In addition, one day's notice for 
such time off must be given and all leave granted must be used to attend bona fide industry-related trade 
union activities. See also clause 34(2) of the Clothing Industry, Eastern Province: Amendment of Main 
Agreement published as notice R 1037 in Government Gazette 17270 of 28 June 1996 in terms of which 
shop stewards are entitled to five days paid leave per annum per shop steward to attend to their trade 
union duties. This clause further provides that this leave may be pooled and that the shop stewards are 
entitled to use the pooled leave to attend to trade union duties "in any manner that the trade union deems 
fit .. .". 
42see clause 8.1.2 of the Recognition Agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA; clause 34 of the 
Clothing Industry, Eastern Province: Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice R 1037 in 
Government Gazette 17270 of 28 June 1996; clause 23 of the Leather Industry, Republic of South Africa: 
Amendment of Agreement for the Tanning Section published as notice R 219 in Government Gazette 16266 
of 17 February 1995 and clause 33 of the Furniture Manufacturing Industry, Orange Free State: Main Agree-
ment published as notice R 1427 in Government Gazette 15918 of 19 August 1994. 
43see, for instance, clause 13 of the BuUding Industry, Western Province: Amendment of Agreement for the 
Boland published as notice R 1671 in Government Gazeme 16782 of 27 October 1995, which stipulates that 
bargaining takes place at sectoral level. See also clause 26 of the Building Industry (Transvaal) Main Agree-
ment published as notice R 1994 in Government Gazette 16095 of 19 November 1994 and clause 5 of the 
Contract Cleaning Industry (Natal) Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice R 620 in 
Government Gazette 15596 of 31 March 1994. The majority of the big trade unions have developed a pref-
erence for centralised bargaining. SACCAWU, for instance, demanded centralised bargaining in the com-
mercial and catering sectio11s (see "Saccawu Gives Employers Final Chance• (1992) 4(7) South African 
Labour News 1 and 2; "Saccawu set for National Strike Over Central Bargaining" (1992) 4(6) 1 and 2 as well 
as "Militant Action at Lubners• {1992) 4(7) South African Labour News 2.) This was also an issue about 
which Cosatu campaigned at its conference held from 11 to 13 September 1992 (see "Programme of 
Action: Adopted by Cosatu Gampalgns Conference! 11-13September1992" (1992) South African Labour 
News: Special Document). SACTWU also campaigned for national centralised bargaining in both the clo-
thing and textile industry (see ·sactwu National Bargaining Strategy" (1992) 3(18) South African Labour 
News 1-2; "Sactwu Push for National CouncD" (1992) 3(20) South African Labour News 6; "Call for National 
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employees on whose behalf such bargaining will be conducted. 44 
5.2.2 Dispute Resolution Proceclures45 
Collective agreements often contain dispute resolution procedures for the settling of dis-
putes between the parties.46 In terms of some of these procedures, the parties must first 
attempt to resolve the dispute themselves. 4 7 Where this is unsuccessful, some of these 
procedures prescribe that the dispute must be referred to the bargaining counci148 and, 
where it cannot settle the matter, it must be referred to a mediator or an arbitrator.49 
Textile Industry Forum• (1992) 3 (23) South African Labour News 5; "Clothing Workers Push for Restructur-
ing• (1992) 3(25) South African Labour News 1-2 and "Sactwu Gains on National Forum" (1992) 4(4) South 
African Labour News 4). On 3 March 1992 Kellogg and the FAWU signed an agreement which included a 
formal commitment to a national food industry forum (see "Fawu Moves Towards National Forum" (1992) 
3(18) South African Labour News 5 and "Movement on Food Forum" (1992) 3(21) South African Labour 
News 8). CWIU also demanded centralised bargaining for the petroleum industry (see "CWIU Strike at Gen-
rer (1992) 3(21) South African Labour News 9 and "No Agreement on Oil Industry Forum" (1992) 3 (23). 
South African Labour News 6). The Labour Relations Act, 1995 unequivocally subscribes to centralised 
bargaining (see par 4.2.5 of chapter 4 where this matter is discussed). 
44This is also referred to as the "bargaining unit". In terms of clauses 1 (c) and 2(a) of the Agreement for the 
Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 
1992, the agreement is only applicable in respect of employees who are employed in the knitting industry in 
certain prescribed areas at wages prescribed in the agreement. The industrial court held in Amalgamated 
Engineering Union of SA & Others v Mondi Paper Co Ltd (1989) 1 o IW 521 OC) at 5250-E as well as Black 
Allied Workers Union & Others v Edward Hotel (1989) 10 IW 357 (IC) at 372E-H that the collective bargain-
ing parties must determine the bargaining unit and that it is not something which should be determined by 
the court. However, in Natal Baking & Allied Workers Union v BB Cereals (Pty) Ltd & Another (1989) 10 IW 
870 (IC) at 873F-H the industrial court held that the court was not entitled, as a matter of course, to 
determine the bargaining unit although circumstances may exist which would warrant such interference. 
45see par 4.2.1 o of chapter 4 in which the dispute resolution procedures provided by the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 for disputes about the exercising of any of the statutory collective bargaining rights are dis-
cussed. 
46This is in accordance with the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which subscribes to voluntarily agreed 
dispute-resolution procedures (see par 4.2.10 of chapter 4 in this regard). 
471n this regard, the procedure may provide for a declaration of a dispute by one of the parties and a 
response from the other. Thereafter, the parties must endeavour to settle the dispute and, in this regard, 
agreement must reached on the number of meetings to be held (see dauses 14.1-14.3 of the Recognition 
Agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA). 
48see, for example, dause 39 of the Building Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement published 
as notice A 805 in Government Gazette 16452 of 9 June 1995. 
491bid. 
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Other procedures circumvent the statutory collective bargaining structure and prescribe 
that the dispute must be referred directly to mediation or arbitration. 50 
5.2.3 Matters Relating to Industrial Action51 
The regulation of industrial action through collective agreements is in accordance with 
the provisions-of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.52 
Certain collective agreements contain strike procedures or rules. 53 Often, these proce-
dures are essentially in line with the requirements of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 for 
protected strike action. 54 There are, for example, agreements which curtail the 
employers' right to dismiss workers who participate in unprotected strike action55 in that 
they must first allow the trade union to intervene and endeavour to convince the workers 
to desist from such action. 56 A number of collective agreements prohibit employees 
50rhis is what the Transvaal Provincial Division, Nehawu and COSATU agreed to in their agreement con-
cluded on 25Septem~r1992 (see "Accord Ends Nehawu Strike" (1992) 4(7) South African LabourNews 
4). 
51see chapter 6 where industrial action by employees is discussed and chapter 7 where industrial action 
by employers is discussed. 
52see s 65(3) which gives effect to the provisions of a collective agreement regarding participation in a 
strike or a lock-out or in any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike or lock-out. The Act also 
gives effect to the procedures regulated in a collective agreement in respect of a strike or lock-out (see s 
64(3)(b) which stipulates that the Act's procedures for a strike or lock-out do not apply if the strike or lock-
out conforms to the procedures in a collective agreement). It also gives effect to collective agreements 
which prohibit a strike or lock-out in respect of the issue in dispute (sees 65(1)(a)). 
53see, for instance, clause 14.8.2 of the recognition agreement between Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA. In 
terms thereof the union must give the company at least 72 hours' written notice of the commencement of 
industrial action and the employees participating in the industrial action must not in any way hinder access 
to or exit from the premises by any vehicle or person. Furthermore, the employees participating in the 
industrial action must leave the company premises when requested to do so by the company. In addition, 
employees engaged in industrial action must do so without disrupting ongoing operations and must 
behave in an orderly manner and may not damage company property or the property of other employees 
or customers of the company. Also, the demand by employees or the union gMng rise to the industrial 
action must relate to the collective relationship between the company and the union or to the employment 
relationship between the company and its employees, and must be capable of being resolved by the con-
clusion of an agreement between those parties which will be legally binding on them. Lastly, the industrial 
action must be legitimate and reasonable. 
54see s 64 which deals with the right to strike and s 65 which sets out the limitations on this right See also 
pars 6.3.3 and 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6 where these matters are discussed more fully. 
551n terms of s 68(5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
56see clause 14.8.3 of the Recognition Agreement of Mercedes-Benz and NUMSA in terms of which 
Mercedes-Benz must give the union 72 hours' notice to remedy the breach of the conditions so that 
workers participating in industrial action are not dismissed. This requirement is in line with the requirement 
in clause 6(2) of the Code in terms of which the employer must give the strikers an ultimatum. 
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from striking and employers from locking their employees out about any of the matters 
covered by these agreements. 57 
Some collective agreements contain picketing rules. 58 The Labour Relations Act, 1995 
makes specific provision for picketing59 and gives effect to picketing rules agreed to by 
the employer and the trade union. 60 The Constitution also affords everyone the right to 
picket.61 Accordingly, such collectively agreed provisions are valid in terms of both the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995· and the Constitution. 
5.3 MATTERS RELATING TO THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
5.3.1 Preconditions to Employment62 
Collective bargaining has been utilised to limit or restrict the ability of the employer to 
employ employees of its choice. There are, for instance, collective agreements which 
stipulate minimum ages for employment.63 Certain collective agreements also stipulate 
57see, for example, clause 23 of Building Industry (Transvaal): Gauteng Agreement published as notice 
2132 in Government Gazette 17690 of 27 December 1996 and clause 24 of the Building Industry (Trans-
vaal) Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 In Government Gazette 16095 of 19 November 1994. 
S81n terms of clause 3.4.1 of the Code of Conduct employees have the right to peaceful picketing provided 
that such picketing takes place under the auspices of the union and is conducted in accordance with rules 
agreed at mine level as to designated areas; numbers of people participating in such picketing and con-
duct of pickets (see also "NUM and Anglo Sign Historic Accords· (1992) 4(1) South African Labour News 
3). 
59sees69. 
60see s 69(4). 
61see s 11. 
62see par 3.2 of chapter 3 where the preconditions stipulated by the legislature are discussed. 
63some of the agreements (see clause 9 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering 
Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991 and clause 
14 of the Main Agreement for the Diamond Cutting Industry published as Notice R 1648 in Government 
Gazette 14047 of 12 June 1992) stipulate the same minimum age as that prescribed bys 17 of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act namely 15 years (see par 3.2 of chapter 3 where this aspect is discussed). 
Others prescibe minimum ages which are in excess of that required by the Act. Consider, for instance, 
clause 2 of dMsion A in the Secretary and Staff of the Council (eds) National Industrial Council for the 
Motor Industry: Consolidated Agreements (1992) (hereafter the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry), 
which prohibits the employment of any person under the age of 21 years, other than a journeyman, an 
apprentice in terms of the Manpower Training Act, or a trainee employed in terms of the said Act, on any 
operation which forms part of any trade designated for the motor industry. See also clause 6.2 of the Local 
Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in 
Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994 which provides that the minimum employment age is 16 
years. 
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maximum ages for employees. 64 
Nevertheless, the preconditions set in collective agreements sometimes actually assist 
the employer in its election of what it regards as "suitable" employees. There are, for 
example, collective agreements which require applicants for jobs to undergo medical 
examinations65 and to be X-rayed.66 It is, however, suggested that provisions of this 
nature may be invalid in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 if they amount to unfair 
discrimination in terms of Schedule 7 thereof. 67-
One type of agreement that seriously restricts employers' right to decide whom to 
employ, is the closed shop agreement. The closed shop provided for in the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 199568 is a post-entry closed shop in that it actually prevents an employer 
from employing a person who is not a member of the particular union; the employee 
must become a union member within a stipulated period. 69 
Employers' decision-making power regarding whom to employ is also restricted by 
provisions which prescribe the proportion or ratio of specific categories of employees in 
64see clause 6.2.3.1 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Trans-
vaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994 in terms of which the 
employer may not employ anyone 65 years old or over. See also clause 40 of the Furniture Manufacturing 
Industry, Eastern Cape Province: Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice R 1416 in 
Government Gazette 15035 of 6 August 1993 which makes it obligatory for employees who are 65 years 
old to retire. 
65see, for example, clause 6.2.2 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agree-
ment, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994 in terms of 
which an employee's appointment is subject to proof of good health after a medical examination, at the 
council's expense, by a registered medical practitioner designated by the council. 
66see clause 10(4) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. It appears from the terms of Cosatu's Aids Programme 
that they will not be prepared to agree to the testing of employees for the HIV virus as a precondition to 
employment (see ·eosatu Sets Out Aids Programme· (1992) 4(12) South African Labour News 11-12). 
67 See clause 2(1 )(a) read with subclause (2)(a) of Schedule 7. 
68see s 26 as well as par 4.2.4 of chapter 4 where the statutory closed shop is discussed. 
69see, for instance, the following post-entry closed shop agreements which were concluded in terms of s 
24(x) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956: aause 29 of the Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 470 in Government Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995 and clause 24 of the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry, Orange Free State: Main Agreement published as notice R 1427 in Government 
Gazette 15918of19 August 1994. Section 24(1)(x) of the Labour Relations Act., 1956 stipulated a period of 
90 days, but the Labour Relations Act., 1995 does not contain any provisions regarding the period within 
which an employee must become a member. Accordingly, it is for the employer and trade union to 
determine the period. 
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an enterprise. 70 These provisions usually relate to artisans or craftsmen and are aimed 
at preventing the employer from employing unskilled persons at cheaper rates to do 
skilled work. Their power to choose people for employment may also be restricted by 
retrenchment agreements in terms of which they have agreed to re-employ71 the 
retrenched. 72 Often, such an obligation is linked to a pre-determined period. 73 
5.3.2 Terms and Conditions of Employment 
5.3.2.1 Introduction 
As will be seen from the discussion below, virtually every aspect of the employment rela-
tionship has been regulated in collective agreements; including those aspects which nei-
ther the common law nor legislation has removed from the ambit of employers' preroga-
tive. 74 
In most instances, collective agreements contain provisions that are more favourable 
than the provisions of the common law or statutory terms regarding these aspects. But 
this is not always the case and there are instances where the collectively agreed terms 
70see. for instance, clause 12 of the Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in 
Government Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995 which provides that one qualified milliner and one qualified 
trimmer must be employed before any unqualified milliners or trimmers may be employed in an estab-
lishment. See also clause 13 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in 
Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995. Clause 13.1 thereof provides that an employer may not 
employ an auto-electrician's assistant unless it employs at least one journeyman and one apprentice. 
71 See par 3.2 of chapter 3 where the statutory restrictions on the employer's right to re-employ whom it 
wants to are discussed. 
72see, for instance, clause 2 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift 
Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995; 
clause 1.9 of chapter 7 of the Building Industry (Transvaal) Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 in 
Government Gazette 16095of19 November 1994 and clause 17.4.7 of the Local Government Undertaking: 
Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 
of 28 October 1994. See also par 5.3.2.26 below in this regard. 
73see. for example, clause 2 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift 
Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 in 
terms of which the employer is obliged to give preference to retrenched employees for 24 months after 
their retrenchment. In tenns of clause 17.4.7 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employ-
ment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994 
the period is one year. 
74see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3 which lists some of the matters which neither the common law nor legislation 
has specifically regulated. 
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are actually less favourable. 75 This may be due to the weaker bargaining strength of the 
trade union or because those matters have been used as trade-offs by trade unions in 
order to obtain more favourable terms in respect of those matters which they regard as 
important. 76 Such less favourable terms may depend on the nature of the industry 
involved. 
5.3.2.2 The Nature of the Work to be Done77 
Employers' right to give instructions about the type of work that employees must do is 
restricted by collective agreements which categorise employees according to the type of 
work they do. 78 Depending on the precise formulation of the agreement, they may not 
be able to instruct employees, falling within a particular job category, to do work which 
falls within the parameters of another. 
5.3.2.3 Hours of Work 79 
Employers' right to instruct employees when and how long to work has been restricted 
by collective agreements which stipulate the maximum daily and weekly working hours 
of employees covered by these agreements. The provisions are often more favourable 
75see s 1 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act which provides that the terms regarding any mat-
ter regulated in collective agreements will take precedence over the terms provided by the Act in respect of 
such matters. 
76A number of collective agreements' overtime provisions are more onerous for employees than those 
stipulated in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. But the rates at which overtime is worked are more 
favourable than those prescribed by the Act. 
nsee par 2.4.2.2 of chapter 2 where the employer's common law right to tell the employee what work to 
do is discussed. See also par 3.3.2 of chapter 3 where the statutory restrictions on the employer's common 
law right are discussed. 
78see, for example, clause 4 of the collective agreement entitled Furniture Manufacturing Industry, Natal: 
Exclusion from Main Agreement published as notice R 871 in Government Gazette 17207 of 24 May 1996 
which distinguishes between 31 different categories of employees on the ground of the type of work they 
do. See also the BuHding Industry (fransvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1896 in Government 
Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995 which distinguishes between specified skills (see clause 1 of chapter 
2), non-designated trades or artisan trades (see clause 2 of chapter 2) and designated trades or craftsman 
trades (see clause 3 of chapter 2). See further clause 7 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as 
notice R 838 in Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995 in terms of which an employer is prohibited 
from employing or utftising any person other than a journeyman on journeymen's work. 
79rhe employer's common law right to instruct the employee when work must be done, is discussed in par 
2.4.2.5 of chapter 2. Statutory provisions regarding hours of work are discussed in par 3.3.2 of chapter 3. 
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than those contained in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.80 However, such a 
decrease in hours of work normally results in a decrease in wages. In order to combat 
this, trade unions usually pursue such a decrease in conjunction with demands for 
higher hourly wages81 and more overtime.82 
Apart from ordinary hours of work and overtime, collective agreements also regulate 
meal intervals,83 rest intervals, 84 Sunday work85 and work on public holidays. 86 
80Consider, for instance, clause 4 of division B of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry which stipu-
lates that the maximum weekly working hours are 45, whereas s 2 of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act provides for a maximum of 46 hours. See also clause 9.1 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main 
Agreement published as notice R 1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995 which makes 
provision for maximum weekly working hours of 40. In clause 6 of the Main Agreement for the Diamond 
Cutting Industry of South Africa published as notice R 1648 in Government Gazette 14047 of 12 June 1992 
the maximum daily hours to be worked during a five day week are set at eight whereas-s 4(1)(c)(i) of the 
said Act stipulates nine hours and 15 minutes as the maximum number of hours which may be worked per 
day. 
81 See par 5.3.2.4 below in this regard. 
82see, for instance, the Central Industrial Council for the Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995. In terms of clause 6.1 thereof, 
the maximum weekly hours of work are 43. An employee who works in excess of 43 hours, is paid at over-
time rates. See also the Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in Government 
Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995. The maximum weekly hours are 41 hours (see clause 9(1)(a)). An 
employee who works in excess of 41 hours, is paid at overtime rates (see clause 10(2)). 
83see clause 5 of the Civil Engineering Industry: Agreement published as R 1841 in Government Gazette 
16833 of 24 November 1995. 
84some agreements provide for rest intervals in addition to meal intervals. See clause 28 of the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry, Eastern Cape Province: Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice R 
1416 in Government Gazette 15035 of 6 August 1993 which provides for a break of 1 o minutes both in the 
forenoon and afternoon of each day. These intervals are treated as time worked. See clause 9(3)(a) of the 
Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in Government Gazette 16332 of 31 
March 1995 which contains similar provisions. 
85There are agreements that prohibit Sunday work. Consider, for instance, clause 6 of the Motor Industry: 
Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995 in terms of 
which no employee may be required or permitted to work on a Sunday except for the purposes of stock-
taking, supervising shift changes, collecting cash from petrol pump attendants or performing emergency 
work. See also clause 9(1)(c) of the Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in 
Government Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995 which prohibits employees working in shops from working 
on Sundays. 
86see clause 8 of the Central Industrial Council for the Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 1820 In Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 and clause 17 of the Motor 
Industry: Amendment of Administrative Agreement published as notice R 834 In Government Gazette 
16464 of 23 June 1995. 
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5.3.2.4 Matters Relating to Remuneration87 
Collective agreements frequently prescribe the minimum wages payable to employees 
covered by the agreements. Employers and trade unions who are bound by industrial 
council agreements on minimum wages often conclude agreements on so-called actual 
wages88 in addition to the minimum wages. 89 There are, however, a number of indus-
trial council agreements that specifically provide for actual wages90 and prohibit further 
negotiations over wages at shopfloor level. 91- -· 
Employees' rate of remuneration for ordinary hours of work is often determined accord-
ing to criteria such as personal performance related to experience, 92 merit, 93 the type of 
87For a discussion of the employer's common law duty to remunerate and matters relating thereto, see par 
2.4. 7 of chapter 2. For a discussion on the statutory provisions about remuneration and matters ancillary 
thereto, see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3. 
88The industrial court held that it would not be unfair for a trade union, after agreement had been reached 
on the rate of wages at industrial council level, to demand that the employer bargain with it about actual 
wages (see SA Woodworkers Union v Rutherford Joinery (Pty) Ltd (1990) 11 IW 695 (IC) at 700F and 701 B-
O; Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Asoka Hotel (1989) 1 O IW 167 (IC) at 169G-H, 173E-F and 176C-
G and Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Palm Beach Hotel (1988) 9 IW 1016 (IC) at 1018C-D and 
1023C-D). 
89see, for instance, clause 4(1) of the agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 
3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, which states that employers must pay to each of 
its employees •not less than the weekly wage prescribed". See also clause 4 of the Main Agreement of the 
Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 
13038 of 1 March 1991, which states that • ... no employer shall pay, and no employee shall accept wages 
lower than the following ... •. See further clause 4 of the Main Agreement of the Diamond Cutting Industry of 
South Africa published as notice R 1648 in Government Gazette 14047 of 12 June 1992 which states that 
no employer will pay and no employee accept wages lower than the wage in the agreement or the higher 
wages agreed upon between an employer and an employee. 
90see the facts in Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Asoka Hotel (1989) 10 /W 167 (IC) at 175J. In the 
metal industry, SEIFSA agreed to an increase in actual wages on condition that the trade union thereafter 
desisted from further wage bargaining at plant level (see •still no Metal Settlemeni- (1992) 7(4) South 
African Labour News 5). 
91 See, for Instance, clause 26 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 
1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995; clause 13 of the Building Industry, Western 
Province: Amendment of Agreement for the Boland published as notice R 1671 in Government Gazette 
16782 of 27 October 1995 and clause 34 of the Motor Transport Undertaking (Goods): Amendment of A-
Agreement) published as notice R 1834 in Government Gazette 17548 of a November 1996. 
92see clause 3 of the Clothing Industry, Orange Free State and Northern Cape: Amendment of Main 
Agreement published as notice R 106 in Government Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996. 
93see clause 4 of the Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand pub-
lished as notice R 412 In Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, in terms of which the employer is 
allowed to pay higher wages than the agreed minimum, •according to personal performance related to 
merit". 
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job which the employee does, 94 the grade of the job, 95 whether or not he is skilled, 96 
his length of service97 and whether or not he is in charge of other employees. 98 
Agreements also prescribe the rates for overtime,99 work on Sundays100 and public 
holidays.101 
94Most industrial council agreements concluded in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 distinguished 
between classes of employees which receive different rates of renumeration. See, for instance, clause 3, 
read with clause 4, of the agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, where a distinction is made between a foreman, dyer, 
storeman, mechanic, supervisor, factory clerk, knitting machine oper.;ttor and a general worker. 
951n clause 3 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand pub-
lished as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, the parties categorised employees 
into eight grades, depending on their jobs. Chefs and managers are, for instance, categorised as grade 
one employees while bartenders, clerks/cashiers, extra-heavy motor vehicle drivers, security guards and 
supervisors are grade three employees. 
96see, for example, clause 4 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 
3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. Distinction is made between different types of 
jobs, such as a "dyer", "storeman" and "mechanic", and a further distinction is made between employees 
who have qualified for these jobs and those who are still learners. See also clause 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Main 
Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in 
Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, which states that an employer must pay an employee in pos-
session of a certificate of qualification an additional amount of 10% of the minimum prescribed wage. 
Clause 18(2) defines a certificate of qualification as a document recognised by the industrial council 
indicating that the holder has produced evidence that skills, necessary for employment, have been 
acquired. 
97see clause 4(1)(a) and (d) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 
3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. In terms of subclause (1)(d) thereof, an 
employee who has ten years or more service, receives an additional amount. 
98see, for example, clause 4(1)(c) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice 
R 3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992 in terms of which any employee who performs 
the duties of a team leader is paid an additional amount. 
99see, for instance, clause 5.3 of the Central Industrial Council for the Explosives and Allied Industries: 
Agreement published as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 and clause 5 of 
the CMI Engineering Industry: Agreement published as notice R 1841 in Government Gazette 16833 of 24 
November 1995. 
1 OOsee, for instance, clause 4 of the Meat Trade, East London: Amendment of Agreement published as 
notice R 102 in Goverment Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996 which is actually more favourable than s 1 o 
of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act as it provides for double pay irrespective of the number of 
hours worked on the Sunday. See also clause 8 of the CMI Engineering Industry: Agreement published as 
notice R 1841 in Government Gazette 16833 of 24 November 1995. 
101see clause a of the CM Engineering Industry: Agreement published as R 1841 In Government Gazette 
16833 of 24 November 1995. 
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Collective agreements do not only prescribe the minimum wages that must be paid to 
employees, but also the manner in which payment must be made. They often prescribe 
the day of the week, the date, time, place and manner of payment.102 Agreements also 
contain provisions about the statements which must accompany payments, the con-
tainer in which the remuneration must be put 103 and the information which must be writ-
ten on the container.104 
Agreements also· regulate the deductions that employers- can make from employees' 
remuneration. There are agreements which provide for deductions for unauthorised 
absence from work, 105 absence from work on a workday before or following a public 
holiday, 106 damage maliciously caused to the employer's property107 and a deficiency 
102Article 5 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal, published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992 provides that wages must be paid cash weekly or, with 
the written consent of the employee, in cash or by cheque monthly during working hours, on the 
nominated pay-day of the establishment. Article 5(1) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant 
and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 
1991 provides that wages must be paid weekly or monthly in cash, or, with the written consent of the 
employee, by uncrossed cheque. Clause 2 of the Motor Industry: Amendment of Administrative Agreement 
published as notice R 834 in Government Gazette 16464 of 23 June 1995 provides that payment may also 
be made by means of electronic transfer if the employee consents thereto. 
1031n terms of clause 5(3) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 
in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, all payments to employees must be made in sealed 
envelopes. See also clause 5(4) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991. 
1041n terms of clause 5(3) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 
in Government Gazette 14395of13November1992, the container (ie a sealed envelope), must contain the 
following information: name of establishment, name, occupation and number of the employee, the weekly 
wage, number of hours worked on ordinary time, number of hours worked on overtime and/or Sunday 
time, amount earned for the time worked, amount of any bonuses earned, amount of holiday pay (if any), 
details of all deductions made from such amount, the amount contained in the envelope and the week in 
respect of which wages are paid. 
105See clause 5(9) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and catering Trade, Witwatersrand 
published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, as well as clause 5(2) of the 
Agreement for the Knitting Industry Transvaal, published as notice R 3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 
13 November 1992. 
106See clause 5(9) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and catering Trade, Witwatersrand 
published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, which provides that an employee 
who is absent under these circumstances will forfeit pay for such paid holiday unless he can produce a 
medical certificate from a registered medical practitioner, or any other medical certificate acceptable to the 
council or unless he can satisfy the council that his absence was due to circumstances beyond his control. 
107 See clause 5(9) of the Main Agreement for th& Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand 
published as notice R 412 In Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991. 
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in cash handled by an employee who, by virtue of his position, is responsible for balanc-
ing receipts and disbursements.108 Agreements also regulate deductions for short-time 
funds 109 and trade union dues. 11 O They may also regulate deductions in respect of 
insurance premiums, membership fees of pension or provident funds, medical aid 
societies and sick pay funds. Agreements may further regulate contributions to bargain-
ing councils' funds.111 
A number of agreements specifically prohibit employers from setting off debts owing by 
employees or provide that set-offs may only be effected under certain conditions.112 
5.3.2.5 Vacation Leave 113 
Collective agreements often prescribe the minimum number of days of paid annual leave 
which employers must afford their employees. 114 
108See clause 5(9) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand 
published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991. This clause contains a proviso 
that the employer can only make such a deduction where the employee accepts responsibility for such 
deficiency in writing and specifies therein the amount and conditions of repayment. It also provides that 
where the employee does not accept responsibility, the council may, at the request of the employer, con-
duct an enquiry into the matter and make such recommendation as it deems fit. 
109see clause 5(2) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal, published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. 
110see clause 5(2) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal, published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992 and clause 12 of dMsion A of the Main Agreement for the 
Motor Industry. 
111 See clause 5(2) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal, published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. 
1121n terms of clause 5(2)(g) of the agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 
3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, an employer may, with the written consent of the 
employee, make deductions in respect of money borrowed or goods purchased from the employer, pro-
vided that the amount so deducted does not exceed one-third of the employee's wage. The Main Agree-
ment for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in 
Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991 also limits such a set-off to a third of the employee's 
remuneration (see clause 5fiv) thereof). 
113The common law does not specifically provide for vacation leave (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2). The Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act, however, does make provision for such leave (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3). 
114The agreed leave provisions generally appear to be more favourable than those contained in s 12 of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (see, for instance. clause 14 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, 
Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 In Government Gazette 13038 of 
1 March 1991, where the minimum amount of leave is 21 consecutive days as opposed to the Act's 14 con-
secutive days). 
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A number of collective agreements allow employees to accumulate leave.115 Some pro-
vide that there is no cut-off period for such accumulation, whereas others stipulate that 
leave can only be accumulated for a certain period.116 There are also agreements which 
provide that employees may be paid out for accumulated leave. 117 
5.3.2.6 Sick Leave 118 
Collective agreements prescribe the minimum· paid ·sick-leave-which employers must 
afford employees.119 Often, agreements set out when proof of illness is required and 
what would be regarded as sufficient proof .120 
115see clause 14(3)(a) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038of1 March 1991. 
1161n terms of clause 14(3)(a) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, the employer, at 
the written request of the employee, may permit the leave, or a portion thereof, to accumulate over a period 
of not more than 24 months. 
117Transnet, which allows its employees to accumulate leave, agreed on a scheme with the unions to pay 
out employees on all leave accumulated to the end of December 1990 (see "Transnet Pays Out Accumu-
lated Leave· (1992) 3(16) South African Labour News 4). 
118-rhe common law does not make specific provision for sick leave (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2). The Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act does, however, make such provision (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3). 
119see, for instance, clause 31 of division A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry in terms of which 
an employee is entitled to ten working days paid sick leave if he normally works a five day week or 12 work-
ing days if he normally works a five-and-a-half day week during a period of 52 consecutive weeks of 
employment. It is interesting to note that these terms are less favourable than those contained in s 13 of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 
120Normally, a certificate signed by a medical practioner is required (see, for instance, clause 7 of the The 
Civil Engineering Industry: Agreement published as R 1841 in Government Gazette 16833 of 24 November 
1995 which requires such a certificate for absence of work for more than three consecutive days). In terms 
of the agreement reached by the University of Pretoria and NEHAWU, the University will also accept a cer-
tificate by a sangoma or traditional healer registered with his professional association. Such a certificate will 
be acceptable for one week at a time. Should a sangoma recommend that an employee needs more than 
one week's sick leave, a medical certificate from a doctor registered with the South African Medical and 
Dental CouncB would also be required (see "Nehawu Breakthrough in Traditional Healer Campaign" (1992) 
3(17) South African Labour News 1). See also the demands made byCWIU in this regard in "Strikes Loom 
at Sasol Operations" (1992) 4(2) South African Labour News 9 and "CWIU Talks on Centralised Bargaining" 
(1992) 4(3) South African Labour News 5. 
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5.3.2.7 Maternity Leave 121 
A number of collective agreements entitle employers to terminate employees' services 
when they take maternity leave but also oblige them to re-employ these employees in the 
same or similar positions provided they apply for re-employment within a stipulated 
period.122 It is, however, submitted that such a provision is invalid as it is contrary to s 
187(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which brands the termination of an 
employee's service because of pregnancy as automatically unfair.123 It is also 
unconstitutional as it constitutes unfair discrimination on the ground of pregnancy.124 
Other agreements prohibit the termination of such employees' services and oblige 
employers to give them their old jobs or similar positions after expiry of the maternity 
leave.125 Maternity leave, however, is often subject to conditions such as that it will be 
unpaid, 126 that the employee must have a minimum period -0f continuous employment 
with the employer, 127 that the employee returns to work within a specified period128 
121The common law does not make provision for maternity leave (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2). The Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act does not specifically provide for maternity leave. It does, however, prohibit a 
pregnant employee from working for four weeks prior to her confinement and eight weeks thereafter (see s 
17). The Labour Relations Act, 1995 provides such employees with a measure of job security (see pars 
3.3.5 as well as 3.3.3 of chapter 3). 
122see clause 41 (1) of division A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry in terms of which an 
employee, with a minimum of two years' continuous service, is entitled, on termination of her services, to a 
guarantee of re-employment. The guarantee must be in writing and will be valid for a period of at least six 
months reckoned from the date of termination of services. 
123see par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3 where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. In addition, clause 
1.2.1 of chapter D of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute pub-
lished as Notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 labels automatically unfair 
dismissals as infringements of "fundamental rights• which collective agreements should not be able to vary. 
124see s 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution which inter alia prohibit unfair discrimination on the ground of 
pregnancy. 
125see clause 12.2 of the Central Industrial Council for the Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement 
published as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995. 
126see, for instance, clause 6(2)(a) of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-
enactment of Main Agreement published as notice R 1642 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 
1995. 
127See clause 12.3 of the Central Industrial Council for the Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement 
published as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 and clause 6(2) of the Iron, 
Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Main Agreement published as notice R 1642 
in Government Gazette 16782 of 27October1995. In terms of clause 1.3 of chapter G of the Green Paper. 
Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as Notice 156 of 1996 in Government 
Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 four months' maternity leave is proposed. Nevertheless, it may be pos-
sible for the collective bargaining parties to bargain out of the maternity leave requirement under these cir-
cumstances (see clause 1.2.2 of chapter D of the Green Paper). However, the parties cannot agree that 
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and that the employer's obligation is restricted to a specified number of confine-
ments.129 It is submitted that these provisions may be labelled as unconstitutional in that 
they constitute unfair discrimination on the ground of pregnancy .130 
There are also collective agreements which afford employees paid maternity leave.131 
such an employee may be dismissed as such a provision would be invalid in terms of s 187(1)(e) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 which brands such a dismissal as automatically unfair. Also, automatically 
unfair dismissals are labelled as infringements of "fundamental rights" by the Green Paper and, in terms of 
clause 1.2.1 of chapter D, collective bargaining parties should not be able to vary the employee's statutory 
right not to be dismissed because she is pregnant. 
128see, for instance, clause 9(4)(a) of the Agreement for the Knitting tndustry, Transvaal published as 
notice R 3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, in terms of which an employer may not 
terminate an employee's services by reason of such employee's approaching confinement. This provision 
is, however, subject to the proviso that the employee returns to work not later than six months after having 
taken leave for a confinement. If the proposal contained in clause 1.3(a) of chapter G of the Green Paper: 
Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as Notice 156 of 1996 in Government 
Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 is made law, any period less than six weeks after the birth of the child 
may be invalid, unless the employee's doctor certifies that she is fit to return to work or the collective 
bargaining parties have agreed to a lesser period and they have obtained the necessary exemption or 
ratification (see clause 1.2.2 of chapter D of the Green Paper). 
129see, for instance, the terms of the agreement discussed in Collins v Volkskas Bank (Westonaria 
Branch)- A Division of ABSA Bank Ltd (1994) 15 /W 1398 (IC) at 14001-1401A. Health workers employed by 
the State are at present allowed three confinements. The State has, however, indicated that it wants to 
reduce this to two (see "State v Health Workers" (1992) 4(7) South African Labour News 8). In terms of 
clause 16.18 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal pub-
lished as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994 employees are afforded paid 
maternity leave for a maximum of two confinements. It is submitted that, in terms of clause 1.2.2 of chapter 
D of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as Notice 156 
of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 the collective bargaining parties may possibly 
obtain an exemption to the Green Paper's proposal of four months maternity leave under these circum-
stances. However, the parties cannot agree that such an employee may be dismissed as such a provision 
would be invalid in terms of s 187(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which brands such a dismissal as 
automatically unfair. Also, automatically unfair dismissals are labelled as infringements of "fundamental 
rights• by the Green Paper and, in terms of clause 1.2.1 of chapter D, collective bargaining parties should 
not be able to vary the employee's statutory right not to be dismissed because she is pregnant. 
130see s 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution which inter alia prohibit unfair discrimination on the ground of 
pregnancy. 
131 See, for example, clause 4 of the Leather Industry, Republic of South Africa: Amendment of Sick Benefit 
Fund Agreement published as notice R 76 in Government Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996 in terms of 
which employers must pay employees on maternity leave for 13 weeks of the maternity leave period at the 
rate of 33% of their basic wage rate. See also clause 12.1 of the Central Industrial Council for the 
Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement published as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 
17 November 1995. Core demands presented by NUMSA during 1992. included a demand for six months' 
paid maternity leave (see •Numsa Core 0emancts• (1992) 3(20) South African Labour News 5). The 
Women's Forum of COSATU demanded 12 months' pakl maternity leave (see "Women Raise their Voices· 
(1992) 4(4) South African Labour News 1). 
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5.3.2.8 Paternity Leave 132 
Some collective agreements oblige employers to afford their employees paternity 
leave.133 Most of these agreements make the granting of such leave subject to proof of 
paternity.134 
5.3.2.9 Compassionate Leave 135 
A number of collective agreements compel employers to afford employees com-
passionate leave when, for instance, a close member of an employee's family dies.136 
Some of these agreements require written proof of death of such a family member.137 
132i'he common law does not deal with the question of paternity leave (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2) nor 
does the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3). 
1331n an agreement reached by the National Union of Leatherworkers and the general goods sector of the 
leather industry, the employers have agreed to allow employees two days unpaid paternity leave (see 
"Settlements in Leather Industry" (1992) 4(3) South African Labour News 8). See also clause 6(2) of the Clo-
thing Industry, Transvaal: Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice A 104 in Government 
Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996 which affords employees three days' unpaid leave and clause 5(2) of 
The Clothing Industry, Orange Free State and Northern Cape: Amendment of Main Agreement published 
as notice A 106 in Government Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996. In terms of clause 10(1) of the Hair-
dressing Trade, Pretoria published as notice R 1684 in Government Gazette 17500 of 18 October 1996 
male employees are afforded seven days paid paternity leave per annum. It is interesting to note that 
clause 2.3 of chapter G of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute 
published as Notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 proposes three days' 
paid paternity leave. It is submitted that, unlike maternity rights which collective bargaining parties will 
probably only be able to vary through an exemption or ratification (see clause 1.2.2 of chapter D of the 
Green Paper), the parties will be able to vary the statutory provisions regarding paternity leave without a 
requirement for administrative exemption or ratification (see clause 1.2.4 of chapter D of the Green Paper). 
134see, for instance, clause 6(2) of the Clothing Industry, Transvaal: Amendment of Main Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 104 in Government Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996 and clause 7(2) of the Knitting 
Industry, Transvaal: Amendment of Agreement published as notice R 105 in Government Gazette 16938 of 
26 January 1996 and clause 5(2) of the Clothing Industry, Orange Free State and Northern Cape: Amend-
ment of Main Agreement published as notice A 106 in Government Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996. It is 
interesting to note that the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute pub-
lished as Notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 also proposes that an 
employer may require reasonable proof of paternity (see clause 2.3(c) of chapter G). 
135Neither the common law (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2) nor minimum legislation (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 
3) provides for such leave. 
136see, for instance, clause 11 of the Central Industrial CouncH for the Explosives and Allied Industries: 
Agreement published as notice A 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 which provides 
for five days' leave per occasion. See also clause 16.17.1.1 o of the Local Government Undertaking: Condi-
tions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice A 1828 In Government Gazette 16047 of 28 
October 1994 and clause 35 of the Furniture Manufacturing Industry, Orange Free State: Main Agreement 
published as notice R 1427 in Government Gazette 15918 of 19 August 1994. 
137see, for instance, clause 10(2) of the Hairdressing Trade, Pretoria published as notice A 1684 in 
Government Gazette 17500 of 18 October 1996. 
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5.3.2.10 Study Leave 138 
Some collective agreements make provision for the granting of study leave by employers 
to their employees.139 
5.3.2.11 Accommodation 140 
The obligation to afford·accommodation-is--often- linked-to-the-special nature of the 
industry or the type of work which the employees do. For example, most collective 
agreements concluded in the mining industry make it obligatory for the mines to provide 
their employees with accommodation and regulate the governance of the hostels.141 
There are also a number of collective agreements which oblige employers to provide 
accommodation in special circumstances such as when employees must work on a 
site 142 or have to travel for business purposes. 143 
138Neither the common law (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2) nor minimum legislation (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 
3) provides for such leave. 
139see clause 12 of Motor Transport Undertaking (Goods): Re-enactment of A-Agreement published as 
notice R 2129 in Government Gazette 17690 of 27 December 1996 in terms of which the employer must 
grant employees a maximum of four days' paid study leave per annum provided inter alia that the course is 
approved by the employer and is accredited by the Road Transport Industry Education and Training Board. 
See also clause 13 of the Central Industrial Council for the Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement 
published as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 and clause 16.17.2 of the 
Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 
1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994. 
140Neither the common law (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2) nor the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (see 
par 3.3.3 of chapter 3) makes specific provision for accommodation. 
141 See clause 3.4.2 of the Code of Conduct in terms of which the mining companies must provide hostels. 
The Code of Conduct also stipulates that the fundamental responsibility for the management and mainte-
nance of good order in the hostels rests with the mining companies. 
142See clause 18 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1896 in 
Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995 in terms of which the employer must provide its workers 
working on a site with suitable accommodation to serve as a shelter during wet weather and to serve as a 
change-room. 
143see clause 5.4 of the Central Industrial CouncD for the Explosives and Allied Industries: Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 in terms of which the employer 
must refund an employee who is required to be away from home overnight all reasonable expenses 
incurred in respect of board and accommodation. See also clause 8 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and 
Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in 
Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995. 
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5.3.2.12 Mea1s144 
In addition to meal intervals, 145 a number of collective agreements require employers to 
provide their employees with meals.146 
5.3.2.13 Clothing 14 7 
A number of collective agreements oblige- employers to ·i;>rovide certain categories of 
employees with protective clothing such as uniforms, overalls, 148 dustcoats or 
aprons.149 
5.3.2.14 Transport 150 
Transport may be a serious problem for employees; particularly those who are depend-
ent on public transport and have to travel long distances or have to work at night or early 
144Neither the common law (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2) nor the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (see 
par 3.3.3 of chapter 3) makes specific provision for meals. 
145see par 5.3.2.3 above. 
14&rhis is normally done in return for a small fee payable by the employee. See, for example, clause 15 of 
the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade Witwatersrand published as notice R 
412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, in terms of which the employee has the choice to 
accept meals from the employer. Should the employee elect to do so, the employer may deduct R30 per 
month in respect of part-time employees and R50 per month in respect of full-time employees. 
147The common law does not make provision for clothing (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2). The Basic Condi-
tions of Employment Act also does not contain any provisions regarding clothing (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 
3) but employers may be obliged to provide their employees with protective clothing in terms of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act or the Mine Health and Safety Act (see s 6(1 )(a)). 
148see clause 34 of the Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in Government 
Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995 in terms of which the employer must issue every employee with two new 
overalls of the required size. Thereafter, two overalls must be issued to every employee every 12 months. 
149see clause 10 of division B of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry in terms of which the 
employer, which requires its employees to wear either a uniform, overall, dustcoat or apron, must provide 
such garment free of charge. See also clause 7 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and 
Catering Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038of1 March 1991. 
150Neither the common law nor minimum legislation deals with transport. 
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in the mornings. A number of collective agreements make it obligatory for employers to 
provide transport.151 
5.3.2.15 Increments 152 
The employer's right to decide whether or not to pay increases has been restricted by 
collective agreements. Some agreements limit this right only to a certain extent 153 
whereas others limit it totally by making the payment of annual increases obligatory. The 
latter agreements also frequently contain criteria according to which the amount of the 
increment is to be calculated.154 
5.3.2.16 Bonuses155 
Collective agreements restrict employers' right to decide whether or not to pay their 
employees bonuses. In certain instances, the restriction is absolute and-the employer 
151see clause 15(2) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, in terms of which 
the employer must make reasonable arrangements for transport home of a "special function employee" or 
a "special function casual employee" or casual employee working later than 22:30. In lieu of providing such 
transport, an employer must order a taxi and pay the taxi in advance or pay such employee R10. See also 
clause 3 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Main Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 1642 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 in terms of which the employer is 
obliged to provide transport, free of charge, to its employees who have to work away from their ordinary 
place of work. See further clause 6 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in 
Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995 in terms of which no employee may be expected to use his 
own bicycle. 
152rhe common law does not specifically provide for increases (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2), nor does mini-
mum legislation (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3). But the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (s 84(1)(h)) lists the criteria 
for merit increases as one of the matters about which employers must consult with workplace forums (see 
par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 in this regard). 
153eonsider, for example, clause 8.1.1 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment 
Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994 in 
terms of which the employer may elect not to increase an employee's salary if, in its opinion, the 
employee's work performance is unsatisfactory. 
154see, for instance, clause 4.2 of the Central Industrial CouncH for the EXplosives and Allied Industries: 
Agreement published as notice R 1820 in Government Gazette 16827 of 17 November 1995 in terms of 
which increments are calculated according to years of service. 
155The common law does not deal with bonuses (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2). Minimum legislation also 
does not deal with bonuses (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3). The Labour Relations Ad:, 1995, however, does list 
criteria for the payment of discretionary bonuses as one of the matters about which the employer must 
consult with the workplace forum (sees 84(1)(h) as well as par 4.3.2.1 of chapter 4 where this issue is dis-
cussed). 
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has no discretion whatsoever. This is often the case where agreements provide for 
bonuses which are linked to objective considerations such as annual bonuses, 156 
holiday bonuses, 157 setting bonuses, 158 attendance bonuses 159 and long service 
bonuses.160 In the case of bonuses which are linked to subjective considerations such 
as incentive, 161 competency or outstanding service 162 and outstanding perform-
ance 163 employers may retain a measure of discretion. 
156see clause 4 of the Clothing Industry, Orange Free State and Northern Cape: Amendment of Main 
Agreement published as notice R 106 in Government Gazette 16938 of 26 January 1996 and clause 16 of 
the Civil Engineering Industry: Agreement published as R 1841 in Government Gazette 16833 of 24 Novem-
ber 1995. 
157see clause 13 of division B of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry and clause 16.25 of the Local 
Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in 
Government Gazette 16047 of 28October1994. 
158rhis bonus is payable to an employee who, in the course of his duties, sets or adjusts the machine or 
machines he operates. See clause 5(2) of division C in chapter 2 of the Main Agreement for the Motor 
Industry. 
159see clause 4(6)(a) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. 
160see clause 39 of the Furniture Manufacturing Industry, Orange Free State: Main Agreement published 
as notice R 1427 in Government Gazette 15918 of 19 August 1994. 
161see clause 11 of the Main Agreement for the Diamond Cutting Industry of South Africa published as 
notice R 1648 In Government Gazette 14047 of 12 June 1992, which provides that whenever the employer 
requires its employees to participate in such a scheme, it must negotiate with them in regard to a tariff or 
rate by which such bonus can be calculated. Details of such an agreement must be submitted to the 
bargaining council in writing within one week of being requested by the council to do so. See also clause 
4(6)(b) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in Government 
Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992. 
162see clause 8.2.1 (a) and (b) of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agree-
ment, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994. 
163see clause 8.2.1 (e) of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, 
Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28October1994. 
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5.3.2.17 Productivity Agreements 164 
Bendix 165 describes productivity bargaining as follows 
[It] is an extremely complicated process and each agreement is tailormade to suit the 
needs of a particular company and its employees. Basically, it entails the reorganisation of 
work and the offer of various packages to the employees. It may also involve the introduc-
tion of job flexibility, ... time flexibility, changes in payment structures, and the introduction 
of work groups. 
A productivity agreement was concluded by employers and trade unions in the mining 
industry during their 1991 wage bargaining. It essentially entailed low basic salary 
increases and bonuses determined by production levels and the gold price.166 
5.3.2.18 Training 167 
A number of agreements restrict employers' right to dismiss redundant employees by 
providing that they must retrain such employees.168 
Collective agreements also often make it obligatory for employers to provide their 
employees with the necessary technical training requird for their jobs. In addition, there 
164The common law does not deal with productivity. Minimum legislation also does not deal with it. The 
Labour Relations Act, 1995, however, does list the restructuring of the workplace and changes in the 
organisation of work as matters about which the employer must consult with the workplace forum (see s 
84(1 )(a) and (b) as well as par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where these issues are discussed). 
165sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 468. 
166some time after the implementation of the scheme it was, however, criticised by both NUM and the 
Mineworkers' Union. The National Union of Mineworkers alleged that employers had provided Insufficient 
information for the scheme to be monitored accurately and that the workers had been denied a role in set-
ting targets (see "Body Blows for Productivity Bargaining• (1992) 3(15) South African Labour News 1-2 and 
"Ruling in Bonus Scheme Dispute" (1992) 3(22) South African Labour News 7). The National Union of 
Mineworkers and the Chamber of Mines' gold mine members thereafter agreed to a profit-sharing scheme 
in terms of which the employers shared 20 percent of their profits with their employees (see "NUM in Dis-
pute with Coal Bosses" (1992) 4(2) South African Labour News 4 as well as "Agency Shop Agreement at 
Harmony" (1992) 4(4) South African Labour News 10 in this regard). 
167see par 2.4.2.3 of chapter 2 where the obligation to train employees as part of the employer's common 
law duty of care is discussed. See also par 3.3.2 of chapter 3 where the duty in terms of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act, the Mine Health and Safety Act and the Manpower Training Act to train employees is 
discussed. The labour Relations Act, 1995 makes provision for the promotion and establishment of training 
schemes as one of the functions of bargaining councils (sees 28(t)). 
168see "Numsa Sets Out Core Demands" (1992) 3(18) South African Labour News 5. Eskom follows a 
policy of no forced retrenchment on the understanding that employees who become surplus are adaptable 
and flexible, allowing themselves to be retrained and redeployed into other positions (see "No Forced 
Retrenchments at Eskom" (1992) 3(18) South African Labour News 9). 
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are collective agreements which require employers to provide training "to address past 
imbalances" between different races.169 Often, and in order to facilitate the re-training or 
training of employees, collective agreements require employers to make funds available 
for the establishment 170 and running of training schemes.171 
5.3.2.19 Tools and Equipment 172 
A number of collective agreements· require employers to-provide their employees with 
tools.173 In other instances, employees are required to provide their own tools, but 
employers are obliged to pay allowances in respect of these tools174 and/or to insure 
1 ~ee. for instance, clause 3.4.1 of the Code of Conduct in terms of which the employers have committed 
themselves to a positive programme of job and skills development in accordance with their needs, to 
address past imbalances (see also "NUM and Anglo Sign Historic Accords· (1992) 4(1) South African 
Labour News 3). 
170such provisions are in line with the social upliftment objective of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 con-
tained in s 1 thereof. In s 28(f) of the Act, the promotion and establishment of training and education 
schemes by bargaining councils is listed as one of the functions of such councils. In terms of clause 42(1) 
of dMsion D of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry the employer is obliged to forward to the secre-
tary of the regional council a training levy of 50 cents per week in respect of every employee employed by 
it. In terms of clause 42(5) levies received by the council must be paid to the Motor Industry Training Board 
which has been established in terms of the provisions of the Manpower Training Act See also clause 30 of 
the Building Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement published as notice R 805 in Government 
Gazette 16452 of 9 June 1995 in terms of which an employer must pay to the secretary of the council the 
required amount which is to be contributed to the Building Industry Training Fund in terms of clause 7(3) of 
notice R 1886 of 31 August 1984. See further clause 5 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical 
Industry: Re-enactment of Education and Training Fund Agreement published as notice R 855 in 
Government Gazette 1647 4 of 15 June 1995 in terms of which employers must make monthly contributions 
to the Metal and Engineering Industries Education and Training Fund. 
171see, for instance, clause 7 of the Textile Industry, Republic of South Africa: Amendment of Agreement 
published as notice R 1673 in Government Gazettte 16782 of 27October1995 which requires the employer 
to make financial contributions on a regular basis to an education bursary scheme run by the trade union. 
172Neither the common law nor minimum legislation deals with this matter. 
173see clause 12 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in Government Gazette 
16466 of 23 June 1995 and clause 11 of the Furniture Manufacturing Industry, Orange Free State: Main 
Agreement published as notice R 1427 in Government Gazette 15918 of 19 August 1994. 
174see, for instance, clause 4.5 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 
1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995. 
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them. 175 Employers may also be required to provide secure storage places for such 
tools.176 
5.3.2.20 Anti-Discriminatory Provisions 177 
There are collective agreements which explicitly prohibit employers from discriminating 
between employees solely on grounds such as race, colour, language, sex, 178 religion, 
ethnic origin, birth, political views; disability or-other-natural c::haracteristics.179 These 
agreements take on special significance in view of the fact that they are in line with the 
anti-discriminatory provisions contained in Schedule 7180 to the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 as well as the provisions of the Constitution.181 
5.3.2.21 Health and Safety 182 
Frequently, collective agreements specifically incorporate the provisions of the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act.183 But a number of agreements prescribe their own health 
and safety procedures in addition to the health and safety procedures of the Act. These 
175see clause 7 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift Engineering 
Agreement published as notice R 1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995. 
176see, for example, clause 12 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 
1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995. 
177The common law, by operating on the premise that employees are an equal footing with their 
employers and that it does not have to provide protection against discrimination, makes it possible for 
employers to discriminate (see par 2.2 of chapter 2 in this regard). However, the residual unfair labour 
practice contained in schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords employees a measure of pro-
tection against unfair discrimination on arbitrary grounds. Protection is also afforded by the Constitution 
against discrimination (see pars 3.2 and 3.3.3 of chapter 3 where these provisions are discussed). 
178rhe Department of National Education agreed to do away with any salary disparities for married women 
in education as from 1 July 1992 (see "Women Teachers Gain Salary Parity" (1992) 3(18) South African 
Labour News 10). The Women's Forum of Cosatu have demanded an end to discrimination against women 
obtaining housing loans (see "Women Raise their Voices• (1992) 4(4) South African Labour News 1 ). 
179see clause 3.4.2 of the Code of Conduct in terms of which the right to human dignity and equality has 
been acknowledged as a civil right 
180see clause 2. 
181 See s 9 thereof which deals with the principle of equality. 
182see pars 2.4.2.2-2.4.2.4 of chapter 2 where the employer's common law duty of care is discussed and 
par 3.3.2 of chapter 3 where the different health and safety Acts are discussed. 
183see clause 28 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 in 
Government Gazette 16095of19November1994. 
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procedures are usually geared to specific circumstances in the workplaces 184 and may 
be more onerous for the employer than the statutory provisions. There are, for instance, 
agreements which require employers to allow trade union officials and office-bearers to 
form part of investigations into accidents involving workers at the workplace.185 
But collective agreements' safety provisions often go much further than employers' com-
mon law and statutory duties of qare. A serious problem is the high level of crime and 
violence in our society and its effect-on employees who, due to the- nature of their jobs, 
are prone to attacks and other forms of violence. Demands have been made by trade 
unions for employers to provide a measure of protection to such employees.186 
Violence is also prevalent amongst employees with different political views and collective 
agreements also require employers to attempt to eliminate such violence. 187 
184see, for example, the specific provisions in clause 22 of the Hairdressing Trade, Pretoria published as 
notice R 1684 in Government Gazette 17500 of 18 October 1996 in terms of which the employer must 
ensure that the workplace is adequately lighted and ventilated and provided with an adequate supply of hot 
and cold running water; that it is fitted with glazed washbasins with waste pipes and a system for the 
innocuous disposal of waste water; that the walls and floors are constructed of material which will permit 
their being kept clean and that a place for the storage or preparation of food is separated from the part 
used for carrying on the trade by a wall or walls having no doors, windows, apertures or other means of 
communication therewith. 
185Premier Food Industries have reached such an agreement with FAWU (see "Epic Explosion Investiga-
tion· (1992) 3(23) South African Labour News 6). 
1 ~mployees of the Post Office, for instance, have been subjected to acts of violence - particularly during 
the early 1990's. This was a matter of concern to the Post and Telecommunication Workers Association, 
which raised the question of restructuring security structures by the Post Office in co-operation with the 
unions concerned (see "New Shape for Post Office Wage Talks" (1992) 3(15) South African Labour News 7 
and "Potwa Stoppage over Township Attacks" (1992) 4(3) South African Labour News 5 in this regard). The 
South African Railways and Harbour Workers Union has also demanded adequate security at all stations 
and on all trains for its employees (see ·spoomet Sit-in Follows March· (1992) 3(21) South African Labour 
News 4). See further the demands made by Johannesburg municipal security guards for improved safety 
provisions in "Jo'burg Security Guards Strike" (1992) 3(22) South African Labour News 5. 
1871n terms of clause 3.6 of the Code of Conduct, Anglo American and NUM have agreed that the following 
is not permitted on mine property: language or behaviour which may incite, be derogatory or which may 
reasonably give offence to others; the wearing of any party political insignia at the workplace; the wearing, 
carrying or displaying of weapons; any form of coercive behaviour; any interference in the normal running 
of the operations. In terms of clause 3.5.1. management has the right to conduct searches for weapons 
and other illicit substances (see also ·NuM and Anglo Sign Historic Accords· (1992) 4(1) South African 
Labour News 3). 
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5.3.2.22 Private Work by the Employee 
An employee's common law duty not to compete with his employer 188 has been con-
firmed in a number of collective agreements which expressly prohibit employees from 
doing any other remunerative work after working hours.189 There are, however, a num-
ber of agreements which permit employees to do such work, subject to the express 
permission of their employers.190 
5.3.2.23 Funds for the Benefit of Employees 191 
Collective agreements often require employers to establish funds for the benefit of their 
employees and/or to make regular contributions to such finds. Examples of such funds 
provided for in agreements are holiday funds, 192 sick pay funds, 193 medical aid 
188see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2 where the employee's duty to act in good faith is discussed. 
189see, for instance, clause 4 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in 
Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995 in terms of which employees are prohibited from soliciting or 
taking orders for or undertake any work falling within the scope of the motor industry, whether for gain or 
not, other than for their employers. Employees may also not engage in trading in motor vehicles or acces-
sories on their own account or on behalf of any person or firm other than their employers. See also clause 
6 of the Furniture Manufacturing Industry, Orange Free State: Main Agreement published as notice R 1427 
in Government Gazette 15918 of 19 August 1994. 
190see, for example, clause 14.1.1 of the Industrial Council for the Local Government Undertaking, Trans-
vaal: Standard Conditions of Service for Town aerks and Chief Executive Officers published as notice A 
1807 in Government Gazette 16038 of 21 October 1994 in terms of which employees are allowed, with spe-
cial permission from the employer and on conditions determined by it, to perform remunerative work out-
side the employer's service. See also clause 15.2.1 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of 
Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice A 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 
October 1994. 
191Neither the common law (see par 2.4.8 of chapter 2) nor minimum legislation (see par 3.3.3 of chapter 
3) makes provision for the establishment and maintaining of such funds. 
192fhe purpose of such a fund is to provide employees with additional funds when they take their leave. 
Clause 33 of the Main Agreement for the Diamond Cutting Industry of South Africa published as notice R 
1648 in Government Gazette 14047 of 12 June 1992, provides for such a fund. Membership is compulsory 
for all employees employed in the industry and employers which are members of the employers' organisa-
tion (see clause 33(2)). In terms of subclause (3)(a), each employer must contribute in respect of each 
employee a monthly sum, calculated at 6% of the employees' weekly or monthly earnings. In terms of sub-
clause (6), payment of the holiday bonus must be made during the week preceding the commencement of 
the employee's annual leave. A very interesting provision, which actually provides the employer with some 
sort of hold over the trade union and its employees, is contained in sub-clause (8). It provides that in the 
event of the union's failure to bring about a cessation of a stoppage or retardation within four working days, 
the employers' organisation has the right to declare the provisions of the fund terminated. 
193see clause 20 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, in terms of which a so-called sick pay fund is estab-
lished for the benefit of the employees who are absent from work owing to Ulness. See also the National 
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funds, 194 unemployment funds, 195 maternity benefit funds, 196 bursury funds, 197 pen-
sion funds, t98 provident funds 199 and other insurance funds. 200 
5.3.2.24 Grievance Procedures201 
Agreements have been concluded which contain grievance procedures. In terms of 
these procedures, employees who have grievances against co-workers or superiors, or 
about their work, or the· environment in which they work-; or-about their terms and condi-
Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry Sick Pay Fund Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 1804 in Government Gazette 17548 of 8 November 1996 which makes provision for the 
payment of sick pay benefits (see clause 5(1)); benefits for injury on duty (see clause 5(2)); funeral benefits 
(see clause 5(3)); benefits in respect of pregnancy, confinement and stillborn confinement(see clause 5(4)) 
and benefits in respect of the adoption of children under two years of age (see clause 5(5)). 
194see clause 19 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, in terms of which a medical benefit society is created. 
The aim of the society is to provide its members with medical treatment and medicines in case of illness. 
See also the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgucal Industry: Steelmed-Agreement published as notice 
R 230 in Government Gazette 16266 of 17 February 1995. 
1951n terms of clause 21 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, the parties have established a so-called slack pay fund. 
The funds of the fund must be applied to provide benefits to employees who have been placed on short-
time. 
196see, for instance, clause 35 of the Millinery Industry (Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in 
Government Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995. 
197see clause 19(A) of Clothing Industry, Natal: Amendment of Main Agreement published as notice R 175 
in Government Gazette 17763 of 7February1997. 
198see the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Engineering Industries Pension Fund Agree-
ment published as notice R 627 in Government Gazette 17109 of 19 April 1996 in terms of which a pension 
fund is established. 
199see clause 22 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, in terms of which a provident fund is established. See 
also the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Provident Fund Agreement for the Metal 
Industries published as notice R 624 in Government Gazette 17109 of 19 April 1996 in terms of which such 
a fund is established. 
200such as the funeral benefit scheme which Transnet and the unions represented on the bargaining 
council have established. The parties have agreed that Transnet would implement and finance the scheme 
for its employees (see "Agreement Reached at Transnet" (1992) 4(2) South African Labour News 9). See 
also clause 23 of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry published as notice R 3124 in Government 
Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, in terms of which a so-called maternity benefit fund is established 
which provides members thereof with maternity benefits in case of absence from work owing to confine-
ment. 
201 Neither the common law nor legislation make provision for grievance procedures. 
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tions of employment, may lodge a complaint with a manager or someone higher in the 
hierarchy of the enterprise. 202 
5.3.2.25 Disciplinary Codes and Procedures203 
Although collective bargaining parties have generally accepted that it is for employers to 
determine what would be acceptable conduct in the workplace, 204 there have been 
employers and trade unions whictLhave __ concluded agreements on disciplinary 
codes.205 Others have only reached agreement on certain aspects of discipline such as 
the appropriate penalty for a particular offence. There are, for example, agreements that 
provide that the employer has the right to summarily dismiss an employee ''for any cause 
recognised by law as sufficient0206 or for misrepresentation. 207 Some agreements pro-
vide that an employer may temporarily suspend an employee on full pay,208 or may dis-
202see, for instance, clause 29 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 
1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995. See also clause 2 of chapter 7 of the Building 
Industry (Transvaal) Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 in Government Gazette 16095 of 19 
November 1994; clause 9 of the Industrial Council for the Local Government Undertaking, Transvaal: 
Standard Conditions of Service for Town Clerks and Chief Executive Officers published as notice R 1807 in 
Government Gazette 16038 of 21 October 1994 and clause 14 of the Local Government Undertaking: Con-
ditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 
28 October 1994. · 
203see par 3.4.2 of chapter 3 where the statutory provisions regarding disciplinary codes and procedures 
are discussed. 
204See par 2.4.9 of chapter 2 on the employer's common law right to discipline and par 3.4.2 of chapter 3 
where It is indicated that the Code leaves It to the employer to determine what conduct will be acceptable. 
But see s 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists disciplinary codes and procedures as matters 
about which the employer must jointly decide with the workplace forum (see par 4.3.3.2 of chapter 4 in this 
regard). 
205see, for instance, clause 10 of the Industrial CouncU for the Local Government Undertaking, Transvaal: 
Standard Conditions of Service for Town Clerks and Chief Executive Officers published as notice R 1807 in 
Government Gazette 16038 of 21 October 1994 which sets out the different forms of misconduct which will 
be unacceptable in the workplace. See also clause 10.4 of this agreement which sets out the penalties 
which may be imposed against employees who have been found guilty of misconduct See further clauses 
10 and 11.1.4 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal 
published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28 October 1994. 
206See, for example, clause 14(1)(i) of dMsion A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry. 
207see clause 3 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in Government Gazette 
16466 of 23 June 1995. 
208see clause 4.2 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1896 In 
Government Gazette 16870of15December1995. 
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miss an employee who is absent from work without permission for a specified period. 209 
There are also agreements which provide for the demotion of an employee who is guilty 
of misconduct.210 
Many collective agreements contain disciplinary procedures which set out the procedure 
according to which an employer must exercise discipline in the workplace.211 There are 
also agreements which prescribe the procedure which must be followed where the dis-
pute cannot be settled in the workplace~212 · 
5.3.2.26 Retrenchment Procedures213 
Negotiated retrenchment procedures are fairly common. The procedure is normally in 
accordance with the statutory requirements for a fair dismissal for operational reasons 
contained in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 214 Retrenchment agreements provide for 
209see clause 11 of the Building Industry, Western Province: Re-enactment of Agreement for the Cape 
Peninsula published as notice R 1657 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 in terms of which 
the employer may dismiss an employee who is absent from work without its consent for a continuous 
period of five or more days. See also clause 15 of the Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice 
R 838 in Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995 which stipulates that an employee who has been 
absent, without permission, for a period of at least five days will be regarded as having deserted. 
210see clause 6.5.1.1 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Trans-
vaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazette 16047 of 28October1994. 
211 See, for instance, the disciplinary procedures contained in clause 3 of chapter 7 of the Building Industry 
(Transvaal) Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 in Government Gazette 16095 of 19 November 
1994 and clause 10.2 of the Industrial Council for the Local Government Undertaking, Transvaal: Standard 
Conditions of Service for Town Clerks and Chief Executive Officers published as notice R 1807 in 
Government Gazette 16038 of 21October1994. 
2121n clause 4.2.6 of the Code of Conduct, for instance, it is stipulated that alleged unfair dismissal dis-
putes must be referred to arbitration. 
213see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where the employer's common law right to dismiss by notice is dis-
cussed. See par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where the statutory regulation of an employer's right to dismiss for 
operational reasons Is discussed. See also par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where the listing of dismissal for opera-
tional reasons as a matter for consultation with the workplace forum is discussed. 
214see par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 where the requirements are discussed. See, for instance, clause 17 of 
the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice 
R 1828 In Government Gazette 16047 of 28October1994. 
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the consideration of alternatives to retrenchment,215 prior notice of the intention to 
retrench,216 prior consultation in regard to the contemplated retrenchment,217 the dis 
closure of information, 218 the implementing of objective criteria for the selection of those 
to be retrenched,219 notification and assistance to the employees, an undertaking to re-
employ220 and the quantum of severance pay.221 
215See clause 13 of division B and clause 6 of chapter 1 of division C of the Main Agreement for the Motor 
Industry in terms of which.theparties have agreed to the implementation of short-time as an alternative to 
retrenchment. They have agreed that the employer may introduce short-time where there is a slackness of 
trade and, in such an event, the employer is not required to pay wages. The parties to the Main Agreement 
for the Diamond Cutting Industry of South Africa published as notice R 1648 in Government Gazette 14047 
of 12 June 1992 have also agreed to short-time. In clause 10 they provide that, whenever the employee is 
placed on short-time, he should be paid a minimum of 65% of his daily rate. See also clause 1 of annexure 
A to the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift Engineering Agreement 
published as notice R 1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995. See further clause 13 of the 
Motor Industry: Main Agreement published as notice R 838 in Government Gazette 16466 of 23 June 1995 
in terms of which the reduction of wages is listed as an alternative to retrenchment. 
216see clause 25(1) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992, and clause 1 (b) of annexure A to the Iron, Steel, 
Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift Engineering Agreement published as notice R 
1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995. 
217see clause 25(2) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992; clause 1 (c) of annexure A to the Iron, Steel, Engineering 
and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in 
Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 and clause 1.3 of chapter 7 of the Building Industry (Trans-
vaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 in Government Gazette 16095of19November1994. 
218See clause 1 (c)(ii) of annexure A to the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-
enactment of Lift Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 
October 1995. Of interest is the fact that the agreement stipulates that the employer is not expected to dis-
close information which •could harm the employer's business interests, for example trade secrets and 
other confidential information•. This provision is not as onerous ass 189(4) read withs 16 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which an employer may be ordered to disclose confidential information 
which, if disclosed, may cause substantial harm to it (see par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 where this matter is 
discussed in detail). 
219See clause 25(3) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395of13November1992. In terms of clause 25(3)(c), an employee who is elected 
for retrenchment on account of old age, is paid a certain sum, which appears to be something akin to 
severance pay. The amount depends on the age of the employee as well as his length of service. See also 
clause 1.6 of chapter 7 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 in 
Government Gazette 16095 of 19 November 1994 which lists UFO as the primary criterion but also allows 
selection on the ground of proven poor work performance. 
220See clause 25(5) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal published as notice R 3124 in 
Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992; clause 2 of annexure A to the Iron, Steel, Engineering 
and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Lift Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in 
Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 as well as clauses 1.8.2 and 1.9 of chapter 7 of the Bulding 
Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1994 In Government Gazette 16095 of 19 
November 1994. 
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An interesting development in regard to retrenchment is the demand by certain trade 
unions that employers agree to implementing a moratorium on retrenchments.222 
Although this demand has met with· strong opposition from some employers, 223 others 
have agreed to such a moratorium.224 
5.3.2.27 Notice Periods225 
Collective agreements often stipulate the period of notice to which employees will be 
entitled if their services are terminated. 226 
5.3.2.28 Atypical Employees 
Some collective agreements prohibit employers from giving piece-work227 or taskwork 
2211n terms of clause 39 of division A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry payment of retrench-
ment pay or severance pay must be made by the employer. In terms of this clause, the employer must pay 
a sum equal to one week's wages for each completed year of service. This is in accordance with the mini-
mum stipulated in s 196(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (see par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 where 
severance pay is discussed). Clause 17.4.8.8 of the Local Government Undertaking: Conditions of Employ-
ment Agreement, Transvaal published as notice R 1828 in Government Gazett& 16047 of 28 October 1994 
provides for much more favourable terms. It stipulates that all employees with less than 1 o years' service 
must be paid three weeks' salary for each completed year of service. 
222see "Job Security Key Demand• (1992) 3(20) South African Labour News 5; "Job Security Crucial Issue" 
(1992) 3(22) South African Labour News 10 and "Fawu Seeks Job Security at SAS" (1992) 3(22) South 
African Labour News 11. 
223see "Job Security Key Demand" (1992) 3(20) South African Labour News 5. 
224see, for instance, "Saccawu Ends Fredsmollen Strike" (1992) 4(7) South African Labour News 4; "Job 
Security Critical Issue· (1992) 3(22) South African Labour News 10 and "Agreement Reached at Transnet" 
(1992) 4(2) South African Labour News 9. 
225see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2 where the common-law notice requirements are discussed and par 3.4.3.4 
of chapter 3 where the statutory provisions are discussed. 
226see, for instance, clause 11 of the Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 
1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995. It is interesting to note that the majority of the 
provisions contained in this clause are less favourable than those contained in s 14 of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act. 
227 A piece-worker is a pennanent employee of the business who is given a specific piece of work to do 
and is paid for work done. In clause 3 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering 
Trade, Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, a piece-
worker is defined as •an employee ••• employed permanently by the establishment for not more than 24 
ordinary hours in any week" and piece-work is defined as •any system by which earnings are based solely 
on quantity or output of work done•. 
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out to any of their employees.228 Other agreements allow the giving out of piece-work 
but regulate it,229 for instance, by prescribing the manner in which piece-workers' 
remuneration must be calculated. 230 
There are also collective agreements which regulate employers' right to appoint casual 
emp/oyees.231 Such employees' terms and conditions are usually less favourable than 
those of permanent employees232 and they are also normally ineligible for membership 
of certain funds such as pension and-provident-funds and-medical aid schemes.233 
228see, for instance, clause 1 o of the Building Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 805 in Government Gazette 16452 of 9 June 1995 and clause 8 of the Millinery Industry 
(Transvaal) Agreement published as notice R 470 in Government Gazette 16332 of 31 March 1995. 
229See clause 16 of division A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry and clause 5 of The Building 
Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement published as notice R 1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 
December 1995 as well as clause 9 of the Civil Engineering Industry: Agreement published as R 1841 in 
Government Gazette 16833 of 24 November 1995. 
2301n clause 16 of division A for the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry, for instance, it is stipulated that 
a piece-worker may not be paid less than the remuneration which he would have received had he been 
employed as a time-worker. See also clause 5 of The Building Industry (Transvaal): Main Agreement pub-
lished as notice R 1896 in Government Gazette 16870 of 15 December 1995. 
2311n clause 3 of division A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry a casual employee is defined as a 
person who is employed on not more than three days in any week. There is, however, a rider that that 
employee is also not employed on more than 28 calender days in any period of six months. See also 
clause 11 of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Witwatersrand pub-
lished as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991 which provides that an employee 
may be employed as a temporary employee for a period not exceeding 3 months on condition that the 
employer has in writing clearly conveyed his temporary status to the employee at the time of his engage-
~~ . . 
232eonsider, for instance, clause 5 of the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Industry (Cape): Amendment of 
Main Agreement published as notice R 1429 in Government Gazette 15918 of 19 August 1994 in terms of 
which probationary employees are not entitled to the normal disciplinary procedures which precede 
termination of employme~ 
233see, for instance, the Civil Engineering Industry: Agreement published as R 1841 in Government 
Gazette 16833 of 24 November 1995. In terms of clause 14.4 thereof such workers are not entitled to 
annual leave. They are also not entitled to sick leave (see clause 14.5) and the employer does not have to 
provide such an employee with a certificate of service (see clause 14.7). It is for this reason that trade 
unions are so keen to obtain permanent status for temporary workers where possible. NEHAWU, for 
instance, has striven to obtain permanent employee status for hospital workers who had, some of them 
after many years of service. merely temporary worker status. It was successful as an agreement was con-
cluded in 1992 in terms of which apprOximately 160 000 health sector workers got permanent status before 
the start of the 1993 financial year (see in this regard •state v Health Workers- (1992) 4(7) South African 
Labour News 8). 
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Certain collective agreements, however, do contain more favourable terms for such 
workers than the minima stipulated by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 234 
Collective agreements confirm employers' right to appoint employees on a probationary 
basis. 235 Some of these agreements prescribe a notice period for dismissal during the 
probation period236 whereas others entitle employers to terminate probationary employ-
ment without notice.237 Other agreements require employers to train probationary 
employees or to allow them time oftto undergotraining;238- ·---
Collective agreements sometimes entitle employers to hire employees for a fixed 
term, 239 usually to work on a special project. 240 
234see clauses 3 and 4(1) of the Main Agreement for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Witwatersrand published as notice R 412 in Government Gazette 13038 of 1 March 1991, and clause 30 of 
division A of the Main Agreement for the Motor Industry. See also clause-6(3) of the Furniture Manufactur-
ing Industry, Natal: Exclusion from Main Agreement published as notice R 620 in Government Gazette 
17207 of 24 May 1994. 
2351n terms of clause 14 of the Building Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement published as 
notice R 805 in Government Gazette 16452 of 9 June 1995 certain employees are subject to a trial period of 
42 working hours. aause 21 of the Industrial Council for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, 
Pretoria: New Agreement published as notice R 1797 in Government Gazette 17548 of 8 November 1996 
makes provision for a trial period of 30 days for certain employees and a three month probation period for 
others. 
236ctause 21 of the Industrial Council for the Tearoom, Restaurant and Catering Trade, Pretoria: New 
Agreement published as notice R 1797 in Government Gazette 17548 of 8 November 1996 prescribes 24 
hours' notice for dismissal during a 30 day probation period and seven days' notice for employees who are 
on a three month probation period and who are paid weekly. 
237see, for instance, clause 9(1)(e) of the Agreement for the Knitting Industry, Transvaal puplished as 
notice R 3124 in Government Gazette 14395 of 13 November 1992 in terms of which the first ten working 
days of the period of employment of an employee is deemed to be a trial period and such employment 
may be terminated either by the employer or the employee at any time within such trial period without 
notice. However, the Labour Relations Act, 1995's guidelines for the fair dismissal of a probationary 
employee clearly require that the employer must dismiss in a fair manner (see pars 3.4.3.3.3.1 and 
3.4.3.3.3.2 of chapter 3). 
238see clause 8 of the Building Industry, North and West Boland: Main Agreement published as notice R 
805 in Government Gazette 16452 of 9 June 1995. 
239see pars 3.2 and 3.4.3.1 of chapter 3 for a discussion on fixed term contracts and employees' right to 
attack the fairness of employers' refusal to renew their contracts. 
240see, for instance, clause 4 of the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of 
Lift Engineering Agreement published as notice R 1641 in Government Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 
in terms of which an employer may employ an employee ior a specified limited contract period in terms of 
a limited duration contract of employment". Such employees are required to do sitework, or turnaround 
work, or ship repair work or they are employed because the employer has managed to secure additional 
work of a short term nature. See alsri clause 6(3) read with the annexure to the Iron, Steel, Engineering and 
Metallurgical Industry: Re-enactment of Main Agreement published as notice R 1642 in Government 
Gazette 16782 of 27 October 1995 in terms of which the employer is entitled to employ a substitute 
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5.4 MATTERS WHICH DO NOT HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE EMPLOY-
MENT RELATIONSHIP 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Trade unions often involve themselves in matters which do not have a direct bearing on 
the employment relationship. Some of them have, for instance, become involved in mat-
ters such as economic policies241 and-political issues; They· do-not engage in formal 
collective bargaining about these matters. Usually, their involvement entails making sug-
gestions, or submitting proposals, or commenting on these matters or endeavouring to 
reach consensus.242 
5.4.2 Economic Policies 
Subsequent to trade unions' and employers' discussions243 about the possibility of 
establishing a joint forum on economic matters to formulate a macro-economic 
policy244 and to ensure that no unilateral economic decisions are taken by the 
employee on a fixed term contract during the period of maternity leave taken by a permanent employee. 
241Trade unions deemed It necessary to become involved in the active promotion of economic growth and 
job creation because of the extent of unemployment and Its negative social consequences (see Ebrahim 
Patel ·New Institutions of Decision-making: The Case of the National Economic Forum" in Ebrahim Patel 
(ed) Engine of Development? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 1 at 3). 
242see clause .3.3 of the founding document of the National Economic Forum as reproduced in Ebrahim 
Patel (ed) Engine of Development? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 64. See also the found-
ing document of National Economic Development and Labour Council (hereafter NEDLAC) as well as the 
Ministerial Legal Task Team Explanatory Memorandum notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 
1 o February 1995 page 112. 
243see "Joint Economic Forum Takes Shape" (1992) 3(15) South African Labour News 9 and "NEF Gets 
Down to Business" (1992) 4(11) South African Labour News 3. The foundations for such a macro-economic 
forum were laid by business and labour leaders on 5 February 1992 (see "Economic Forum Lays Founda-
tions• (1992) 3(16) South African Labour News 3). 
244For a detailed discussion on the unions' motivation for the establishment of such a joint forum, see 
Ebrahim Patel "New Institutions of Decision-making: The Case of the National Economic Forum• in Ebrahim 
Patel (ed) Engine of Development? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 1 at 2-5. See also 
Jayendra Naidoo "The Role of the National Economic Forum• In Ebrahim Patel (ed) Engine of Develop-
ment? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 28 at 30. 
237 
Scope and Content 
employers and/or the State, the National Economic Forum was formed.245 Its main 
objective was set out in clause 1 of its founding documents. 246 It reads as follows 
In recognition of the economic challenges facing South Africa, we believe that major eco-
nomic stakeholders need to develop co-operative mechanisms for addressing South 
Africa's economic challenges. Organised labour, organised business and the governing 
authority have a central role in developing strategies geared towards the generation of 
sustained economic growth, the addressing of distortions in the economy, stability and the 
addressing of social needs. 
The body had to endeavour to achieve its objectives through "practical and effective con-
sensus". 24 7 
The National Economic Development and Labour Council, an amalgamation of the 
National Manpower Commission and the National Economic Forum, was formed in May 
1995. 248 The founding document of NED LAC cites its purpose as the bringing together 
of labour, business, Government and development actors in order to "ensure consensus 
on all matters relating to economic policy" and to "consider all proposed labour legisla-
tion". 249 
In accordance with NEDLAC's stated purpose, trade unions tabled formal responses to 
the draft negotiating document in the form of a Labour Relations sm250 and participated 
245see Ebrahim Patel "New Institutions of Decision-making: The Case of the National Economic Forum" in 
Ebrahim Patel (ed) Engine of Development? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 1 at 7 as well 
as D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 16. 
246see Ebrahim Patel (ed) Engine of Development? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 62-68 
where the forum's founding documents are reproduced. 
247see clause 3.3 of its founding documents as reproduced in Ebrahim Patel (ed) Engine of Development? 
South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 64. See also Ebrahim Patel •New Institutions of Decision-
making: The Case of the National Economic Forum" in Ebrahim Patel (ed) Engine of Development? South 
Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 1 at 6. 
248tt was formed in terms of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act 35 of 1994 
(hereafter the National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act) which came into operation on 5 
May 1995 in terms of Proclamation No R 48, 1995 published in Government Gazette 16403 of 3 May 1995. 
See also D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 18. 
249see also s 5(1)(b) and (c) of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act. See further 
Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 114 and D du Tait. D Woofrey, J Murphy, s 
Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 18~ 
250Publlshed as notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 1 o February 1995. 
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in negotiations with the State and employers concerning the Bill. 251 On 21 July 1995 
NEDLAC tabled a report recommending the adoption of the draft Bill, subject to the 
necessary amendments occasioned by the agreements reached by the negotiating 
parties. 252 
Through their participation in these negotiations at NEDLAC, trade unions have ensured 
that those sections which either directly or indirectly promote the social and economic 
upliftment of the South-African.workforce. have been included.in the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995.253 
5.4.3 Political Issues 
Trade unions h.ave, especially prior to the first democratic elections in 1994, 254 
endeavoured in a number of different ways to force employers to put pressure on the 
Government in order to introduce political changes. The method most often utilised by 
trade unions was stayaways255 although they also occasionally resorted to overtime 
bans.256 
Most employers have treated political issues as matters about which they can do very 
little and have accordingly been reluctant to compromise in this regard. Some of them, 
251see the "Explanatory Memorandum" published in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive Thompson and 
Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law 1995: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour 
Law (1995) 214. 
252see the "Explanatory Memorandum· published in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive Thompson and 
Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law 1995: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour 
Law (1995) 215. For a detailed account of the negotiations between the various parties at NEDLAC, see D 
du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 
26-32. 
253see D du Tait, D Woottrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 21-32 for a discussion of the various matters which trade unions regarded as relevant for the 
social and economic upliftment of workers and the negotiations which surrounded these matters prior to 
the passing of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 by Parliament. 
254see "Cosatu Mass Action Programme" (1992) 4(7) South African Labour News 3 and "Programme of 
Action: Adopted by Cosatu Campaigns Conference: 11-13 September 1992" (1992) South African Labour 
News: Special Document. 
255see Ebrahim Patel "New Institutions of Decision-making: The Case of the National Economic Forum" in 
Ebrahim Patel (ed) Engine of Development? South Africa's National Economic Forum (1993) 1 at 4-6. 
256see, for instance, the facts in Cape Gate (Pty) Ltd v Namane & Others (1990) 11 /LJ 766 ~C) at 769A-B 
and 775A. 
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however, have been prepared to become involved.257 On closer scrutiny of the reasons 
for their willingness to become involved, it appears that they were mostly moved by busi-
ness considerations1258 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
From the above survey, it is apparent that very few aspects of the employment relation-
ship are excluded from collective bargaining. In practice, therefore, in many places of 
work most facets of the employment relationship are regulated by collective agreements 
rather than being the product of unilateral employer decisions. 
It is also apparent that the ambit of collective bargaining is, in certain cases at least, 
being extended to issues beyond the employment relationship. 
t- Matters which have not received much attention from trade unions so far are those 
related to the business or economic component of enterprises259 such as the issuing of 
shares, investment of surplus funds, the purchasing of a plant or new equipment, 260 the 
relocation of the business, 261 exporting, customer services, the prices of products and 
product development. 
257consider, for instance, the case of Bertrands Holdings, a major textile employer which had in 1992 
been prepared to call on the then President to remove Brigadier Oupa Gqoza as head of State in the Cis-
kei. In its letter to the President, the company alleged that this had been done as a result of demands from 
its labour force. The company also urged the re-incorporation of Ciskei into South Africa (see "Sactwu 
Harnesses Employers" (1992) 4(7) South African Labour News 9). South African businesses also became 
involved in the then Bophuthatswana concerning the promulgation of legislation in terms of which unions, 
with their head offices outside the homeland, were barred from registration in Bophuthatswana (see "Busi-
ness Joins Unions in Opposition to Bop Labour Law" (1992) 3(15) South African Labour News 1-2). 
258 Bertrands Holdings, for instance, had subsidiaries in the Ciskei. See Lionel Hodes "The Social 
Responsibility of a Company" (1983) 100 SAW 468 at 490 where he points out that there are businesses 
which maintain that political action by employers wUI in the long run enhance business prospects. 
259see par 1.2 of chapter 1 where this sphere of a business is discussed. 
260rhe purchasing of a plant, however, has been indirectly challenged where trade unions were consulted 
about the retrenchment of employees who could not or would not move to the newly acquired plant (see 
par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where the requirements for a fair dismissal for operational reasons are dis-
cussed). The purchasing of equipment has also been indirectly challenged where trade unions were con-
sulted about the dismissal of employees who became redundant as a result of such purchase (see par 
3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3) or where they negotiated about the retraining of employees affected by the purchase 
(see par 5.3.2.18 above). 
261 This matter has received a measure of attention from trade unions in so far as it may lead to dismissals. 
Under such circumstances. employers are statutorly obliged to consult either the workplace forum flf there 
is one) or the trade union (see par 3.4.3.3.4.2 of chapter 3 where the statutory requirements for a proce-
durally fair dismissal for operational reasons are discussed). 
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There may be a number of reasons for this. Trade unions' historical interest in collective 
bargaining issues has traditionally been limited to the "job territory". 262 They may also 
believe that they lack the expertise to make decisions in these areas. Furthermore, their 
members may not be interested in these issues and thus the risk of pursuing them may 
be too high,263 particularly as most employers hold the view that these matters are part 
of their prerogative. Nevertheless, employers may in future also be challenged by trade 
unions about these matters, particularly now that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 lists 
some of these matters for consultation with workplace forumst264-. -
In future, collective bargaining parties will have to ensure that their agreements are in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution265 and the Labour Relations Act, 
1995. They will have to be particularly sensitive to the equality clause of the Constitu-
tion266 and the provisions of Schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and ensure 
that their agreements about the treatment of co-workers as w~ll as applicants for jobs do 
not constitute unfair discrimination between such people. In addition, they will also have 
to give due consideration to the Constitution's provisions regarding labour relations,267 
particularly those relating to the right to freedom of association, 268 organisational rights 
of trade unions269 and the right to strike270 as well as the Labour Relations Act, 1995's 
provisions in this regard.271 
262see Martin M Perllne and David J Poynter "Union and Management Perceptions of Managerial Preroga-
tives: Some Insight into the Future of Co-operative Bargaining in the USA" (1990) 28 British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 179 at 187. 
2631bid. 
264see s 84 which lists the restructuring of the workplace, partial or total plant closures, mergers and 
transfers of ownership, product development plans and export promotion as matters about which consulta-
tion must take place (see also par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where this section and its implications for employers' 
decision-making power are discussed). 
265Particularly the Bill of Rights contained in chapter 2 thereof. 
266sees9. 
267sees23. 
268see s 23(2)(a). 
269see s 23(4). 
270see s 23(2)(c). 
271 See ss 4, 11-22 and ss 64 and 65. See also chapters 4 and 6 where these statutory rights are discussed. 
CHAPTERS 
THE RESTRICTION OF EMPLOYER PREROGATIVE THROUGH ECONOMIC 
POWER 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, 1 the role which collective bargaining plays in the restriction of an 
employer's decision-making power was considered. It appeared that collective bargain-
ing could constitute a significant restriction on virtually every aspect of the management 
of an enterprise. The restriction, however, takes place with the employer's co-operation 
as it is implemented through collective bargaining. 
Where the parties are unable to reach agreement through collective bargaining, the 
employees and their trade union have a number of options. They may decide to drop the 
matter. They would normally do this where they do not feel too strongly about the matter 
or where they realise that their bargaining power is not strong enough. The collective 
bargaining parties may agree on mediation2 or they may be obliged to refer the matter to 
arbitration, either because they are involved in an essential or maintenance service3 or 
because their collective agreement contains a clause in terms of which they are obliged 
to do so. 4 The matter may also be referred to arbitration by the employees and their 
trade union in terms of a right to do so contained in the Labour Relations Act, 1995.5 Or, 
where the parties are not obliged to refer a matter to arbitration, 6 they may agree to 
(voluntary) arbitration. 7 The employees and their trade union may also decide to exert 
economic pressure on the employer. 
1 See chapter 5 in which the scope and content of collective bargaining are considered. 
2strictly speaking, this is not an alternative to collective bargaining as mediation is really a continuation of 
collective bargaining under the guidance of a mediator. 
3see s 65(1 )(d) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 6.3.3.1 below where the provisions of s 65 of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 are discussed. 
4See s 65(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. See also par 6.3.3.1 below where the provisions of s 65 of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 are discussed. 
Ssee s 65(1 )(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. See further par 6.3.3.1 below wheres 65 is discussed. 
6perhaps because the matter falls under the jurisdiction of the labour court. Consider, for instance, automati-
cally unfair dismissals and dismissals for operational reasons which, in terms of s 191 (5)(b)(i) and (ii) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995, must be referred to the labour court for settlement. 
7 See s 141 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
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Economic pressure can take various forms. Pressure could, for example, be exerted 
through picketing, 8 boycotts9 and the mobilising of public opinion through press state-
ments, 10 advertisements, television interviews 11 and the distributing of pamphlets.12 In 
practice, however, the most important form of economic pressure is through collective 
action at the workplace. In colloquial terms, employees embark on a "strike" or "industrial 
action".13 
In this chapter, the way-in which the-law-prohibits or-regulates-the use of economic 
power as a method to enforce employee demands will be discussed. 
6.2 COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES 
Employees who use economic power to enforce demands can, depending on the form 
which the economic pressure takes, incur civil and/or crim_inal liability on the basis of 
common law principles. They may, for example, incur civil liability in the form of delictual 
liability or breach of contract. They may also incur criminal liability in terms of certain 
common law offences. 
Employees who organise a boycott 14 of a business or who picket 15 may be interdicted 
8Picketing, as a form of economic pressure exerted by employees, is discussed in greater detail in par 6.2 
below. 
9Boycotts, as a form of economic pressure exerted by employees, is discussed in greater detail in par 6.2 
below. 
1 Osee, for example, Dunlop SA Ltd v Metal & Allied Workers Union & Another (1985) 6 /W 167 (D) at 175G-
176B and 176B-D and VNR Steel (Pty) Ltd v Ntional Union of Metalworkers of SA (1995) 16 /W 1483 (LAC) at 
1489C-D. See also Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 436. 
11 See, for example, VNR Steel (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1995) 16 /W 1483 (LAC) at 
1489C-D. 
12see, for instance, BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1989) 10 IW 181 (IC) at 186F-
187A. See also Neil W Chamberiain and James W Kuhn Collective Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 189-190. 
13As will be seen in par 6.3.2 below, the definition of a strike in South African labour legislation has a very 
technical meaning which does not correspond to the layman's concept of a strike. 
14To •boycott" means io engage in a concerted refusal to have dealings with( ... a person, store or organisa-
tion)9 (see HB WOOf (editor in chief) Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976)) or to abstain from buying 
or using another person or entity's products (see HG Emery and KG Brewster (eds) The New Century Dic-
tionary {1948)). See also JJ Gauntlett SC and OF Smuts •Boycotts: The Limits of Lawfulness• (1990) 11 /W 
937. In terms of industrial relations, persons organising a boycott try to persuade customers or prospective 
customers not to do business with an employer (see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed 
(1996) 471, 532 and 543-544). 
15AA Landman "Picketing In South Africa• (1988) 2(3) LLB 17 describes picketing as •a congregation of one 
or more employees with the intention to communicate a message or enforce a demand or persuade their 
employer or other persons•. See also Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 
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from continuing to do so on the ground that their actions amount to a delict. 16 The ques-
tion of whether or not they may be interdicted on the ground that their actions amount to 
breach of contract, remains inconclusive. 17 They may also be liable for any damages 
these actions may cause the employer. 18 In addition, they may be guilty of certain com-
mon law offences.19 Picketers may furthermore defame20 an employer21 or a manager. 
2 ed (1992) 289. Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) states (at 530) that "[p]icketing 
has traditionally been regarded as a peaceful. method by.which striking_ workers can publicise their action 
and encourage others to join them". 
16Picketers may be committing a delict if, for example, they persuade fellow employees to stop working in 
breach of their contracts of employment. They may also be committing a delict where they persuade 
employees to terminate their contracts of employment lawfully. In addition, they may be committing a delict 
where they persuade would-be strike breakers not to accept employment with the employer (see, for 
instance, the facts of Laursens Division o{BTR Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others (1992) 
13 IW 1405 (T)) or suppliers to stop deliveries in breach of their contracts with the employer. For a discus-
sion of these various delicts, see AA Landman "Picketing in South Africa" (1988) 2(3) LLB 17 at 20-21. 
- -
17 On the one hand, It could be argued that their actions amount to breach of contract. Employees who 
Incite others not to deal with their employer, breach their common law duty to act in good faith towards it 
(see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2). This constitutes a serious breach of their contracts of employment. On the other 
hand, if the incitement to boycott and picket is regarded as a mere ancillary to strike action, breach of con-
tract flows from their participation in strike action and not from these actions. It is submitted that these 
actions are currently regarded as mere ancillaries to strike action (see Reagan Jacobus "The Ancillaries to 
the Right to Strike" in Paul Benjamin, Reagan Jacobus and Chris Albertyn (eds) Strikes Lock-outs & Arbitra-
tion in South African Labour Law: Proceedings of the Labour Law Conference 1988 (1989) 53 at 54 as well 
as CJ Napier and SW McBride "Industrial Picketing in South Africa. Does it have a Role?" (1986) 6(2) IRJSA 
50). Consequently, these actions do not constitute breach of contract and an interdict cannot be obtained on 
this ground. In terms of s 69 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 the purpose of picketing is to peacefully 
demonstrate in support of a protected strike. Once more, it is treated as something ancillary to strike action. 
181f, for example, picketers' actions amount to a delict and an employer suffers damages as a result thereof, 
they may be liable for delictual damages (see AA Landman "Picketing in South Africa" (1988) 2(3) LLB 17 at 
20). 
19Picketers may, for example, be guilty of public violence. Public violence is defined as the unlawful and 
intentional commission, together with a number of people, of an act which assumes serious dimensions and 
which is intended forcibly to disturb public peace and tranquility, or to invade the rights of others (see CR 
Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1986) at 321). Picketers, who by their conduct or by the content of their appeal 
or message to the public, demonstrate defiance against the authority of the State, could commit the com-
mon law offence of sedition (see CR Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1986) at 316). A picketer may also be guilty 
of assault. Even where he merely threatens to assault, he may be guilty of this offence provided that it leads 
to the threatened person believing that the picketer has the intention and ability to carry out the threat (see 
CR Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1986) at 438). Picketers may be guilty of malicious damage to property 
where they unlawfully and intentionally damage property belonging to another person, such as the 
employer's (see CR Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1986) at 519). They may be guilty of crimen iniuria. This 
offence involves the unlawful and intentional violation of the dignity or privacy of another person. The physi-
cal presence of picketers at their workplace may violate the privacy of their employer. Moreover, the content 
of their appeal, or their conduct, may violate the dignitas of their employer's persona. For a discussion of 
common law offences and picketing, see Cronje van Zyl An Analysis of Picketing in the South African Labour 
Law Context LLM dissertation University of South Africa (1993). 
20Picketers convey their message or grievance either verbally or In writing through, for example, placards, 
posters and advertisements. Should. these messages or grievances contain defamatory statements, they 
may be gµllty of defamation. For a discussion on defamation, see Anon "Defamation in Industrial Relations" 
(1988) 2(2) LLB 9. 
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This could also lead to civn22 or criminal liability.23 
Although the act of going on strike will not normally, per se, lead to criminal liability,24 
civil liability may flow therefrom. Strikers may, for example, incur delictual liability25 or 
21This will be the case irrespective of whether the employer is a natural or-a legal-person. 
22Defamation is a delict in respect of which the defamed person may claim solatium and, where economic 
loss was suffered, damages. He may also obtain an interdict. A company may be defamed. Although the 
legal basis for this claim is subject to uncertainty, it seems that the courts are willing to grant an order for the 
payment of solatium to a legal entity if its reputation has been infringed (see "Defamation in Industrial Rela-
tions" (1988) 2(2) LLB 9 at 11 ). Where it has suffered economic loss, it may claim damages. A legal entity 
may also obtain an interdict. 
23-rhey may be guilty of crimen iniuria. This offence, inter alia, involves the unlawful and intentional violation 
of the dignity of another person. The content of picketers' appeal, or their conduct, may -violate the dignitas 
of their employer's persona. Picketers may also commit criminal defamation where their demands or mes-
sages injure the reputation and good name or fama of a member or members of management or the 
employer (see CR Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1986) at 456). For a discussion of these common law 
offences, see Cronje van Zyl An Analysis of Picketing in the South African Labour Law Context LLM disserta-
tion University of South Africa (1993). 
241n terms of s 65(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, however, strikers could be guilty of an offence if their 
actions were contrary to the provisions of the section. Although such criminal liability does not exist in terms 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, the possibility nevertheless exists that strikers may commit common law 
offences such as public violence, assault and malicious damage to property whilst striking. 
25There appears to be some debate as to whether or not trade union officials and strikers would be commit-
ting a delict where they incite other employees to breach their contracts of employment and to go on strike. 
Some writers (see, for example, John Grogan Collective Labour Law (1993) at 82 and John Grogan Work-
place Law (1996) 176) hold the view that trade union officials and strikers may be committing a delict should 
they convince other employees to go on strike. This also appears to have been the view of the supreme 
court in Jumbo Products CC v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1996) 17 IW 859 (W) at 876A. They 
may also commit a delict where they convince employees to lawfully terminate their contracts of employ-
ment by giving the required notice. Where the court is satisfied that a delict has been committed or is to be 
committed, it may grant an interdict. Also, where economic losses have been suffered, it rTtaay award delictual 
damages. However, in Tramway & Omnibus Workers Union (Cape) v Heading 1937 AD ~ at 54 and R v 
Givantoni 1934 CPD 1 at 4 the courts left the question of whether it did in fact constitute a corrlmon law delict 
unanswered. Although the industrial court also did not consider this in National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
& Others v Jumbo Products CC (1991) 12 /W 1048 (IC) at 1052, it was prepared to grant an interdict against 
the trade union and Its members participating in an illegal strike which ordered them to desist from their 
industrial action. Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Oive Thompson The New Labour Relations Act: The 
Law after the 1988 Amendments (1989) 80-81 ask whether Inciting breach of contract of employment.in the 
furtherance of a strike is a wrongful action which constitutes a delict. They point out that the Labour ReJa-
tions Act, 1956 provided for strike action and ask on what basis the incitement thereof could be treated as 
behaviour which offends the legal convictions of a modem industrial society (le could be considered as a 
wrongful action). Although they based their argument on the Labour Relations Act, 1956, their argument also 
has merit In terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as this Act also makes provision for strike action. It is 
submitted that, from a common law perspective, these officials and strikers would be committing a delict. 
The fact that the legislature deemed It necessary to specifically provide them with immunity against civil 
liability ins 79(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 ands 67(2) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, supports 
this view. In Jumbo Products CC v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1996) 17 /W 859 at 876J-877A the 
supreme court distinguished between legal and mega1 strikes and intimated that trade unions and their offi-
cials could be delictually liable for inciting breach of contract where the strike was statutorily illegal. 
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commit a breach of their employment contracts26 or a collective agreement27 or they 
may even be in breach of a statutory duty. 28 
From the above it is clear that common law principles do not recognise the legitimacy of 
collective action to enforce employee demands.29 The idea that employees should have 
the right to exert collective economic pressure to rectify the imbalance inherent in the 
individual emptoyment relationship finds little favour in common law principles. 
As has been the case in many countries, South African law has been adapted to meet 
this need for the right to exert collective pressure. This was primarily achieved through 
the introduction of legislation. 30 The first major innovation in this regard was the Indus-
trial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924.31 Two reasons appear to be motives for this legislation. 
The first was to make provision for collective bargaining and collective action, namely 
261t is submitted that most of the actions and omissions stipulated in the definition of a strike in s 214 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 amount to breach of contract. The most important exception is the refusal to do 
voluntary overtime work. All the actions and omissions stipulated in the definition constitute serious 
breaches. The employer has a number of options. It could hold the employee to the contract and obtain an 
order for specific performance (see National Union of Textile Workers & Others v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd & 
Another (1982) 3 IW 39 CN) at 45A-C). Or, it could cancel the contract, in other words, dismiss the employee 
(see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 176; Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African 
Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 274 and Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson The New Labour 
Relations Act: The Law after the 1988 Amendments (1989) 80). See also R v Smit 1955 (1) SA 239 (C) at 
241H-142C; Ngewu & Others v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co Ltd; Masondo & Others v Union Co-
operative Bark & Sugar Co Ltd 1982 (4) SA 390 (N) at 405E-F; (1983) 4 IW 41 (N); Egbep Ltd v Black Allied 
Mining & Construction Workers' Union & Others 1985 (2) SA 402 (T) and Marievale Consolidated Mines Ltd 
v National Union of Mineworkers & Others (1986) 7 ILJ 108 CN) at 115E-1; 117H-118A and 120C-D). The 
employer is also entitled to claim damages, irrespective of whether it elects to hold the employee to the con-
tract or to dismiss him. 
27This will be the case where the employees strike In breach of the collective agreement between the 
employer and the trade union or where they breach the so-called strike rules set out in such an agreement 
(see par ~.3 of chapter 5 In this regard). 
28An example of such a breach is where an employee, in contravention of the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act and its regulations, leaves da~erous machinery unattended in order to participate in a strike. 
29see JY Claasen "Die Regsposlsle van W~emers by 'n Staking in die Arbeidsreg" (1984) 47 THRHR 83 at 
87 as well as John Grogan Collective Labour Law (1993) 65 who both point out that the common law is 
geared to regulate the individual employment relationship - not the collective dimension of employment rela-
tions. 
30As was the case in the United Kingdom. In a number of other countries, such as Belgium and the Nether-
lands, it was achieved mainly through judicial intervention. In France this was achieved through a combina-
tion of provisions in its constitution and court decisions (see R Blanpain (ed) International Encyclopaedia for 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations (1987)). 
31see John Grogan Worlcplace Law (1996) 144-145; Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed 
(1996) n-103 and Alan Rycroft and Barney B Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) 114-
115 for an historical account of the legislation introduced in South Africa to deal with the collective dimension 
of industrial relations. See also par 3.1 of chapter 3 where this Act is referred to. 
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strike action. The second was to control or regulate such action. At present, the Con-
stitution and the Labour Relations Act, 1995 are the principal statutes which regulate the 
exercising of collective action. The Constitution specifically affords every trade union, 
employers' organisation and employer the right to engage in collective bargaining. 32 In 
addition, it affords every worker the right to strike.33 The Labour Relations Act, 1995, 
gives effect to these constitutional rights. 34 It makes provision for collective bargaining35 
and affords employees the right to strike. 36 It also controls and regulates strike action. 37 
6.3 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT, 1995 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The cornerstone of the legislature's approach to strikes is the definition of a strike. The 
reason for this is that, should the actions or omissions of employees fall within the defini-
tion of a strike, s 64 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which affords employees a right 
to strike38 ands 65, which limits the right, will apply. Where ss 64 and 65 have not been 
complied with, the act of going on strike, or any conduct in contemplation or furtherance 
32see s 23(5). 
33see s 23(2)(c). 
34see s 1 of the Act which lists as one of the Act's purposes the giving of effect to the fundamental rights 
conferred by the Constitution. 
35see the discussion on the statutory provisions regarding collective bargaining in chapter 4. 
36see s 64 which makes specific provision for a right to strike. 
37 Although the legislature accepts that there is constant conflict between employers and their employees 
and that strike action is the most effective way for employees to enforce their demands, it nevertheless wants 
to ensure that employees first endeavour to negotiate with their employers over their demands (see s 
64(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). It also wants to ensure that strike action takes place according to 
a regulated process and that employers are not taken by surprise (see s 64(1 )(a) as well as s 64(1 )(b) and (d) 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). In addition, it wants to restrict its sanctioning of strikes to those which do 
not jeopardise the weU-being of the community at large (sees 65(1)(d) as well as ss 70-75 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995). It also does not want to afford protection to strikes that amount to a re-opening of a dis-
pute which has been settled through either collective bargaining, a determination made in terms of the Wage 
Act or s 44 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 or arbitration (see s 65(3)(a) and (b) of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995). For a discussion of these various motivations of the legislature, see Craig Tanner "Strikes and 
Lock-outs" In Michael Robertson (general ed) South African Human Rights and Labour Law Yearbook 1991 
Volume 2 (1992) 354. Otis submitted that, although Tanner's article was written while the Labour Relations 
Act, 1956 was in force, the motivation for similar provisions in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 remain the 
same.) 
38rh1s provision of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 is in accordance withs 23(2)(c) of the Constitution which 
affords employees a right to strike. 
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thereof, does not constitute a criminal offence.39 However, such a strike will be 
unprotected in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 and may form the basis of an 
interdict by the labour court40 and/or an order by it for the payment of compensation for 
any loss attributable to such a strike. 41 In addition, such strikers do not enjoy much 
statutory protection against dismissat.42 
Where the requirements of ss 64 and 65 have been complied with the strike will become 
a protected strike.43 Stril<ers ·participating in such strikes, are protected against civil 
liability bys 67(2), read withs 67(6) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.44 tn addition, they 
are also protected against dismissal based on their participation in such a strike. 45 
There are, however, various forms of economic pressure which can be used by employ-
ees to enforce their demands against the employer that do not fall within the definition of 
a strike such as picketing, boycotts and the mobilisation of public opinion through press 
39contra s 65(1) read withs 65(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, which provided that non-compliance 
withs 65 of that Act, which regulated the legality of strike action, constituted a criminal offence. In practice, 
contraventions of s 65 seldom lead to the institution of criminal proceedings (see Craig Tanner "Strikes and 
Lock-outs" in Michael Robertson (general ed) South African Human Rights and Labour Law Yearbook 1991 
Volume 2 (1992) 354 at 355 as well as Halton Cheadle, Adolph Landman, PAK le Roux and Clive Thompson 
Current Labour Law: A Juta Seminar May-June 1991: Workbook for Delegates (1991) at 31). 
401n terms of s 68{1 )(a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. During the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 
1956, the industrial court (see, for example, White & Others v Neill Tools (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 IW 368 (IC) at 
370), as well as ordinary courts (see, for instance, Dunlop SA Ltd v Metal & Allied Workers Union & Another 
(1985) 6 IW 167 (D) and Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others {1992) 13 
IW 345 (T)) could interdict illegal strikes. 
41 See s 68(1 )(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
42see clause 6 of the Code which brands participation in an unprotected strike as misconduct. It, however, 
also stipulates that such strike action does not always deserve dismissal and sets out requirements for a sub-
stantively and procedurally fair dismissal under such circumstances. 
43see s 67 which refers to a strike which complies with the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as a 
"protected strike". 
4410 terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, a strike which complied with s 65 thereof was a legal strike in 
the sense that no criminal offence was committed, and employees and their trade unions enjoyed protection 
from clvl llablity in terms of s 79(1) of the Act. In addition, strikes as defined did not constitute unfair labour 
practices and could therefore not be judged on the grounds of fairness by the industrial court. 
45see s 67(4) of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 as well as par 6.3.5.2 below. In terms of s 67(5), s 67(4) does 
not preclude an employer from fairly dismissing such strikers for misconduct during the strike (see par 
3.4.3.3.2 of chapter 3 where dismissal for this reason is discussed as well as par 6.3.5.2 below where dis-
missal of protected strikers for this reason Is discussed) or for a reason based on the employer's operational 
requirements (see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 where dismissal for this reason is discussed as well as par 
6.3.6.2 below where dismissal of protected strikers for this reason is discussed). 
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statements, advertisements, television interviews and the distribution of pamphlets. 46 If 
this is the case, ss 64 and 65 do not apply. By the same token, however, if these forms 
of economic pressure are exerted in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected 
strike, the strikers may enjoy protection against civil liability provided for in s 67 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995.47 However, such strikers will not be afforded protection if 
the actions in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected strike constitute an 
offence.48 
6.3.2 The Definition of a Strike 
A strike is defined in s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. It reads as follows 
"strike" means the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or 
by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, and every 
reference to "work" in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or com-
pulsory. 
The fact that a strike is defined is in itself a limiting factor. Not every form of industrial 
action amounts to a strike which may enjoy statutory protection. Nevertheless, the range 
of actions and omissions which fall within the definition are broadly stated and cover 
most forms of industrial action. 49 The definition covers actions and omissions which 
amount to a breach of the contract of employment such as work stoppages, go-slows 
and the obstruction of work. It also covers actions and omissions which do not neces-
46ouring the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, the refusal to work voluntary overtime also did not 
fall within the definition of a strike (see SA Breweries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & Others (1989) 1 O 
/W 844 (A) at 849 and 851 E-F; National Automobile & Allied Workers' Union v CHT Manufacturing Co (Pty) 
Ltd (1984) 5 /W 186 (IC) at 190A and National Union of Textile Workers & Others v Jaguar Shoes (Pty) Ltd 
(1986) 7 /W 359 (IC) at 365H). However, such a refusal is included In the definition of a strike ins 213 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
47see s 67(6)(b). In the case of a picket, this protection is expressly provided ins 69(7) read withs 67 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. In terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 participants in boycotts and pickets 
also enjoyed protection against civil liability in terms of s 79(1) thereof. Perhaps of the greatest import, 
however, was the fact that such actions and omissions could constitute unfair labour practices and that their 
fairness could therefore be judged by the industrial court (see, for example, MacSteel (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others (1989) 10 /W 285 (IC) at 289 and Langeberg Foods Ltd (Boksburg) v 
Food & Allied Workers Union & Others (1989) 10 /W 1093 (IC) at 1102 where it was held that the refusal to 
work voluntary overtime could constitute an unfair labour practice). 
48see s 67(8) of the Labour Relations Aa. 1995. 
49f=or a discussion of the various actions and omissions which are covered by the definition, see D du Toit, D 
Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 {1996) 17 4-176. 
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sarily constitute a breach such as the refusal to work voluntary overtime.SO It further-
more covers full blown strikes such as complete work stoppages as well as partial 
strikes where production is not halted altogether. The definition also covers sympathy 
strikes.51 
The reason for the definition's broad ambit is to be found in the legislature's appreciation 
of the disruptive effect of industrial action on economic activity and the threat which it 
may pose to the well-being of society at large. These economic and social considera-
tions made it imperative for the legislature to regulate strikes. It accordingly made the 
definition wide so as to be able to regulate most of the various forms of industrial 
actioh.52 
Although the legislature's primary aim with the broad ambit of the definition was to regu-
late industrial action, it also created the opportunity for such actions and omissions to 
become protected in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Because of the breadth of 
the definition, those actions and omissions which both employers and the courts have in 
the past regarded as "unacceptable",53 such as overtime bans, sit-ins and go-slows, can 
become eligible for protection. 
50see D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christle The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 175 where they argue that the specific inclusion of the refusal to work voluntary overtime in the defini-
tion favours the contention that "work" in the definition should be construed broadly to include all work, 
including work which employees are not contractually obliged to perform. This makes the definition broader 
than the one of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 which was interpreted, inter alia, by the appellate division to 
cover only "work" that employees were contractually obliged to perform (see SA Breweries Ltd v Food & 
Allied Workers Union (1989) 10 /W 844 (A) at 849E-850A; 850F-I and 851C). 
51The words "by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers" 
also cover those workers who strike in sympathy with the striking workers of another employer. 
52see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 176. 
53Primarily because the economic harm which they cause the employer is disproportionate to the economic 
harm which the strikers suffer. For example, in the case of partial strikes such as overtime bans, the strikers 
stUI receive their ordinary wages while causing their employer economic harm through their refusal to work 
overtime (see MSM Brassey "The Dismissal of Strikers• (1990) 11 /W 213 at 222). The industrial court has 
also indicated that it regarded a so-called sit-In as an unacceptable form of strike action (see Kolatsoeu & 
Others v Afro-Sun Investment (Pty) Ltd Va Re/eke Zezame Supermarket (1990) 11 /W 754 (IC) at 762A). In 
National Union of Metalworkers & Others v Henred Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd (1994) 15 /W 1257 (A) at 
1263H the appellate division referred to a go-slow strike as "a most insidious form of industrial action" as it 
causes financial loss to the employer whle the employees continue to draw their wages. In addition, a go-
slow is often difficult to prove. See further Martin Brassey "Partial Strikes" in Paul Benjamin, Reagan Jacobus 
and Chris Albertyn (eds) Strikes Lock-outs & Arbitration in South African Labour Law: Proceedings of the 
Labour law Conference (1988) at 63. 
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The requirement of common purpose in the definition54 also does not pose much of a 
limitation on the right to strike. All that it entails is that employees must act collectively. A 
single employee, therefore cannot strike. 55 On the other hand, not all the employees in a 
particular undertaking need to participate in a strike. 56 
In terms of the definition, the purpose of strike action must be to remedy a grievance or 
to resolve a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer 
and employee.57 "Mutual interest" is not defined fri the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Mat-
ters which are of interest to both employers and employees will usually include those 
dealing with the employment relationship and the workplace. 58 The most obvious exam-
ples of such matters are terms and conditions of employment such as wages, hours of 
work, overtime, sick leave, ordinary leave and health and safety issues. The supreme 
court has, however, given an extremely wide interpretation to "mutual interest". In Rex v 
Woliak59 it held60 that it included those matters that were in the interest of the industry 
as a whole. In Rand Tyres and Accessories (Pty) Ltd and Appel v Industrial Council tor 
the Motor Industry (Transvaal), Minister for Labour, and Minister for Justice61 the court 
gave a similar interpretation. It held62 
Whatever can be fair1y and reasonably regarded as calculated to promote the well-being of 
the trade concerned must be of mutual interest to them; and there is no justification for 
restricting in any way powers which the Legislature has been at the greatest pains to frame 
in the widest possible language. Mr Roper's construction, which seeks to confine "any 
matter whatsoever of mutual Interest to employers and employees" to conditions of 
employment, would deprive these words of all effect... 
541t refers to a ·concerted" refusal to work or the retardation or obstruction of work by "persons". 
55see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 177 and D du Toit, D Woolfrey; J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch 
and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 175. 
56see John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 177. 
57 See the definition of a strike quoted earlier in this paragraph. 
58see D du Tait. D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christle The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 178 where they state that matters of mutual interest •must have an occupational or work-related aim". 
591939 TPD 428. It had to interpret the concept as provided for in s 24 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 
1937. 
60At431. 
611941 TPO 108. It had to interpret the concept as provided for in s 24 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 
1937. 
62At 115. 
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It is suggested that the matters listed in s 84 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 for con-
sultation with a workplace forum63 as well as some of the functions of bargaining coun-
cils listed ins 28, may in future also be considered matters of "mutual interest".64 The 
authors of The Labour Relations Act of 199565 argue66 that 
[b]y bringing these matters into the domain of the new employment forums [ie the work-
place forum and bargaining council] the legislature has decreed them to be 'of mutual 
interest between employer and employee' and, by implication, matters over which employ-
ees ... may strike ... 
These sections cover a wide range of matters. They cover a number of employment 
issues such as changes in the organisation of work, 67 dismissal for operational 
reasons, 68 job grading, 69 and the establishment and administration of pension, provi-
dent, medical aid and other funds. 70 They also cover a number of economic or business 
issues which may impact on job security such as the restructuring of the workplace, 71 
partial or total plant closures, 72 mergers and transfers of ownership. 73 In addition, the 
sections cover a number of economic or business issues which are not directly linked to 
job security such as product development? 4 and export promotion. 75 Section 28 also 
makes provision for the development of proposals for policy and legislation that may 
63see par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where this section is discussed in greater detail. 
64The matters listed in s 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 for joint decision-making by the employer and 
the workplace forum may be considered as matters of "mutual interesr by the bargaining parties. However, 
in terms of s 65(1 )(c) read with s 86(7) of the Act, the matters listed in s 86 may not be the focus of the strike. 
Disputes about any of these matters may be referred to arbitration by the employer. 
650 du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996). 
66At 179. 
67see s84(1)(b). 
68see s 84(1)(e). 
69see s 84(1)(g). 
70see s 28(g). 
71see s 84(1)(a). 
72see s 84(1 )(c). 
73see s 84(1)(d). 
74see s 84(1)0). 
75see s 84(1 )(k). 
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affect the sector and area. 76 This function of bargaining councils is extremely wide and 
may include policy proposals regarding trade and investment, the economy and employ-
ment. 77 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that, as in the case of the other two elements of 
a strike, the purpose element does not play such an important role in limiting the right to 
strike. "MutuaL interest" is a very wide concept and workers are able to engage in strike 
action about an extremely wide and diverse--range--of matters.- -
In conclusion, it appears that the strike definition does not present a far-reaching or 
extensive restriction of the right to strike. As will appear from the discussion below other 
statutory provisions, particularly ss 64 and 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, present 
very real and extensive restrictions on the statutory right to strike. 
6.3.3 The Right to Strike 
In terms of s 64 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, employees may acquire a right to 
strike.78 Such a right strengthens employees' bargaining power as it forces the 
employer to bargain in good faith with them and their trade union. The importance of 
such a right was expressed as follows by the labour appeal court in Black Allied Workers 
Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hote179 
The right to strike is important and necessary to a system of collective bargaining. It 
underpins the system - it obliges the parties to engage thoughtfully and seriously with each 
other. It helps to focus their minds on the issues at stake and to weigh up carefully the 
costs of a failure to reach agreement. 80 
76see s 2a(h). 
nsee 0 du Toit, 0 Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, 0 Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 
(1996) 179. 
78see s 64(1). This provision is in accordance with the Constitution which affords every worker the right to 
strike (see s 23(2)(c) thereof). It is also in accordance with the views of the International Labour Organisation 
(see Freedom of Association: A Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Com-
mittee of the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation 3 eel (1985)). This provision also 
represents a major diversion from the Labour Relations Act, 1956. The latter Act did not afford employees 
such a right. In view of the fact that they could be dismissed, strikers enjoyed, at most, a freedom to strike. 
79(1993) 14 /W 963 (LAC) at 9728. 
OOsee further at 9720. See also Perskorporasie van SA Bpk v Media Workers Association of SA {1993) 14 
/W 938 (LAC) at 941C; National Union of Mfneworlcers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd {1991) 12 /W 
1221 (A) at 1237F-G and MSM Brassey "The Dismissal of Strikers• (1990) 11 /W 213 at 235. 
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Employees, however, do not acquire this right automatically when they engage in strike 
action as defined in the Labour Relations Act, 1995. They must ensure that their strike 
complies with ss 64 and 65 of the Act. If it does not, they do not acquire the statutory 
right to strike and their strike will accordingly be unprotected. In the paragraph below, 
the extent to which these two sections restrict or limit the right to strike will be examined.· 
6.3.3.1 Limitations on the Right to Strike 
Section 65 prohibits employees from striking in a number of instances.81 In the first 
instance, and in accordance with its subscribing to voluntarism,82 it prohibits strike 
action in circumstances where the collective bargaining parties themselves have 
restricted the right to strike. The section prohibits strike action about issues which the 
collective bargaining parties have agreed will be unfit for strike action.83 It also prohibits 
strike action about issues which the parties have agreed will be referred to-arbitration.84 
Secondly, s 65 prohibits strike action about any of the issues which have been listed in 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995 for determination by arbitration or the labour court. 85 
This provision severely restricts employees' right to strike as the list of matters which 
81However, unlikes 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, contravention thereof does not constitute a 
criminal offence. The statutory limitation will probably not be unconstitutional as s 36 of the Constitution 
states that the rights entrenched in the Constitution may be limited to the extent that they are reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors. It is also in accordance with the International Labour Organisation's views (see A 
Pankert "Freedom of Association· in R Blanpain (ed) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 3 ed 
(1987) 173 at 190). 
82see Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle "Strikes and Lock-outs" in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive 
Thompson and Andre van Nlekerk Cu"ent Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of 
Labour Law (1995) 49 at 50. 
83see s 65(1 )(a). 
84see s 65(1 )(b). See further par 5.2.2 of chapter 5 where dispute-resolution procedures, to which parties 
have voluntarily agreed, are discussed. 
SSsee s 65(1)(c). This prohibition was primarily motivated by the legislature's aim to limit the incidence of 
strikes. It appreciated the disruptive effect of strikes as well as the disastrous financial consequences which 
they may hold for the employer and the strikers as well as for society as a whole (see the Ministerial Legal 
Task Team Explanatory Memorandum notice 97 In Government Gazette 16259of10 February 1995 at 115 
and 128-129). It accordingly endeavoured to limit the incidence of strikes by prescribing dispute-resolution 
procedures for the effective and speedy resolution of certain disputes. 
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must be settled in this manner is extensive and includes a number of issues over which 
employees were entitled to strike in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. 86 
In accordance with this provision, employees are prohibited from striking about the fol-
lowing issues: alleged unfair dismissals, 87 alleged unfair discrimination88 and any other 
alleged unfair labour practices. 89 Employees are also prohibited from striking about dis-
putes regarding freedom of association, 90 the interpretation or application of collective 
agreements91 and the interpretation or application ·of closed shop agreements and 
agency shop agreements. 92 In addition, they are prohibited from striking about disputes 
regarding the admission of parties to bargaining and statutory councils.93 Employees 
may also not strike about an alleged undermining of the effective use of their right to 
picket, the venue of the picket and an alleged breach of the agreed picket rules. 94 
Employees are also prohibited from striking about disputes regarding matters which are 
subject to joint decision-making by workplace forums and employers. 95 . 
86.one of the most important examples in this regard was the freedom which employees had to strike con-
cerning the dismissal of employees (see par (iQ(cc) of the definition of a strike ins 1 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1956 which listed the employment of (dismissed) workers as one of the purposes of strike action). 
However, in the context of determining the fairness of the dismissal of such strikers, the industrial court in 
Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Beva/oid (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 IW 447 (IC) at 451 l-452F indicated 
that it regarded this reason for strike action as "less acceptable" since the dismissed employee had recourse 
to the court in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. 
871n terms of s 191 (5)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 alleged unfair dismissals for misconduct and 
incapacity must be referred to arbitration for settlement. Dismissals which are automatically unfair, those 
based on the operational requirements of the business, dismissal for participation in an unprotected strike 
and dismissal for reasons related to a closed shop agreement, in terms of s 191 (S)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the 
Act, must be referred to the labour court for settlement. 
881n terms of clause 3(4)(a) of Schedule 7, such an alleged unfair labour practice must be referred to the 
labour court for adjudication. 
89see clause 3(4)(b) of Schedule 7 in terms of which such matters must be resolved through arbitration. 
901n terms of s 9(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, disputes about the interpretation or application of any 
of the provisions in chapter II of the Act dealing with rights of association, may be referred to the labour 
court. 
911n terms of s 24(5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, disputes of this nature may be referred to arbitration. 
92see s 24(6) read withs 24(5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, in terms of which disputes of this nature 
may be referred to arbitration. 
93see s 56 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which such disputes may be adjudicated by the 
labour court. 
941n terms of s 69(11) of the Labour Relations Act., 1995, such a dispute may be referred to the labour court 
for adjudication. 
951n terms of s 86(7} of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, such disputes may be referred to arbitration. 
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In the case of disputes regarding organisational rights, 96 employees have a choice. 
They may refer the dispute to arbitration for settlement97 or they may strike about it. 98 
However, if employees have elected to strike, they will be unable to refer the dispute to 
arbitration for a period of 12 months from the date of their notice of the commencement 
of the strike. 99 This is to prevent a trade union which has failed to obtain organisational 
rights through economic pressure to try and obtain it through arbitration. 
It is suggested that this exception- underpins- the legislatur&'s-preference for collective 
bargaining.100 It enables a trade union to try to compel an employer to grant it organisa-
tional rights under circumstances where, if the dispute had been referred to arbitration, 
the arbitrator may have determined that the union was not representative 101 and, by 
implication, that the employer was not statutorily obliged to grant the union such rights. 
Thirdly, section 65 prohibits employees involved in essentiat~102 and maintenance serv-
ices 103 from striking.104 This prohibition is in accordance with the internationally 
96Namely the right to access, check-off facilities, the election of shop stewards and leave for trade union 
activities (sees 65(2)(a) read with ss 12-15 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). For a discussion of these 
statutory organisational rights, see par 4.2.3 of chapter 4. 
971n terms of s 21 (7)-(10) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, disputes regarding the representativeness of a 
trade union for purposes of the exercising of organisational rights may be settled through arbitration. 
98see s 65(2)(a) read with s 65(1 )(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
99see s 65(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. From the wording of this section, it appears that they will 
be restricted in this manner even where they have not actually implemented strike action. 
1 OOsee par 4.2.1 of chapter 4 where the legislature's preference, and the reasons for it, are discussed. 
101 See s 21 (8) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which sets out certain requirements according to which the 
arbitrator must determine the representatlviness of a trade union. 
102see s 65(1)(d)(i). An essential service is defined ins 214 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. It includes 
those services the interruption of which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the whole or any part 
of the population. This is in accordance with the International Labour Organisation's views of the character-
istics of an essential service (see the report of the Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission of Freedom of 
Association concerning the Republic of South Africa (International Labour Office Geneva 1992) as 
reproduced in (1992) 13 /W 739 at 758). In addition, s 214 labels the Parliamentary service and the Police 
Services as essential services. 
103see s 65(1)(d)OI). A maintenance service is not defined ins 214 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Sec-
tion 75(1) nevertheless describes a maintenance service as one the interruption of which "has the effect of 
material physical destruction to any working area, plant or machinery". Collective bargaining parties may 
conclude an agreement In terms of which the whole or part of the employer's business is regarded as a 
maintenance service (sees 75(2)). 
104Members of the National Defence Force, who are exlucled from the Labour Relations Act, 1995, are also 
prohibited from striking in terms of legislation dealing specifically with them (see ss 19 and 20(1)0) of the 
Public Service Labour Relations Act.102 of 1993). 
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accepted principle that strikes should not pose a threat to the physical well-being and 
safety of society at large.105 
The extent to which this prohibition will restrict employees' right to strike will largely 
depend on the essential service committee 106 whose function it is to decide whether or 
not a service should be designated as either an essentia1107 or maintenance service.108 
In the fourth instance, s 65 prohibits strike action about· matters which are the subject of 
a collective agreement which binds the parties the agreement.109 In terms of this sec-
tion, employees may also not strike about a matter which is regulated by an arbitration 
award.110 The section further prohibits employees from striking about a matter which is 
regulated by a determination made in terms of the Wage Act in its first year of opera-
tion.111 
The reason for this prohibition is obvious. Once a matter has been settled, employees 
should be bound by the terms of settlement. They should not be entitled to try to obtain 
a more favourable outcome through strike action. 112 This prohibition also contains the 
disruption of economic activity to a certain extent and promotes industrial peace and 
stability. 113 
From the foregoing analysis of s 65, it is clear that the section severely limits the right to 
strike. However, those strikes which are not prohibited in terms of this section are not 
105see note 85 above. 
10&fhe essential services committee is established in terms of s 70(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
107 See s 70(2)(a) read with s 71. 
1 OSsee s 75(2) read withs 70(2)(c). 
109see s 65(3). 
11osee s 65(3)(a)(i). 
111Sees65(3)(a)(ii) and (b). 
1121n this regard, however, a distinction can be made between minimum and actual terms and conditions. 
(For a discussion of this distinction in collective agreements, see par 5.3.2.4 of chapter 5 and in regard to 
wage determinations. see Vereeniging Refractories Ltd v Building Construction & Allied Workers Union 
(1989) 10 /W 79 (W)). Employees are entitled to strike about actual terms and conditions where those con-
tained in a collective agreement or a wage determination represent only minimU111«MNM• terms and conditions. 
113see s 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists economic development and labour peace as pur-
poses of the Act 
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automatically eligible for protection. Section 64 prescribes further procedural require-
ments with which employees must comply before their strike will be protected. 
In the first instance, the dispute must have been referred to either a counci1114 or the 
Commission for possible "conciliation". 115 This provision differs substantially from s 65 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 which merely required the industrial council or concilia-
tion board to "consider" the dispute.116 It did not require any actual or real effort to 
reach settlement. Nor did it make provision for an objective third-person to guide the 
parties to a possible solution. Contrary to this, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 requires a 
party117 to attempt to resolve the dispute through "conciliation". Although "conciliation" 
is not defined, it denotes actual or real endeavours on the part of the conciliator to 
resolve the dispute. The Act allows the conciliator to use any method to achieve his 
objective including mediation, fact-finding exercises and the making of a recommenda-
tion which may be in the form of an advisory arbitration award. 118 
Once actual and deliberate attempts to settle the dispute have been unsuccessful and 
strike action remains the only option, 119 the Labour Relations Act, 1995 prescribes a 
second procedural requirement. It requires the employees to give the employer 48 
hours'120 written notice of the commencement of the strike.121 
114This may be a bargaining or statutory council (sees 64(1)(a) read withs 214 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 where "council• is defined). See also par 4.2.5 of chapter 4 where the different types of councils are dis-
cussed. 
1151n the case of a council, it must attempt to resolve the dispute in accordance with its constitution's provi-
sions regarding dispute settling (see s 64(1) (a) read with s 51 (2) (a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). Or, 
where a party to the dispute is not a party to the council, it must attempt to resolve it through "conciliation· 
(sees 64(1 )(a) read withs 51 (3)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). In the case of the Commission, it must 
attempt to resolve any dispute referred to it through "conciliation" (see s 64(1 )(a) read with s 115(1 )(a) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
116see s 65(1 )(d)(i) and (ii) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. 
1171n the case of a referral to the Commission, the Act requires that the Commission must appoint a com-
missioner to attempt to settle the dispute through concilition (sees 64(1)(a) read with ss 115(1)(a) and 
133(1) (b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
11asee s 135(3). 
119rhis will be the case where a certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved has been issued (see 
s 64(1)(a)0) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995) or where a period of 30 days, or any extension of that period 
agreed to between the parties, has elapsed since the dispute was received by the council or the Commission 
(sees 64(1)(a)OQ of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
120where the State is the employer, at least seven days' notice of the commencement of the strike must 
have been given (see s 64(1 )(d) of the Labour Relations Act.. 1995). 
121see s 64(1)(b). Where the dispute relates to a collective agreement to be concluded in a council, notice 
must have been given to that council (sees 64(1)(b)O)). And, if the employer is a member of an employers' 
organisation which is party to the dispute, notice must have been given to that organisation (see s 
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This requirement is beneficial to the employer. It ensures that the employer has prior 
knowledge of the strike and enables it to make contingency plans such as arrangements 
for the temporary employment of persons to do the work of the strikers.122 
If the dispute concerns a refusal to bargain, 123 employees have an additional proce-
dural requirement to comply with. Before they can give notice of the commencement of 
their strike, they must be in possession of an advisory award by the commissioner to 
whom the dispute has been referred for conciliation.-124 The· reason-for this requirement 
is to ensure that a dispute of this nature is, in the words of the Ministerial Legal Task 
Team125 
thoroughly conciliated ... before the resort to industrial action. The intervention of skilled 
mediators in these types of disputes has demonstrated that they can often be resolved 
without the resort to industrial action. 
Employees are exempt from compliance with the procedural requirements in a number 
of instances.126 The Labour Relations Act, 1995 subscribes to voluntarism. Thus, where 
the dispute has been dealt with in accordance with a council's constitution 127 or there 
has been compliance with the collectively agreed pre-strike procedures, 128 the employ-
ees do not have to comply with the statutory requirements. Also, employees are exempt 
64(1 )(b)(iQ). 
122see Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle •strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive 
Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of 
Labour Law (1995) 49 at 57. Note, however, that an employer will not be allowed to arrange replacement 
labour if the whole or a part of its service has been designated a maintenance service (see s 76(1 )(a) of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
123A refusal to bargain is given a fairly wide interpretation by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (sees 64(2)(a)-
(d)). It goes further that an ordinary refusal by an employer to bargain with a union and also covers the situa-
tion where an employer wishes to withdraw from a collective bargaining relationship. 
124see s 64(2). 
1251n their Explanatory Memorandum notice 97of1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 10 February 1995 at 
129. See also Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle •strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, 
Clive Thompson and Andre van Nlekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key 
Areas of Labour Law (1995) 51 where they state that this requirement reflects the legislature's recognition 
that such issues can often be resolved through dispute resolution processes. 
126see s 64(3)(a)-(e) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
127 See s 64(3)(a). 
128see s 64(3)(b). See also par 5.2.3 of chapter 5 where collectively agreed pre-strike procedures are dis-
cussed. 
259 
Economic Power 
where their strike is in reaction to their employer's unprocedural lock-out 129 or where 
the employer refuses, despite a request from the employees, 130 to maintain or restore 
the status quo pending the expiry of a statutory conciliation period.131 
In conclusion, the fact that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 has abolished the ballot 
requirement 132 has undoubtedly made it easier for employees to acquire a right to strike 
as this requirement presented the biggest obstacle in employees' endeavours to strike 
legally in terms of the Labour Relations Act,-195S-:·The Ministerial-tegal Task Team133 
explained134 the exclusion of the ballot requirement as follows 
Ballots provide fertile soil for employers to interdict strikes and to justify the dismissal of 
strikers in strikes that are technically irregular but otherwise functional to collective 
bargaining. This has been a recurring feature of South African industrial relations and has 
prevented the proper conclusion of collective bargaining processes. There is also an 
anomaly because union members are prohibited from striking unless the union has held a 
ballot while non-union members are free to strike .... 
If employees are not prohibited in terms of s 65 to strike and they have complied with the 
procedural requirements in s 64, they acquire the statutory right to strike. The con-
sequences for employees of such a protected strike are discussed in par 6.3.5 below. 
129see s 64(3)(c). 
1301n terms of s 64(4). 
131 See s 64(3)(e) read with subsecs (4) and (5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. These statutory provisions 
give effect to the decisions of the courts that the unilateral change of conditions of employment is unfair if 
imposed before the bargaining parties have reached an impasse (see Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle 
•strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current 
Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour Law (1995) 49 at 52). 
132rhe Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not require the trade union to hold a ballot on the question of strike 
action as trade unions were obliged to do in terms of s 65(2) (b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. And, even 
where the trade union's constitution makes provision for a ballot and it has failed to comply with it, the 
legality of the strike will not be affected (see s 67(7) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). 
1331n the Explanatory Memorandum notice 97 of 1995 in Government Gazette 16259 of 10 February 1995. 
Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle •Strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Oive Thompson 
and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour Law 
(1995) 49 at 51 state that it could also be argued that the balloting requirement is inappropriate where the 
right to strike vests in the individual, as provided in s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
134At 129. 
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6.3.4 The Right to Participate in Secondary Strikes and the Limitations on this 
Right 
Additional pressure can be exerted against an employer whose employees are striking 
by the employees of another employer when they embark on strike action in support of 
the primary strikers. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 entitles employees to-embark on. such action.135 
Nevertheless, employees' right to participate in a secondary strike is not unrestricted. 
The Act stipulates three requirements.136 
In the first instance, the primary strike must comply with ss 64 and 65 of the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1995.137 Cooper and Cheadle 138 point out that this requirement is in accord-
ance with international jurisprudence which requires that the _primary strike must be pro-
tected for the secondary strike to be protected. 
Secondly, the employees must have given seven days' prior written notice to their 
employer of their proposed strike. 139 This affords the secondary employer the 
opportunity to put pressure on the primary employer to settle its dispute with its striking 
workers.140 
And, in the third instance, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 requires that the nature and 
extent of the employees' strike must be reasonable in relation to the possible direct or 
13Ssee the definition of a strike in s 214 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which covers secondary strikes in 
that it makes provision for strike action by employees who are or have tJeen employed by the same •or by 
different employers•. See also Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle •strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton Cheadle, 
PAK le Roux, Clive Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Develop-
ments in Key Areas of Labour Law (1995) 49 at 53. See further s 66 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
136see s 66(2). 
137see s 66(2)(a). 
138carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle •strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton.Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive 
Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of 
Labour Law (1995) 49 at 53. 
139see s 66(2)(b). 
1401t seems appropriate that the notice period should be longer than in the case of a primary strike (sees 
64(1)(b)) as the secondary employer will need time to convince the first employer to come to an agreement 
with its employees. 
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indirect effect that it may have on the business of the primary employer.141 The aim with 
this requirement is to prevent secondary strikes which have little or no ability to influence 
the primary employer while at the same time causing substantial economic loss to the 
secondary employer. 
Although this requirement seriously restricts employees' right to participate in secondary 
strikes, Cooper and Cheadle 142 are of the view that it will still allow a broad range of sec-
ondary strikes. The question of whether or·not employees'-strike will comply with this 
requirement is a factual one. It is nevertheless. suggested that employees who work in 
totally unrelated occupations or industries to the primary strikers, may find it difficult to 
satisfy this requirement 143 although there may be circumstances where they will be able 
to do so.144 
6.3.5 The Consequences of a Protected Strike 
6.3.5.1 Protection against Civil liability 
A significant benefit which compliance with the statutory requirements for a strike holds 
for strikers is that they are indemnified against civil liability. 145 They cannot therefore be 
141see s 66(2)(c). The Labour Relations Act, 1956 did not contain such a restriction but the supreme court in 
Barlows Manufacturing Co Ltd v Metal & Allied Workers Union & Others (1990) 11 ILJ 35 (T) at 42F 
endeavoured to introduce one when it, in addition to the three requirements contained in the definition of a 
strike, required that the evidence had to show that there was a reasonable possibility that its "purpose may 
reasonably be achieved.• See also Barlows Manufacturing Co v Metal & Allied Workers Union & Others 
(1988) 9 /W 995 at 1014A 
142carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle "Strikes and Lock-outs• in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Clive 
Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of 
Labour Law (1995) 49 at 54. 
143see also Carole Cooper and Halton Cheadle "Strikes and Lock-outs" in Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, 
Clive Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour Law: A Review of Recent Developments in Key 
Areas of Labour Law (1995) 49 at 54. 
144See D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 202-203 where they give the example of stevedores who refuse to handle goods from a food 
processing employer whose employees are on strike. Their secondary strike is likely to have a substantial 
impact on the business of the primary employer notwithstanding that the stevedores and primary strikers 
work in totally unrelated sectors. 
145see s 67 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which a person who takes part in an ordinary or a 
sympathy strike which complies with the provisions of the Act. does not commit a delict or a breach of con-
tract (see subsec (2)(a)) and no clvB legal proceedings may be instituted against him for participating in the 
strike (see subsec 6(a)). 
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interdicted from participating in such a strike 146 and no action for damages can be 
instituted against them.147 
In common with many other actions, the use of the interdict to prevent strikes has been 
fairly extensive and has often provided employers with a useful weapon to prevent them. 
Interdicts break the momentum of a strike, thereby reducing or even eradicating the eco-
nomic pressure which the strike puts on the employer. In addition, it is often difficult to 
resume a strike once it has been interdicted:· Protection-against-interdicts will therefore 
probably be of immense value to protected strikers. 
Being protected against claims for damages suffered as a result of a strike is also, in 
theory at least, of great value to strikers. The loss inflicted by strike action can be sub-
stantial. It is not limited to the damages suffered by the strikers' refusal to work, but 
includes also damages suffered as a result of the subsequent cancellation of contracts 
by customers and the expense incurred in hiring temporary labourers and subcontract-
ing with competitors in order to complete contracts. 148 
In practice, however, being protected against claims for damages is not that important 
as employers seldom institute such actions.149 Strikers are so-called "men of straw" and 
employers accept that it would be a waste of time and money to obtain an order for 
damages against them. Also, instituting action against strikers may impact negatively on 
the employer's relationship with the strikers and their trade union. 
A further benefit which compliance with the statutory requirements for a strike holds for 
strikers, is that they are afforded indemnity against civil liability for any conduct in con-
146see s 68(1)(a)(i) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which the labour court can interdict a per-
son from participating in an unprotected strike. 
147see s 68(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 in terms of which the labour court can order the pay-
ment of compensation for any loss attributable to an unprotected strike. 
1481n practice, protection against a claim for damages may not be so important as employees participating 
in an unprotected strike may also be indemnified. When considering whether or not an order for compensa-
tion should be made, the labour court must have regard to, inter alia, the financial position of the trade union 
and the employees (see s 68(1 )(b)(iv) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). John Grogan Workplace Law 
(1996) 186 points out that this requirement, if regarded as conclusive, would in effect indemnify virtually all 
employees and poor unions. 
149see Craig Tanner ·strikes and Lock-outs• in Michael Robertson (general eel) South African Human Rights 
and Labour Law Yearbook 1991 Volume 2 (1992) 354 at 355-356. Keith McCall •interdicts and Damages 
Claims in Collective Disputes• in Paul Benjamin, Reagan Jacobus and Chris Albertyn {eds) Strikes Lock-outs 
& Arbitration in South African Labour Law: Proceedings of the Labour Law Conference 1988 {1989) 41 
points out that employers normally only Institute actions for damages against their employees and trade 
unions where the employment relationship has been terminated. 
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templation or in furtherance of such a strike.150 What this means is not clear but it would 
probably include picketing, 151 boycotts, 152 press statements, advertisements and the 
distributing of pamphlets 153 in support of a protected strike. 
They are also protected against liability for defamatory statements. 154 This indemnity is 
of particular importance to picketers and boycotters as their placards and posters may 
contain such statements. 
However, strikers do not enjoy protection against civil liability for acts that constitute 
common law offences.155 In terms of this exception to civil indemnity, an employer can 
hold strikers liable for acts such as assault, malicious damage to property and intimida-
tion committed prior to and during a protected strike.156 It is submitted that statements 
which violate the dignity of the employer may constitute crimen iniuria. Criminal defama-
tion may also be committed where the person's message _injures the reputation and 
good name of the employer. Consequently, although a person is protected in respect of 
the delict, defamation, he may incur civil liability for defamatory statements which con-
stitute common law offences. Nevertheless, it is possible that the exclusion from pro-
tection against these common law offences could have limited effect in view of the con-
stitutional right to strike.157 
Strikers can also be held civilly liable if their ancillary actions constitute statutory 
offences.158 This provision may restrict thei.r right to picket and/or boycott since they 
150see s 67(2)(b) and (6)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
151special provision is made for pickets (sees 69(1) and (7) read withs 67 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995). This right is in accordance with the Constitution which affords everyone the right to picket, peacefully 
and unarmed (sees 17) and to freedom of expression (sees 16(1)). 
152This right is in accordance with the Constitution which affords everyone the right to assemble, to 
demonstrate, peacefully and unarmed (sees 17) and to freedom of expression (sees 16(1)). 
1531bid. 
154see also John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 182 note 15. The protection afforded bys 67 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 in this regard is therefore broader than that afforded by s 79(1) of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1956. 
155see s 67(8) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
156see par 6.2 and note 19 above for a discussion of the common law offences which may be committed 
during a strike. 
157 See s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution as well as par 6.3.3 above. 
158see s 67(8) of the Labour Relations Act. 1995. 
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may be committing offences in terms of municipal regulations and Acts such as the Inter-
nal Security Act 7 4 of 1982, the Trespass Act 6 of 1959 or the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982. 
The legislature appreciated this and afforded picketers indemnity where they assemble 
in contravention of these Acts.159 It is also possible that some of these Acts may be 
branded as unconstitutional.160 
6.3.5.2 Protection against Dismissal 
A further and very important benefit which compliance with the statutory requirements for 
a strike holds for strikers is that they are indemnified against dismissa1161 for their parti-
cipation in the strike and/ or actions committed in the furtherance thereof .162 
In Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hote1163 
the labour appeal court explained the need for strikers to be protected against dismissal 
as follows 
If an employer facing a strike could merely dismiss the strikers from employment by 
terminating their employment contracts then the strike would have little or no purpose. It 
would merely jeopardize the rights of employment of the strikers. The strike would cease 
to be functional to collective bargaining and instead it would be an opportunity for the 
employer to take punitive action against the employees concerned. 
Statutory protection against dismissal ensures that employees' right to strike constitutes 
an important economic weapon. It will undoubtedly strengthen their bargaining power as 
employers will be induced to bargain in good faith. 
159See s 69(2) read with ss 69(7) and 67 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
160see, for example, s 17 of the Constitution which affords everyone the right to assemble, to demonstrate, 
to picket and to present petitions, peacefully and unarmed. 
161 See s 67(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. This protection is in accordance with employees' statutory 
(see s 64 as well as par 6.3.3 above) and constitutional (see s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution) right to strike. It is 
also in accordance with the recommendations made by the International Labour Organisation in its Report 
entitled •Prelude to Change: Industrial Relations Reform in South Africa: Report of the Fact-Finding and Con-
ciliation Commission on Freedom of Association Concerning the Republic of South Africa· (1992) 
reproduced in (1992) 13 IW 739 at 760-1. The Labour Relations Act, 1956 did not contain such a provision. 
Statutory protection, or a measure thereof, however, was afforded indirectly by the industrial court. It had the 
opportunity to consider the fairness of strikers' dismissal and laid down guidelines for the fair dismissal of 
strikers. Employers took these guidelines into consideration when they had to decide whether or not to dis-
miss strikers. 
162see s 67(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. A dismissal for this reason wHI be automatically unfair (see 
s 187(1)(a) and (b) of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 as well as par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3 where automatically 
unfair dismissals are discussed. 
163(1993) 14 /W 963 (LAC) at 972C. See also National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd 
(1995) 16/W1469(LAC)at14781-J. 
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However, strikers do not enjoy absolute protection against dismissal. Those who partici-
pate in a protected strike may be dismissed for misconduct committed during the 
strike.164 However, this does not detract from the value of strikers' right not to be dis-
missed as those who are dismissed under these circumstances are not dismissed 
because they are striking, but because they are guilty of misconduct.165 An employer 
who wants to dismiss strikers under such circumstances, must ensure that their dis-
missal is fair in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.166 
Furthermore, such strikers may be dismissed for a reason based on the operational 
requirements 167 of the business.168 What is intended by this formulation is not clear. 
However, a similar approach was adopted by the courts in terms of their unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction under the Labour Relations Act, 1956.169 
In terms of the definition of operational requirements in s 2:13 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995, an employer will be able to dismiss for this reason if the technological or struc-
tural or economic or similar needs of the business require it. 170 It appears that the 
employer will have to prove 171 that the harm which it is suffering as a result of the strike 
164see s 67(5) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
165see also John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 183. 
166see par 3.4.3.3.2 of chapter 3 where the statutory requirements for a fair dismissal for misconduct are 
discussed. 
167For a detailed discussion of the meaning of "operational requirements" as reason for dismissal, see par 
3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3. 
168see s 67(5). 
169see Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC Va Blue Waters Hotel (1993) 14 /W 963 
(LAC) at 973B-C where the labour appeal court stated "If the respondent [ie Blue Waters Hotel, the employer] 
wished to justify dismissing the employees engaged in their lawful strike it might have done so on the basis 
of the operational requirements of the enterprise, .. .lt would then have done so, not on grounds of mis-
conduct, but for reason of genuine economic necessity after following a fair procedure•. This ground for dis-
missal of strikers was also accepted by arbitrators acting in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. See, for 
example, MAN Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd and United African Motor & Allied Workers Union (1991) 12 /W 
181 (ARB) at 190F where the arbitrator stated "But if the strike is proper, it cannot be treated as a species of 
misconduct The employer remains entitled to dismiss, but only for operational reasons ... •. See further Alan 
Rycroft "The Employer's 'Level of Tolerance' in a lawful Strike" (1993) 14 /W 285 at 289. 
17Dsee the definition of operational requirements in s 214 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 
3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3. 
171 For a discussion of what an employer that wants to dismiss for operational reasons must prove to ensure 
that it wUI be substantively fair, see par 3.4.3.3.4.1 of chapter 3. 
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is more than it can be expected172 to suffer and is prejudicing the economic well-being 
of the business. In other words, the employer must prove that it has exceeded its level of 
tolerance.173 
The rationale for this provision is clear. If the employer cannot dismiss strikers when its 
limit of tolerance has been reached, it will have to close and everyone, including the 
employees, will suffer.174 
The question of whether or not the harm has become unbearable is a factual one.175 In 
order to determine whether the employer's level of tolerance has been reached, the 
nature and extent of the harm which the employer has suffered because of the strike 
must be considered. 
The harm may take a number of forms.176 It will primarily b13 of a financial nature such 
as loss of profits due to a loss or reduction in sales and the cancellation of orders, the 
172The causing of harm is one of the accepted objectives of a strike (see MAN Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd 
and United African Motor & Allied Workers Union (1991) 12 IW 181 (ARB) at 189E-F where the arbitrator 
stated that " ... a strike is ... specifically designed to damage the employer.") See also Black Allied Workers 
Union & Others v Prestige Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hotel (1993) 14 IW 963 (LAC) at 972A-D and National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd (1995) 16 IW 1469 (LAC) at 1481A. See further John 
Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 183. 
173see J Myburgh SC "The Protection of Strikers from Dismissal• in P Benjamin, R Jacobus & C Albertyn 
(eds) Strikes, Lock-outs & Arbitration in South African Labour Law: Proceedings of the labour Law Con-
ference 1988 (1989) 27 at 34 where he states that the extent of the harm required would be "when ... the 
employer's loss of production and concomitant loss of profits become unbearable·. 
174see National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Company (Pty) Limited 
(unreported case no 705/94) where the supreme court of appeal of South Africa held, "[t]o protect strike 
action beyond that point would be detrimental not only to the interests of both sides but also to those of the 
community at large•. 
175The labour appeal court in National Union of Metalworkes of SA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd (1995) 16 IW. 1469 
(LAC) at 14790-F stated: •But no universally applicable test can or should be laid down when an employer 
dismisses for economic reasons. It is the duty of the court to assess those reasons and all other relevant 
facts ... •. See also National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Company (Pty) 
Umited (unreported case no 705/94) where the supreme court of appeal of South Africa (at page 30 of the 
judgment) held that, .,.he inquiry is not whether one or other course may have been more successful in 
resolving the dispute or whether the employer could have endured the strike for longer; the inquiry is 
whether in all the circumstances (including, for example, the duration of the strike and the extent of the 
measures actually taken by the parties to resolve the dispute) the dismissal can be said to have been unraw-. 
176$ee Alan Rycroft's discussion of the more subjective aspects of tolerance in his article entitled .,.he 
Employer's 'Level of Tolerance' in a lawful Strike• (1993) 14 /W 285 at 286-287. 
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loss of customers, 177 negative press coverage 178 and a negative industrial relations 
image.179 
To determine the extent of the harm will not normally pose a problem as it will primarily 
consist of financial losses which can be proved through financial statements and 
estimates et cetera. Employers will normally also be able to attach a monetary value to 
most of the other forms of economic harm. 
The difficulty, however, is to determine whether the effects of the harm have reached the 
required level. Some of the courts held that the question of whether or not the employer 
had reached the required level of tolerance was a factual one. 180 The labour appeal 
court in Cobra Watertech v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 181 and National Union 
of Metalworkers of SA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd182 warned against a test or tests to 
determine this question. 
However, the labour appeal court in Black Allied Workers Union & Others v Prestige 
Hotels CC t/a Blue Waters Hote1183 did establish a test. It held that a business will have 
reached the required level of tolerance where the strike poses a "threat of extinction" to 
the enterprise or a threat "of irreparable harm" to it. 184 
1 n Caused by the strike itself but also possibly by acts in contemplation or in furtherance of the protected 
strike such as pickets and boycotts. 
178eomments made by trade union officials or by strikers during the strike may possibly contribute to such 
coverage. Ancillary strike action such as placards, advertisements et cetera may also play a role. 
179strikers' placards shown during pickets or their advertisements may play a role in this regard. 
180see National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Company (Pty) Limited 
(unreported case no 705/94) where the supreme court of appeal of South Africa held (at page 30-31 of the 
judgment) that it is a question which must be determined on the facts. 
181 (1995) 16 IW 607 (LAC) at 6161. 
182(1995) 16 IW 1469 (LAC) at 1479E. 
183(1993) 14 IW 963 (LAC) at 972F. 
184see also 972J where it used the words "irreparable economic hardship". The court did not, however con-
sider it necessary to give a precise definition of the extent of such hardship as the employer in casu did not 
present sufficient evidence to establish economic harm. See also Laeveld Kooperasie Bpk (Tobacco Divi-
sion) & Others v SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union & Others (1993) 14 IW 1354 (IC) at 1357F 
where the Industrial court also stated that the economic harm must be "irreparable". See further National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Boart MSA (1995) 16 /W 1098 (IC) at 1103 C. Contra, however, Hotel 
Liquor Catering Commercial & Allied Workers Union & Others v Awerbuch's Bargain House (Pty) Ltd (1995) 
16 /W 163 OC) at 173 where the Industrial court stated "To have expected respondent to have tolerated the 
strike untl such time as the 'threat of economic extinction' or 'irreparable economic hardship' could be 
shown, is. .. grossly unfair and has no justifiable 'commercial rationale'. Generally speaking, surely it speaks 
for itself that such an approach could result not only in prolonged labour unrest and chaos, but also in eco-
nomic disaster not only concerning employers but also their employees as well, and on a broader scale the 
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It is suggested that "threat of extinction" should be equated with a threat of 
insolvency .185 Nevertheless, the word "threat" indicates that the insolvency need not be 
a fait accompli before dismissal would be justified. On the contrary, the object of the dis-
missal is to end the harm in order to ensure the enterprise's survivat 186 The labour 
appeal court in National Union of Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development 
Co (Pty) Ltd187 held a similar view. It stated188 
One would obviously not have to wait until [lnsolvency] ... had already occurred before 
insisting upon the right to dismiss strikers ... 
It is suggested that the labour appeal court's other test in the Blue Waters Hotel case 189 
namely the threat of "irreparable harm", may also be criticised. "Irreparable harm" should 
not be equated with unbearable or intolerable harm. Harm which cannot be "repaired" or 
made good does not necessarily constitute a level of harm which has become intolerable 
for the employer. The object of strike action is to cause harm _and often the harm caused 
cannot be recouped. 190 Only when the irreparable harm has reached proportions or 
levels which are intolerable for the employer, will it be entitled to dismiss fairly. 
In a number of cases the courts have held that the enterprise's financial situation prior to 
the strike 191 as well as the well-being of the trade within which it operates should be 
taken into consideration when determining whether or not the employer has reached its 
national economy". 
185see also Alan Rycroft "The Employer's 'Level of Tolerance' in a Lawful Strike" (1993) 14 /W 285 at 294. 
186rhis is in accordance with the legislature's aim to advance economic development (see a 1 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995). 
187(1994) 15 /W 1005 (LAC). 
188At 1012A. 
189At 972F. 
190see the example given by PAK le Roux "From the Courts: The Dismissal of Strikers: A new approach from 
the Labour Appeal Court" (1993) 2(11) CLL 119 at 126 of a newspaper publishing business which is sub-
jected to a two day strike. It wUI lead to irreparable harm in the sense that the revenue lost because of the 
loss of sales and advertising cannot be recouped. 
191 See, for instance, Construction & Allied Workers Union v AG Gillies (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 /W 291 (IC) at 
3000-E as well as National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Boart MSA (1995) 16 /W 1098 (IC) at 
1102H-H where the court stated "It is hard to reject the argument that this did not in itself constitute a threat 
of extinction to the company. Where it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision could be made that a hold-
ing company may close down a subsidiary because of an lnablity to make profits. that is a threat of extinc-
tion•. See also National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Uniross Bateries (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 /W 175 
(IC) at 182F. 
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level of tolerance.192 It is submitted that these factors should be treated with caution.193 
They are not indicators of the level of harm caused by the strike. They do, however, play 
a role in determining the time it will take the employer to reach its level of tolerance. A 
financially weak business, for instance, will reach its level of tolerance sooner than one 
which is financially strong at the commencement of the strike. 
6.3.5.3 Protection against Eviction and Forfeiture of other Benefits 
Although strikers who participate in protected strikes do not breach their contracts of 
employment in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, the Act specifically provides that 
their employer does not have to remunerate them.194 However, the employer may be 
required to continue making payments in kind should they request it.195 
The fact remains, however, that strikers who receive payment in kind during the strike, 
are enriched. They can be obliged to repay the monetary value thereof after the 
strike.196 
6.3.6 Industrial Action which does not Constitute a Strike 
There are forms of industrial action which may serve the same purpose as strike action 
which do not fall within the ambit of the definition of a strike.197 Pickets and boycotts by 
192see National Union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Uniross Batteries (Pty) Ltd (1996) 17 IW 175 (IC) at 
181. 
193see also the comments of the labour appeal court in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Boart MSA 
(Pty) Ltd (1995) 16IW1469 (LAC) at 1479F-H. 
194see s 67(3). 
195see s 67(3)(a). The Labour Relations Act, 1956 did not contain a similar provision. In National Union of 
Mineworkers v Black Mountain Mineral Development Company (Pty) Limited (unreported case no 705/94) 
the employer provided accommodation and food to its workers. In an attempt to place pressure on the strik-
ing workers, the employer cut off the hot water and electricity supply to the hostel which housed the striking 
workers. It also cut off their meat supply. The supreme court of appeal of South Africa which had to judge the 
case in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, accepted (at page 18 of the judgment) that the employer 
was entitled to stop making payment in kind during a strike. 
196see s 67(3)(b). 
197ouring the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, it was held that overtime bans that were not com-
pulsory in terms of employees' contracts of employment, did not fall within the ambit of the statutory defini-
tion of a strike (see SA Breweries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union & Others (1989) 10 IW 844 (A) at 849 
and 851E-F and National Automobile & Allied Workers' Union v CHT Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd (1984) 5 IW 
186 (IC) at 190A and National Union of Textile Workers & Others vJaguar Shoes (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 /W 359 
(IC) at 365H). Contra, however, Plascon Evans Paint (Natal) Ltd v Chemical Workers Industrial Union & 
Others (1988) 9 IW 231 (D) at 241 where the supreme court held that a refusal io continue to work" included 
a refusal to do voluntary overtime which employees normally did. The court was also of the view that the 
word "work" was not limited to contractual work (see also Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd v Food & 
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employees in order to force their employer to comply with their demands during collec-
tive bargaining, constitute such industrial action.198 
Sections 64 and 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 do not apply to such industrial 
action. By the same token, however, s 67, which provides immunity against civil pro-
ceedings, also does not apply to such industrial action. This means that the employer 
can approach a court of law for civil relief against the employees. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 plays an extremely important role in the regulation of the 
use of economic power by employees to counter the employer's decision-making 
power. It undoubtedly promotes the use of such power and contributes towards its 
effectiveness. 
The definition of a lock-out ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 is narrower than 
the one in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 as it affords employers only one form 
of action that can constitute a lock-out, namely the exclusion of employees 199 from the 
workplace. 200 
Through its broad definition of a strike, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords employ-
ees a variety of forms of economic pressure which, provided they comply with the other 
requirements of a strike, may enjoy protected status in terms of the Act.201 
In addition, the broad ambit of the concept "mutual interest" in the definition affords 
employees tremendous scope as regards the matters about which they may institute 
Allied Workers Union & Others (1988) 9 IW 252 (IC) at 262G-I and Bebe/ Investments (Pty) Ltd v Paper Print-
ing Wood & Allied Workers Union & Others (1988) 9 /W 572 (E) at 5nG- H). This dispute is no longer rele-
vant as the definition of a strike ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 includes a refusal to do overtime 
work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory. 
198such pickets and boycotts must be distinguished from pickets and boycotts engaged in contemplation 
or in furtherance of a strike. 
19910 terms of the definition, an employer cannot lock a single employee out. The definition refers to ihe 
exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer's workplace .. :. See also John Grogan Workplace 
Law (1996) 198. 
200John Grogan Workplace Law {1996) 198 submits that it would include a partial exclusion such as a with-
drawal of overtime. 
201 See par 6.3.2 above. 
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strike action.202 Should they comply with the other requirements of a strike, the issues 
about which they have instituted strike action may enjoy statutory protection. 
Section 65, however, constitutes a significant limitation of the right to strike, particularly 
subsec (1)(c) thereof which prohibits strike action about matters which must be referred 
to arbitration or adjudication by the labour court in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995.203 The number of matters which, in terms of the Act, must be settled in one of 
these ways, is extensive. 204 It includes issues which employees may have been able to 
strike about due to the breadth of the concept "mutual interest" in the definition of a 
strike.205 It also covers a number of issues which employees used to be able to strike 
about in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 such as unfair dismissals, unfair dis-
crimination, other unfair labour practices and disputes about freedom of association.206 
Although s 65 severely restricts the right to strike, those strikes which are not prohibited 
- -
by it can attain legitimacy fairly easily because of the few and relatively simple procedural 
requirements which such strikes must comply with for statutory protection.207 
The protection afforded by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to strikes which comply with 
the provisions of ss 64 and 65 is far-reaching and promotes the effectiveness of a strike. 
In addition, the fact that this protection is also afforded to any conduct in contemplation 
or in furtherance of a protected strike, further promotes the effectiveness of such a 
strike. 208 The Act also affords employees unlimited scope with regard to the type of 
ancillary action that they may resort to as it requires only that such action may not con-
stitute an offence.209 Picketing, undoubtedly one of the most effective forms of pressure 
2021bid. 
203see par 6.3.3.1 above wheres 65(1)(c) as well as the disputes which must be referred to either arbitration 
or adjudication by the labour court in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, are discussed. 
205see, for instance, the matters listed in s 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 for joint decision-making by 
the employer and the workplace forum. In terms of s 65(1)(c) read withs 86(7), these matters may not be the 
focus of a strike as the employer has the choice to refer a dispute in respect of any of these matters to arbi-
tration. 
206see par 6.3.3.1 above in this regard. 
207 See par 6.3.3.1 above. 
208see par 6.3.5.1 above in this regard. 
209see s 67(8) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as well as par 6.3.5.1 above. 
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in the furtherance of a strike, is not only allowed but statutorily promoted and pro-
tected. 210 
That a protected strike and conduct in contemplation or in furtherance thereof cannot be 
interdicted is of great importance as interdicts, even interim ones, usually spell the end of 
the dispute.211 The protection against an action for damages, however, is of less value 
as employers seldom institute proceedings for such relief212 and it may also be afforded 
to strikers participating in unprotected strikes.2_:13 
However, statutory protection against dismissal is an extremely important benefit 
afforded to employees participating in a protected strike. 214 Grogan215 explains the 
effect of this protection as follows216 
The ultimate strike-breaking weapon, dismissal or the threat thereof, is all but ruled out. 
The aim of the Act is plainly to make a protected strike a simple endurance contest: to 
measure whether the employer can do without the services of the strikers for loriger than 
they can do without their wages. 
Although protection against dismissal goes a long way in making a strike a valuable eco-
nomic weapon, the effectiveness thereof may be lessened by a number of factors. The 
fact that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 allows an employer to employ temporary 
labour217 lessens the effectiveness of a strike, particularly as the employer does not 
have to remunerate the strikers for the duration of the strike.218 And, of great impor-
tance, strikers' protection against dismissal is not absolute. The employer retains the 
210see par 6.3.5.1 above. 
211 See par 6.3.5.1 above. 
212see, however, Jumbo Products CC v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1996) 7 /W 859 CN) where 
the employer instituted an action for damages against a trade union which had instigated a strike that was 
illegal in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. 
2131bid. 
214see par 6.3.5.2 above. 
215John Grogan Workplace Law (1996). 
216At 184. 
217 See s 76 of the Labour Relations Act. 1995. 
21 Ssee par 6.3.5.3 above. See also National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd (1995) 16 /W 
1469 (LAC) at 1479 and Cobra Watertech v National Union of Metalworkers of SA (1995) 16 /W 607 (LAC) at 
615C-D. 
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right to dismiss them if the operational requirements of the business necessitate this. 219 
However, it may not be that easy for the employer to comply with the statutory require-
ments for a fair dismissal for this reason,220 particularly where it had been able to keep 
production going with the help of non-striking workers and temporary labour.221 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the employer's most powerful economic weapon 
namely dismissal, is still available to it. 
Apart from dismissal, the employer also has a number of-other-forms of economic pres-
sure at its disposal. In the next chapter, the different forms of economic pressure which 
may be implemented by the employer in order to force employees to drop their demands 
or to agree to its demands, will be examined. 
219see par 6.3.5.2 above. 
220see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3. 
221see National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd (1995) 16 /W 1469 (LAC) at 1479H 
where the labour appeal court, in assessing the substantive fairness of a dismissal for alleged operational 
requirements, took these factors into account 
CHAPTER7 
THE MAINTENANCE AND FURTHERANCE OF EMPLOYER PREROGATIVE 
THROUGH ECONOMIC POWER 
7 .1 INTRODUCTION 
The exertion of economic pressure as a means to enforce demands is not restricted to 
employees and their trade unions. Employers may also resort to economic pressure 
against their employees and their trade unions. They may do so for a number of 
reasons. Employers may, for example, apply economic pressure to compel their employ-
ees to submit to their demands or proposals concerning terms and conditions of 
employment.1 If the economic pressure takes the form of a lock-out, it is referred to as 
an "offensive" or "aggressive" lock-out.2 
Employers may also exert economic pressure in order to foil or pre-empt their employ-
ees' plans to exercise economic pressure against them.3 If the economic pressure takes 
the form of a lock-out, it is labelled a "pre-emptive lock-out". 4 
Economic power may also be used by employers to counter their employees' economic 
power which they may be exerting through, for example, strike action.5 If employers' 
economic pressure takes the form of a lock-out, it is referred to as a "defensive lock-
out". 6 
1 See Alan Rycroft and Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) at 290. 
2see lnthiran Moodley "The Key to Unlocking the 'Lock-out'?· (1990) 11 IW 1 at 3 and Marius Olivier "Lock-
outs (Final) (1992) De Rebus 626. See also the facts of NTE Ltd v Ngubane & Others (1992) 13 IW 910 
(LAC) at 914E-F. 
3see John Grogan Collective Labour Law (1993) at 106. 
4See Marius Olivier •Lock-outs (Final)9 (1992) De Rebus 626. AT Trollip in his article entitled "Lock-outs in 
South African Law" In Paul Benjamin, Reagan Jacobus and Chris Albertyn (eds) Strikes Lock-outs & Arbi-
tration in South African Labour Law: Proceedings of the Labour Law Conference 1988 (1989) 83 at 84 
states that a pre-emptive lock-out can have a psychological effect on a workforce as the employer, by 
adopting this tactic, is suggesting that it is not concerned by a disruption in production. 
Ssee. for example, the facts of Satchwell Controls Paarl and Steel Engineering & Allied Workers Union of 
SA (1992) 13 ILJ 1044 (ARB) at 1046J-1047A-O as well as SA Chemical Workers Union v Plascon Inks & 
Packaging Coatings (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 IW 353 OC) at 356. 
6See lnthlran Moodley -rhe Key to Unlocking the 'Lock-out'?• (1990) 11 IW 1 at 3 as well as Marius Olivier 
"lock-outs (Finat)• (1992) De Rebus 626. A strike and (defensive) lock-out may run concurrently (see JY 
Oaasen •ote Regsposlsie van Werknemers by 'n Staking in die Arbeidsreg• 1984 (47) THRHR 83 at 85; 
MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, Dismissals and the 
Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 114-116; Ngubane & Others v NTE Ltd (1991) 12 IW 
138 OC) at 1440; SA Chemical Workers Union v Plascon Inks & Packaging Coatings (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 /LJ 
353 (IC) at 360 and National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Cobra Watertech (1994) 15 /LJ 832 (IC) at 
8380-E) although, where the employer introduces the lock-out after the employees have gone on strike, 
the lock-out may be branded as •not1onat• or •ineffective• by the courts as there would not be much pur-
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Lock-outs are not the only form of economic pressure used by employers. They may 
mobilise public opinion against employees and their trade unions through adver-
tisements, television interviews, press statements 7 and the distribution of pamphlets. 
Although these forms of economic pressure are relatively rare and are usually linked to 
lock-outs, they may be exerted independently. 
In this chapter, the way in which the law prohibits or regulates the use of economic 
power by employers as a method to maintain or further their decision-making power, will 
be discussed. 
7.2 COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES 
As is the case with employees who embark on strike action, employers which use eco-
nomic power against their employees may, depending on the form which the pressure 
takes, incur civil and/or criminal liability on the basis of common law principles. They, for 
example, may incur civil liability in the form of delictual liability or breach of contract. They 
may also incur criminal liability in terms of certain common law offences. 
Employers which, during a television interview or through press statements or adver-
tisements, defame their employees and/or their trade union,8 may be interdicted and/or 
be held liable for damages on the ground that their actions amount to a delict. They may 
also be held criminally liable. 9 
pose in preventing employees from working who are in any event refusing to work (see SA Chemical 
Workers Union v Plascon Inks & Packaging Coatings (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 /W 353 (IC) at 361F-G). Contra, 
however, AT Trollip "Lock-outs in South African Law" in Paul Benjamin, Reagan Jacobus and Chris Albertyn 
(eds) Strikes Lock-outs & Arbitration in South African Labour Law: Proceedings of the Labour Law Con-
ference 1988 (1989) 83 at 88 and Ngewu & Others v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co Ltd; Masondo & 
Others v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co Ltd (1983) 4 /W 41 (N). 
7 See, for example, the facts of Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Game Dis-
count World Ltd (1990) 11 /W 162 (IC) at 165A. 
8rt was argued in the previous chapter that a legal person such as a company can also be defamed (see 
note 22 of chapter 6). It is submitted that, in accordance with this argument, a trade union which is 
registered in terms of s 96 of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 and is accordingly a body corporate (sees 97 
of the Labour Relations Act, 1995), can also be defamed. 
9such employers may be guity of crimen iniuria where it is proved that they have unlawfully and inten-
tionally violated the dignity of their employees or their trade union. Employers may also commit criminal 
defamation where their messages injure the reputation and good name or fama of the employees or an offi-
cial or office-bearer of the employees' trade union or even the trade union itself. 
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The act of locking employees out will not normally lead to criminal liability, but may lead 
to civil liability. Employers may incur civil liability on the ground of breach of contract for 
prohibiting employees from doing their work and refusing to pay them.10 
From the above it is clear that the common law does not recognise the legitimacy of the 
exercise of economic pressure by an employer as a means to enforce its demands 
against employees and their trade union.11 
The law has, however, been adapted to allow an employer to enforce its demands in this 
manner. As in the case of collective action by employees and their trade unions, this 
adaptation has been brought about through the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 12 The Act 
makes provision for the exertion of economic power by an employer to enforce its 
demands in that it provides for lock-outs 13 and conduct in contemplation or furtherance 
thereot.14 The Labour Relations Act, 1995 however, also controls and-regulates the 
exercise of such economic power .15 
101n terms of the common law, an employer must pay employees their agreed wages where they offer their 
services (see par par 2.4.2.2 of chapter 2). See also Marius Olivier "Uitsluitings" (1992) De Rebus 555; 
Marius Olivier "Lock-outs (Flnal)8 (1992) De Rebus 626 at 627 and John Grogan Collective Labour Law 
(1993) at 106. Generally speaking, in terms of the common law, an employer may only terminate its 
employees' contracts of employment unilaterally where they are guilty of a material breach. Where this is 
not the case, It would be guilty of breach of contract (see Food & Allied Workers Union v Middevrystaatse 
Suiwel Kooperasie Bpk (1990) 11 /W 776 (IC) at 7900-E as well as Gubb & lnggs Ltd and SA Clothing & 
Textile Workers Union of SA (1991) 12 ILJ 415 (ARB) at 427J-428A where the arbitrator held that the 
employer's exclusion of Its employees in response to their breach, did not constitute breach of contract on 
the part of the employer). 
11 See Marius Olivier "Lock-outs (Final)• (1992) De Rebus 626 at 627 where he states • ... It should be evident 
that It would rid legitimate collective power play of its essential character and effectiveness if the normal 
common law and law of contract principles, consequences and remedies were to be applied to lock-
outs .. :. See also JY Claasen "Die Regsposisie van Werknemers by 'n Staking in die Arbeidsreg• 1984 (47) 
THRHR 83 at 86 and MSM Brassey, E Cameron, MH Cheadle and MP Olivier The New Labour Law: Strikes, 
Dismissals and the Unfair Labour Practice in South African Law (1987) 6-7. 
12see note 31 in par 6.2 of chapter 6 where some of the sources which give an historical account of the 
development of South African legislation with regard to strikes and lock-outs are given. See also par 3.1 of 
chapter3. 
13see s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
14see s 67(2)(b) and (6)(b) as well as par 7.3.1 below in this regard. 
15AJthough the legislature accepts that there is constant conflict between employers and employees and 
that a lock-out Is an effective method through which employers may enforce their demands, It nevertheless 
wants to ensure that employers first endeavour to negotiate with their employees about their demands (see 
s 64(1 )(a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). It also wants to ensure that lock-outs take place according to 
a regulated process and that employees are not taken by surprise (sees 64(1)(c) and (d) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995). In addition, It wants to restrict Its pennission of lock-outs to ones which do not jeopar-
dise the well-being of the community at large (sees 65(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). It also 
does not want to allow lock-outs which amount to a re-opening of a dispute which has been settled 
through either collective bargaining (see s 65(3)(a)(i)), a determination made in terms of the Wage Act (see 
s 65(3)(b)) or arbitration (sees 65(3)(a)(i)) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995). For a discussion of these 
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7.3 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT, 1995 
7 .3.1 Introduction 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords employers a "recourse"16 to lock-out as 
opposed to employees' "right"17 to strike. This is in accordance with the provisions of 
the interim Constitution which afforded employers a "recourse" to lock-out and employ-
ees a "right" to strike.18 These provisions were the result of a compromise reached dur-
ing negotiations concerning the interim Constitution.19 Trade unions were of the view 
that strikes and lock-outs should not be treated as countervailing forces. They argued 
that a right to strike was employees' only means for effective bargaining20 whereas 
employers' superior economic strength ensured the effectiveness of their bargaining. 
According to them, affording employers a right to lock-out would disturb the balance in 
bargaining power in their favour. 
The contents of the labour relations clause in the interim Constitution were hotly debated 
in the Constitutional Assembly.21 A compromise produced a "right" to strike22 but no 
right or recourse to a lock-out in the (final) Constitution. The specific exclusion of the 
recourse to lock-out in the Constitution lead employers to argue that the balance pro-
vided by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 has been disturbed. The main ground for objec-
tion raised by employers for the constitutional court23 to consider was based on con-
stitutional principle XXVlll which provides that 
considerations of the legislature, see Craig Tanner "Strikes and Lock-outs" in Michael Robertson (general 
ed) South African Human Rights and Labour Law Yearbook 1991Volume2 (1992) 354. (It is submitted that, 
although Tanner's article was written while the Labour Relations Act, 1956 was in force, the considerations 
for similar provisions in the Labour Relations Act, 1995, remain the same.) 
16see s 64(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
171bid. 
1 Ssee s 27 of the interim Constitution. 
19see Pieter de Waal "Deadlock on the Lock-out" (1996) 4(3) Juta's Business Law 131. 
20see par 6.3.3 of chapter 6. 
21 See Pieter de Waal "Deadlock on the Lock-out" (1996) 4(3) Juta's Business Law 131. 
22see s 23(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
23see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 /W 821 (CC). This Is an excerpt from the judgment in which only 
those paragraphs of the judgment which explain the certification process and which directly affect labour 
law have been excerpted. 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of Principle XII, the right of employers and employees to 
join and form employer organisations and trade unions and to engage in collective 
bargaining shall be recognised and protected. Provision shall be made that every person 
shall have the right to fair labour practices. 
The employers argued that in order to engage effectively in collective bargaining, 
bargaining parties must have the right to exercise economic power against each other. 
Accordingly, the right to lock-out should be expressly recognised in the Constitution. The 
court held that although it is correct that collective bargaining implied a right to exercise 
economic power, constitutional principle XXVlll did not require that the Constitution 
expressly recognise the mechanisms for the exercise of economic power: it sufficed that 
the right to bargain collectively was specifically protected.24 
The employers further argued that, by including the right to strike but omitting the right to 
lock-out, employers' right to bargain collectively was accorded less status than the right 
of workers to bargain collectively. This argument was also rejected by the court. It 
pointed out that employers' right to bargain collectively was expressly recognised in the 
Constitution. 25 
The employers also argued that the constitutional principle of equa11ty26 requires that, if 
the right to strike is included in the Constitution, so should the right to lock-out. The 
argument was based on the proposition that the right to lock-out was the necessary 
equivalent of the right to strike and that therefore, in order to treat employers and 
workers equally, both these rights should be recognised in the Constitution.27 The court 
rejected this argument. It pointed out that strike action was workers' primary economic 
weapon whereas employers exercised power through a range of weapons such as dis-
missal, the employment of replacement labour, the unilateral implementation of new 
terms and conditions of employment and the lock-out. 28 
24see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 IW 821 (CC) at 840C-E. 
2Ssee Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 IW 821 (CC) 840F-G. See also s 23(5) of the Constitution which 
provides that every employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage In collective bargaining. 
26contalned in constitutional principle II. 
27 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 /W 821 (CC) at 841A. 
28see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 IW 821 (CC) at 841A-C. 
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It was also argued by the employers that the exclusion of the right to lock-out necessarily 
implied that the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which protected the right, would be 
unconstitutionat.29 This argument was also rejected. The court held that the effect of s 
23 of the Constitution was that the right of employers to use economic power against 
workers would be regulated by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 within the framework of 
the Constitution. 30 
Although the Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords employers a "recourse" to lock-out as 
opposed to employees' "right" to strike, it regulates the two forms of economic pressure 
in the same manner.31 As in the case of strikes, the cornerstone of the Act's approach 
to a lock-out is its definition thereof in s 213. The reason for this is that, should the 
employer's actions fall within the definition, s 64 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which 
affords employers a recourse to lock-out, ands 65, which limits the recourse, will apply. 
If an employer fails to comply with the provisions of ss 64 and 65 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995, the act of instituting a lock-out, or any conduct in contemplation or further-
ance thereof, does not constitute a criminal offence.32 However, non-compliance with 
these two sections may lead to civil proceedings in the form of an application for an inter-
dict in the labour court33 and/or an order by it for compensation for losses attributable 
to such a lock-out.34 
29see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 IW 821 (CC) at 841 E. 
30see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996) 17 IW 821 (CC) at 841 F-G. 
31see par 6.3 of chapter 6 where the manner in which the Labour Relations Act, 1995 regulates strikes is 
set out. 
32Contra s 65(1) read withs 65(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. As in the case of strikes (see note 39 
of chapter 6), contraventions by employers of s 65 seldom lead to criminal proceedings. However, a lock-
out which does comply with ss 64 and 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 may constitute a criminal 
offence in terms of other labour legislation such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Wage 
Act. Consider, for example, where the employer contravenes s 19(1)(b) of the Basic Conditions of Employ-
ment Act when it does not pay excluded employees their wages. The legislature has nevertheless 
indemnified employers by providing in s 67(9) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 that such a contravention 
wUI not constitute a criminal offence (see par 7.3.5 below in this regard). 
331n terms of s 68(1 ). During the period when the Labour Relations Act, 1956 was in force, the industrial 
court (see Food & Allied Workers Union v Royal Beech-Nut (Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 IW 1033 (IC) at 10331-10346 
and Slthole & Others v Federated Timbers Ltd (1989) 10 /W 517 (IC) at 520-521) as well as ordinary courts 
could interdict Ulegal lock-outs. 
34see s 68(1) (b). 
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If the employer has complied with ss 64 and 65 and the lock-out is a protected one, the 
employer is protected against civil liability bys 67(2), read withs 67(6) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995. 35 
However, the employer may also use economic pressure against its employees which 
does not constitute a lock-out as defined.36 In such a case, ss 64 and 65 do not apply. 
These forms of economic pressure, however, may enjoy protection against civil liability 
which is provided for in s 67 of the Labour Relations Act, -1995 if they were implemented 
in contemplation or in furtherance of a protected lock-out. 
7 .3.2 The Definition of a Lock-out 
Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 defines a lock-out as follows 
"lock-out• means the exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer's work-
place, for the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any 
matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the employer 
breaches those employees' contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of 
that exclusion. 
In terms of the definition, a lock-out consists of two37 elements, namely a specified act 
on the part of the employer committed for a specific purpose. 
The definition of a lock-out in the Labour Relations Act, 1956 was much broader and the 
employer had a number of actions and omissions to choose from. Although the legisla-
ture's aim with the broad definition was to retain a measure of control over most forms of 
economic pressure exerted by employers, it arguably had the effect of disturbing the 
balance in the bargaining power between employers and employees. Employers, for 
351n terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 a lock-out which complied with s 65 thereof was legal in the 
sense that no criminal offence was committed and the employer enjoyed protection against civil liability in 
terms of s 79(1) of the Act. The indemnity provided in terms of s 79(1) was broad and included protection 
against civil proceedings for orders for specific performance (such as, for example, applications for orders 
for the payment of notice pay which the employer, in breach of the Basic Conditions of Employment, failed 
to pay when it instituted a lock-out dismissal against its employees - see Msongelwa & Others v Zinc Cor-
poration of SA (1993) 14 /W 917 (T)). Furthermore, lock-outs did not constitute unfair labour practices. 
Consequently, the fairness of lock-outs could not be judged by the industrial court 
36Examples of such economic pressure are the mobilising of public opinion through press statements, 
advertisements. television interviews and the distribution of pamphlets. 
37 A strike has an additional element. namely collectivity on the part of the employees instituting strike 
action (see the definition of a strike Ins 213 of the Labour Relations Ad, 1995 as well as par 6.3.2 of chap-
ter 6 where the definition is discussed In detaD). 
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instance, could exclude employees from the workplace, breach their contracts of 
employment and also dismiss them. 38 
Presumably for this reason, the definition of a lock-out ins 213 of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 affords employers only one form of action which can constitute a lock-out, 
namely the exclusion of employees39 from the workplace. 40 
However, mere exclusion from the workplace will not really have any effect if the 
employer continues to pay the employees their wages as it is obliged to do in terms of 
the common law. 41 The definition accordingly contains the provision that a lock-out 
occurs "whether or not the employer breaches those [excluded] employees' contracts of 
employment in the course of or for the purpose of that exclusion". 
The act of locking employees out must be linked to the purpose set out in the defini-
tion42 namely "to accept a demand43 in respect of any matter of mutual interest 
38see the definition of a lock-out in s 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 19S6. For a dismissal to constitute an 
act in terms of the definition of a lock-out, it had to be linked to one of the purposes set out in the definition 
(see Food & Allied Workers Union v Middevrystaatse Suiwel Kooperasie Bpk (1990) 11 ILJ 776 (IC) at 
788G as well as Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Game Discount World Ltd 
(1990) 11 ILJ 162 (IC) at 1650-F). If no such linkage existed, there was no lock-out. Such a dismissal, 
however, could constitute an unfair labour practice. 
391n terms of the definition, an employer cannot lock a single employee out. The definition refers to "the 
exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer's workplace .. .". See also John Grogan Work-
place Law (1996) 198. 
40John Grogan Workplace Law (1996) 198 submits that it would include a partial exclusion such as a with-
drawal of overtime. 
41 See par 2.4.2.2 of chapter 2 in this regard. 
421t this is not the case, the actions or omissions will not constitute a lock-out as defined. See, for instance, 
Satchwell Controls Paarl and Steel Engineering & Allied Workers Union of SA (1992) 13 IW 1044 (ARB) at 
10S1 where the arbitrator came to the conclusion that the employer's exclusion of its workers from its 
premises was not a lock-out as defined, as the purpose was to compel them to cease breaching their con-
tracts of employment which was not a purpose stipulated in the lock-out definition in s 1 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1956. See also Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Game Dis-
count World Ltd (1990) 11 IW 162 (IC) at 1650-F; Sappi Fine Papers (Pty) Ltd v Pienaar NO & Others 
(1994) 1S /W 137 (LAC) at 1400-F; SA Chemical Workers Union v Plascon Inks & Packaging Coatings (Pty) 
Ltd (1991) 12 /W 353 (IC) at 361E-F; Ngewu & Others v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co Ltd; 
Masondo & Others v Union Co-operative Bark & Sugar Co Ltd (1983) 4 /W 41 (N) at SSH and National 
Union of Metalworkers of SA v Cobra Watertech (1994) 15 /W 832 OC) at 839G-I. 
431t could be argued that the reference to a ·demancr in the definition suggests that It covers only offensive 
lock-outs (see Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) 534). It is suggested that this is 
not the case as the Labour Relations Act, 1995 makes provision for other forms of lock-outs. Ins 76(1)(b), 
for example, the Act clearty refers to a defensive lock-out. 
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between employer and employee". 44 The matters about which the employer may lock 
employees out are the same as those about which employees may strike. 45 Matters of 
"mutual interest" is a very wide concept46 and employers are accordingly able to lock 
employees out about an extremely wide and diverse range of matters. 
Because of its breadth, the purpose element does not play an important role in limiting 
employers' recourse to lock employees out. However, as will appear from the discussion 
below, other statutory provisions, particularly ss 64 and 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995, present very real and extensive restrictions on employers' recourse to lock-out. 
7 .3.3 A Recourse to Lock-out 
As was indicated earlier, s 64 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not afford 
employers a "right" but only a "recourse" to lock-out.47 
What a "recourse" as opposed to a "right" to lock-out entails in practical terms remains to 
be seen. An employer which has complied with the statutory requirements for a 
"recourse" to lock-out is entitled to the same protection against civil claims as strikers 
who participate in a protected strike. 48 
7.3.3.1 Limitations on a Recourse to Lock-out 
Section 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which prohibits employees from striking in 
a number of instances,49 also ·applies to lock-outs.SO In addition, s 64, which sets out 
the procedural requirements for strikes which are not prohibited in terms of s 6s,51 also 
applies to lock-outs. 52 Accordingly, lock-outs which are not absolutely prohibited by s 
44see the definition in s 213 of the Labour Reiations Act, 1995. 
45see par 6.3.2 of chapter 6 where the definition of a strike was analysed. 
46see par 6.3.2 of chapter 6 where the meaning of the concept matters of •mutual interest• was analysed. 
47see s 64(1) as well as par 7.3.1 above. 
48see s 67(2)(a) and (6)(a). 
49see par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6 where s 65 with regard to strikes is discussed in detail. 
50sees65. 
51 See par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6 where s 64 is discussed. 
52sees64. 
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65 will only acquire statutory protection once the employer has complied with the proce-
dural requirements stipulated in s 64. 
7.3.4 The Consequences of a Protected Lock-out 
Section 67 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which affords indemnity against civil liability 
for strikers who have complied with ss 64 and 65 of the Act, 53 also applies to lock-outs 
which comply with these two sections. 54 Consequently; employers cannot be interdicted 
from instituting a protected lock-out and no action for compensation can be brought 
against them for any loss suffered as a result of such a lock-out. 55 
Employers also enjoy protection against civil liability for any conduct in contemplation or 
in furtherance of protected lock-outs. 56 One of the most effective forms of such conduct 
is the non-payment of wages. Mere exclusion from the workplace would not really be an 
effective weapon if the employer continues to remunerate the locked out employees. The 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 has accordingly specifically released the employer from this 
obligation during a protected lock-out. 57 It has also indemnified the employer against 
criminal liability which it may incur for such non payment in terms of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act58 or the Wage Act. 59 
Employees who live in accommodation provided by their employer may be evicted from 
it upon their dismissal. During the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, 
employers which locked their employees out by dismissing them, often also evicted 
them from such accommodation.60 However, in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 
53see par 6.3.5.1 of chapter 6. 
54see s 67(2) and (6)(a). 
55see s 67(2)(a) and (6)(a). 
56see s 67(2)(b) and (6)(b). 
57see s 67(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. See also the definition of a lock-out ins 213 of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 where it is provided that a breach of the employees' contracts in the course of such an 
exclusion would not preclude the exclusion from constituting a statutory lock-out 
58consider, for instance, s 19(1 )(b) read with s 25(1) of the Act in terms of which an employer who 
deprives an employee of his remuneration or part thereof is guilty of an offence. See also Msongelwa & 
Others v Zinc Corporation of SA (1993) 14 /W 917 (f) at 922H-923A 
59see s 67(9) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
OOsee, for example, the facts in NTE Ltd v Ngubane & Others (1992) 13 /W 91 o (LAC) at 914H and 925. 
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1995, employees can prevent such an eviction by requesting the employer not to discon-
tinue providing payment in kind (ie accommodation) during the lock-out.61 
In terms of s 67, employers are also protected against civil liability for conduct in con-
templation or in furtherance of their protected lock-outs such as the issuing of press 
statements or advertisements or the distribution of pamphlets. The protection afforded 
by s 67 also covers defamatory statements made during such interviews or in such 
advertisements and pamphlets.62 
However, employers do not enjoy protection against civil liability for conduct in con-
templation or in furtherance of a protected lock-out which constitutes an offence. 63 
Accordingly, employers may not enjoy such protection in respect of statements which, 
for instance, violate the dignity of a trade union or an official and constitute crimen 
injuria. 64 Criminal defamation may also be committed wher~ the employer's message 
injures the reputation and good name of an employee or trade union or an official. 65 
Consequently, although an employer is protected in respect of the delict defamation, it 
may incur civil liability for defamatory statements which constitute a common law 
offence. 
Being protected against actions for damages is of particular importance to employers. 
Unlike strikers employers have the financial resources which makes civil proceedings 
against them for damages or for orders for specific performance66 feasible options for 
employees and their trade unions. 
7 .3.5 Economic Pressure which does not Constitute a Lock-out 
There are a number of forms of economic pressure which employers may exercise 
against their employees which do not constitute a lock-out as defined. Often, these 
61 Sees 67(3)(a). 
62see also par 6.3.5.1 of chapter 6. 
63see s 67(8). See also par 6.3.5.1 of chapter 6. 
64see note 9 in par 7.2 above where this offence is discussed. 
651bid. 
66conslder, for example, Msongelwa & Others v Zinc Corporation of SA (1993) 14 /W 917 (T) and NTE Ltd 
v Ngubane & Others {1992) 13 /W 910 (LAC) where the employees endeavoured to obtain an order in 
terms of which their employers had to pay them their wages and/or their notice pay which they forfeited as 
a result of the lock-out. 
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forms of economic pressure are exercised in contemplation or in furtherance of a lock-
out, but they can be exercised independently. 
During the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, an employer was able to circum-
vent a trade union and to make an offer directly to its employees in order to get them not 
to resort to strike action. It was able to do this once an impasse had been reached. 67 If 
the union had bargained in good faith, the employer could not make a better offer than 
its final offer to the union. 68 However, if the trade union had bargained in bad faith, the 
employer could make a better offer.69 
By virtue of s 5(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, this form of economic pressure is 
no longer available to an employer if employees are engaging in a protected strike. It 
reads as follows 
No person may advantage, or promise to advantage, an employee .. .in exchange for that 
person not exercising any right conferred by this Act or not participating in any pro-
ceedings in terms of this Act. However, nothing in this section precludes the parties to a 
dispute from concluding an agreement to settle that dispute. 
If an employer acts in contravention of s 5(3), the trade union may refer the dispute to a 
bargaining council or the Commission. 70 Should the dispute remain unresolved, the 
trade union may refer the dispute to the labour court for adjudication. 71 
The employer will probably still be able to resort to this form of economic pressure in the 
case of a threatened unprotected strike as it would not be endeavouring to prevent the 
employees from exercising a right conferred by the Ac~. Under such circumstances, 
however, it would probably elect to approach the labour court for an interdict prohibiting 
the employees from proceeding with their unprotected strike. 72 
67see National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 IW 1221 (A) at 12371-
J. 
68See National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 IW 1221 (A) at 12398-
C and Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Indian Ocean Fertilizer (1991) 12 /W 822 (IC) at 828A-
B. 
69see National Union of Mineworkers v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12 /W 1221 (A) at 1239E. 
70see s 9(1). 
71 See s 9(4). 
72see s 68(1 )(a) as well as par 7.3.4 above. 
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It is suggested that s 5(3) does not prohibit an employer from unilaterally changing 
employees' terms and conditions of employment if the change is not made in exchange 
for the employees not resorting to strike action. However, the right of the employer to 
unilaterally change employees' terms and conditions of employment is restricted by s 
64(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. In terms of s 64(4)(a), the trade union may 
require the employer not to implement the change unilaterally until the bargaining council 
or the Commission has issued a certificate stating that the dispute regarding the 
unilateral change remains.unresolved or a period of 30 days has elapsed since the refer-
ral of the dispute was received by the bargaining council or the Commission.73.or, if the 
employer has already implemented the change unilaterally, the trade union may, in terms 
of s 64(4)(b), require the employer to restore the terms and conditions of employment 
which applied before the change until the bargaining council or the Commission has 
issued a certificate stating that the dispute regarding the unilateral change remains 
unresolved or a period of 30 days has elapsed since the referral of the dispute was 
received by the bargaining council or the Commission. 7 4 - -
The employer must comply with the union's requirement within 48 hours of service of the 
referral on the employer.75 If the employer fails to comply with the union's requirement 
and the status quo is therefore not maintained or restored, the employees may strike 
without first having to comply with the requirements of s 64(1).76 
Employers may furthermore hire temporary workers to lessen the economic harm which 
they suffer as a result of a strike.77 They, however, may not employ temporary labour 
during an offensive78 or a pre-emptive79 lock-out.BO Employers are nevertheless 
73see s 64(4)(a) read withs 64(1)(a). 
74see s 64(4)(b) read withs 64(1)(a). 
7Ssee s 64(5). 
76See s 64(3)(e). For a discussion of the requirements of s 64(1), see par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6. 
nsee s 76. See also par 6.4 of chapter 6. See further the facts of National Union of Mineworkers v East 
Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd (1991) 12/W1221 (A) at 1232C-D. 
78see par 7.1 above for a discussion of offensive lock-outs. 
791bid. 
SOsees 76(1)(b). 
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entitled to hire temporary workers if the lock-out is in response to a strike,B1 in other 
words, if it is a defensive lock-out.B2 
Economic pressure may also be exercised through stockpiling. B3 Employers utilise their 
extra stock to lessen the economic harm which their employees' industrial action may 
cause or to minimise their losses when they lock their employees out. 
During the period in which the Labour Relations Act, -1956 was in force, employers could 
dismiss employees in order to force them to accede to their demands. Such a dismissal 
could constitute a lock-out as defined in the Act. B4 If that was the case, the employer 
could enjoy the protection afforded in s 79 of the Act against civil liability for the lock-out. 
If, however, the dismissal was not linked to one of the purposes of a lock-out, the fair-
ness of such a dismissal could be judged by the industrial court in terms of its unfair 
labour practice jurisdiction. B5 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 has severely restricted dismissal as a form of economic 
pressure. In terms of the Act, a dismissal to compel employees to accept a demand in 
respect of any matter about which the parties may bargain collectively, constitutes an 
automatically unfair dismissal. B6 In addition, the dismissal of strikers who participate in a 
protected strike is also branded by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as an automatically 
unfair dismissal. B7 Nevertheless, strikers' protection against dismissal is not absolute. 
The employer may dismiss them for operational reasons.BB However, an employer 
which wants to dismiss strikers for this reason, must ensure that the dismissal complies 
81 Sees 76(1 )(b). 
82see par 7.1 above for a discussion of defensive lock-outs. 
83For a discussion of this form of economic pressure, see Neil W Chamberlain and James W Kuhn 
Collective Bargaining 3 ed (1986) 187-188. 
84rhat is if the purpose of the dismissal was one of the purposes set out in the definition of a lock-out in s 1 
of the Act. 
SSsee, for example, the facts of Chemical Workers Industrial Union & Others v Indian Ocean Fertilizer 
(1991) 12 IW 822 (IC) as well as Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Game Dis-
count World Ltd (1990) 11 IW 162 (IC) at 165E-F. See also lnthiran Moodley "The Key to Unlocking the 
'Lock-out'?· (1990) 11 IW 1 at 17. 
86see s 187(1)(c). See also par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3 where automatically unfair dismissals are discussed. 
87 See s 187(1 )(a) read with s 67(4). See also par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3 where automatically unfair dismissals 
are discussed. 
88see s 67(5). See also par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6 in this regard. 
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with the statutory requirements for a fair dismissal. 89 This has proved to be a fairly diffi-
cult task, especially with regard to the extent of economic harm which the employer must 
have suffered to make the dismissal substantively fair. 90 
In conclusion, because the forms of economic pressure discussed above do not con-
stitute lock-outs as defined in terms of s 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, they are 
not covered byss 64 and 65 of the Act. By the same token, however, employers will only 
enjoy indemnity in terms of-s 67 against civil proceedings in.. the labour court in respect of 
such actions and omissions if they are implemented in contemplation or in furtherance of 
protected lock-outs. If this is not the case, the employer could face civil proceedings in 
respect of these actions and omissions. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
- -
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 plays a very important role in the regulation of the use of 
economic power by employers. 
Although the Act affords employers only a recourse to lock-out,91 they are accorded the 
right to utilise a lock-out to enforce their demands or to either pre-empt or counter 
employees' exercise of economic power.92 
The definition of a lock-out ins 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 is narrower than 
the one in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 as it affords employers only one form 
of action which can constitute a lock-out, namely the exclusion of employees from the 
workplace. 93 
The matters about which an employer may lock employees out are the same as those 
about which the latter may strike, namely matters of "mutual interest".94 The wide ambit 
of the concept "mutual interest" affords employers tremendous scope as regards the 
matters about which they may lock employees out. 
89see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3. 
9Clsee par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6 in this regard. 
91s 73 abo. ee par .. 1 ve. 
92see par 7.1 above. 
93see par 7.3.2 above. 
94see par 7.3.2 above read with par 6.3.2 of chapter 6. 
289 
Economic Power 
The prerequisites for a pro;tected lock-out are the same as those for a protected strike. 95 
Accordingly, lock-outs w~1ich are not absolutely prohibited by s 65 will only acquire 
statutory protection once t.he employer has complied with the procedural requirements 
stipulated in s 64. 96 It is r~asonably easy to comply with these requirements as they are 
few in number and relatively simple. 97 
The protection afforded by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to lock-outs which comply 
with the provisions of ss $4 and 65 is far-reaching and promotes the effectiveness of a 
lock-out. 98 In addition, the fact that this protection is also afforded to any conduct in 
contemplation or in furtherance of a protected lock-out, further promotes the effective-
ness of such a lock-out. 99 Non-payment of wages, arguably the most effective form of 
pressure in the furtherance of a lock-out, is specifically regulated in the Act. 100 It 
releases the employer from this obligation during a protected lock-out and indemnifies 
the employer against criminal liability which it may incur for such non-payment in terms 
of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act or the Wage Act.101 
It is submitted that employers may make greater use of lock-outs in the future. During 
the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, they seldom resorted to lock-outs.102 
Apart from owner-related considerations, 103 employers often had problems ensuring 
that their economic pressure constituted a statutory lock-out.104 This was particularly 
true if the action took the form of dismissal. Frequently, that which an employer thought 
9Ssee par 7.3.3.1 above read with par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6. 
96see par 7.3.3.1 above. 
971bid. 
98see par 7.3.4 above. 
gglbid. 
1 OOsee s 67(3) as well as par 7.3.4 above. 
101 See s 67(9) as well as par 7.3.4 above. 
102see Andrew Prior "The Luck of the Lock-out: A Brief Examination of the Lock-out Option• (1990) 11 /W 
460; AA Landman "The Right to Strike and the Right to Lock-out in the New Labour Dispensation" (1995) 
4(8) CLL 85 as well as M OIMer "Ultslultings• (1992) De Rebus 555. 
103Lock-outs bring either a total halt to or a reduction in production and can cause a loss of customers as 
well as financial losses. See Sonia Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa 3 ed (1996) at 533 where she 
states "In practice, lock-outs occur far less frequently than strikes, ... because an employer has far more to 
lose, in total, by closing down his operations than an individual employee loses by engaging in strike 
action". 
104see M OIMer "Lock-outs (Final)" (1992) De Rebus 626 at 628. 
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was a lock-out, amounted to a dismissa1105 which could he judged by the industrial 
court.106 A further reason for employers seldom resorting to lock-outs was that they had 
another economic weapon namely, dismissat.107 They often resorted to dismissal to 
counter industrial action or to rid themselves of employees who refused to work on their 
terms and conditions. In terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, however, dismissal 
under such circumstances is branded as automatically unfair.108 
It is further submitted that employers will rather resort-to protective or defensive lock-
outs 109 than to offensive 110 or pre-emptive 111 ones as they are only statutorily entitled 
to employ temporary labour during the former.112 
1051n Food Workers Council of SA & Others v Fresh Mark (Pty) Ltd (1995) 16 /W 175 (IC) at 178 the indus-
trial court held that the dismissal was not a lock-out but a dismissal. See also the facts of SA Chemical 
Workers Union v Plascon Inks & Packaging Coatings (Pty) Ltd (1991) 12 /W 353 (IC) at 366; Commercial 
Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & Others v Game Discount World Ltd (1990) 11 /W 162 (IC) as well 
as National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Cobra Watertech (1994) 15 /W 832 (IC) at 839G-H. 
106-rhis was because a dismissal which was not linked to one of the purposes in the definition of a lock-out 
did not constitute a lock-out. It constituted a dismissal which could be judged by the court in terms of its 
unfair labour practice definition jurisdiction (see Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union of SA & 
Others v Game Discount World Ltd (1990) 11 /W 162 (IC) at 165F-1 and National Union of Metalworkers of 
SA v Cobra Watertech (1994) 15 /W 832 (IC) at 839). 
107see John Grogan Collective Labour Law (1993) at 106. 
108see par 7.3.5 above. 
109see par 7.1 where protective lock-outs are discussed. 
110see par 7.1 where this type of lock-out is discussed. 
111tbid. 
112see s 76(1)(b). 
CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the extent to which employer prerogative is restricted by the law and col-
lective bargaining is summarised and certain conclusions are drawn. 
8.2 A SUMMARY OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH EMPLOYERS' PREROGATIVE 
HAS BEEN RESTRICTED 
As was indicated in chapter 1, 1 it is generally accepted by employers and most2 trade 
unions that employers have the right to manage their employees. The legal basis for this 
right is to be found in the contract of employment which has as one of its elements the 
subordination of the employee to the authority of the employer. This element affords the 
employer the legal right to give instructions and creates the legal duty for the employee 
to obey these instructions. 3 
Employers' right to manage is neither fixed nor static. 4 This is because there is a con-
stant struggle between employers and employees about the extent of this right, mainly 
because of their different objectives. Employers strive to retain as much of their preroga-
tive as possible to ensure that employees' labour potential is converted as effectively as 
possible into actual productive labour whereas employees strive to improve their terms 
and conditions of employment. 
The main purpose of this thesis was to determine the extent of employers' right to 
manage employees.5 This was done by examining the restrictions imposed by the law 
and collective bargaining in accordance with Storey·s6 definition of employer prerogative 
namely 
1 See par 1.4.1 of chapter 1. 
2Trade unions which hold a radical view of industrial relations (see par 1. 7.3 in chapter 1 where this view is 
discussed) do not hold this view. 
3see par 1.4.2 of chapter 1 as well as par 2.3.1 of chapter 2 where subordination as an element of the con-
tract of employment, is discussed. 
4see par 1.6.1.2 of chapter 1. 
Ssee par 1. 7 of chapter 1. 
6John Storey The Challenge to Management Control {1980) 41. 
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[a]s a working definition we ... consider managerial prerogatives to be the residue of discre-
tionary powers of decision left to management when the regulative impacts of law and col-
lective agreements have been subtracted. 
Essentially, therefore, the examination was focussed on what is left of employer preroga-
tive.? 
The impact of the common law on employer prerogative was examined first. 8 The 
examination showed that the common law favours the employer. It allows the employer 
to unilaterally impose the terms and conditions of the contract of employment on the 
employee. 9 Through the subordination element of the contract of employment, the 
employer acquires the right to give instructions to the employee.10 And, through residual 
terms such as the duty to be respectful, 11 to work in a cometent manner 12 and to act in 
good faith, 13 this right of the employer is strengthened. Furthermore, the fact that these 
residual terms are phrased in such broad terms, 14 further-enhances the employer's 
prerogative as it allows the employer to give a broad interpretation to these duties. 
However, the right to dismiss by giving the required notice undoubtedly represents the 
common law's most important contribution to enforcing and strengthening the 
employer's right to manage.15 The fear of losing their jobs through notice, and with no 
consideration of the concept of fairness, plays a pivotal role in employees' preparedness 
to follow instructions and to comply with their other contractual duties. Dismissal by 
notice also plays a crucial role in employees' preparedness to agree to changes to their 
original terms and conditions of employment. 
7 See also par 1.8 of chapter 1. 
Bsee chapter 2. 
9see pars 2.2 and 2.5 of chapter 2. 
1 Osee par 2.3.1 of chapter 2. 
11 See par 2.4.4 of chapter 2. 
12see par 2.4.6 of chapter 2. 
13see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2. 
14see pars 2.4.4-2.4.6 of chapter 2. 
15see par 2.4.10.3 of chapter 2. 
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An examination of South African labour legislation 16 in chapter 3 indicated that legisla-
tion has not challenged the basic common law premise that the employment relationship 
is a contractual one and that the employer has the right to utilise and control the labour 
potential of the employee.17 Legislation, however, has taken cognisance of the unequal 
bargaining relationship between employers and individual employees 18 and is aimed at 
preventing or limiting the exploitation of employees and at promoting job security. 
The statutory limitations take three basic forms.· The-first set of limitations regulates the 
ability of the employer to enter into contracts of employment. 19 Employers retain their 
right to decide whom to employ provided they are not statutorily prohibited from employ-
ing applicants and that they do not unfairly discriminate against applicants on arbitrary 
grounds.20 
The second set of limitations restricts employers' decision-making pewee vis-a-vis per-
sons already in employment.21 In this regard, a distinction can be made between the 
employer's right to give instructions22 and the terms and conditions of employment.23 
With regard to employers' right to give instructions, legislation has not alienated the right 
but has restricted it by requiring that instructions must be lawful and reasonable and that 
they must be in accordance with certain statutory measures regarding the work which 
must be done, the manner in which the work must be done, the place where the work 
must be done and when the work must be done. 24 
As far as terms and conditions of employment are concerned, labour legislation goes 
some way towards addressing the unequal bargaining power between employers and 
employees by prescribing minimum terms and conditions of employment. 25 The Basic 
16see pars 3.1 and 3.5 of chapter 3. 
17 See par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
1 Ssee par 2.2 of chapter 2. 
19see par 3.2 of chapter 3. 
201bid. 
21 See par 3.3 of chapter 3. 
22see par 3.3.2 of chapter 3. 
23see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3. 
24see par 3.3.2 of chapter 3. 
2Ssee par 3.3.3 of chapter 3. 
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Conditions of Employment Act, for example, regulates the minimum remuneration for 
overtime, work on Sundays and public holidays and sets out the formulae according to 
which such remuneration must be calculated. It also makes provision for paid annual 
leave and sick leave.26 
However, legislation does not regulate all terms and conditions of employment. It, for 
instance, only_ regulates ordinary minimum remuneration in areas and industries where 
trade unions do not really feature or are not well organised and- effective collective 
bargaining does not therefore exist.27 In addition, terms such as bonuses, increments, 
training, bursaries, maternity leave, 28 paternity leave, study leave, compassionate leave, 
accommodation, meals, clothing, travel allowances, housing subsidies and other 
allowances have been left to the parties to bargain about.29 However, the employer's 
prerogative regarding these terms and conditions is restricted by Schedule 7 in that it 
must ensure that it does not commit an unfair labour practice_ as defined ir:i the Schedule 
when formulating the conditions on which it is prepared to afford these terms to employ-
ees. 30 
The third set of statutory limitations limits or restricts the employer's right to discipline 
and to dismiss.31 Employers have retained the right to discipline. However, the 
employer's right to decide on rules of conduct has been restricted by the requirement 
261bid. 
27 See par 3.3.3 of chapter 3. See also par 5.3.2.4 of chapter 5 where the determination of minimum wages 
through collective bargaining is discussed. 
28The Basic Conditions of Employment Act does not regulate maternity leave. Although it stipulates that 
pregnant employees may not work four weeks prior to their confinement and eight weeks thereafter, this 
cannot be regarded as maternity leave as these employees are not afforded any form of job security 
and/or payment for the period which they are prohibited from working. These are accordingly matters for 
negotiation. The Labour Relations Act, 1995, however, has provided a measure of job security for female 
employees through its provisions regarding unfair dismissal. It brands the refusal of an employer to allow a 
female employee to resume work after she took agreed maternity leave or was absent for the compulsory 
period stipulated in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, as a dismissal. In addition, it brands a dis-
missal of a female employee because of her pregnancy, or intended pregnancy, or any reason related to 
her pregnancy, as automatically unfair. For a detaUed discussion on these legislative provisions, see pars 
3.3.3 and 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3. 
29see par 3.3.3 of chapter 3. 
30see par 3.3.3 of chapter a. 
31 See par 3.4 of chapter 3. 
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that rules must be reasonable or fair. 32 The concept of progressive or corrective dis-
cipline as established in the Code, restricts the employer's right to elect a penalty. In 
accordance with this concept, it will have to implement penalties with due regard to the 
severity of the offence and will only be able to dismiss for a serious offence or for 
repeated offences. 33 
Nevertheless, the common law right to demand respect34 and good faith35 on the part 
of employees has remained relatively unaffected by legislation and -will accordingly con-
tinue to play an important role in determining acceptable conduct of employees in the 
workplace. The right to demand good faith will remain particularly important. Because of 
its broad connotation, as in the past, it will enable an employer to rely on it in misconduct 
cases, particularly if the offence the employee is accused of is not listed in the dis-
ciplinary code. 36 
Employers' right to dismiss has been severely restricted by the Labour Relations Act, 
1995. Chapter VIII thereof and the Code have essentially eradicated arbitrary dismiss-
als. 37 Through these provisions employees, irrespective of whether they are probation-
ary, ordinary or fixed term employees, have been provided with a substantial degree of 
job security. The statutory restriction of the employer's right to dismiss can be regarded 
as one of the most far-reaching of all restrictions on its prerogative. As a result of this 
restriction, the employer can no longer force employees to comply with its instructions or 
to accept new or altered terms and conditions of employment by threatening dismissal 
on notice. 38 
The legislature has not only used minimum standards legislation to prevent exploitation 
and to promote bargaining equality between an employer and an individual employee. It 
has also endeavoured to do this through the statutory promotion of collective bargain-
32see par 3.4.3.3.2.1 of chapter 3 where it was pointed out that the fairness or reasonableness of a rule 
must be considered when the substantive fairness of a dismissal for misconduct is considered. Also, where 
a workplace forum exists, an employer must consult and reach consensus with it before implementing any 
proposal concerning its disciplinary code and procedure (see par 4.3.3.2 of chapter 4). 
33see pars 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of chapter 3 in regard to the concept of progressive discipline. 
34see par 2.4.4 of chapter 2. 
35see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2. 
36see par 3.3.6 of chapter 3. 
37see par 3.4.3 of chapter 3 where these statutory provisions are discussed. 
38see pars 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 of chapter 3. 
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ing. 39 In fact, it has clearly indicated that it regards collective bargaining as the preferred 
method to determine all terms and conditions of employment, including those in respect 
of which it has stipulated minima. 40 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 which regulates collective bargaining, however, does not 
make provision for a statutory duty to bargain.41 Accordingly, an employer's prepared-
ness to bargain with a trade union about terms and conditions of employment and other 
matters of mutual interest is principally determined-by- its bargaining strength vis-a-vis a 
union. However, through its regulation of a framework for collective bargaining, the Act 
extends significant rights to trade unions, thereby increasing their bargaining strength. 42 
It provides extensive protection for the right of employees to form, join and participate in 
the lawful affairs of trade unions. 43 It also regulates the acquisition of organisational 
rights.44 In addition, it regulates the establishment of collective bargaining structures 
such as bargaining councils. 45 The Act also regulates the leg_al nature and enforceability 
of collective agreements. 46 It furthermore makes provision for the right to strike to 
enforce collective bargaining rights, subject to the prior requirement of obtaining an 
advisory award47 and the protection of strikers against dismissa1.48 In addition, the Act 
also limits unilateral decision-making by the employer. 49 
The effectiveness of collective bargaining as a means of regulating employer prerogative 
is of course dependent on the topics about which collective bargaining can take place. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 is phrased in very broad terms and does not restrict the 
39see par 3.1 of chapter 3 as well as par 4.2 of chapter 4 in this regard. 
40see par 3.5 of chapter 3. 
41~~ par 4.2.1 of chapter 4. 
42See par 4.2 of chapter 4. 
43see par 4.2.2 of chapter 4. 
44see par 4.2.3 of chapter 4. 
45see par 4.2.5 of chapter 4. 
46see pars 4.2.6 and 4.2. 7 of chapter 4. 
47see par 4.2.1 of chapter 4. 
48see par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6. 
49see par 7.3.5 of chapter 7. 
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collective bargaining parties' freedom in this regard.50 In addition, the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act affords precedence to collective agreements which regulate terms 
and conditions of employment also regulated in the Act.51 
From the survey done in chapter 5 of this thesis, it appears that where collective bargain-
ing takes place, most facets of the employment relationship are regulated by collective 
agreements rather than being the product of unilateral employer decisions. The survey 
also indicates that the ambit of collective bargaining, in certain- cases at least, is being 
extended to issues beyond the employment relationship. However, matters which have 
not received much attention from trade unions so far are those related to the business or 
economic component of enterprises52 such as the issuing of shares, investment of sur-
plus funds, the purchasing of a plant or new equipment, 53 the relocation of the busi-
ness, 54 exporting, customer services, the prices of products and product development. 
Employers, however, in future may also be challenged by trade unions about these mat-
ters, particularly now that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 lists some of these matters for 
consultation with workplace forums. 55 
Notwithstanding the importance they attached to collective bargaining, the drafters of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 also realised its shortcomings in the South African context. 
They argued that a second channel of communication was necessary between 
employers and employees to improve productivity and to ensure greater competi-
tiveness. 56 The result has been the introduction of provisions which envisage the estab-
lishment of workplace forums. 57 These bodies can be seen as supplementing rather 
than undermining collective bargaining. 58 In essence, they are meant to relieve collec-
tive bargaining of functions to which it is not well suited. 
50see par 4.4 of chapter 4. 
511bid. 
52see par 1.2 of chapter 1 where this sphere of a business is discussed. See also par 5.5 of chapter 5. 
53see par 5.5 of chapter 5. 
541bid. 
55see also par 4.3.3.1 of chapter 4 where the matters listed for consultation with workplace forums are dis-
cussed. 
SSsee par 4.1 of chapter 4. 
57 See par 4.3 of chapter 4. 
58see pars 4.1 and 4.3.1 of chapter 4. 
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Employers' prerogative regarding the matters listed in s 84 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 for consultation with workplace forums is not severely restricted. An employer must 
only "attempt" to reach consensus with a workplace forum and, provided the forum's 
constitution does not contain a deadlock breaking mechanism which includes arbitra-
tion, the employer may unilaterally implement its proposal about any of the listed mat-
ters. 59 The range of matters about which a workplace forum can exercise its joint 
decision-making function is limited compared to that about which it must be consulted, 
but its joint decision-making function is. more restrictive- of employer prerogative. Once 
the employer has initiated the joint decision-making process, it must reach consensus 
with the workplace forum. If this does not happen, its choices are very limited. It may 
either decide to risk arbitration or retain the status quo. 60 
The legislature appreciated that collective bargaining without the right to exert economic 
pressure, such as strike action, to force the employer to comply with empl_oyees' collec-
tive demands would amount to collective begging. 61 It has accordingly made provision 
for and regulated strike action and conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of strike 
action.62 
Through its broad definition of a strike, the Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords employ-
ees a variety of forms of economic pressure which, provided they comply with the other 
requirements of a strike, may enjoy protected status in terms of the Act.63 In addition, 
the broad ambit of the concept "mutual interest" in the definition affords employees 
tremendous scope as regards the matters about which they may institute strike action.64 
Section 65 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, however, constitutes a significant limitation 
of the right to strike, particularly subsec (1)(c) thereof which prohibits strike action about 
matters which must be referred to arbitration or adjudication by the labour court in terms 
of the Act. 65 The number of matters which must, in terms of the Act, be settled in one of 
59see pars 4.3.3.1 and 4.4 of chapter 4. 
60see pars 4.3.3.2 and 4.4 of chapter 4. 
61 See par 6.2 of chapter 6. 
62see par 6.3 of chapter 6. 
63see par 6.3.2 of chapter 6. 
641bicl. 
65see par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6. 
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these ways, are extensive. 66 It includes issues about which employees may have been 
able to strike due to the breadth of the concept "mutual interest" in the definition of a 
strike. It also covers a number of issues about which employees used to be able to strike 
in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1956 such as unfair dismissals, unfair discrimina-
tion, other unfair labour practices and disputes about freedom of association. 
Although s 65 severely restricts the right to strike, those strikes which are not prohibited 
by it can be legitimised fairly easily because of the few and relatively-simple procedural 
requirements with which such strikes must comply in order to obtain statutory pro-
tection. 67 
The protection afforded by the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to strikes which comply with 
the provisions of ss 64 and 65 is far-reaching and promotes the effectiveness of a strike. 
In addition, the fact that this protection is also afforded to any conduct in _contemplation 
or in furtherance of a protected strike, further promotes the effectiveness of such a 
strike.68 Picketing, undoubtedly one of the most effective forms of pressure in the fur-
therance of a strike, is not only permitted but statutorily promoted and protected. 69 
The most important form of statutory protection for strikers is protection against dis-
missal. 70 However, although protection against dismissal enhances the effectiveness of 
a strike as a valuable economic weapon, the effectiveness is lessened by a number of 
factors. The fact that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 allows an employer to employ 
temporary labour71 will probably lessen the effectiveness of a strike, particularly as the 
employer does not have to remunerate the strikers for the duration of the strike. 72 And, 
of great importance, strikers' protection against dismissal is not absolute. The employer 
has retained the right to dismiss them if the operational requirements of the business 
necessitate this. 73 It, however, may not be that easy for the employer to comply with the 
661bid. 
67see par 6.3.3.1 of chapter 6. 
68see par 6.3.5.1 of chapter 6. 
69see par 6.3.5.1 of chapter 6. 
70see par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6. 
71 See par 6.4 of chapter 6. 
72see par 6.3.5.3 of chapter 6. 
73see par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6. 
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statutory requirements for a fair dismissal for this reason,74 particularly where it had 
been able to keep production going with the help of non-striking workers and temporary 
labour. Nevertheless, the fact remains that dismissal is still an option available to an 
employer. 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 also allows employers to use economic power, most 
importantly lock-outs, to either force employees to accede to their demands, or to pre-
empt employees' plans to exert economic power against them or.to counter employees' 
exercise of economic power.75 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995 affords employers a "recourse" to lock-out as opposed 
to employees' "right" to strike. This is in accordance with the provisions of the interim 
Constitution which afforded employers a "recourse" to lock-out and employees a "right" 
to strike. 76 It nevertheless regulates the two forms of economic pressure in the same 
manner.77 -
It is submitted that, although the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not afford them a right 
to lock-out and it is uncertain what the legal implications of a "recourse" to a lock-out are, 
employers may make more use of lock-outs in the future. 78 They may resort to pro-
tective or defensive lock-outs79 in order to prevent strikers from damaging company 
property and intimidating non-striking workers and temporary labour. Also, the fact that 
they are statutorily entitled to employ temporary labour during such a lock-out, may con-
tribute to their preparedness to implement such a measure. Employers may, however, 
refrain from resorting to offensive80 or pre-emptive81 lock-outs as they are statutorily 
prohibited from employing temporary workers in these circumstances. 82 
7 4see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3 as well as par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6. 
75see par 7.1 of chapter 7. 
76see par 7.3.1 of chapter 7. 
n See par 7 .3.1 of chapter 7. See also par 6.3 of chapter 6 where the manner in which the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995 regulates strikes is set out. 
78see par 7.4 of chapter 7. 
79see par 7. 1 of chapter 7 where protective lock-outs are discussed. 
SOsee par 7.1 of chapter 7 where this type of lock-outs is discussed. 
811bid. 
82see par 7.4 of chapter 7. 
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Another reason for employers' possible willingness to utilise lock-outs in the future may 
be that other forms of economic pressure used in the past, particularly dismissal, have 
been severely restricted by the Labour Relations Act, 1995. In terms of the Act, a dis-
missal to compel employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter about which 
the parties may bargain collectively, constitutes an automatically unfair dismissa1.83 In 
addition, the dismissal of strikers who participate in a protected strike is branded an 
automatically unfair dismissal by the Labour Relations Act, 1995.84 Nevertheless, 
strikers' protection against dismissal is not-absolute. The employer- may dismiss them for 
operational reasons.85 However, an employer which wants to dismiss strikers for this 
reason, must ensure that the dismissal complies with the statutory requirements for a fair 
dismissal. 86 This has proved to be a fairly difficult task, especially with regard to the 
extent of economic harm which must be proven by the employer to make the dismissal 
substantively fair. 87 
8.3 CONCLUSIONS 
From the above summary it appears that most88 of an employer's common law 
decision-making powers have been statutorily regulated. Of great importance, however, 
is that, although the restrictions may be particularly severe in certain instances, 89 the 
statutory provisions have not rescinded any of the employer's decision-making powers. 
Even in the case of the matters listed in s 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 for joint 
decision-making with workplace forums, the employer has retained a measure of its 
decision-making power. 90 
83see par 3.4.3.2 of chapter 3. 
841bid. 
85see par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6. 
86see par 3.4.3.3.4 of chapter 3. 
· 87 See par 6.3.5.2 of chapter 6. 
88Legislation has not essentially interfered with the employer's right to respect (see par 2.4.4 of chapter 2) 
and to good faith on the part of its employees (see par 2.4.5 of chapter 2). 
891t is suggested that even in the case of drastic or far-reaching statutory interference such as with an 
employer's right to dismiss either summarily or on notice (see par 3.4.3 of chapter 3), employers' have not 
lost these rights. They have retained them although in severely restricted forms. 
90-rhe Act provides the employer with a choice if consensus cannot be reached with the forum. It may risk 
arbitration or revert to the status quo ante. See pars 4.3.3.2 and 4.4 of chapter 4. 
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The employer has accordingly retained its decision-making power, albeit in a more 
restricted or limited form. 91 This makes further restriction of its decision-making power 
through contractual or statutory provisions or collective bargaining92 possible. It, 
however, also makes the lessening or even the total removal of these restrictions 
through future statutory provisions or collective bargaining93 possible. 
Collective bargaining is, from an employer's perspective, possibly the most acceptable 
method of regulating its decision-making power. Unlike legislation which constitutes the 
unilateral regulation of matters by the legislature, 94 collective bargaining is underpinned 
by voluntarism.95 The employer can bargain about the matters which should be 
included in a collective agreement and the extent to which they should be regulated. It 
also retains a say in the matters so regulated. 
However, collective bargaining as a method to regulate employer prerogative is 
inextricably linked to the strength of trade unions. Anstey suggests that worldwide, trade 
911n George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 /W 571 (IC) the industrial court also made the 
point that the employer's decision-making power has not been totally alienated from it but that it has been 
"eroded or reduced" (at 583B) or "restricted" or "limited• (at 5830). 
92see s 1 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (as amended by clause 1 of schedule 5 to the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995) in terms of which collective bargaining parties may agree on terms more 
favourable for employees than those stipulated in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. 
931n terms of s 1 (3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (as amended by clause 1 of schedule 5 to 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995) an employer and trade union may collectively agree to terms less 
favourable for employees than the minima stated in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act. Clause 1.3 of 
chapter D of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment Standards Statute published as 
notice 156 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17002 of 23 February 1996 proposes that a collective agreement 
may automatically vary any employment standard except a fundamental right (such as the prohibitions on 
child labour and discrimination, protection against employer abuse through, for instance, the imposition of 
fines, and automatically unfair dismissals) and a right which requires ratification for variation (such as, for 
instance, sick pay rights and maternity rights). For a discussion of the Green Paper and its effect on collec-
tive bargaining, see Halton Cheadle, PAK le Roux, Oive Thompson and Andre van Niekerk Current Labour 
Law 1996: A Review of Recent Developments in Key Areas of Labour Law (1996) 5-6. 
94Strlctly speaking, this description of legislation may no longer be correct in view thereof that the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 is the result of debate and negotiations by the State, labour and business at NEDLAC 
(for a discussion of these negotiations, see D du Tait, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S 
Christie The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (1996) 26-32). In future, all labour legislation will be dealt with in 
this way (sees 5(1)(b) and (c) of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council Act). Although 
labour legislation will still be imposed unilaterally by the legislature, it constitutes the results of negotiations 
by the three main interest groups in Industrial relations. 
95see par 4.2.1 of chapter 4 where It is indicated that the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not regulate a 
duty to bargain collectively. 
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unions seem to be diminishing in numerical strength.96 Nevertheless, it appears that this 
tendency is not evident in South Africa. 97 It is suggested that trade unions will remain a 
bargaining force to be reckoned with for the foreseeable future and that their numerical 
strength may even increase. In its annual report for 1995, the Department of Labour 
intimated that it expected trade union membership to show more growth, particularly in 
the Government, agricultural and domestic sectors, as well as in the rural areas, as these 
sectors are at present relatively unorganised.98 Other factors which could have a posi-
tive influence on future trade union membership are the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
which provides that trade unions can register by following a more simplified registration 
process99 as well as the fact that the Act will apply to a far wider range of workers. 100 
It is suggested that workplace forums will not really impact on the role of trade unions 
and collective bargaining in the restriction of employers' decision-making power. A work-
place forum's purpose is not to undermine collective bargaining but rather to supple-
ment it.101 In practice, however, it appears that a workplace forum is actually sub-
ordinate to collective bargaining. The establishment of a workplace forum is effected by 
a representative trade union 102 and its powers and functions are either regulated in a 
collective agreement or by chapter V of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.103 In addition, a 
96see Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Anal-
ysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 386-388 
where he discusses the decline in trade union membership and collective bargaining in Britain. See further 
his discussion on the decline of trade unions in the USA (at 391 ), the Netherlands (at 394-395) and Poland 
(at 396). Anstey also points out that other European countries such as France and Spain, have low trade 
union membership figures (at 392). He indicates that in South America, only about 50% of the working pop-
ulation is in formal wage employment of which 30% are unionised (at 400). Trade unionism, however, has 
grown in Taiwan and South Korea (at 397). In South Korea, the growth can be ascribed to greater political 
awareness and a push for democracy (at 398). In Taiwan, it is ascribed to a climate of liberalisation (at 
398). 
97 See Mark Anstey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise Participation: A Comparative Anal-
ysis of Change in the South African Labour System PhD thesis University of Port Elizabeth (1997) 374 
where he states that, • ... trade union density is high (at least 50 persent) in the engine room of the economy, 
leaving union strength powerful in a strategic sense although it is relatively weak in terms of representing 
the whole of the economically active population·. 
98see page 14 of the Annual Report 1995: Department of Labour RP 101 /1996. 
99see chapter VI of the Act which regulates the registration of trade unions and employers' organisations. 
1 OOsee s 2 in terms of which only members of the Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the 
South African Secret Service are excluded from the Act. · 
101 See pars 4.3.1 as well as par 4.4 of chapter 4. 
102see pars 4.3.2 and par 4.4 of chapter 4. 
1031bid. 
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representative trade union may effect the dissolution of a workplace forum by requesting 
a ballot to dissolve the forum.104 Furthermore, as long as the establishment of work-
place forums is statutorily linked to trade union representativeness, 105 their existence is 
dependent on the strength or bargaining power of trade unions. 
It is also foreseen that matters listed in ss 84 and 86 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 
which are regulated in a collective agreement will not be relinquished by a trade union to 
a workplace forum even though it may effectively control the forum.-106 A representative 
trade union's bargaining power is stronger than that of a workplace forum. It is not 
prohibited from invoking agreed dispute resolution procedures as is the workplace 
forum.107 The union also has different forms of economic pressure at its disposal.108 A 
trade union may, however, consider effecting the establishment of a workplace forum if it 
is unable to reach consensus with the employer during collective bargaining about the 
matters listed in ss 84 and 86 or the renegotiation of these matters. This m_ay be a partic-
ularly viable option in regard to the matters listed in s 86 for joint decision-making. 
Nevertheless, even if no workplace forum is established, it is foreseen that employers 
may no longer be able to deal unilaterally with any of the matters listed in ss 84 and 86 of 
the Labour Relations Act, 1995. The statutory listing of these matters for consultation or 
joint decision-making by workplace forums may cause trade unions to regard them as 
matters fit for collective bargaining. 
Also of importance is that the matters listed for consultation and joint decision-making 
with workplace forums in ss 84 and 85 respectively are not all employment matters.109 A 
number of them actually relate to the business component of an enterprise.110 Their 
inclusion may be indicative of the legislature's view that essentially all decisions by an 
employer, including those that do not impact directly on employees and their job security 
104see s 93(1) a~ well as par 4.4 of chapter 4. 
1 OS see s 80(2) read with the definition of a representative trade union in s 78(b) of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995. 
106see pars 4.3.2 and 4.4 of chapter 4. 
1071n the case of consultation and matters that must be jointly decided (see ss 85(4) and 86(4) as well as 
pars 4.3:3.1, 4.3.3.2 and 4.4 of chapter 4). 
1 OSsee chapter 6 where the exercising of trade unions' economic power is discussed. 
109see pars 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 of chapter 4. 
11 Osee par 1.2 of chapter 1 where the distinction is made between the human resources component and 
the business component of an enterprise. 
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should, at the very least, be made subject to consultation with them. The rationale is that 
increased worker participation in the running of the workplace would increase produc-
tivity and so promote the country's competitiveness in the international economic 
market.111 In practice, however, it has resulted in a number of an employer's decision-
making powers regarding the business aspect of its enterprise no longer being free from 
a certain degree of interference by employees operating through workplace forums or by 
trade unions insisting on bargaining about these matters. 
Another factor which may in future play an important role in the restriction of the 
employer's decision-making power is the proposed introduction of equity legislation 
aimed at eradicating all forms of discrimination in the labour market. 112 Such legislation 
will be in accordance with the anti-discriminatory 113 and affirmative 114 action provisions 
of the Constitution.115 It will centre in a ban on unfair discrimination in hiring, promotion, 
training, pay, benefits and retrenchment. 116 It will also regulate measures- to encourage 
affirmative action programmes.117 
It is foreseen that such equity legislation will have an enormous impact on the employer's 
decision-making power. For instance, it will impact on its right to select and appoint new 
employees. In addition, all its decisions regarding a particular employee, including mat-
ters such as promotion, training, renumeration and the providing of benefits, will have to 
be taken after due consideration of the other employees in the establishment in order to 
111 See par 4.3.1 of chapter 4. 
112see the foreword to the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment and Occupational 
Equity Statute published as Notice 804 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996. 
113see s 9(1) which states that everybody is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. See s 9(3) which provides that the State may not unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on grounds such as race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
114see s 9(2) which makes provision for affirmative action programmes. 
115see s 9( 4) of the Constitution which stipulates that national legislation must be enacted to prevent or 
prohibit unfair discrimination. 
116see clause 1.1.5.1 of chapter 1 of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment and 
Occupational Equity Statute published as Notice 804 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996. 
117 See clause 1.1.5.2 of chapter 1 of the Green Paper: Polley Proposals for a New Employment and 
Occupational Equity Statute published as Notice 804 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996. 
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ensure that its decisions do not constitute unfair discrimination against the particular 
employee or against the other employees. 
The manner of enforcement of the provisions of such legislation is not clear. The Green 
Paper dealing with the proposed equity legislation 118 makes provision for a Directorate 
of Equal Opportunities.119 The Directorate will guide the process of policy formulation 
and implementation.120 It will do this by developing codes of good practice, 121 setting 
up a system of consultation with stake holders with a view to nurturing social partner-
ship, 122 examining the practices of employers, 123 establishing performance indicators 
and timetables to assess 124 and establishing machinery for the collection and collation 
of data from the relevant employers.125 In addition, the Green Paper makes provision 
for a Labour lnspectorate.126 It will undertake monitoring and enforcement activities. In 
the course of inspections, it will ensure that employers make the required returns of data 
and plans. It might also ensure that employers have complied with appropriate measures 
regarding hiring, training, promotion and transfers.127 The Green Paper, furthermore, 
makes provision for the resolution of disputes regarding anti-discrimination and employ-
ment equity aspects.128 It suggests that the Commission must endeavour to resolve 
such disputes 129 and, if it is unsuccessful, the dispute may be referred to the labour 
court.130 
11 Bsee chapter 5 of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment and Occupational Equity 
Statute published as Notice 804 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996. 
119see clause 5.3. 
120see clause 5.3.1. 
121 See clause 5.3.2.1. 
122see clause 5.3.2.2. 
123see clause 5.3.2.3. 
124see clause 5.3.2.4. 
125see clause 5.3.2.5. 
126see clause 5.4. 
1271bid. 
12Bsee clauses 5.6 and 5. 7. 
129see clause 5.6. 
130see clauses 5.6.2 and 5. 7. 
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In the interim, provision has been made in Schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act, 
1995131 for the protection of employees and even applicants132 for positions against 
unfair discrimination on arbitrary grounds by employers. 133 Schedule 7 also brands the 
unfair conduct of the employer relating to promotion, demotion or training of an 
employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an employee as an unfair labour prac-
tice. 134 However, it does allow employers to adopt or implement affirmative action 
programmes 135 and to discriminate if such discrimination is based on an inherent 
requirement of the particular job.-136 
The Constitution's impact on an employer's prerogative will be extensive.137 This is par-
ticularly true with regard to the Bill of Rights contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
The Bill of Rights binds the legislature 138 and the latter will accordingly have to take 
those provisions into consideration when drafting labour legislation.139 The Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 was drafted with due consideration of the Constitution's terms 140 
131 During the operation of the Labour Relations Act, 1956, the industrial court had occasion to consider 
allegations of unfair discrimination in the workplace on a number of occasions. See, for example, SA 
Chemical Workers Union & Others v Sentrachem Ltd (1988) 9 IW 410 (IC) at 429F and Sentrachem Ltd v 
John NO & Others (1989) 10 ILJ 249 0N) at 259C-D (discrimination based on race), George v Western 
Cape Education Department & Another (1995) 16 ILJ 1529 (IC) at 1544J-1545B-C and Association of 
Professional Teachers & Another v Minister of Education & Others (1995) 16 /W 1048 (IC) at 1076-1084 
and 1090F-G (discrimination based on gender and marital status). Nevertheless, compared to the dis-
criminatory nature of the society within which the industrial court operated, the number of cases which 
came before it were relatively few. 
132see clause 2(1)(a) read with clause 2(2)(a). 
133see clause 2(1)(a). 
134see clause 2(1 )(b). 
135see clause 2(2)(b). The industrial court also indicated in George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 
(1996) 17 /W 571 (IC) at 591 F that one of the values which an employer may fairly take into account is the 
need for affirmative action. 
136see clause 2(2)(c). 
137 See s 2 of the Constitution which stipulates that it is the supreme law of South Africa and that law or 
conduct inconsistent with it will be invalid. 
138see s 8(1) of the Constitution. 
139see also par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
140see the long title of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists as one of its aims the changing of the law 
governing labour relations and for that purpose the gMng effect to s 27 of the interim Constitution. See also 
s 1 (a) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which lists the effectuation and regulation of the fundamental rights 
conferred by s 27 of the interim Constitution as one of the primary objectives of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995. Consider, for Instance, the provisions of the Labour Relations Act. 1995 regarding organisational 
rights (see par 4.2.3 of chapter 4), its provisions regarding the right to strike (see par 6.3.3 of chapter 6) 
and its provisions about unfair dismissals (see par 3.4.3 of chapter 3) and other unfair labour practices. 
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and, as was mentioned earlier in this paragraph, the proposed equity legislation will also 
be drafted with due consideration of these terms.141 
The Bill of Rights also applies to the common law 142 and will undoubtedly impact on the 
common law contract of employment principles and the employer's decision-making 
power in terms of these principles. In addition, the Bill of Rights binds the judiciary 143 
and the Bill specifically states that every court, tribunal or forum will have to promote the 
spirit, purport and object of-the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation and when 
developing the common law.144 In practice, therefore, the Commission as well as the 
labour court, the labour appeal court and the ordinary civil courts will exercise their func-
tions with due consideration of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
It is foreseen that the conventions and recommendations of the International Labour 
Organisation will continue 145 to influence our labour legislation and our courts 146 and in 
this manner impact on employer prerogative, particularly now that South Africa has been 
readmitted to the organisation.147 Van Niekerk summarises the implications of this as 
follows 
[a]s South Africa ratifies more Conventions, our law will increasingly become subject to 
scrutiny by the ILO's supervisory mechanisms. The interpretation of important ILO Con-
ventions will acquire an increased significance ... as the new Labour Court and Labour 
Appeal Court begin interpreting the 1995 LRA. 
141 See also par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
142see s 8(1) which stipulates that the Bill of Rights applies to "all law". 
143see s 8(1) of the Constitution which stipulates that the Bill of Rights applies to the judiciary. 
144see s 39(2) of the Constitution. See also s 3(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which stipulates that 
any person when applying the Act, must interpret its provisions in compliance with the Constitution. See 
also par 3.1 of chapter 3. 
145some of the organisation's conventions and regulations played an important role in South African 
industrial relations. For instance, the law regarding unfair dismissal as codified in chapter VIII of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995 and the Code has its origins in the International Labour Organisation's Recommenda-
tion Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 119 of 1963 and the Termina-
tion of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer Convention 158 of 1982 which the industrial court 
applied when it had to judge the fairness of dismissals in terms of its unfair labour practice jurisdiction (see 
par 3.4.3.1 of chapter 3 where the impact of this recommendation and convention on our law of unfair dis-
missal was discussed). 
146see Association of Professional Teachers & Another v Minister of Education & Others (1995) 16 /W 
1048 (IC) at 1975 and George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1996) 17 /W 571 (IC) at 587-588. 
147see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 48 where they discuss South Africa's readmission. 
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Shortly after South Africa's readmission, it ratified two conventions namely the Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 87 of 1948 and the 
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively Conven-
tion 98 of 1949.148 The Labour Relations Act, 1995's provisions regarding the right to 
freedom of association 149 and organisational rights 150 are in accordance with princi-
ples established in these two conventions.151 It also appears that the proposed equity 
legislation mentioned earlier in this paragraph will have as its basis another important 
convention of the International Labour Organisation namely, the-Discrimination (Employ-
ment and Occupation) Convention 111 of 1957 .152 
In view of all the considerations mentioned in this paragraph, it is foreseen that the 
employer's decision-making power will in future become even more restricted statutorily. 
However, it is foreseen that, as in the past, the statutory interventions will take the form of 
restrictions and not alienations or rescissions. 
From the employer's perspective, the best method to counter the statutory regulation of 
its prerogative will be through collective bargaining. The legislature also favours the 
regulation of workplace matters through collective bargaining and has been actively 
promoting collective bargaining.153 Trade unions also seem to prefer collective bargain-
ing. It is accordingly foreseen that collective bargaining, and not legislation, will be the 
primary mechanism for the restriction of employer prerogative. This is, of course, based 
on the assumption that trade unions retain and even increase their membership. Should 
their membership decline in accordance with international tendencies, 154 legislation will 
replace collective bargaining as the principal mechanism for the restriction of employer 
148see D du Toit, D Woolfrey, J Murphy, S Godfrey, D Bosch and S Christie The Labour Relations Act of 
1995 (1996) 48. 
149see par 4.2.2 of chapter 4. 
1 SOsee par 4.2.3 of chapter 4. 
151 This is in accordance with s 1 (b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 which provides for the effectuation 
of obligations incurred by South Africa as a member of the International Labour Organisation. 
152see the foreward of the Green Paper: Policy Proposals for a New Employment and Occupational Equity 
Statute published as Notice 804 of 1996 in Government Gazette 17303 of 1 July 1996. See also JV du 
Plessis, MA Fouche, B Jordaan and MW van Wyk A Practical Guide to Labour Law 2 ed (1996) 338-339. 
153see par 4.2.1 of chapter 4. 
154see the discussion earlier in this paragraph about international tendencies regarding trade union mem-
bership. 
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prerogative. With this possibility in mind, employers' participation in negotiations at NED-
LAC about future labour legislation takes on added significance.155 
1551n future, all labour legislation will be debated and negotiated by the State, labour and business at NED-
LAC (sees 5(1)(b) and (c) of the National Economic, Development and Labour CouncU Act). For an evalua-
tion of NEDLAC's future prospects, see Mark Anst.ey Corporatism, Collective Bargaining, and Enterprise 
Participation: A Comparative Analysis of Change In the South African Labour System PhD thesis University 
of Port Elizabeth (1997) 359-379. 
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